Indian Defence Review

There is also some confusion created by the use of the term informationized warfare (xinxihua zhanzheng) instead of IW (xinxi zhanzheng).9 However, there is no ambiguity in the manner in which the Chinese view information operations:¹⁰

• Intelligence operations, which include intelligence reconnaissance and protection.
• Command and control operations to disrupt enemy information flow and weaken his C2 capability while protecting one’s own.
• Electronic warfare by seizing the electromagnetic initiative through electronic attack, electronic protection and electronic warfare support.
• Targeting enemy computer systems and networks to damage and destroy critical machines and networks and the data stored on them.
• Physical destruction of enemy sources like information infrastructure such as C4ISR through the application of firepower.

The Chinese call their pursuit of information warfare and other hi-tech means to counter the overwhelmingly superior conventional military capabilities of the Western Alliance “acupuncture warfare”, a term that first surfaced in a 1997 PLA National Defence University publication entitled “On Commanding Warfighting under High-Tech Conditions”.11 Acupuncture warfare (also called “paralysis warfare”12) was described as “Paralysing the enemy by attacking the weak link of his command, control, communications and information as if hitting his acupuncture point in kung fu combat.” Acupuncture warfare is a form of asymmetrical warfare dating back to the teachings of Sun Tzu, China’s pre-eminent military strategist from the 5th century BC. For quite some time now the PLA has been simulating computer virus attacks in its military exercises.

According to a US Congressional Research Service report entitled “Cyberwarfare”, authored by Steve Hildreth, China is developing a strategic information warfare unit called “Net Force” to neutralize the military capabilities of technologically superior adversaries.13 This new information warfare unit will “wage combat through computer networks to manipulate enemy information systems spanning spare parts deliveries to fire control and guidance systems.” The PLA’s research into the theoretical aspects of information warfare is fairly advanced and it is well on its way to developing a coordinated and integrated information warfare doctrine.

Chong-Pin Lee, Vice Chairman of Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council, says Beijing is re-directing its emphasis away from nuclear deterrence to this new asymmetrical strategy and its “overarching purpose is to deter the United States from intervening around China’s peripheries and to seize Taiwan with minimum bloodshed and destruction.”14 In another five to 10 years China will develop depth and sophistication in its understanding and handling of information warfare techniques and information operations. With Indian society becoming increasingly dependent on automated data processing and vast computer networks, India will also become extremely vulnerable to such information warfare techniques. The fact that it can be practiced from virtually any place on the earth even during peacetime makes acupuncture warfare even more diabolical. India can ill-afford to ignore this new challenge to its security.

Defence analysts Timperlake and Triplett have written that economic, political and social systems are essentially unprotected against Chinese information warfare attack. In their view, China has adopted a comprehensive strategy to further its information warfare plans:15 Information warfare has the support of the top PLA brass; the PLA’s best strategists and defence scientists have had extensive open discussions about information warfare; the PLA is conducting military exercises in information warfare; it is expanding its already strong signals intelligence (SIGINT) capability in Cuba; and, the PLA is buying the hardware necessary. As supercomputers require huge capital investments, a strong political and financial commitment is implied. The Chinese are recruiting scientists and technicians and are building related weapons such as high-powered microwave weapons.

The PLA is acutely conscious of its continuing relative backwardness in information technologies. To prepare itself for a conflict with an RMA-ready opponent, China’s military thinkers recommend that China must:16 Close the information gap; network all forces; attack the enemy’s C3I to paralyze it; use directed energy weapons; and computer viruses. Physical measures include the use of submarine-launched munitions; anti-satellite weapons; forces to prevent a logistics build-up; and special operations raids. Timothy Thomas, of the Foreign Military Studies Office at Fort Leavenworth, has written about a 1999 “network battle” fought between Chinese and American “hackers after the US bombed the Chinese embassy in Belgrade”.17

Cyberwarfare

Developing cyberwarfare capabilities is seen is presenting a level playing field in an otherwise David versus Goliath scenario as Chinese hardware is no match for the weapons technology fielded today by the US and its allies. Recent cyber attacks directed against Taiwan and the US are indicative of the efforts to develop new techniques, viruses and logic bombs. Information warfare will be crucial in the opening phases of a war aimed at the re-unification of Taiwan or a border conflict with India as it will be important to knock out the adversary’s communications infrastructure by cyber as well as physical means. A private army of young civilian hackers on whom the state can bank during crises is being developed for this purpose besides the employment of regular PLA personnel.18 China is known to have called on its citizens to join this national endeavour and, in about a decade, the world can expect to be confronted with over a million “laptop warriors” who will use China’s rapidly expanding broadband networks to disrupt and even subvert military and civilian computer networks the world over from the safety and comfort of their homes.

Compared with China’s historically reactive stance of luring the enemy in deep and destroying him through strategic defence, the present doctrine is essentially pro-active and seeks to take the battle into enemy territory. It also strives to achieve surprise in a pro-active manner that is demonstrated by new “quick-strike” tactics. The aim is to catch the enemy unprepared in order to inflict substantial damage on strategic targets and disrupt logistics to gain psychological ascendancy. While the land frontier is expected to continue to generate some local tensions, the CMC has identified space and the oceans as the new areas where future conflict might take place.

The Chinese have rejected the doctrine of deterrence as, in their view, it is associated with imperialism, amounts to military blackmail, glorifies the use of force and would be an empty threat if not substantiated by tangible power.19 The “active defence” doctrine also calls for integrated deep strikes a concentration of superior firepower that is to be utilized to destroy the opponent’s retaliatory capabilities by employing long-range artillery, short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) and precision guided munitions. The doctrine emphasizes the effective use of advanced equipment wielded by elite units, with a focus on joint operations. The overall aim in this “limited war under hi-tech conditions” doctrine is to cause heavy attrition and disrupt the enemy’s combat forces and logistics so as to bring about a negotiated end to the conflict or dictate terms if possible.

India should adopt an inter-ministerial, inter-departmental, inter-Services, multi-agency approach to dealing with emerging cyber warfare threats and must develop appropriate responses. A nodal agency must be nominated to spearhead India’s cyberwar effort. The armed forces must be part of this effort from the very beginning so that emerging tactics, techniques and procedures can be incorporated into doctrine and training. The strategy must be defensive to guard India’s vulnerable assets, such as military command and control networks and civilian infrastructure dependent on the use of cyber space, as well as offensive to disrupt the adversary’s C4I2SR and develop leverages that can be exploited at the appropriate time. With some of the finest software brains in the world available to India, it should not prove to be an insurmountable challenge. This is too important a field to allow the traditional Indian approach digging heads into the sand while waiting for the threat to go away to hold sway and react only when the enemy has reached Panipat and is knocking on the gates of Delhi. In this case, the nothingness of cyberspace connects Beijing and hundreds of other Chinese cities directly with Delhi  and Mumbai, and Kolkata, and Chennai, and Bangalore and Hyderabad…