Military & Aerospace

Ballistic Missile Defences in 2030
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Issue Book Excerpt: Asia 2030 - The Unfolding Future | Date : 25 Feb , 2011

Not only can we hit a bullet with a bullet, we can hit a spot on the bullet with a bullet.

–Lt. Gen. Henry A. Obering, Former Director, Missile Defense Agency, USA

History has often shown that a military technological invention could be neutralized or riposted with a countervailing technology that would, if not mitigate its capability; certainly provide an alternative or response to the first technology. Only a handful of military inventions, like nuclear weapons, have escaped this trend; ballistic missiles have not. Right from the days of the German V-2 rockets, major military powers have explored defences against rocketry. Though air defence seemed an immediate answer to ballistic threats, there was always a need to construct a “shield against this sword” even if it implied a metaphorical scenario of “hitting a bullet with a bullet”. A challenging technological endeavour, evolution of interception technologies has been a laborious grind since the initial efforts in the 1940s.

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A host of these baseline technologies are currently under development in major military-industrial bases, notably the United States and Russia. These technologies intend to create various interception, tracking and surveillance applications on ground, sea and airborne platforms, with the space frontier extensively being explored for parking tracking and surveillance machinery. Some have matured and progressed into deployment in limited numbers, while a host of others are at various stages of development. Most of these platforms are expected to pass through greater technology augmentation and upgradation lifecycles in the coming years. In that sense, the next few decades might witness operational maturity of many systems as well as the birth of new interceptor-vehicle concepts, largely influenced by the nature of the emergent nuclear security environment and the scenarios of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their delivery systems.

“¦the two sides agreed on the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of 1972, which banned all forms of missile defences in order to maintain mutual vulnerability. However, both countries continued to pursue ABMs in their bid to gain strategic advantage.

This article attempts to trace the direction of technological evolution in missile defences by the year 2030, and the factors that will shape this evolution. For this technology forecast, however, it is pertinent to analyse the past and current evolution of this technology and its strategic drivers. There are other variables also which merit attention, including the nature of the security environment in 2030, and whether it will merit the existence of ballistic missile defences (BMDs). Of equal interest will be the impact of BMDs in strategic equations, more so on nuclear deterrence.

Evolution of Interception Technology Development

The initial forays into interception technology started with the German Wasserfall, and followed by the Soviets’ Berkut and US projects Wizard and Thumper in the 1940s. Actual work on anti-ballistic missiles (ABM) started with the US Project Plato and the Soviet “A” in the early 1950s.1 Propelled by their nuclear competition, the superpowers competed to develop defences against the other’s longer-range missiles, which resulted in the US’ Nike-Zeus and Nike-X programmes, countered by the Soviets’ A-35 armed with the thermonuclear-tipped Galosh A-350 interceptor.2 Subsequently the US developed the Sentinel and the Safeguard system, deployed by the late 1960s. As this race threatened to destabilize deterrence equations based on Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD), the two sides agreed on the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of 1972, which banned all forms of missile defences in order to maintain mutual vulnerability.3 However, both countries continued to pursue ABMs in their bid to gain strategic advantage.

The need to overcome the strategic stalemate created by MAD was reflected in President Ronald Reagan’s March 1983 speech announcing the Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI) or Star Wars programme in which he called for ABMs that would make “nuclear weapons obsolete” and shift the balance in US favour. The SDI heralded the development of a new generation of baseline BMD technologies and architectural models, many of which are being pursued even today and are likely to be reflected even in the systems of 2030. The SDI’s four-layered architecture called the Strategic Defence System (SDS) consisted of ground-, sea-, space-based and airborne components,4 delineating interception phases of a missile, namely, boost, post-boost, midcourse and terminal – form the fulcrum of contemporary BMD architectures.

Also read: Article 370: The Untold Story

A vast array of systems were planned including space-based sensors and interceptors and various kill mediums consisting of nuclear-tipped, kinetic and directed energy (laser and particle beams). Considering the possibility of collateral destruction created by nuclear warheads, focus shifted to Kinetic Kill Vehicles (KKV) – destroying the warhead through collision (hit-to-kill).

China is known to be developing strategic air defence systems with ABM capabilities, though publicly opposing missile defences.

Significant part of KKV ventures revolved around two programmes: the Smart Rocks, which aimed at huge satellite garages to host a large number of KKVs; and the Brilliant Pebbles, which relied on “singlets” or small, self-contained kinetic interceptors orbiting the space in large numbers.5 The BP was considered more feasible and was to be backed by a constellation of low-orbit satellites called Brilliant Eyes. However, concerns over violation of the ABM Treaty, diminished threats from ICBMs after the Cold War, among others, led to termination of the BP programme, though its space component survived. A series of theatre defence projects were also initiated by SDI, including the Theatre High Altitude Area Defence (THAAD), Patriot (Phased Array Tracking to Intercept of Target), and the Arrow.

The Soviets were not far behind. The Soviets had the first viable ABM system, A-35/A-350 (ABM-1), armed with the Galosh three-stage solid-fuelled interceptor missile, with a range of over 300 km, thus perceivably achieving exo-atmospheric capability as early as 1968.6 After the ABM Treaty, A-35 was deployed outside Moscow consisting of 64 nuclear-tipped Galosh systems. The Soviets upgraded this architecture to ABM-1B and ‑2 in the 1970s,7 and replaced it in the 1980s with A-135 (ABM-3) layered system with both endo- and exo-atmospheric capabilities through the long-range Gorgon (SH-11/ABM-4/51T6)8 and short-range Gazelle (SH-08/ABM-3/53T6). An interesting twist to this competition was the technological strategy the Soviets adopted during the Star Wars years, by shifting the focus to strategic air defence systems with innate ABM capability. In the years to come, Russia thrived on this niche to develop a new generation of strategic air defence systems which, it claimed, were on par with lower-end US BMD systems.

Book_Asia_2030President George Bush (Sr.) initiated the Global Protection against Limited Strikes (GPALS) in 1991 focusing on ground-based defences against limited missile threats and accidental launches.9 President Clinton transformed it to a limited nation-wide defence (NMD) project consisting of ground- and theatre-based interceptors, along with the Airborne Laser (ABL).10 His successor George W. Bush sustained these projects and announced a robust BMD deployment plan by 2004. After withdrawing from the ABM Treaty, he re-designated the NMD programme as Ground-Based Midcourse Defence System (GBMDS), which though could not be declared operational through 2005 owing to consecutive test failures.11 In 2006 many programmes showed signs of optimistic progress, prompting President Bush to plan the first foreign deployment of GBMDS in East Europe.

Notes:

  1. “Missile Defense: The First Sixty Years”, Missile Defense Agency Backgrounder, 15 August 2008, at www.mda.mil/mdalink/pdf/first60.pdf.
  2. A. Karpenko, “ABM and Space Defense”, Nevsky Bastion, No. 4, 1999, pp. 2–47, at http://www.fas.org/spp/starwars/program/soviet/990600-bmd-rus.htm.
  3. Initially, two ABM deployments, one each for the capital and another site, were allowed. The ABMs had to be within a radius of 150 km over designated areas with not more than 100 launchers and six radars. The 1974 protocol to the treaty restricted ABMs to a single area. While the Soviets maintained Galosh coverage over Moscow, the US deployed the Safeguard in Grand Forks, which it closed down in February 1976.
  4. For a detailed analysis of the SDS, see Sanford Lakoff, Strategic Defense in the Nuclear Age (Westport: Praeger Security International, 2008).
  5. From an initial plan for a 4000-strong constellation, the BPPebbles See “Brilliant Pebbles” at <www.missilethreat.com/missiledefensesystems/id.13/system_detail.asp>, accessed 19 October 2009; also see “Missile Defense, Space Relationship, and the Twenty First Century”, Independent Working Group Report, 2009 Report, The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, accessed 15 October 2009. in outer space. was to have over 100,000
  6. “Strategic Defense and Space Operations”, Soviet Military Power 1987, at <http://www.fas.org/irp/dia/product/smp_87_ch3.htm>, accessed 15 October 2009
  7. ABM-2 consisted of S-225 endo-atmospheric interceptor developed during the early 1970s. See www.fas.org/spp/starwars/program/soviet/s-225.htm.
  8. Over 32 Gorgons and over 68 Gazelles are currently deployed around Moscow. For more details on System A-135, see www.missilethreat.com/missiledefensesystems/id.7/system_detail.asp.
  9. “Missile Defense Act of 1991”, Part C of National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993: Conference Report to Accompany H.R. 2100, Report 102-311, US Congress, House of Representatives, 102nd Congress, 1st Session.
  10. See James M. Lindsay and Michael E. O’Hanlon, Defending America (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 2001).
  11. Bradley Graham, “U.S. Missile Defense Test Fails”, Washington Post, 16 December 2004; “US Missile Defense Test Ends in Fiasco”, AFP, Washington, 15 February 2005.

The US BMD plans, however, hit new roadblocks with President Barack Obama, who sceptical on the technology and had vowed to deploy only proven technologies while cancelling the money guzzlers.1 After a heightened debate, Obama withdrew from the East European BMD in September 2009 and instead backed a mobile deployment consisting of Aegis, THAAD and PAC-3 across Europe.

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Avowed to the disarmament cause, Obama perceives BMDs as destabilizing and could desire to curb many technological endeavours that could trigger an arms race. Nonetheless, the pursuit of baseline technologies could flourish, driven by the fact that missile technologies entwined with WMD resources continue to proliferate globally.

The Current Baseline Technological Spectrum

American BMD Pursuits

The current phase of US BMD technology development is an assortment of baseline technologies pursued since the Clinton and Bush years. While some projects were revamped and some terminated, the key ones are at advanced stages of maturity, promising interception capabilities for layered defence. For terminal or theatre defence phase, there are three notable systems – PAC-3, Arrow-2 and THAAD – which have moved into deployment. An improvement of the Patriot air defence system, PAC-3 has a 15 km-plus range at Mach-5 speed and is considered ideal for defence against slower, low-flying missiles.2 Arrow-2, a US-Israeli joint venture, has a higher altitude range (90 km); the two-stage solid-fuel system could intercept at upper segments of Earth’s atmosphere.3 While PAC and Arrow-2 operate as endo-atmospheric systems, the THAAD with a 100-plus km range has extended theatre defence capability to intercept missiles beyond the endo-atmosphere.4

Indian BMD venture is seen as a means to counter Chinese IRBMs supposedly deployed in Tibet, as well as Pakistani missiles.

The flagship project of US BMD is GBMDS, which is being developed to protect against long-range missiles in midcourse. Its primary vehicle, the GBI,5 relies on a variety of satellites and radars (such as Cobra Dane, X-band and AN/SPY-1) for launch warning, tracking, targeting, and discrimination. Bogged by development failures, the project sprung back to life after a successful interception in September 2006, adding to over thirty successful intercepts out of forty-two since 2001. After initial deployment in Alaska and California, the plan is to deploy over 30 GBIs by 2010, and to over 44 by 2013.

Currently, the only operational midcourse system is the Aegis BMD. Formerly known as Navy Theatre Wide, the BMD system integrated on Aegis destroyers forms the foremost sea-based component. Its main interceptor is the Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) with over 270 km range and capability to engage short- to interim-range missiles in their early ascent or descent stage. Aegis has dual functionality of being a first-tier mobile interceptor as well as a forward-deployed early-warning system.6 The long-term plan is to deploy 84 Aegis ships with SM-3. The SM-3 Block I is redesigned to achieve a midcourse and even a boost-phase capability after upgrade to an advanced version, SM-3 Block IIA, undertaken with Japan. The successful intercept of a dysfunctional satellite by SM-3 in February 2008, while declaring its ASAT utility, also validated the interceptor’s capability to engage faster targets.

Among boost-phase technologies, the most visible in terms of innovation is the ABL programme, the world’s first high-energy laser weapon on an aerial platform operating inside Earth’s atmosphere. The system consists of a chemical oxygen-iodine laser (COIL) mounted on redesigned Boeing-747 aircraft.7 The first ABL aircraft rolled out in October 2006; the laser system has undergone a series of ground-based testing before being integrated on the test aircraft. The future of the programme will hang on the results of a crucial in-flight firing test of the laser system sometime in 2010, when the system’s capability to shoot down a boosting missile during flight should be proven.

Also read: India’s quest for anti-ballistic missile defence

Along with these interception technologies, the United States is also deploying a layered sensor network through ground-, sea- and space-based platforms, namely the sea-based X-band radar, Upgraded Early Warning Radars (UEWRs) in California and UK, a Cobra Dane radar in Alaska, and AN/TPY-2 in Japan and Israel – together forming an integrated battle management, command and control and surveillance network. The X-band radar is conducting the world’s sole naval BMD patrol in conjunction with the AN/TPY-2. For space-based sensors, NASA is working on the STSS low-orbit satellites with infrared sensors to track missile launches, midcourse flight and re-entry, and an NFIRE satellite for signature collation assistance. The space-based infrared system (SBIRS), meanwhile, had to be supplanted with the alternative infrared satellite system (AIRSS), due to cost overruns.

Russian BMD Ventures

Post-Soviet Russian BMD architectures, while being as vibrant as those of the US, exhibit a different character. The primary arm of Russian BMDs is their theatre defence platforms which integrate both ABM and air defence roles as operationally compatible components in a comprehensive-tiered architecture. The chunk of Russian forays revolves around S-300, S-400 and the futuristic S-500 programmes. S-300 is developed in two variants, namely, S-300P (SA-10/PMU Grumble) and S-300V (SA-12A Gladiator, SA-12B Giant).8 S-400 (SA-20 Triumf), Russia’s new showpiece air defence system with ABM utility, is an upgrade of S-300 with over 400 km range.9

“¦US BMD expansion that would influence the security calculus of second-tier powers like Russia and China, which in turn will flow down to the third tier of technology-developers like India, Pakistan and Iran, among others.

The system is envisioned for both extended air defence as well as BMD roles with its capability to target short- and medium-range missiles, aircraft and other aerodynamic threats with effective ranges up to 3500 km.10 S-500 is the ambitious project planned to match US midcourse interceptors with an intended exo-atmospheric range of 3500 km. In the post-S‑400 phase Russia would be working on compact and manoeuvrable fifth-generation air defence/ABM systems which “combine the elements of air, missile and space defence for targeting enemy system deeper into space” – implying an intention to gain greater exo-atmospheric capabilities.11

Other Prominent Players

A handful of other countries have made notable inroads in BMD technology development. China is known to be developing strategic air defence systems with ABM capabilities, though publicly opposing missile defences. Known Chinese projects include FT‑2000 and variants of the Hongqi system (Hongqi-2, ‑9, ‑10 and ‑15), assumed to be based on Russian systems such as S-75 and S-300 PMU. Propelled by HQ-9 and HQ-15 missiles, FT-2000 is intended to achieve interception coverage of between 150 and 200 km. Israel also has achieved major milestones in interception technologies. Besides Arrow 2, it has developed a series of strategic air defence systems, namely the Barak anti-ship missile, Spyder, Hawk, Shavit and Nimrod, all with varying augmented air defence capabilities.12

Book_Asia_2030India is the latest entrant with the development of two systems, Prithvi Air Defence Experiment (PADE) and Advanced Air Defence System (AAD) – intended to be deployed by 2015. The project was launched in 2000 to attain an indigenous BMD capability on the lines of Arrow‑2. Though the first interception test on 27 November 2006 was achieved at 50 km range, the project aspires to attain capability for two intercept modes, to hit a target within four minutes at both exo-atmospheric and endo-atmospheric levels. With the 500-plus km Greenpine as its pathfinder, the PAD system is powered by a liquid-fuel first stage and a solid-fuel second stage, and carries active radars. The endo-atmospheric AAD would be a lower-tier air defence system with 15 km range. Its first two tests in December 2007 were declared successful as it managed to intercept the target on both occasions.13

Notes:

  1. See Obama for America, “A 21st Century Military for America: Barack Obama on Defence Issues,” at <www.barackobama.com/pdf/Defense_Fact_Sheet_FINAL.pdf>, accessed 20 March 2009.
  2. PAC-3 is single-stage mobile system with a hit-to-kill capability and can carry 16 missiles at a time. For more on PAC-3, see “Lockheed Martin Patriot PAC-3”, Directory of U.S. Military Rockets and Missiles, at www.designation-systems.net/dusrm/app4/pac-3.htm.
  3. With Mach-9 velocity, Arrow 2 is an endo-atmospheric ABM. It uses an initial burn for a vertical launch, a secondary burn to sustain its trajectory, and destroys missiles through a blast fragmentation warhead. See www.israeli‑weapons.com/weapons/missile_systems/surface_missiles/Arrow/Arrow.html
  4. THAAD entered the manufacturing phase in 2000. A single-stage rocket with thrust vectoring to boost it beyond burnout, THAAD operates in conjunction with the X-band radar. The latest operational test in July 2010 was a success. See www.defenselink.mi/specials/missiledefense/tmd-thaad.html.
  5. GBI, comprising a booster vehicle and an exo-atmospheric kill vehicle (EKV), flies to a projected intercept point upon threat identification. The EKV uses its in-built propulsion and guidance control for final-seconds decisions to acquire the target, perform identification and steer itself to the warhead. See “Testing: Building Confidence”, BMD Fact Book, Missile Defense Agency, 2009.
  6. The Aegis system integrates SPY-1 radar, MK41 vertical launching system and long-range surveillance and tracking system. Together with X-band radar, Aegis can track and engage multiple targets simultaneously.
  7. The aircraft crew operates the laser at altitudes of around 12,000 metres, by flying over friendly territory and scanning the horizon for the plumes of rising missiles. For more on ABL functioning, see A. Vinod Kumar, “Airborne Laser Aircraft Rolls Out”, IDSA Strategic Comments, 6 November 2006.
  8. S-300P is designed to detect, track, and destroy incoming ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and low-flying aircraft. It has been modified several times, the recent variants being S-300PMU-1 (SA-10D) and S‑300PMU-2 (SA-10E Favorit).
  9. S-400 consists of an upgraded S-300 missile, multi-target radar, and observation and tracking vehicles which can simultaneously track and guide missiles to multiple targets. For more on S-400, see www.missilethreat.com/missiledefensesystems/id.52/ system_detail.asp.
  10. On 6 August 2007, Russia deployed the S-400 Triumf air defence system in Elektrostal outside Moscow. See “Russia unveils air defence, eyes U.S. missile shield”, 6 August 2007, at http://in.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idINIndia-28848420070806?sp=true
  11. Statement by Russian Air Force Commander, Colonel General Alexander Zelin; see “Russia working on missile to hit targets in space”, Times of India, 9 August 2007.
  12. Israel is also researching a short-range interceptor called “Iron Dome” and a medium-range interceptor called “Magic Wand”. See www.israeli‑weapons.com/israeli_weapons_missile_systems.html.
  13. “Advanced Air Defence Missile Test-Fired”, The Hindu, 6 December 2007.

BMD in 2030: Technological and Political Paradigms

The previous sections evaluated the evolution of BMD technology to impart a perspective on existing technological templates. This section moves forward to forecast the probable/possible direction of BMD technology through an assessment of hypothetical technological and political paradigms likely to develop in the next few decades that will shape the nature of BMD technologies in 2030.

Technological Paradigms

The longer the period of technology forecast, the greater will be the challenges to predict accurately. Technology futures have often been denoted by imaginative narratives, largely in the realm of science fiction. However, technology forecast has been undertaken through rigorous scientific methods also. Various tools for futures research have been developed by Spyros Makridakis, Bertrand de Jouvenel, T.J. Gordon, T. Modis, M. Dublin, among others.1 They include methods such as Delphi (tacit knowledge), analogy (study of another comparable system), extrapolation (observation from the sample system), statistics (based on variables to be predicted) and causal relations (studying the phenomena). Besides, there are other analytical methods like genius forecasting, simulations, scenario building, cross-impact matrix, decision trees, etc., which are used for futures research.2

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Though these methods have inherent limitations, adapting suitable models for specific cases or an assortment of methodologies can drastically influence and assist forecasts. For example, use of comparatively easier denominators like the study of the system/technology’s evolution and position in the probable/possible “life curve” or the “road mapping” of this evolution can help in forecasting the functional or structural progress of technologies. Often, the key to such approaches towards forecasting lies in identifying the trends, mapping the possible/probable innovations and imagining revolutions on a particular technological construct, an approach this chapter prefers to pursue. While trend identification has been done in previous sections, the task now is to outline the possible or probable route of innovations, potentially influenced by causal relations from political and technological drivers.

The rise of new BMD-armed nations such as India and China might complicate the nuclear deterrence equation in Asia.

Like many military technologies, development cycles of BMD have spanned ten- to twenty-year periods. Hence, one could start with the assumption that most of the baseline technological paradigms in BMD development exist and are not expected to dramatically alter in the next two decades, but for a few systems. This could facilitate easier mapping of the probable/possible route of the technological development process currently underway and identify the potential innovations in their future evolution. As a causal relationship variable, strong political drivers could shape the progress of these developments or radically change their character. However, a focused study of this evolution could also be done in a ceteris paribus approach,3 implying that technological lifecycles would move in predictable phases of conceptualization, development, maturity and consolidation, and that political drivers will not evolve in a manner that will dramatically transform the nature of technological development in a limited period of time. The causal impact of political drivers could, however, be inducted at appropriate levels to infer the possible shifts in the development lifecycles or influences on the conceputalization processes.

For example, in the US pursuits, various development periods like C1, C2 and C3 of the SDI Organization (SDIO) phase or Block I, II and III of the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) phase carried a five- to ten-year development period from conceptualization to development maturity of technology baselines. Yet, most of the matured technologies took an average of ten to fifteen years to complete the development lifecycle before moving into deployment phases. While technological templates remained constant during this period, the nature of decisions on conceputalization or development was influenced by political drivers, including change in the strategic environment and the influence of political leaderships or ideologies. The US BMD development since the SDI years embodies this phenomenon.

While the Cold War dynamics influenced the nature of SDI-era technologies such as Brilliant Pebbles and directed energy programmes, the end of the Cold War and change in dispensation affected only the development programmes, not the technological concepts, many of which continued to be pursued with new nomenclatures. Though political factors such as the ABM Treaty affected the development of space-based interceptors, the concept remained strong as the US continued to vouch for military uses of space platforms. The ABM Treaty, despite being a major political driver, could only block the deployment of BMD systems, but not its continuing research and development.

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Assuming that MDA would take another ten to fifteen years to realistically deploy its contemporary technologies for a comprehensive nation-wide layered defence, the space for the next fifteen years or so after this phase could be devoted to conceptualizing revolutionary BMD models. Here too political drivers could influence and dramatically alter this process. While assuming that the BMD architectures two decades from now could inevitably be advanced manifestations or matured models of the current baselines, the revolutionary innovations expected beyond that period could be compatible with the political environment prevailing at the time. Though imaginative thinking could prevail, technological paradigm predictions of a twenty- to thirty-year period would be as challenging as forecasting political paradigms.

The Obama administrations declared intent to work towards total elimination of nuclear weapons and curb proliferation through enhanced nuclear security has raised hopes of reversing the armament drive, with lesser incentives for proliferation and arms races.

Nonetheless, going by the evolution of BMD since the 1950s, the nature of technological progress of a twenty- to thirty-year period would very much be within the limits of realistic imagination. As some programmes described below would testify, technologies thought about in the 1960s are being revived for future development with deployment plans of ten to fifteen years from now. Many of the components of Star Wars then thought to be in the realm of science fiction, have since been pursued and achieved, though in limited terms.

Some of the contemporary baseline technologies qualify strongly to become futuristic applications because of their innovative character and creative magnificence. They include concepts such as ABL, Kinetic Energy Interceptor (KEI), and Brilliant Pebbles. These technologies cover a whole spectrum of directed and kinetic energy and space-based applications, which could be futuristic templates. The concept of hitting a ground-based or airborne target from a mobile aerial platform (ABL system) through a laser beam is a futuristic technology which cannot be overlooked, especially because much headway has been achieved by MDA.

Going by the progress made, seemingly only a few technical challenges constrain this programme from fruition. The key challenge is to focus a high-powered beam of light on a rapidly moving target while maintaining its intensity amidst atmospheric absorption and aircraft-oriented jitters before concentrating on a small point for kill.4 Though systems integration of ABL may be proven in upcoming tests, its capability to function under stressful battle conditions may need more strenuous conditioning. This project is, however, now sidelined because of its heavy costs. Yet the technology is futuristic and is likely to rebound into development in the near future, depending on changes in the security environment. This could be replicated in most other directed energy technologies too.

A challenging area for research and development since the 1950s has been the development of requisite kill vehicle technologies. While nuclear and explosive payloads were initially in use, most developers preferred the KKV concept. They are deemed to be more cost-effective as their power depends on the interceptor velocity and mass of the payload. Yet, some KKV projects such as KEI have not found favour. Several current systems, including GBI, SM-3, ABM-3 and THAAD use exo-atmospheric hit-to-kill vehicle (EKV). Unlike directed energy vehicles, KEI is a high-energy, three-stage interceptor that can travel at 19,000 kmph and is meant to target medium-, interim-range ballistic missiles and ICBMs in boost and midcourse phases.5 Highly mobile and transportable in a C-135, the KEI launcher deployment comes with choices of close proximity to the target or as a midcourse interceptor.

Book_Asia_2030Though KEI was considered as replacement for SM-3 in Aegis, huge costs, weight and size limitations led to its rejection. However, the concept of advanced KKVs still remains strong, especially with the revival of the Advanced Technology Kill Vehicle (ATKV) of SDI days. The ATKV is considered for SM-3 Block IIA and is expected to significantly improve the missile’s acceleration and final ve­locity due to its reduced weight and provide a better suite of sensors than EKV. It can also be improvised as multiple kill vehicle (MKV) by placing a number of KVs on a single interceptor to engage several targets. In fact, MKV is being vigorously pursued as a future template by MDA. As a result, exo-atmospheric kills of the future would involve multiple (independently operating) KVs from a single interceptor that could be effective against MIRVed threats as well as countermeasures.

Notes:

  1. Some of their noted works include: Nikita Larry and Bertrand de Jouvenel, The Art of Conjecture (New York: Basic Books, 1967); S. Makridakis, “The Art and Science of Forecasting”, International Journal of Forecasting, Vol. 2, 1986; T. Modis, Predictions: Society’s Telltale Signature Reveals the Past and Forecasts the Future (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992); M. Dublin, Futurehype: The Tyranny of Prophecy (New York: Plume, 1989).
  2. David S. Walonick, “An overview of forecasting methodology”, 1993, at www.satpac.com/research-papers/forecasting.htm.
  3. Where all other factors, including political environment, remain constant.
  4. In July 2007, the MDA tested the ABL’s ability to target a missile with tracking beams, to adjust for atmospheric disturbances and to start the high-powered destructor laser sequence. See Global Security Newswire, 31 July 2007, at www.nti.org/d_ newswire/issues/2007_7_31.html#C2278269.
  5. The system had a successful flight test inSeptember 2006, and was destined to replace SM-3 in the Aegis ships. For more on the KEI, see www.military.com/soldiertech/0,14632,Soldiertech_KEI,00.html.

The spectrum which remains largely out of bounds for BMD experimentation is the space frontier, owing to the global consensus – with some exceptions – against militarization of space and initiatives like the United Nations Outer Space Treaty and PAROS.1 Even during the Cold War, the ABM Treaty largely restricted programmes such as Brilliant Pebbles, as a result of which the space frontier was confined to surveillance, early warning sensors and tracking applications. While these applications would continue in the next decades, there is pressure from sections in the US scientific and military establishment to optimally exploit outer space for BMD applications.2 In fact, an independent group recommended the revival of space-based interceptors of the Brilliant Pebbles-era for layered interception along with a space test bed.3

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Though the revival of these projects in the Obama-era is unlikely, the emergent threat from ASAT capability among newer nations such as China, proliferation of long-range missile capability, slow progress in ground-based technologies, etc., could contribute to at least some elements of interception being considered from space-based platforms. That Russia is also seeking to exploit space resources in a formidable manner also reflects the new attention on outer space applications. As a result, a host of advanced tracking and sensor technologies is likely to be developed, especially in low earth orbit, with higher resolutions and tracking capabilities to assist boost and midcourse interception, while deeper-space endeavours might follow in future.

The current geo-political equations show very limited possibilities to reverse this trend despite the influence of various counter- and non-proliferation initiatives like the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR).

For the near future, the US Air Force has been contemplating realistic possibilities of integrating newer interceptors on airborne platforms. This proposal itself is not new as the Air Force had in the 1960s conceptualized an Airborne Ballistic Missile Intercept System (ABMIS) for protection against low-trajectory attacks, through radars and interceptors integrated on specially equipped aircraft on around-the-clock patrols.4 Similarly, the Navy had examined the scope for a midcourse system called the Sea-Based Anti-Ballistic Missile Intercept System (SABMIS), with radars and interceptors mounted on vessels and submarines. While the Navy programme later evolved into the Navy Theatre Wide and the Aegis BMD, the ABMIS is seemingly reincarnated through the ABL programme, though emphasis has been on directed energy kill medium. Considering the costs of laser programmes, and assuming the ABL will be blocked by the Obama administration, the ABMIS concept with KKV interceptors could see a rebirth.

A host of other futuristic projects are also at the conceptualization stage at the MDA. They include the Early Launch Detection and Tracking (ELDT) system, meant to cover tracking gaps in the initial launch seconds; and the Over-the-Horizon Radar (OTHR) meant to pick signals over long ranges for early launch detection.5 Another interesting concept with shades of ABL is the High-Altitude Airship (HAA) – an unmanned airship to carry sensors and tracking systems over hostile areas to detect and monitor launch possibilities. Then there is Project Hercules, which intends to develop robust detection, tracking and discrimination algorithms to help quicker identification and targeting, and the MEMS (microminiaturized electro-mechanical systems) meant to assist the MKV projects are planned future missions.

The brighter side is the radical augmentations in theatre and augmented air defence systems, which in all likelihood would thrive due to their tactical nature and affordability. Driven by newer lower-tier threats especially from non-state actors, a new generation of advanced air defence systems with point and area defence capabilities is on the ascendancy. A handful of these systems are currently in operation and stand out for their technological brilliance. The most noteworthy are Sky Shield and Skyguard. Sky Shield uses a unique 35 mm AHEAD (Advanced Hit Efficiency and Destruction) shell that ejects sub-projectiles on the path of the incoming target, especially aircraft and short-range missiles. Derived from the Tactical High Energy Laser (THEL) programme, the Skyguard (Nautilus) is an air defence system that uses laser cannons to create a protective shield of over 10 km radius over strategic zones like airports, urban areas or force deployments to protect against short-range threats.6

Also read: China’s brazen assertiveness

Another system of this variety is the HAWK Air Defence System,7 – supposedly the world’s most advanced all-weather, medium-altitude air defence system in service since the 1960s. There are other prominent ones of this genre, like the MBDA’s Aster SAMP/T – a limited-TMD system designed to provide point and area defence against lower-tier threats, and Spada 2000 – an all-weather air defence system with a range of up to 60 km and capable of intercepting targets at 25 km while engaging four simultaneously.

The new wave in favour of elimination of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems, though at a slow pace, is likely to derive dividends in the coming decades.

Two variables emerge from these present and futuristic concepts. First, most advanced BMD concepts in vogue are being developed in the US. After the end of the Cold War, Russia lacked the capability to invest heavily in advanced technologies and shifted the focus towards cheaper theatre and air defence systems. But for Russia, Israel and Japan, most other military powers are still working on rudimentary BMD technologies. Second, it is likely that the future course of BMD technology development will be predominantly determined by political factors. While missile and WMD proliferation scenarios will influence future technology concept, political ideologies, especially in Washington, will determine the fate of their development and deployment. Though BMD technologies will endure and might even trigger a new arms race, the momentum for disarmament could also drastically affect the pace of innovation.

Political Paradigms

As mentioned earlier, Political drivers will remain central in the evolution of interception technologies though their influence would vary depending on the character of the strategic environment. Primarily, there are three political drivers that can be analysed in this context: (1) proliferation of WMD/delivery means; (2) impact of BMDs on arms race and stability; and (3) nuclear security environment and deterrence.

Proliferation of WMD/delivery means

The dominant logic of pursuing BMD programmes is the perceivable threat from increasing instances of proliferation of WMD and their delivery systems. According to various assessments, the number of countries with ballistic missile capabilities has risen from nine in 1972 to over thirty in 2008, while those with NBC (nuclear, biological, chemical) capabilities rose from fifteen in 1972 to thirty-five in 2008.8 As the number of countries with delivery-vehicle capabilities increases, it will commensurately reflect in the number of countries pursuing BMDs, which has increased from two in 1972 to around eight in 2009.

Book_Asia_2030The current geo-political equations show very limited possibilities to reverse this trend despite the influence of various counter- and non-proliferation initiatives like the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). Regional conflicts and security dilemmas among states have contributed to this phenomenon. Nonetheless, there is renewed movement towards strengthening non-proliferation instruments to reverse this trend. The new wave in favour of elimination of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems, though at a slow pace, is likely to derive dividends in the coming decades. The Obama administration’s determination to plug holes in the non-proliferation regime could also boost these efforts. If this momentum consolidates and sustains in the next two decades, it could lead to a new security environment favouring steady decline in proliferation.

Notes:

  1. The United Nations Outer Space Treaty, effective since October 1967, provides the basic framework on international space law affirming that space should be reserved for peaceful uses. In late 2000, the UN General Assembly voted on a resolution called the “Prevention of Outer Space Arms Race.” In October 2006, 166 nations voted for a resolution to prevent an arms race in outer space. Israel abstained; the US voted against.
  2. Besides the Pentagon request for a billion-dollar space-based weapon programme in 2008, the US Joint Chiefs of Staff urge “full spectrum dominance” in space. The 2006 National Space Policy explains that the US will “preserve its rights, capabilities, and freedom of action in space; dissuade others from either impeding those rights; take those actions necessary to protect its space capabilities; and deny, if necessary, adversaries the use of space capabilities hostile to US national interests.”
  3. Missile Defense, Space Relationship, and the Twenty First Century”, n. 6.
  4. “Missile Defense: The First Sixty Years”, n. 1.
  5. Gary Payton, “Advanced Concepts in Missile Defence”, Washington Roundtable on Science and Public Affairs (Washington, DC: George C. Marshall Institute, 12 September 2005).
  6. A product of US-Israel cooperation, the THEL was conceptualized to deal with the short-range rocket menace from Hezbollah. In July 2006, Northrop Grumman unveiled Skyguard; see www.gizmag.com/go/5868/.
  7. Development details of the current upgrade, Phase III HAWK, can be accessed at www.raytheon.com/products/hawk/.
  8. Peppi DeBiaso, “Missile Defense in the Evolving Security Environment”, Office of the Missile Defense Policy, Department of Defense, April 2008. Also see “World Ballistic Missile Inventories”, Arms Control Association Fact Sheet, September 2007, at <www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/missiles>. 

Yet this is a complex task, as the initiative has to come from nuclear weapon states to help reduce the security deficit among weaker states, which could reduce incentives for engaging in WMD proliferation. The shift from an offensive to a defensive posture through BMDs could be a catalyst, provided the emphasis on BMDs generates and projects this posture in good measure. Unfortunately, the present evolution of BMDs has produced a contrarian effect, one which postulates competition for interception capabilities that could consequently trigger arms races rather than containment of proliferation.

Click to buy: Asia 2030: The Unfolding Future

Development of the US BMD and plans for its deployment abroad has only compounded the security dilemma, not just among states which are targeted, but also among other nuclear weapon states which feel a negation of their nuclear deterrent. States which are supposedly targeted by the US BMD have striven to enhance their deterrent capabilities both of ballistic missiles and nuclear programmes. As a result, there are likely to be more actors getting into missile development.

Impact of BMDs on Arms Race and Stability

A key factor that could influence the future of BMDs is their potential to trigger a new arms race, especially among the nuclear weapon states. Missile defences, with their inherent capability to negate nuclear deterrence and neutralize offensive forces, create competitions that could affect the existing strategic calculus. The race to construct and deploy BMDs could create a domino effect as states would seek to riposte consequent threats. The response envisaged by various states like China and Russia is to aggressively augment their offensive forces to overwhelm a US BMD shield. This is based on the belief that BMDs are not foolproof defences and hence could be countered through massive attacks, especially with MIRVed missiles. This drive has inspired other states to develop their own BMDs to gain similar advantage.

China is also known to be working on ground-launched compact kinetic-energy and high-energy laser weapons and high-powered microwave weapons for ASAT applications.

While Washington argues that its BMDs are an inherent part of its defensive strategy and are meant to deter “rogue states” with clandestine nuclear programmes and their ballistic missile capability, traditional rivals like Russia sees a US BMD in their neighbourhood as posing a direct threat and also negating the deterrent capability of its nuclear forces, in effect creating a Cuban missile crisis-like situation. As a result, Russia is developing new ICBMs such as Topol-M to overwhelm the US BMD, along with its plan to develop advanced interception capabilities.1 Notwithstanding its opposition to space militarization, Russia is also preparing to augment its capabilities in space, not just to counter the US BMD but also to seek influence and dominance in outer space.2

The same applies to China, which perceives US BMD systems such as GBMDS as space weaponry since they can target assets in outer space.3 China believes BMDs would be a force multiplier to the US nuclear doctrine and in effect negate its nuclear deterrent. For, China believes even a limited US BMD can neutralize its twenty ICBMs capable of reaching the US shores.4 As a result, China is also pursuing various responses which add to the competition. Apart from the primary effort of augmenting its missile inventory, including with MIRVed ICBMs, China is developing ASAT capability along with development of countermeasures.

China is also known to be working on ground-launched compact kinetic-energy and high-energy laser weapons and high-powered microwave weapons for ASAT applications.5 Finally, Beijing has belied its posture of opposing missile defences by demonstrating its BMD capability through an exo-atmospheric interception in January 2010.6 While it was always believed that China has a rudimentary air defence programme with extended theatre defence capabilities, the January 2010 test confirmed Chinese plans to match the US BMD challenge in kind. Like the US, China too perceives the strategic benefits of having twin layers of defensive systems to complement its offensive forces.7

Also read: Future of Aerospace Power

Amidst this great-power race as an inherent feature of BMDs, there are other zones where such domino effects could create instability. For example, the Indian BMD venture is seen as a means to counter Chinese IRBMs supposedly deployed in Tibet, as well as Pakistani missiles. The mere fact that India is developing BMDs could disturb the nuclear calculus in South Asia, with Pakistan worried about the tenacity of its nuclear deterrent. While not exhibiting BMD capabilities, Pakistan with its known skills for clandestine technology development is likely to pursue a counter to the Indian BMD shield, besides enhancing its missile inventory as a natural riposte to the Indian BMD. A similar picture is visualized in the Middle East where countries such as Iran are projecting medium- and longer-range missile capabilities to overwhlem Israeli and US theatre defence systems.

Nuclear Security Environment and Deterrence

Missile defences have a great impact on nuclear deterrence equations. While Russia and China fear their nuclear deterrents being neutralized by US BMDs, Washington perceives BMD as central to its nuclear deterrent strategy. In the US scheme of things, BMD advances deterrence by dissuading countries from pursuing ballistic missiles as it could impose costs on their missiles. It could deter ballistic missile use by denying benefits of an attack and in the process undermine the quantum of its threat. In a comprehensive architecture, offensive forces could increase the risks to an aggressor while defences like BMD would decrease potential gains, thus forcing aggressors to question the utility of their ballistic missiles.

The possibility of an arms race and the concerns raised by China and Russia demand a new equation for a BMD-oriented security environment.

Beyond these rationales, BMDs are seen as a way out of the MAD-oriented strategic equation, as referred by President Reagan. During the Cold War, US planners had devised various deterrent strategies, from assured destruction and massive retaliation to mutual vulnerability. While threats of assured destruction and massive retaliation primarily guided nuclear deterrence equations between the Cold War adversaries, the propriety of leaving space for mutual vulnerability found few takers, notwithstanding the three-decade endurance of the ABM Treaty. It was perceived that defensive systems could offset first-strike capabilities along with diminishing success of assured destruction by the enemy’s second strike, thus imparting undue advantage to the nuclear weapon states armed with BMD capability.

As a result, even when the ABM Treaty was in force, the superpowers purused the development of ABM systems to gain strategic advantage. While Russian ICBMs are no longer perceived as a primary threat by Washington, that may not be the case as regards China, whose ICBM and nuclear forces remain a key factor in American security planning. Added, there are new states with nuclear weapons like North Korea (and others on the threshold like Iran) which may use nuclear weapons as tools for blackmail or brinkmanship, and may not necessarily subscribe to threats of assured destruction. Instead, they may seek to deter the US through their missile capabilities and ranges to reach US soil or its foreign interests. These are threats which the US perceives can only be addressed through BMDs.

Book_Asia_2030However, the possibility of an arms race and the concerns raised by China and Russia demand a new equation for a BMD-oriented security environment, if this technology has to endure in future as a contributor to deterrence stability. Though the US has withdrawn from its initial Eastern Europe plan, it is yet to devise the means to ensure that instability is not permeated by its BMD deployments. There are multiple strategies that could be explored to manage a potential arms race caused by BMDs, while formulating a new BMD-driven deterrence equation. For example, there could be stability among the nuclear weapon states if they can agree on an offensive-defensive balancing equation, as done in the case of nuclear deterrence during the Cold War. While mutual vulnerability is plugged with the deployment of BMDs, there can be a possibility of balancing BMD capabilities and inventories alongside their nuclear forces. This could lead to a zero-sum equation as BMDs would limit the scope for massive retaliation through a second strike even while checking first-use options.

Notes:

  1. See n. 22.
  2. See Pavel Podvig and Hui Zhang, “Russia and Chinese Responses to U.S. Military Plans in Space”, American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 2008, at <http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/militarySpace.pdf>.
  3. Liu Huaqiu (ed.), Arms Control and Disarmament, Handbook (Beijing: National Defense Industry Publishing, 2000).
  4. Sha Zukang, “The Impact of the US Missile Defense Programme on the Global Security Structure”. Paper presented at the CPAPD/ORG Joint Seminar on Missile Defense and the Future of the ABM Treaty, Beijing, 13–15 March 2000, cited by Podvig and Hui Zhang, n. 39.
  5. Ibid.
  6. “With Defense Test, China Shows Displeasure of U.S.”, New York Times, 12 January 2010.
  7. See A. Vinod Kumar, “The Dragon’s Shield: Intricacies of China’s BMD Capability”, IDSA Issue Brief, February 2010, http://www.idsa.in/issuebrief/IntricaciesofChinasBMDCapability_250210.

If executed in a bilateral framework, this could mean a (mutual) defensive deterrence arrangement. Even in the scenario of nuclear forces reduction, as currently pursued by the US and Russia, BMDs will act as a stabilizer when such movements are executed. In the long run, balancing of missile defence capabilities might devalue the gains and utility of nuclear deterrence and encourage timely reduction of nuclear weapons, potentially leading to total elimination. However, such optimistic scenarios have limited possibilities considering that security dilemmas are dynamic, uncontrollable processes being created and influenced by offensive (or even defensive) postures of nations.

Click to buy: Asia 2030: The Unfolding Future

The US BMD created a security dilemma for Russia and China, prompting them to beef up their offensive and defensive capabilities, thus causing a competition. The path to 2030 and beyond would be embroiled in such competitions though such heightened races might facilitate mutually agreeable stability arrangements. Considering that the ABM Treaty came about as a result of strategic instability created by the superpower arms race, there are possibilities for such new agreements and covenants shaping up when a BMD-driven arms race adds to greater strategic instability.

Future Scenarios

Determining the role or relevance of missile defences for global security by 2030 could be an uphill task, with possibilities of near-certain inaccuracies. The decades from now could witness massive changes in the global security environment along with a natural progressive evolution of technological forces. There are potential for great power rivalries, peace dividends and strategic stalemates.

While Russia would attempt to prefect its BMD planning and deploy systems such as S”‘400 and S”‘500, other nations pursuing BMD capability such as India and China could be expected to develop and deploy their new systems during this period.

War could also possibly move to retrograde levels involving lower levels of conflict where technology might not be a saviour or balancer. Considering these eventualities, a handful of scenarios could be envisioned for the period based on the trends derived by the above-given postulations.

Scenario I:

Politically Driven Slow-paced Technological Progress

A probable scenario will be the continuation of the existing security environment, without major transformations, and a handful of technological templates being pursued in consonance with existing demands with the political drivers exercising varying influence on the nature of the technological innovations. In such a scenario, many of the projects currently envisaged might move from conceptualization or development stages to maturity and deployment. This could mean that many of the US BMD programmes currently under development might reach deployment during 2025–30. Many of the current variants could undertake natural upgrades and augmentations. While Russia would attempt to prefect its BMD planning and deploy systems such as S‑400 and S‑500, other nations pursuing BMD capability such as India and China could be expected to develop and deploy their new systems during this period.

The rise in instances of proliferation and concomitant challenges from a belligerent North Korea or a nuclear-armed Iran might endow further shifts in the political environment, which will be reflected in the US BMD postures through more foreign deployments and extended coverage. Countries such as Japan, Australia and Israel could host theatre-level and exo-atmospheric US BMD systems in their regions while Europe might be expected to be covered by an extended US shield. The rise of new BMD-armed nations such as India and China might complicate the nuclear deterrence equation in Asia. On the other hand, a push for space-based systems might happen, propelling increased competition in this domain. However, the momentum against space militarization might be a spoil the attempts for maximum exploitation of this domain. Thereby, the nature of BMDs by 2030 would be an imaginable extreme of the technologies envisioned today based on a hand-to-mouth requirement, and strongly driven by political push-and-pull factors.

Scenario II:

Peace Dividend

Another possible scenario could be the dramatic change in the nature of BMD development through the benefits of a peace dividend, derived from the momentum in favour of nuclear disarmament. The Obama administration’s declared intent to work towards total elimination of nuclear weapons and curb proliferation through enhanced nuclear security has raised hopes of reversing the armament drive, with lesser incentives for proliferation and arms races. This could favour a preferential leap towards defensive postures, which will be reflected in the BMD landscape, as a phased reduction of nuclear warheads and delivery systems will ultimately diminish the political utility of missile defences.

Also read: Taiwan’s courtship with India

However, their role as a stabilizer in the phased reduction process could also be valued if the nuclear weapon states decided on parity in BMD systems to balance the deterrence equations on the route to total elimination. If this momentum is initiated and sustained in the next two decades through a strengthened Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) or a stand-alone treaty, it could lead to reversal of funding and lesser emphasis for military technological innovations, thus facilitating a decline even in BMDs. However, the risks of proliferation, especially among threshold states, which could misuse the reduction process among the nuclear weapon states, could be a spoiler. In such scenarios, BMDs might exist as a shield against limited missile and nuclear threats.

Missile defences by and large could remain an irrevocable phenomenon, even if a peace dividend gradually emerges on the scene.

If the peace dividend fructifies, the period around 2030 might see a slide towards formidable reductions both of offensive and defensive missiles. However, going by the lukewarm response to the Obama pacifism and with possibilities of security deficits likely to continue along with enhanced military competition among major powers, this scenario might not be a sustainable proposition.

Scenario III:

Great-power Competition and Technological Revolutions

The third potential scenario, and a more realistic one, is the expected dynamism in BMD development that could be generated through heightened competition between the major military powers to gain strategic depth along with a double-edged deterrent capability. The mere fact that various systems are currently under development and that newer technological templates are emerging indicates the potential for a technological competition that could generate a domino impact, in the process triggering and consolidating a new arms race. This impact chain could start with the US BMD expansion that would influence the security calculus of second-tier powers like Russia and China, which in turn will flow down to the third tier of technology-developers like India, Pakistan and Iran, among others.

The US would be propelled to provide missile defence umbrellas to its allies in strategic zones like East Asia and the Middle East, which would create a security deficit in these regions. A complicated nuclear equation would thus be the most potent political driver for BMD expansion. An inherent asymmetry endowed by the US technological supremacy would be a pushing factor for other countries to embark further on this technological domain.

Conclusion

As the scenarios show, missile defences by and large could remain an irrevocable phenomenon, even if a peace dividend gradually emerges on the scene. However, considering the contemporary and past history, such dividends might not be sustainable and could only be the beginning of a new era of power competitions, strategic rivalries and resultant instabilities. As a defensive mechanism, missile defences could have a brighter scope of endurance. Even for wild card scenarios of great wars, missile defences might be the trump card against total annihilation. Beyond all, there are not visible political contingencies expected to such potent level that can reverse this trend.

Book_Asia_2030Just like technologies have evolved into an infinite process, BMDs might be at the central of future burgeoning of military technologies. This is inevitable, considering the current revolution in military affairs (RMA) and the expected revolution in military and dual-use technologies. Ballistic missile defences, needless to say, will be a major component of this evolving technological paradigm. Though there would be increasing opportunities for strategic stability among BMD-armed nations, the innovations in technology could inevitably generate competition among the major powers, potentially creating a new complex strategic environment by 2030.

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The views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily represent the opinions or policies of the Indian Defence Review.

About the Author

A Vinod Kumar

is Associate Fellow at Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi

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