Indian Defence Review

Counter-Insurgency Operations in Nagaland      

By the beginning of 1953, situation in Nagaland had turned volatile. Phizo toured the district and exhorted the people not to pay taxes. Assam Rifles men were ambushed and killed, government buildings and houses of loyal Nagas were set on fire, telephone lines were cut and bridges destroyed. One of the worst acts of violence, which took place in November 1954, was the massacre of fifty seven villagers of Yimpang by men of Pangsha village in Tuensang area in retaliation of the murder of a dak runner, who was the son of the village headman of Pangsha.

Click to buy: Lost Opportunities

The massacre was attributed to the Indian Army in a charge sheet produced by Phizo’s followers and was widely circulated by Rev Michael Scott, about whom enough has been said earlier.

The army patrol had mistakenly taken Haralu as a hostile. The insurgents made much of the incident to show the army as trigger-happy.

Nehru in Parliament refuted the charges; while refuting he said that the massacre had nothing to do with any of the Indian security forces, which were not present there at all. The incident highlights the extent to which Phizo and his followers could manipulate and distort facts.34

Recourse to Force

As raids and ambushes, particularly in Tuensang Division, continued despite the induction of more platoons of Assam Rifles and one battalion of the UP Special Armed Constabulary, it was decided to call in the army. In keeping with the understanding that the rebels are fellow citizens, the Chief of the Army Staff issued an Order of the Day in 1955: “You must remember that all the people of the area in which you are operating are fellow Indians – – – and the very fact that they are different and yet part of India is reflection of India’s greatness.

Some of the people are misguided and have taken to arms against their own people, and are disrupting the peace of the area.

Some of the people are misguided and have taken to arms against their own people, and are disrupting the peace of the area. You are to protect the mass of the people from these disruptive elements. You are not there to fight the people in the area, but to protect them. You are fighting only those who threaten the people. You must, therefore do everything possible to win their confidence and respect and help them feel that they belong to India.”35

Troops of 181 Independent Infantry Brigade under Brigadier Sukhdev Singh, VrC were the first to move to Nagaland. The move began in July 1955 and by February 1956, all the four battalions of the brigade had moved to Nagaland. Two more brigades, 201 Infantry Brigade and 192 Infantry Brigade under Brigadiers Ram Singh and Niranjan Prasad, were moved to Mokokchung and Kohima sectors respectively.36 With the induction of additional formations, Major General RK Kochar was appointed GOC Naga Hills and Tuensang in April 1956.

Siege of Kohima

By 1956, the rebels had formed the FGN; simultaneously a military wing called the Naga Home Guard was formed. The rebels armed themselves with arms and ammunition from the dumps left behind by the British and Japanese forces after the World War II. The hostiles attacked Kohima from three different directions on June 10, 1956. They cut off telephone lines and electricity37 and besieged the town for nearly three days when Kohima remained cut off from rest of India and the greater part of the village remained under hostile control. Phizo had given instructions to assassinate men like Jasokie, who were moderate leaders. They were given protection inside army camps till Kohima was cleared of hostiles.38

In the early days of the counter-insurgency operations, the army suffered heavy losses.

On June 14 the hostiles under Kaito Sema had a marked success when they ambushed and killed Lt Col JR Chitins, commanding officer of 1/3 GR near Zunheboto. Chitnis had, in April 1956, busted the headquarters of Kaito in Satakha area and had inflicted heavy casualties on the Semas.39 Chitnis was the first officer recipient of Ashoka Chakra Class I in the Naga Hills. Army reinforcement were called forcing the hostiles to lift the seize and withdraw.

Initial Losses

Increased militant activities forced the government to declare Naga Hills as Disturbed Area. By the end of 1956 the army had recovered or captured large quantities of arms and ammunition at the cost of 135 killed and 442 wounded. This was a heavy price to pay for not firing first and lack of experience in fighting a guerrilla war.40

The grouping was intended to break the supply and intelligence network of the hostiles. It did have a positive effect on the counter-insurgency operations in the short term.

In the early days of the counter-insurgency operations, the army suffered heavy losses. In one of the worst setbacks, a road protection party of 9 PUNJAB was ambushed by hostiles on April 1, 1957 on road Kohima-Jaluke. 32 men were killed. It was a grievous blow, but the units were learning fast; counter-ambush drills were perfected, convoy protection was better organised and greater emphasis was laid on minor tactics and the use of ground.

The Unfortunate Killing of Haralu

An unfortunate incident took place on July 2, 1956, which was to have far reaching effect on how the army conducted operations. Dr. Haralu, a respectable old doctor was killed by a patrol of the army in the early hours of that day.41 The army patrol had mistakenly taken Haralu as a hostile. The insurgents made much of the incident to show the army as trigger-happy.

The killing of Dr Haralu overshadowed the brutal killing of Sakhrie by the followers of Phizo. Nehru made a statement in the Parliament regretting the incident. The killing highlighted the difficult terms of engagement under which troops were operating.

Grouping of Villages: The Indian Experience in Naga Hills

During the period 1957-59, a number of measures, both military and political were taken to persuade the hostile Nagas to give up their struggle. One such measure was the grouping of villages that was adopted in early 1957. The villagers were allowed to go out during day and cultivate their fields under escort but had to return to the barricaded villages before nightfall. The grouping was intended to break the supply and intelligence network of the hostiles. It did have a positive effect on the counter-insurgency operations in the short term.

Another step taken by the civil administration was to raise a force of Naga militias or village guards, who knew the ways of the hostiles. The government armed them with muskets and rifles and supplied them uniforms.

But a large number of villagers were separated from their land and immediate surroundings around which their lives were built. Mr BN Mullick, the Intelligence Bureau Chief, who exercised considerable influence on the formulation of policy for the administration of frontier areas because of his proximity with Nehru, supported the grouping experiment wholeheartedly.

In his assessment the grouping of villages was enough to break their (Nagas) spirit of defiance, if there was any.”42 But there are others who hold the view that the grouping produced more hostiles and added to their rank rather than breaking their spirit of defiance

Raising of Village Guards

Another step taken by the civil administration was to raise a force of Naga militias or village guards, who knew the ways of the hostiles. The government armed them with muskets and rifles and supplied them uniforms. The chiefs and headmen controlled the force. The hostiles considered them a greater threat than the army columns.

Even as the government took military and political initiative concurrently, violence continued sporadically. The Naga insurgency was far from being subdued. Army continued to operate aggressively.

There were several cases where the militia fought the rebels, and though there were a few cases of betrayal, on the whole they acquitted themselves well.43

Political Initiative: Creation of Naga Hills–Tuensang Area

The separation of Naga Hills district from Assam and forming it into a separate administrative unit along with Tuensang sub division of NEFA with effect from December 1, 1957 and placing it under the MEA to be administered by the Governor was a timely political initiative, which compromised the influence of secessionists amongst the Nagas. This was all the more important for the announcement of the separation from Assam and creation of an enlarged district as it came soon after a resolution was passed by the Naga People Convention held at Kohima in August 1957 and attended by 4,000 delegates and their supporters, opting for a settlement within the Indian Union, which substantially nullified the resolution of plebiscite adopted earlier by the NNC convention held in 1951.44

Even as the government took military and political initiative concurrently, violence continued sporadically. The Naga insurgency was far from being subdued. Army continued to operate aggressively. Large number of hostiles surrendered in 1957 and 1959. Their numbers had been greatly reduced but the hostile Nagas proved to be skilful guerrilla fighters and retaliated by ambushing army patrols whenever opportunity came their way.

The JCO, despite his injury due to hostile fire, led his men to the hostile hideout and killed three of them. He was posthumously awarded the Ashoka Chakra Class I”¦

Nari Rustomji in his fascinating book ‘The Imperilled Frontiers’ wrote: “ it was soon a matter of doubt as to who was softening whom. It will serve no purpose to revive old memories, but it is recognised to everybody’s shame, that it was the darkest chapter in the history of Naga Hills. – – – Fierce and relentless revenge was the main motivating force during the black and senseless period.”

Action at Purr and Downing of the Air Force Dakota

Although the strength of hostiles had been considerably reduced by relentless army operations, the guerrillas were still capable of raiding isolated army posts in inaccessible areas. They actually attacked Purr, an isolated post, some 166 km from Kohima, located at the northern tip of a high mountain range running North to South and parallel to the international border with Myanmar.

The hostiles encircled the post with about 500 men of whom 125 were armed with three light machine guns and rifles of sorts and the rest with traditional weapons such as spears, bows and arrows and daos. They opened fire early in the morning of August 25, 1960 and kept it up throughout the day. They had destroyed the three bridges on the Tizu and placed 20 men on each to prevent reinforcement reaching the post, which was occupied by approximately 100 men. The firing continued the next day when they came to within few yards of the post, but withdrew when fired upon by the defenders of the post In the afternoon of the next day, two Dakotas dropped supplies, which fell into the hands of the hostiles.

The Dakotas flew very low and one of them crash-landed between Meluri (near Purr) and Laphori, another small village to the east of Meluri. The ill-fated Dakota was hit by ground fire by the hostiles,46 which forced it to land in a paddy field. It was piloted by Flight Lieutenant Anand Singha and had a crew of eight airmen. The pilot and the crew were captured by the hostiles and taken to their camp, where they were treated well. The defenders fought bravely till reinforcement from 4 Sikh Light Infantry arrived. Early on 28 August, five IAF fighters strafed the hostile positions inflicting heavy casualties, which forced them to lift the siege.47

Operations by the Assam Rifles

The depredations of the Naga hostiles included arson, loot and murder. There were a number of ambushes on road Kohima-Imphal. The Assam Rifles had a number of successful operations in 1960-61. In April 1961, in a memorable action against the hostiles, Subedar Kharka Bahadur Limbu of 8 Assam Rifles laid down his life while raiding a hostile camp in a jungle ravine, which was barricaded by a long palisade covered by bamboo stakes.