The Obama administrations declared intent to work towards total elimination of nuclear weapons and curb proliferation through enhanced nuclear security has raised hopes of reversing the armament drive, with lesser incentives for proliferation and arms races.
Nonetheless, going by the evolution of BMD since the 1950s, the nature of technological progress of a twenty- to thirty-year period would very much be within the limits of realistic imagination. As some programmes described below would testify, technologies thought about in the 1960s are being revived for future development with deployment plans of ten to fifteen years from now. Many of the components of Star Wars then thought to be in the realm of science fiction, have since been pursued and achieved, though in limited terms.
Some of the contemporary baseline technologies qualify strongly to become futuristic applications because of their innovative character and creative magnificence. They include concepts such as ABL, Kinetic Energy Interceptor (KEI), and Brilliant Pebbles. These technologies cover a whole spectrum of directed and kinetic energy and space-based applications, which could be futuristic templates. The concept of hitting a ground-based or airborne target from a mobile aerial platform (ABL system) through a laser beam is a futuristic technology which cannot be overlooked, especially because much headway has been achieved by MDA.
Going by the progress made, seemingly only a few technical challenges constrain this programme from fruition. The key challenge is to focus a high-powered beam of light on a rapidly moving target while maintaining its intensity amidst atmospheric absorption and aircraft-oriented jitters before concentrating on a small point for kill.4 Though systems integration of ABL may be proven in upcoming tests, its capability to function under stressful battle conditions may need more strenuous conditioning. This project is, however, now sidelined because of its heavy costs. Yet the technology is futuristic and is likely to rebound into development in the near future, depending on changes in the security environment. This could be replicated in most other directed energy technologies too.
A challenging area for research and development since the 1950s has been the development of requisite kill vehicle technologies. While nuclear and explosive payloads were initially in use, most developers preferred the KKV concept. They are deemed to be more cost-effective as their power depends on the interceptor velocity and mass of the payload. Yet, some KKV projects such as KEI have not found favour. Several current systems, including GBI, SM-3, ABM-3 and THAAD use exo-atmospheric hit-to-kill vehicle (EKV). Unlike directed energy vehicles, KEI is a high-energy, three-stage interceptor that can travel at 19,000 kmph and is meant to target medium-, interim-range ballistic missiles and ICBMs in boost and midcourse phases.5 Highly mobile and transportable in a C-135, the KEI launcher deployment comes with choices of close proximity to the target or as a midcourse interceptor.
Though KEI was considered as replacement for SM-3 in Aegis, huge costs, weight and size limitations led to its rejection. However, the concept of advanced KKVs still remains strong, especially with the revival of the Advanced Technology Kill Vehicle (ATKV) of SDI days. The ATKV is considered for SM-3 Block IIA and is expected to significantly improve the missile’s acceleration and final velocity due to its reduced weight and provide a better suite of sensors than EKV. It can also be improvised as multiple kill vehicle (MKV) by placing a number of KVs on a single interceptor to engage several targets. In fact, MKV is being vigorously pursued as a future template by MDA. As a result, exo-atmospheric kills of the future would involve multiple (independently operating) KVs from a single interceptor that could be effective against MIRVed threats as well as countermeasures.
Notes:
- Some of their noted works include: Nikita Larry and Bertrand de Jouvenel, The Art of Conjecture (New York: Basic Books, 1967); S. Makridakis, “The Art and Science of Forecasting”, International Journal of Forecasting, Vol. 2, 1986; T. Modis, Predictions: Society’s Telltale Signature Reveals the Past and Forecasts the Future (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992); M. Dublin, Futurehype: The Tyranny of Prophecy (New York: Plume, 1989).
- David S. Walonick, “An overview of forecasting methodology”, 1993, at www.satpac.com/research-papers/forecasting.htm.
- Where all other factors, including political environment, remain constant.
- In July 2007, the MDA tested the ABL’s ability to target a missile with tracking beams, to adjust for atmospheric disturbances and to start the high-powered destructor laser sequence. See Global Security Newswire, 31 July 2007, at www.nti.org/d_ newswire/issues/2007_7_31.html#C2278269.
- The system had a successful flight test inSeptember 2006, and was destined to replace SM-3 in the Aegis ships. For more on the KEI, see www.military.com/soldiertech/0,14632,Soldiertech_KEI,00.html.
The spectrum which remains largely out of bounds for BMD experimentation is the space frontier, owing to the global consensus – with some exceptions – against militarization of space and initiatives like the United Nations Outer Space Treaty and PAROS.1 Even during the Cold War, the ABM Treaty largely restricted programmes such as Brilliant Pebbles, as a result of which the space frontier was confined to surveillance, early warning sensors and tracking applications. While these applications would continue in the next decades, there is pressure from sections in the US scientific and military establishment to optimally exploit outer space for BMD applications.2 In fact, an independent group recommended the revival of space-based interceptors of the Brilliant Pebbles-era for layered interception along with a space test bed.3
Though the revival of these projects in the Obama-era is unlikely, the emergent threat from ASAT capability among newer nations such as China, proliferation of long-range missile capability, slow progress in ground-based technologies, etc., could contribute to at least some elements of interception being considered from space-based platforms. That Russia is also seeking to exploit space resources in a formidable manner also reflects the new attention on outer space applications. As a result, a host of advanced tracking and sensor technologies is likely to be developed, especially in low earth orbit, with higher resolutions and tracking capabilities to assist boost and midcourse interception, while deeper-space endeavours might follow in future.
The current geo-political equations show very limited possibilities to reverse this trend despite the influence of various counter- and non-proliferation initiatives like the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR).
For the near future, the US Air Force has been contemplating realistic possibilities of integrating newer interceptors on airborne platforms. This proposal itself is not new as the Air Force had in the 1960s conceptualized an Airborne Ballistic Missile Intercept System (ABMIS) for protection against low-trajectory attacks, through radars and interceptors integrated on specially equipped aircraft on around-the-clock patrols.4 Similarly, the Navy had examined the scope for a midcourse system called the Sea-Based Anti-Ballistic Missile Intercept System (SABMIS), with radars and interceptors mounted on vessels and submarines. While the Navy programme later evolved into the Navy Theatre Wide and the Aegis BMD, the ABMIS is seemingly reincarnated through the ABL programme, though emphasis has been on directed energy kill medium. Considering the costs of laser programmes, and assuming the ABL will be blocked by the Obama administration, the ABMIS concept with KKV interceptors could see a rebirth.
A host of other futuristic projects are also at the conceptualization stage at the MDA. They include the Early Launch Detection and Tracking (ELDT) system, meant to cover tracking gaps in the initial launch seconds; and the Over-the-Horizon Radar (OTHR) meant to pick signals over long ranges for early launch detection.5 Another interesting concept with shades of ABL is the High-Altitude Airship (HAA) – an unmanned airship to carry sensors and tracking systems over hostile areas to detect and monitor launch possibilities. Then there is Project Hercules, which intends to develop robust detection, tracking and discrimination algorithms to help quicker identification and targeting, and the MEMS (microminiaturized electro-mechanical systems) meant to assist the MKV projects are planned future missions.
The brighter side is the radical augmentations in theatre and augmented air defence systems, which in all likelihood would thrive due to their tactical nature and affordability. Driven by newer lower-tier threats especially from non-state actors, a new generation of advanced air defence systems with point and area defence capabilities is on the ascendancy. A handful of these systems are currently in operation and stand out for their technological brilliance. The most noteworthy are Sky Shield and Skyguard. Sky Shield uses a unique 35 mm AHEAD (Advanced Hit Efficiency and Destruction) shell that ejects sub-projectiles on the path of the incoming target, especially aircraft and short-range missiles. Derived from the Tactical High Energy Laser (THEL) programme, the Skyguard (Nautilus) is an air defence system that uses laser cannons to create a protective shield of over 10 km radius over strategic zones like airports, urban areas or force deployments to protect against short-range threats.6
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Another system of this variety is the HAWK Air Defence System,7 – supposedly the world’s most advanced all-weather, medium-altitude air defence system in service since the 1960s. There are other prominent ones of this genre, like the MBDA’s Aster SAMP/T – a limited-TMD system designed to provide point and area defence against lower-tier threats, and Spada 2000 – an all-weather air defence system with a range of up to 60 km and capable of intercepting targets at 25 km while engaging four simultaneously.
The new wave in favour of elimination of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems, though at a slow pace, is likely to derive dividends in the coming decades.
Two variables emerge from these present and futuristic concepts. First, most advanced BMD concepts in vogue are being developed in the US. After the end of the Cold War, Russia lacked the capability to invest heavily in advanced technologies and shifted the focus towards cheaper theatre and air defence systems. But for Russia, Israel and Japan, most other military powers are still working on rudimentary BMD technologies. Second, it is likely that the future course of BMD technology development will be predominantly determined by political factors. While missile and WMD proliferation scenarios will influence future technology concept, political ideologies, especially in Washington, will determine the fate of their development and deployment. Though BMD technologies will endure and might even trigger a new arms race, the momentum for disarmament could also drastically affect the pace of innovation.
Political Paradigms
As mentioned earlier, Political drivers will remain central in the evolution of interception technologies though their influence would vary depending on the character of the strategic environment. Primarily, there are three political drivers that can be analysed in this context: (1) proliferation of WMD/delivery means; (2) impact of BMDs on arms race and stability; and (3) nuclear security environment and deterrence.
Proliferation of WMD/delivery means
The dominant logic of pursuing BMD programmes is the perceivable threat from increasing instances of proliferation of WMD and their delivery systems. According to various assessments, the number of countries with ballistic missile capabilities has risen from nine in 1972 to over thirty in 2008, while those with NBC (nuclear, biological, chemical) capabilities rose from fifteen in 1972 to thirty-five in 2008.8 As the number of countries with delivery-vehicle capabilities increases, it will commensurately reflect in the number of countries pursuing BMDs, which has increased from two in 1972 to around eight in 2009.
The current geo-political equations show very limited possibilities to reverse this trend despite the influence of various counter- and non-proliferation initiatives like the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). Regional conflicts and security dilemmas among states have contributed to this phenomenon. Nonetheless, there is renewed movement towards strengthening non-proliferation instruments to reverse this trend. The new wave in favour of elimination of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems, though at a slow pace, is likely to derive dividends in the coming decades. The Obama administration’s determination to plug holes in the non-proliferation regime could also boost these efforts. If this momentum consolidates and sustains in the next two decades, it could lead to a new security environment favouring steady decline in proliferation.Notes:
- The United Nations Outer Space Treaty, effective since October 1967, provides the basic framework on international space law affirming that space should be reserved for peaceful uses. In late 2000, the UN General Assembly voted on a resolution called the “Prevention of Outer Space Arms Race.” In October 2006, 166 nations voted for a resolution to prevent an arms race in outer space. Israel abstained; the US voted against.
- Besides the Pentagon request for a billion-dollar space-based weapon programme in 2008, the US Joint Chiefs of Staff urge “full spectrum dominance” in space. The 2006 National Space Policy explains that the US will “preserve its rights, capabilities, and freedom of action in space; dissuade others from either impeding those rights; take those actions necessary to protect its space capabilities; and deny, if necessary, adversaries the use of space capabilities hostile to US national interests.”
- Missile Defense, Space Relationship, and the Twenty First Century”, n. 6.
- “Missile Defense: The First Sixty Years”, n. 1.
- Gary Payton, “Advanced Concepts in Missile Defence”, Washington Roundtable on Science and Public Affairs (Washington, DC: George C. Marshall Institute, 12 September 2005).
- A product of US-Israel cooperation, the THEL was conceptualized to deal with the short-range rocket menace from Hezbollah. In July 2006, Northrop Grumman unveiled Skyguard; see www.gizmag.com/go/5868/.
- Development details of the current upgrade, Phase III HAWK, can be accessed at www.raytheon.com/products/hawk/.
- Peppi DeBiaso, “Missile Defense in the Evolving Security Environment”, Office of the Missile Defense Policy, Department of Defense, April 2008. Also see “World Ballistic Missile Inventories”, Arms Control Association Fact Sheet, September 2007, at <www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/missiles>.
Yet this is a complex task, as the initiative has to come from nuclear weapon states to help reduce the security deficit among weaker states, which could reduce incentives for engaging in WMD proliferation. The shift from an offensive to a defensive posture through BMDs could be a catalyst, provided the emphasis on BMDs generates and projects this posture in good measure. Unfortunately, the present evolution of BMDs has produced a contrarian effect, one which postulates competition for interception capabilities that could consequently trigger arms races rather than containment of proliferation.
Development of the US BMD and plans for its deployment abroad has only compounded the security dilemma, not just among states which are targeted, but also among other nuclear weapon states which feel a negation of their nuclear deterrent. States which are supposedly targeted by the US BMD have striven to enhance their deterrent capabilities both of ballistic missiles and nuclear programmes. As a result, there are likely to be more actors getting into missile development.
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