Military & Aerospace

Capture of Khansama and Ichhamati River
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Not to Scale

Khansama was located East of the Bhuri Tista River, which was a major obstacle for the attacking troops. It was heavily mined on three sides and well fortified with shell-proof bunkers. The position was strongly held by Pak troops with a group of 48 Punjab consisting of 153 Regulars and 78 Razakars. Apart from its normal complement of automatic weapons it was supported by field and medium artillery, 82 mm Mortars and heavy machine guns. The enemy had also made full use of the built-up area of Khansama to strengthen his defences which had been very well coordinated.

On 11 December, 21 Rajput was ordered to capture Khansama, which denied the subsidiary axis to Saidpur, by first light of 14 December. There were 11 Officers, 15 JCOs and 683 OR available in the Battalion and, in addition, the following supporting arms were allotted to them:–

• Armour – 7 x PT-76 tanks.

• Artillery

– In direct support – 983 Mountain Battery.

– In Support – 98 Mountain Regiment less 983 Mountain Battery.

– Air – Two sorties of Hunter aircraft on 13 December.

Based on reconnaissance carried out and available information of the enemy, as well as the ground, the crossing site was selected South of Khansama where Dhepa Nala and Atrai Nala join together and run as the Bhuri Tista River. In the prevailing overall situation and keeping the urgency of defeating the enemy at the earliest, particularly when, over the past few days, we had already snatched the initiative from his hands, I was keen on an early attack to press home the advantage we had by now gained by our relentless action.

Orders were given to the Rajputs for capture of Khansama. They planned to attack either by day on 13 December, or, by night 13/14 December. When the plans made by them were, however, discussed on 12 December, it was found that –

  • The flanking attack was being planned very near the river line, thus restricting room for maneouvre.
  • Three companies were to be used in the assault with only one in reserve.
  • Tanks were not being used at all.
  • As the unit was required to check the routes up to a certain point only no information had been obtained about the enemy or about the ground beyond that point.

The unit seemed to be relying on bookish tactical knowledge and also, for some unknown reason, appeared to be hidebound to launching only a night attack, In such an environment, the overall situation and the urgency of defeating the enemy at the earliest because of international pressures had to be taken into account. This was impressed upon the Commanding Officer and remedial measures were promptly instituted, Plans to assault the position from the South-east, or, rear were suggested to him and it was emphasised that a daylight attack would be carried out as it had more advantages.

Ingredients of final outline plan emerging after discussion were:-

  • Securing a crossing place on Bhuri  Tista River by one company by first light 13 December.
  • Ensuring security of Forming-up Plance (Fup) near Govindpur by one company.
  • In Phase 1, capturing initial objective by two companies by 1200 hours 13 December.
  • In Phase 2, capturing subsequent depth objectives by one company by 1300 hours 13 December.
  • In Phase 3, exploitation up to Jahangirpur on the far bank of the Nala running East of Khansama by one company.
  • Using seven PT-76 tanks initially in fire support role and subsequently to block enemy routes of withdrawal South-west of Khansama.
  • Air strike of two sorties at 0900 hours 13 December.

Thus, as planned earlier, 21 Rajput moved back on 12 December from the area of road block and concentrated at Birganj by 2100 hours. ‘C’ Company under Maj MS Malik, moved out at 2300 hours and secured a crossing place on the Bhuri Tista River by 0300 hours on 13 December. Rest of the battalion crossed over as scheduled by 0530 hours and dug in to avoid casualties likely to be caused by enemy shelling. When the complete battalion was on the other side of the river, D Company under Maj RDS Chauhan was sent to secure the FUP 1000 yards South of Khansama near Gobindpur. The Company did not meet any opposition. At 0915 hours on 13 December, our aircraft (two sorties) engaged the objective. But, it did not prove to be of much use as the position was well concealed from air observation. At about 0930 hours, all available artillery fire was brought down on the enemy while our battalion was forming up. The enemy was by now alive to the situation.

At 1000 hours the battalion attack was launched through the enemy mine field, with A company on the left and B Company to its right. Initially the attack progressed with full momentum, but when the situation became clear to the enemy, he gave a determined fight form every bunker and built-up area. Both the companies had received a heavy dose of shelling in the FUP itself and the subsequent attack was required to be executed through the enemy’s well-coordinated and interlocked screen of light, medium and heavy machine gun fire.

At this critical stage of battle, there was every possibility of the attack petering out, but the company and platoon commanders, by their personal example, maintained aggressive spirit amongst the troops and attack proceeded with the desired momentum. Having overrun the first line of enemy defences, the companies had to clear the enemy from the built-up area.

This involved hand-to-hand fighting and decentralisation of control down to section level. During this phase of attack, it was heartening to see some valiant and laudable individual acts of courage and bravery. Phase 1 of the battalion attack was over as per plan by 1200 hours.

The Rajputs then launched their C Company in Phase 2 from the North-east, firstly to clear Khansama from that direction and secondly, to block the enemy’s route of withdrawal. Though A and B Companies had established a strong foot-hold on the initial objectives, C Company had to fight fiercely throughout in the built-up area. By 1330 hours, Phase 2 was completed. During this phase again there were some inspiring individual acts of gallantry.

At 1330 hours, in Phase 3, D Company carried out exploitation up to Jahangirpur under enemy’s intense artillery shelling and through widely scattered nuisance mines.

The fall of Khansama unbalanced the enemy, and he had to denude the defences at Dinajpur in order to either recapture Khansama or reinforce Saidpur. As for us, its capture helped not only in opening a new axis of advance for capturing Saidpur, but also to maintain the momentum of advance.

Capture of Ichhamati River

Not to Scale

12 Raj Rif now took over for the Battle of Ichhamati River.

Saidpur was an important cantonment in East Pakistan; and Ichhamati River was a major obstacle across the line of advance of our Brigade from Khansama to Saidpur. The enemy had prepared strong and well fortified defences along this river. These defences consisted of two well co-ordinated and mutually supporting company defended localities – one at Ichhamati and the other at Kharkaria, approximately 1000 yards to the East held by two companies of 48 Punjab under the second-in-command of the battalion. (This last fact came to light only after the battle had started). This was the enemy’s last defensive position before Saidpur, on axis Pachagarh – Saidpur. He, therefore, made a last ditch stand here and fought tenaciously. Hand-to-hand fight at this position and the casualties suffered by him are a testimony to the ferocity of the battle that raged here.

After the capture of Khansama on 13 December by 21 Rajput, the battalion was ordered to spearhead the advance of 71 Mountain Brigade Group on axis Khansama-Darwani-Road Junction-Saidpur. The plan was to invest Saidpur from the North-east along this road, and from the East along the Rangpur-Saidpur Road. The battalion was allotted the following troops for its advance:–

• Under Command – ‘D’ Squadron (ad hoc) less two troops,

–  69 Armoured Regiment (7xPT-76 tanks).

• In Direct Support – 98 Mountain Regiment less one battery.

– 54 Mountain Regiment less two batteries.

– Troop 5.5 inch medium guns, ex 46 Medium
Regiment.

• Air – Three close support sorties on demand.

– Air OP(helicopter-borne) on demand.

The advance commenced from area Bridge on Khansama-Darwani Road at 1600 hours on 13 December with A Company 21 Rajput acting as vanguard. No opposition was met till 1400 hours on 14 December. As the leading elements of vanguard and armour emerged from the trees, they came under heavy automatic and anti-tank fire from across the bridge on Ichhamati River. The vanguard immediately fixed the axis and the plan for capture of Ichhamati position was made. From the intensity and type of fire and extent of the enemy deployment it was assessed that he was occupying the position with approximately one company supported by a troop of tanks. The enemy was well entrenched in fortified bunkers and, therefore, a frontal attack was not considered feasible. (This was also confirmed later by the prisoners who were captured and those who surrendered before the battalion at Saidpur.)

A quick attack by the battalion was planned from the North, but they were ordered not to proceed with it for the following reasons:-

Our mountain guns were out of range as they had not yet been able to cross the Bhuri Tista River because our Engineers were still in the process of constructing a floating bridge on it after the capture of Khansama.

Our Air OP had reported the movement of an enemy column in the area of Pakerhat, about 10 km to the South of Ichhamati.

This column was reported to be heading towards Khansama and threatened the Southern flank of the bridge. To counter this movement, I moved 5 Grenadiers who had been placed under command on 14 December to intercept the column and, thereafter, move South along track Pakerhat-Sutipar-Oarwani Railway Station to protect the Southern flank of Raj Rif.

In view of the situation that had arisen, 21 Rajput turned in at Area Mile 10 to obtain detailed information about the enemy dispositions and terrain, and a deliberate attack was planned in two phases as follows:-

Phase 1: Capture Area Bridge by D Company.

Phase 2: Capture Area 13r by C Company.

Reserve: B Company for both phases.

A Company less a platoon was to fix the axis and provide close fire support by observation.

D Squadron less three troops and one platoon ex A Company were to move behind the enemy across Ichhamati River and engage enemy located astride the Bridge and in Area Masjid. Remainder armour was to assist A Company in fixing the axis.

As certain localities could not be seen from the ground, it was necessary to have these registered with the help of Air OP. In addition, time was required for B Company to secure the FUP, which entailed an approach march over difficult and boggy terrain. Keeping these considerations in mind, the H hour was fixed for 1100 hours. However, in view of the speed, required and on my instructions, it was advanced by one hour and fixed at 1000 hours.

The attack was launched by D Company in Phase 1 as scheduled. Enemy offered stiff resistance and fought tenaciously. However, area Bridge was captured intact in a swift action. The ferocity of attack unnerved the enemy so much that he beat a hasty retreat from his depth locality too, to occupy his other position at Kharkharia. Thus, the second phase of attack was not required. However, the Rajputs had to fight another battle at Kharkharia after a short advance, which they did successfully. Even though we lost two tanks, the objectives were captured by the battalion by 1700 hours. Quick and decisive action after the first battalion attack greatly assisted the unit in the capture of this location. Complete surprise was achieved and the enemy was caught off guard.

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It would be of interest to note that besides the lightening speed of attack, a ruse played on the enemy greatly assisted in diverting his attention. A, B and C Companies were moving to their FUPs when a platoon of ‘A’ company was pushed out in assault formation from the firm base and astride the road. This platoon drew heavy automatic fire from the enemy and diverted his attention, besides this, the assault by D Company in Phase 2 astride the road axis had misled the enemy as to the size of the force attacking them. It was later confirmed from the Pakistani Prisoners of War (PsOW) that they had given up the objective for the following reasons:–

Their battalion second-in-command, Maj MA Saeed had been killed.

The initial move of one platoon astride the main axis misled them as to the exact direction of attack; thus, when the attack from the North built up, they were caught off guard.

Assault by one company in Phase 2, astride the axis had misled them as to the quantum of force attacking them and they thought that a whole brigade had attacked them.

They were sensitive to the move of 5 Grenadiers to Darwani Railway Station and could not comprehend what our real intentions were.

The enemy armour coming alive at a late stage caused considerable anxiety to us, especially when the size of our meager armour had already been reduced due to direct hits received by our two tanks resulting in their complete destruction. Our armour was at a further disadvantage because the enemy’s Chaffe tanks had a better gun and extra protection for the crew compared to ours, even though our tanks were more manoeuverble. In this scenario, the capture of a complete troop of Chaffe tanks of Pak 69 Cavalry was no mean achievement. The problems posed by the enemy armour were quickly solved by bold and resolute infantry action, leading to the final capture of this position. 

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4 thoughts on “Capture of Khansama and Ichhamati River

  1. Great read
    But the writer has missed out in mentioning the names of Major S V Singh and Major SB Chillar the A & B Coy Commanders respectively. They were instrumental in the capture of Khansama.
    I , the daughter of Major S V Singh feel proud of her father’s devotion to Duty and his contribution to the Nation
    Kindly check The 21 Rajput Regiment Archives and do the needful
    A soldier should get his due recognition
    Suman Tewatia
    D/o
    Major S V Singh (Retd)

  2. IDR should stop publishing such articles as there is a lot which has already been written about 1965 and 1971 wars.

    We Indians should stop bragging about past achievements and focus more on serious security threat perception that India has in terms of proxy and two front war now. There are serious security gaps in Indian defenses which needs to be plugged fast. If situation escalates and changes swiftly, we may even not have the time that Manekshaw had to prepare for war for 6 to 8 months in 1971.

    • Since the people who are writing the books are hardly the same people as will fight the next war, I dont see how the two are related in any way. Military history and recounting old victories are both important in terms of learning and morale.

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