Here is where the importance of the network-centric war’s complementary (or component) theory comes in, that of the “Prompt Global Strike”. This comes from the idea that the American armed forces, thanks to new kinds of air attack means, are able to strike at any point in the world within an hour. For the sake of comparison, let us note that currently at any given point on the globe, given the amount of secured superiority by air attack means, the American military can properly strike at best in 48 hours.41 Of course, at first glimpse this seems like a long time, yet it is important to mention that no other state comes anywhere close to this capability. In all of the above mentioned wars, it is also this figure that has secured victories. Presently, the Prompt Global Strike (PGS) project, along with the network-centric wars theory, is obstinately being pushed forward, which is forming the foundation for the platform-base centered. This may be considered the new generation war’s premier, longest-range and fastest strike means.
After evaluating the new concept of the intelligence-based strike complexes and American armaments, we have reflected on the full depth of the issue and came to have a new perception. Evidently, on the stage of warfare, there mustn’t be undiscovered targets and as soon as those targets are discovered, they are destroyed immediately and the results are immediately determined, thus additional verification is unnecessary. At that, for the discovery and destruction, multiple complementary means are applied. In other words, “To discover is to destroy”.
Taking all of this into consideration, we can now speak of the new type of war that introduces a new model of strike and management, which in turn we can conventionally name net-platform-centric wars.42
To put it another way, the formula is the following: In the presence of an all-seeing network, that which moves is destroyed. That which remains still has a small probability of survival, yet no chance for victory. Evidently, the intelligence-based strike complexes are at the second stage of the aircraft system’s application, which better corresponds with the air platform. The predecessor was the intelligence and striking aircraft’s ability to work well together, yet separate application. Without the possibilities of applying air platform’s system, they will be limited.
Military aircraft and UAV scan be applied during both offensive and defensive battles. With this, they are the most important components in this new type of combined arms complete electro-fire battle. In this combined arms battle, being platform-centric comes about also with other forces and arms. For example, armoured means can also first be modular, with a platform-based structure and later release another multi-composite means. That is, the artillery has projectiles that are also themselves platforms. Platform-presenting multifarious land, air and sea machines are being created, missiles and cannons, even rifles, from which surveillance projectiles are released.
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Evidently, the new combined arms battles, or electro-fire battles, highest strategic stage is turning into a synthesis of network centric and platform centric wars. It is the superior manifestation of the application of means and management of operations. It is the fine-tuned version of America’s military culture, which has been cultivated for decades. This developed standard, besides the advanced speed which is primarily due to the air attack means43, by combining the devices that accomplish the noted functions, allows for the sparing of a considerable amount of means and simplifies the work of people in charge in various spheres. During the net-platform-centric wars, the air attack means systemic application, with a complete data field, gives the possibility to go beyond the adversary’s common primary targets and on to ones that will have the desired “effect” in turn.44
Yet it is the serviceman, who has been and will remain as the chief figure, who must be able to think and punctually work with the same speed. American military theorists, with all of these revolutionary technical and theoretical developments, have never lost sight of this, particularly with respect to the responsibilities and preparedness of their commanders. The US’s future military guiding “Joint Vision 2020” doctrine, along with all the documents that stem from it, emphasise the important role of commanders above the role of any technology. For the realisation of any given military operation, they have a few underlying principles, where each of them implies the obligatory high standard of the human factor.45 They are:
- Complete harmonisation, meaning all kinds of arms and means are joined for the purpose of accomplishing a single goal
- Mobility and manoeuverability
- Network centralisation, meaning frictionless-communication and harmonious operations
- Decentralisation, meaning the mid-level ranks’ independence and freedom to act around a single, complete goal
- Flexibility, meaning, ability to work with the given situation
- Advantages in making decisions. That is, fast and accurate decision making
- Powerful strike capability
This is how the new generation, net-platform-centric wars will be.
Notes
1. The United States Strategic Bombing Survery Report (European War). September 30, 1945, reprinted in The United States Strategic Bombing Surverys (European War) (Pacific War). Maxwell Air Force Bace, AL: University Press, 1987. 29 May 2009, р. 13.
2. Keaney, A. Thomas and Eliot A. Cohen, Gulf War Air Power Survery, Summary Report. Washington, D.C., 1993, р. 226.
3. Г. А. Арбатов, К. Н. Брутенц, Э. А. Иванян, Е. М. Примаков….Современные США. М., 1988, стр. 351.
4. Тактика / Под ред. В. Г. Резниченко. — 2-е изд., перераб. и доп. М., 1987, стр.152.
5. Williamson Murray, Gulf War Air Power Survey (GWAP), Vol. 2, Part I, Operations, Department of the Air Force, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1993.
6. The term is taken from the Effects-Based theory which originated in the US and has spread lately. The jist of this theory is that by taking certain steps ahead of the enemy, you can determine the moves of the enemy and work backwards to achieve the desired effect, which is where the focus should be.
7. Atkinson Simon R. and James Moffat, The Agile Organization: From Informal Networks to Complex Effects and Agility. Washington, DC: DoD Command and Control Research Program (CCRP) Publication Series, 2005. 29 may 2009. pp. 148-151, http://www.dodccrp.org/files/Atkinson_Agile.pdf
8. David S. Fadok, John Boyd and John Warden: Airpower’s Quest for Strategic Paralysis, in The Paths of Heaven: The Evolution of Airpower Theory, Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, 1997. 27 may 2009.
9. A.Н. Захаров. Операция «Лис пустыни»…, стр. 68; А. Н. Сидорин и др. ВС Зарубежных гасударств. М.,2009, стр. 93.
10. Any discrepancy in the numbers is primarily due to the different methods used in what is counted. Some specialists, by generalizing air attack means, also count unguided missiles fired from helicopters, along with certain ammunition, etc., and some specialists do not count these.
11. Keaney, Thomas A. And Eliot A. Cohen, Gulf War Air…, p. 226.
12. Raytheon (Hughes) AGM-65 Maverick. http://www.designation-systems.net/dusrm/m-65.html; Э. Люттвак. Стратегия: Логика войны и мира. М., 2012, стр. 339.
13. В. Белкин, А. Мухаметжанова. Является ли высокая точность оружия «Абсолютной»?. Вестник Воздушного Флота. май-июнь. 2003, стр. 58-61; А. Н. Сидорин и др. ВС Зарубежных гасударств. М.,2009, стр. 93.
14. ЗВО. № 4. 2008, стр. 50. А. Н. Сидорин и др. ВС…, стр. 93.
15. Washington Post, 28 march 2003, p. 1:
16. Today in the US there are already cyber-forces, giving some specialists grounds to insist that at some time there may also be independent cyber-wars. Accordingly, some մեկտեղում են are equating that with so-called “information wars,” while some see it as a different kind.
17. Electronic War in IAF Strike in Syria. Tuesday, October 16, 2007. http://www.informationdissemination.net/2007/10/electronic-war-in-iaf-strike-in-syria.html
18. AW&ST Aug. 16, 2004, p. 24; Nov. 4, 2002, p. 30
19. Among specialist circles the separate manifestation of electronic and fire-strike warfare is also being evaluated, which we think is a bit exaggerated, yet in special occasions it is possible to see such a phenomenon.
20. R. Langner. (November 2013). “To Kill a Centrifuge: A Technical Analysis of What Stuxnet’s Creators Tried to Achieve”. P. 5-36.
21. Cyber subdivisions are being created in the militaries of many countries, some of whom are also talking about cyber forces, which, true, will not be like the American command, yet they will be created to solve similar issues. In 2014, Russian Minister of Defense S. Shoygu announced that scientific battalions are being established in the military that many experts consider as cybersecurity subdivisions. In 2014 similar subdivisions are also being established in the Armenian Armed Forces.
22. U.S. Department of Defense, «Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace», July 2011 «[www.defense.gov/news/d20110714cyber.pdf]» Accessed 09-28-2011.
23. http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/joint_staff/jointStaff_jointOperations/07-F-2105doc1.pdf
24. Powerful, continuous American sea-air strikes, which take up to 9 hours including 100 cruise missiles and thousands of complete multiprecision means, cannot be withstood against by any classically structured defense system. However, such strikes are exceptions and cannot be applied any time, any place, since they require massive intelligence work, the highest level of organization, etc.
25. The concept of “cyberwars” is actively discussed the world over, in terms of its nature, boundaries, forms, etc. In the US it has been discussed repeatedly, yet the jury is still out on the matter. As we noted, we believe it can’t be called a “war”, but with certain advancements there is the possibility that it could in the future.
26. Here we find it necessary to specifically emphasize that if even though in 1991 the first information-psychological operation was a success for the US (about which not only the adversary, but half the world, did not have an idea), that advantage for the US did not remain beyond 15 years. By 2008, a corresponding Russian subdivision was applying cyber-attacks during the Russian-Georgian war. Following films degrading their religion, even the Muslim extremists were attacking American companies and establishments. Data from 2013 confirms that most attacks are carried out by Russian and Taiwanese hackers. As of 2014, similar operations are taking place by both sides in Ukraine, and Muslim extremists are even surpassing Iraqi and Syrian government forces in this realm. However, from the first decade of the new millennium, the American government is driving a kind of policy that promotes cyber media giants in order to try to control such currents.
27. A few years ago, in the west, they were evaluating whether electronic warfare is becoming a kind of war on its own. With this, we are insisting that it most certainly is not. Further, even on the occasion that it is large-scale, it will simply be a component of electro-fire military operations
28. As we said, the platform in this case is in regards to the strike means, and in the future nearly all strike means will be modular, which presupposes a platform-base. Today, many arms are put to use that are from past generation wars. However, we think that after a short period that will fade away. That phenomenon is also tied to the war’s topmost economic and political levels. It is more favorable to directly create multi-purpose, modular weapons, and in the future, adjustable platforms using nanotechnology
29. Тактика, стр. 3, 120.
30. В.В. Круглов, М.Е. Сосновский. О тенденциях развития современной вооруженной борьбы. Военная мысль. N2. 1998, стр. 43.
31. А.Н. Захаров. Операция «Лис пустыни»…, стр. 68.
32. Here, again, the situation is juxtaposed with the adversary’s fighters. And, in general, these rules are largely applicable against air power as well.
33. “Destroying” is relative. It is necessary that their surface anti-air missile systems and the majority of their fighters be eliminated, and for them to lose any possible organized or active reaction.
34. It should be noted that the development of the ways of fire-strike operations (that are counted) also contributes to transition from theory of total wars toward that of a “civilized” or “bloodless” theory of wars. In recent times, the USA has been inventing more of so called “surgical strike” weapons and armament, which, with their precision, cause less damage to the peaceful population and only strike the intended target. See В. П. Гулин. О новой концепции войны. Военная мысль. № 2. 1997, стр. 13-17.
35. Э. Тоффлер. Война…, стр. 129-130.
36. Network-Centric Warfare and Wireless Communications. http://www.meshdynamics.com/documents/MD_MILITARY_MESH.pdf
37. А. Кондратьев. Реализация концепции Сетецентрическая война в ВВС США. ЗВО. 5.2009, стр. 46.
38. С. Сокут. Сначала-системы, потом-беспилотники. Авиа Панорама. сентябрь-октябрь. 2005, стр. 14-17.
39. Р. Арзуманян. Сложное мышление и сеть. Парадигма нелинейности и среда безопасности 21 века. Ереван. 2011, стр. 260.
40. Here, once again, let us note that among specialists’ circles there is a false view that this is a “network war”. However, as we noted that such phenomena at best may be operations. Information strikes or operations, network attacks, cyber operatations, etc, all such phenomena are merely components of network-centric wars. We will make note of all of this in sections of A. Hovhannisyan’s “Ռազմարվեստ” or “Warcraft”.
41. David E. Sanger; Thom Shanker (28 February 2010). “White House Is Rethinking Nuclear Policy”. The New York Times (New York, NY). Retrieved 8 April 2010. http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/01/us/politics/01nuke.html
42. As we said, the platform in this case is in regards to the strike means, and in the future nearly all strike means will be modular, which presupposes a platform-base. Today, many arms are put to use that are from past generation wars. However, we think that after a short period that will fade away. That phenomenon is also tied to the war’s topmost economic and political levels. It is more favorable to directly create multi-purpose, modular devices, and in the future, adjustable platforms using nanotechnology.
43. Subsequently that can also be electromagnetic-based.
44. Deptula. David A. Effects-Based Operations: Change in the Nature of Warfare. Arlington VA: Aerospace Education Foundation, Defense and Airpower Series. 2001, pp. 8-9.
45. In the American strategic development documents, these incorporated principled are also envisioned in military regulations, just as the Joint Chiefs of Staff JP 5-0 code.
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