Indian Defence Review

Because, per those same specialists, the so called “cyberwars” conduct military operations in the fifth dimension (virtual dimension), they are contradicting themselves, since operations in the other individual fields are not removed wars either, but rather multi-dimensional. Fascist Germany of 1940-1941, for a few continuous months, was fighting with Great Britain in the aerial field, yet they were referred to as “Battle for Britain”. On the whole, all fields are war’s acting stages or fields of operations. The same way, long-range strikes cannot be categorised as wars. Those captivated by purely long-range strike operations think that alone is going to be the future of wars. This view is also incorrect. We noted that those are very important, but only in the best circumstances are they an isolated battle or operation. Of course, operative and strategic surprise strikes without complete, major preparations (which is realised by the American Sea-Air component) can be a determinant for many wars. Yet they may not be the war in and of itself; by themselves they are purely a striking function, which cannot be applied everywhere.²⁴

The above mentioned partial examples cover an extremely small area, small tasks, and are not in any manner cyberwars. With a limited view, a cyberwar can take place when machines are fully integrated with humans and not only virtual, but also when real-life cyber-attacks and battles take place. For example, when it is possible, by interfering with certain networks to use units for other purposes or for poisoning huge reserves of drinking water, which will bring forth large scale casualties. Such actions are currently unreal, and even then when it is partially applied cannot be correctly referred to as “war”.²⁵

Information-psychological work, with its deep layers and multi-function, is today widely being spread as merely a higher level component of electro-fire battle.²⁶ That is, electronisation is fused with the striking element, or is entirely centralised, in all phases and sublayers of the organisation and execution of the classic battle and military operation: reconnaissance, situation analysis, target categorisation, decision-making, collimation, electronic attacks and interferences²⁷, strikes, assessment, ongoing altering of decisions. The electronic component’s physical and virtual elements exist in all other functions, and all of that has long been air-based. Consequently, the strikes with aerial means are already electro-fire in nature, yet they too can not be wars on their own.

Today, in warfare, we are witnesses to fundamental changes, where thanks to synthesized air-based superiority, combined arms battles have clearly become electro-fire. That battle, in case of increase in its level, turns classical military rules into military operations, and the reasoning doesn’t change: It turns from electro-fire battle to electro-fire military operations. Here, already, the electro-fire military operation’s electronic component incorporates information-psychological functions as well, which are separate information-psychological operations. Those, being at a higher level, form the parts of electro-fire military operations as well as network-centric wars.

There are specialists who note that the cyber-operations of 2007 Estonia, 2008 attacks on Georgian sites and the so called “Arab Spring”, are already instances of separate cyberwars, where special American cyber subdivisions delivered blows, and they directed everything to create a public opinion in order to induce action. But as we have already pointed out, wars are a different species. These instances, or for example the ill-fated WikiLeaks, can be cyber-operations at the operative or tactical levels, which fit into the rationale of American foreign policy. In any event, it may be considered a total information-economic-political network centric war. However, it is incorrect to refer to these as examples of separate wars. In cases which lack a vast and active combat operation, no matter how wide-scale they may be, they can be called information-psychological strategic operations but not wars, since wars are a larger totality.

The above-mentioned massive airstrikes, which were essentially electro-fire battles or operations, reluctantly gave birth to a new theory of war – platform centric wars. The network-centric and platform-centric wars are interlinked, though they are also capable of coming about separately. In time, with their amalgamation which is believed to be a matter of time, there may come forth a new term, Net-Platform-Centric Wars.²⁸ Such wars proportionally increase overt attack operations, while the defensive aspect is understated.

First of all, with the increase of air attack means’ inclusion in combined arms battles, American strategists changed the philosophy of combat. The increased roles of air attack means, means of mobility and descent have turned combat into one of air-land, which has displayed its effectiveness in a number of wars. With that, the aerial means, transportation, and devices have a pivotal effect on all other components of warfare. Air-land operations, in themselves, present two ideas: combined arms battle and long range military operations.²⁹ It may not work in total war but even in such a war, it remains advantageous. Along with network-centric wars, which are fundamentally revolutionary with respect to the components of control and supervision, the American military also brought forward the understanding of platform-centric wars, which implies operations of shear strikes without so-called direct contact with the adversary. That is, this too is revolutionary with respect to the component of strikes. Traditional shelling and missile strike means, accreting with airpower, became air attack means which come into play during specific operations with lucidity and regularity.

As we noted, electro-fire battle, with its natural advancement, can blossom into electro-fire grand battle and military operations. These are already new ways and trends of functional operations³⁰, albeit without clear boundaries. One such prototypical example of such an operation is that of the 1998 operation in Iraq headed by the US and UK, Operation Desert Fox. This 73-hour operation consisted of four blows of six to nine hours of massive aircraft missile strikes.³¹ The addition of strike time gives evidence that the capabilities of the intelligence-based strike are functioning brilliantly. The strike time is not longer, at the account of a larger number of previously-known targets, but rather due to the increases and changes of targets during the strikes.

That is, in this type of battle, the first strikes are still being delivered to the previously known targets, yet during those strikes, thanks to immediate verification and the capability of passing on intelligence, new or survived targets are being arranged so quickly, and the means to destroy them are being put into play so quickly, that targets are continually struck without interruption. Certain strike means even have the capability of receiving orders of changes to targets during a given strike. This is also being applied to the 2014 strikes on targets in Iraq and Syria.

Advancements in technology, particularly with respect to airpower and the ability to communicate with and manage troops, have allowed this type of battle to be a reality. But they are not taking place with the mere discretion or moods of troops. All of the examples above showed that such actions are taking place with clear guidelines. They are:

• The group of aircraft must comprise approximately 50 to 60 per cent fighter aircraft and 40 to 50 per cent protective aircraft, against specialised aircraft. These include, for starters, the intelligence-based, aerial management and electronic warfare fighter aircraft. This percentage can definitely decrease taking into account the new generation of fighter aircraft which with similar success combine the strike capability with other abilities. The enumerated non-striking, special purpose aircraft are essential for air superiority yet sometimes they are mistakenly disregarded. For example, if US fighter aircraft are two to three times more than that of Russia or China, then with respect to the special purpose aircraft, also including UAVs, their numbers are also six to eight times more than Russia, or 12 to 14 times that of China. The school and tradition of air superiority are also characterised by these indices.
• At the time of first strikes while air superiority is not fully secured, the density of the strike means must be a minimum of 1.5 to 2 times more than the air defence’s target guideline. The complementary fighter aircraft, with their secondary tasks, can further complicate the situation for air-based air defence, yet as soon as strike means are needed to be in range. The numeric formula is in relation to not only surface-based air defence, but also to countering enemy fighter aircraft, which are more dangerous for achieving or maintaining air superiority. The quantities are secured by complex rules. It is possible to have few aircraft take off, yet the missiles launched from them, also becoming targets themselves, may overwhelm the air defence system.

• First strikes must be electro-fire at a ratio of 1-2 or 1-1. That is, for every individual electronic warfare fighter aircraft, there is one or two striking aircraft. Irrespective of electronic warfare’s superior means which secure total pressure, from which the inferior mean can benefit, these ratios are essential at the start of strikes. If it has its own powerful electronic warfare means, the striking mean can count as a suppressive means; yet as a rule they are few.³² The striking fighter aircraft’s entire section and tactical flexibility are largely dependent on these requirements. Given the circumstance, the striking groups can be separated into sub-groups, pairs. However, at the core they must always take into account the situation where every single strike group or separate target must be secured with an adequate level of electronic security. American airpower ordinarily delivers the strike with up to 400 aircraft not including cruise missiles or UAVs. That quantity is primarily divided into eight to ten airplanes, but it can be divided even down to pairs. However, this is not a dogma and is dictated by the circumstances, superior support and available resources.
• The preliminary strikes, if not entirely, then superbly, must be executed by multi-precision means. It is preferred these strikes are mainly executed with cruise missiles.
• Since the adversary’s air defence system is still not fundamentally destroyed, 70 to 80 per cent of fighter aircraft must work to accomplish just that. This forms the first round of strikes.³³ The subsequent rounds must continue to have this function by dedicating resources, and not only for fighter aircraft flights. Even in the case of full aerial superiority, nearly ten per cent of fighter flights are conducted to resolve these issues. In the case of eliminating separate, spread-out air defenses, other air attack means are applied, particularly tactical and operative multi-precision ballistic missiles.
• The primary part of all strikes must be capable against moving targets, because a well prepared adversary disguises targets well, and will quickly mobilise them immediately after the first strike. Although in 1991, 1999, and 2001-2003, American airpower was delivering brilliant blows, commanders were continually complaining about the standard in the case of striking moving targets. However, the strikes delivered against the ISIS, from August to October of 2014, was startling and there are thousands of video footage online. Moving targets are being destroyed that are moving 80 to 100 kmph. Here, incidentally, some information came to surface that the US, for the first time, put into use its new generation’s first fighter, the F-22. In order to defeat the classically entrenched adversary, the three first points are necessary, however for a more up-to-date adversary, a fourth point is needed as well.

These are the primary though not exhaustive, conditions where a ground or even air-based air defence system of nearly any sophistication, or both the air force and air defence based on it together, can be broken.³⁴

As noted above, during the 1982 and 1990-1991 wars, the new theory that appeared worked brilliantly. That was initially called a purely air-land or air-sea operation, yet it had new elements. Specialists later realised that this was the birth of a new theory, yet it still required development. From the start, there was the possibility to transfer the incoming data to a few sources and announce a post where all commanding takes place from. Subsequently, more participants took part during joint or combined arms operations, which also encompassed a larger area.

During the above-mentioned applications, the systemic reconnaissance and fighter aircraft and air platforms were primarily working separately, although they were staunchly interconnected and cooperated well with one another on the same network. During the application of complicated systems, American strategists came to the conclusion that, within the components of the system, the intelligence elements worked clearer and more dependably than the striking elements. Put simply, raw data is easier to get than it is to develop that data, inform the strike units, destroy the targets and verify the results of the strikes. Presently, Americans are able to secure an all-seeing surveillance network over vast strategic areas where nothing can move or change without being noticed with respect to guiding points, communication systems and, especially, the unification of the “E-3”, “E-8”, “E-6”, “RQ-4 Global Hawk”, “KH-11” reconnaissance platforms and that of others. That is, with respect to the adversary, they have the “informational advantage”.

The transfer of data to commanding points and receiving replies nevertheless requires extra time. To transform the informational advantage into an actual weapon, a further step had to be taken. Aside from minimising time, it was also important to reduce the quantity of steps for securing communication. There was talk going around about what we now know as smart-strike means (guided bombs) even in the 1970-1990s, that is, during those times when in the US fundamental analyses were taking place.

In other words, the perception of the issues brought forth the Network-Centric Warfare theory. The idea is not new. It was born even in the late 1970s, when there clearly appeared huge possibilities in general, aerial intelligence and control means, and technical means. In 1991, during Desert War, the American intelligence systems were ahead of its communication systems, which were immediately growing in fighting situations. When the forces had just set up camp, the intelligence data being developed and delivered to forces was up in two days, but immediately at the start of military operations that time was reduced to up to 13 hours, which was still not quick enough.³⁵

The principles of conduct for such wars are formulated in the following way: forces with multiple, reliable means of communication receive exchangeable information of improved opportunities, which increases the quality of communication and even the possibility of being fully informed, especially with respect to ongoing situations. In its right, this brings the enhancement of cooperation between forces, self-sufficiency, stability of command and execution, speed and clarity.³⁶ As a whole, the battle moves forward more efficiently.

Network-centric wars will already bring together all of the various forces on a single, all-inclusive network. That is, the networks will not be separate supervising and information network, strikes platform network, strike means network as well as the network that unites all of the other networks. Taking this into consideration, today, American theorists, passing the theory of network-centric wars, apart from everything, have bunched together the intelligence component with the fighter aircraft, finally realising the intelligent-strike complex. Following this example, as a preliminary step, it is first necessary to pass from an “intelligence-command-strike” scheme to an “intelligence-strike” scheme, where the commanding aspect doesn’t require an extra step and waste precious time. The next step is to centralise all of these means into a single organ. This is precisely the main purpose of network-centric wars, one of the American military’s two new complementary programs. That is, an unfolding story at any given place in the world must be observable and assailable as quickly as possible. Various reconnaissance means must be in place, and striking means must work very efficiently, and the entire event must be exhibited in the presence of the corresponding commanders. In network-centric wars, a commander, secured by ubiquitous informational fields in all planes, can intervene in any operation when it becomes necessary. At any given moment he will be able to put into practice the most convenient or most appropriate strike means, which may be multifarious, substitutable or supporting; that is, separable.

Of course, for the systemic application of intelligence-based strike fighter aircraft and air platforms, more complicated complexes are incorporated along with their more complicated technologies of management. In network-centric wars, at the time of the systemic application of air platforms, as we noted, the issue is not only with intelligence data which must be refined and put to use without delay and further, the action must be such that it can be monitored. The commander can receive information about the same target from various sources simultaneously and refined information at that. As they say, they can be “online”. What is needed for striking located targets is permanently secured coordinates and verifiability of results, which is a complicated system, yet it is unarguably more reliable and productive. Americans call the new model, “the integration of machines” or Constellation Net.³⁷ In the West, certain similarly changed systems dependent or new possibilities, in the 1990s were called “C4 I” ³⁸, and later “C4 ISR” ³⁹, and new generation fighter aircraft use Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Combat Systems, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C5 ISR).

Plainly put, this is a system where the Commander’s orders, clearly surveyed and supplanted with a wide array of information, reaches the executor and is put in play. Here the network is also a complementary variety of the multilayered striking means, which have their own network, yet are more productive, of course, when working jointly with the management system.⁴⁰ Talk about the network of other striking and security means has given many interesting past examples and shed light on future plans. After 1991, the Americans tried to make aerial superiority collaborative primarily by means of aerial guided navigation. That is, the aircraft of allies also connected to that network, and they got the opportunity to also participate in joint strikes. This was especially important for the European allies.

Of course, those advancements remain in the past. Today, due to unitary aerial guided points and unitary strike means, the American aerial superiority is transforming into inter allied aerial superiority. For example, the E-3 aerial guided aircraft are also widely used by the allies, and the Aegis global sea system secures peaceful air-sea visual fields thanks to the fact that Japanese fleet are also equipped with the same system. And the F-35 fighter is the best example in this respect as a unitary fighter for the US and its allies including Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, Australia, Saudi Arabia, Israel, nearly all of NATO’s member nations. Evidently, one must deal with not just American aerial superiority, but rather with global aerial superiority, which we can also label as international aerial superiority.

The applying of such systems, with all of its complexities, gives commanders the ability to resolve major systemic issues. In network-centric wars, the model for systemic application of the air force or air attack means is not so simple; it involves intelligence satellites, massive and complex analytic computers, as well as other highly complicated equipment requiring vast areas and without time limitations. The devices are also capable of upsetting the adversary’s air defence system’s means with the help of radio influencing means, which is a small part of the system, by complicating the aerial situation with the presentation of false targets with ordinary flights.