Indian Defence Review

General Starry initiated the development of an entirely new approach to military operations. This started the world on a military journey that, thanks to great advancements in technology particularly with respect to air power and the way it is applied, and communication, has brought us to where we are today. In today’s world, we see the clear presence of electro-fire battles, as well as network-centric wars among highly advanced militaries. We also see the presence and advancement of platforms. I argue here that the following evolutionary stages will lead us to Net-Platform-Centric Wars.

In the 1960s, a significant change took place in military science whose consequences are just now being seen. The American team of military theorists, led by General D Starry, upon analysing past military operations especially the defeats in Vietnam and the 1973 Israeli victory, came to the realisation that it is groundless to think that the Soviet war of an overwhelming number of troops has come to replace the Germanic blitzkrieg. Theoretically, this would be a dead end and it was not only surmountable, but it could be completely undermined by the new military doctrine which was the continuation of the blitzkrieg with a more aero-centered strategy. For the sake of fewer forces, more speed, longer range, accuracy, concentration and a higher standard of troop management, General Starry found it necessary to create a new military doctrine based on both land and air. This new military doctrine was first referred to as Deep Strike or Deep Battle, then as Air-Land Battle and even later as Air-Land and/or Air-Sea Military Operation. These issues were widely being discussed in military circles and among academics.

In the 1970s-1980s, that team brought forth an entirely new approach to military operations. That new model was the Air-Land and/or Sea-Land, which led to the present Electro-Fire-Strike Battle and Electro-Network Management. It focused on all aspects of military work including new weapons, new approaches and new solutions.

From prior war experience of applying air attack means, they clearly understood that despite the constant enhancement of the aerial component’s effect, it still didn’t meet the desired standard with mere conventional type weapons. During the WWII bombings, a considerable portion of the released bombs missed their targets. According to some data, during WWII bombings, only 20 per cent were actually striking their targets¹. During the Vietnam War, the American servicemen were convinced that one or two guided bombs and missiles are more effective than the raw bombing power of dozens of airplanes. The scientific and technical bases for the creation of multi-precision bombs and missiles had strengthened. By the last year of the Vietnam War, a great many laser guided bombs were already put into practice.²

As A Migoyan loved to say, “The Americans are practical people.” True to that, here they were; the time had come for them to be the first to even analyse the mistakes of others.

The multi-precision weapons and air attack means continued increase of data can give the possibility of the entire process of war to be dictated by the military operation’s aerial component alone. A large part of their openly published views and regulations were dedicated to combined-arms combat’s aerial component.³ The USA viewed the USSR as its primary adversary, whose core military consisted of land troops. The American theorists were looking for countermeasures using their main tool, which they had constantly tested and refined – airpower. Thus, as per the new doctrine, the general American battle division would require over 150 military airplane flights, and nearly the same amount of military helicopter flights, daily, not counting the considerably larger number of executed UAV flights. In their judgement, when battling against the land troops, the air attack means work 10 to 20 times more efficiently than other means.⁴

Nor did the new theory forget about increasing the efficiency of management during military operations. The mapping of space and particularly the presence of aerial guiding points, rendered major opportunities to commanders. That is, the wounding component was immediately strengthened along with the managing component, which had military commanders with constantly higher demands.

With the application of every component of the new theory, its relatively final version was rigorously tested during military exercises by Israel in 1982 and partly by Great Britain in the Falklands and the US in Libya. It not only pierced and wounded the adversary’s tanks and aircraft but with coordinated, simultaneous intensive blows, it wounded state and defence systems, nerve centres, the air defence infrastructure as well as other high value targets.⁵ That which was envisioned by Douhet and Mitchell, but whose vision could not immediately be actualised at the time due to technological issues, was finally applied in Iraq, in 1991, with its more complete version.

To achieve this, it was first important to overcome not only intelligence, communication and management issues, but theoretical ones as well. Within past failures also laid the absence of certain systems. For the new theory to work, it was not only important to have strikes with proper accuracy and density and lustrous management of individual actions but also the enabling of independent mobility of troops, which has traditionally been among the most important issues for all armies. And in the new theory, that issue of mobilisation with its two crucial components, speed and depth, would also be supported by airpower because no other transportation method other than aircraft was faster or could work at such depth. With all of these innovations in their final polished version, in the US, Douhet’s theory transformed into a theory of “effects”⁶, upon which achieved victories would require the continuous oversight and clear, cooperative efforts of all commanding circles.

For those in the higher ranks in the US, giving such a continual and significant amount of freedom to mid-level commanders remained edgy with respect to proper supervision. Of course, that which had always been a troublesome issue for past armies was now resolved thanks to technological advancements. You train the commander well, give him a large amount of freedom to act, yet supervise his operation through technological means without interrupting him. Without all-seeing eyes and effective communication, there was no way to have a management system that would allow this. In this case, they had resolved these issues by theoretical and other surveillance and communication means. There was already a continuous field of view and communication, which became a standard system of management. What had been merely dreamt of theoretically at the turn of the century had now become feasible thanks to breakthroughs in science.

The latest wars showed that even in the case of influencing government management systems, the application of the air attack means latest version of the theory was still incomplete⁷, yet it was surprisingly effective and had great promise. Here, we must understand just how things worked before, compared to how they work today, in order to appreciate the new way of American management. Let us try to understand this through a short explanation and some examples.

As we can observe, the various tasks were separated and classified as intelligence, strike and management divisions. Of course, this complete separation led to serious complications. As we have already noted, from the mentioned time forward, accompanying the army staff’s work were large groups of military specialists and theorists. Correctly understanding the rendered possibilities of new technology, they were making calculations. Towards the end of the 1980s, alongside the United States Central Command, the «Black Hole» group was established, where servicemen were gathered to also engage in planning the application of the new theory. It was here that Colonel John A Warden served⁸, who is known to have had a major influence on world renowned and cited methods.

The systems of intelligence, management, strike and others were being developed separately while at the other end they were carefully being pieced together. During three decades of military conflict, with respect to means of air strikes, the specific proportion of multi-precision means used increased from two to four per cent to as much as 70 per cent (sometimes 68 per cent is noted)⁹. During the first Iraq War, their specific proportion measured eight to nine per cent. Of the nearly total 220,000 (sometimes 256,000 is noted¹⁰) aviation attacks, nearly 20,500 were multi-precision¹¹. The allies released nearly 5,500 units of the AGM-65 Maverick Air-Land conventional rockets alone. Incidentally, they measured 80 to 90 per cent effective¹².

During the 1999 military operations, multi-precision already made up 30 to 35 per cent of used weapons. Of the 23,000 bombs and missile units used, over 8,000 were multi-precision. In 2001, of the units used in Afghanistan, 60 per cent were multi-precision. More than 22,000 units were used, of which 12,500 were multiprecision. In the 2003 Iraq war, the multi-national forces used more than 29,000 units, of which 70 per cent were multi-precision.¹³ They were also growing in variety. Their striking distance had reached up to 500 km for tactical air power and up to 2,500 km for the strategic. Experience from both Iraq wars (1991 and 2003) came to show that air power, while executing approximately the same number of military flights in both wars (between 42,000 and 50,000), successfully struck targets 4.5 times more than the first war (4500 vs. 20,000)¹⁴. Let us also note that the second war was shorter, which suggests that not only multi-precision weapon use increase, but also the density and effectiveness of air attack means.

With all of this said, we can draw the following conclusion. In military operations, the first strikes, which are generally massive and becoming more decisive, are not currently being executed primarily by aircraft with pilots, which is a very important point (and this phenomenon is likely to increase in the future). Presently, unmanned air attacks are precisely the best evidence for that. Today, there are UAVs launched by fighter aircraft that are in use. In 2003, while the first and primary blows were being delivered by a large number of cruise missiles, there were periods of military operations when over a thousand cruise missiles were used simultaneously.¹⁵ All of this also definitively eliminated the demarcating concepts of tactical, operative and strategic tasks that had been famous since the 1950s. Small tactical groups of fighters were delivering blows to strategic points and large bombers were freely releasing bombs at tactical depths. All such boundaries were simply disappearing.

For all intents and purposes, by these measures, the prominent role of first fire-strikes in war was affirmed. The role of multi-precision strike methods grew so much that it became a necessity to change warfare as we knew it. Specifically, whereas in 1991, the allies were delivering two to three hours of continuous aircraft missile strikes daily, from 1999 to 2003, during similar operations, thanks to improvements of ongoing supervision and other capabilities, there were being delivered six to seven hours of continuous strikes, with which essentially entire operations were being accomplished. That is, these were electro-fire aircraft missile strikes which, along with electro-network supervision, form the foundation of these military operations.

Here appears a new kind of battle; that of the electro-fire. Already, the electro-fire battle means not only the electronisation of the function of the electronic attack that accompanies strikes, but also that of the strike’s pointing, control, management of verification and the striking mean itself. As a rule, the fundamental strike means will have electronic components, even if it may be merely in its internal circuit. Whether the strike means be cruise missiles, cluster bombs or a multi-precision shell, it must undoubtedly work jointly with open and closed electronic systems in order to reach its target. Its very release, pinpointing the target, guiding and controlling it are all electronic-based. And future weaponry will be even more electronic-based. Electro-magnetic cannons, laser cannons, even future soldiers’ rifles, are all to be electronic-based in every way, from their scopes to their owner-recognition features. Prior combined battles of equal magnitude implied that the coordinated activities of all kinds of weaponry were for a single common goal. Today this is replaced by electro-fire battle which is worthy of replacing the prior battle precisely because electro-fire means form not only the capability of all the services to work separately, but also that of the ability to work together.

The electro-fire battle implies that simultaneous with the first strike, the electronic attack is delivered, which is joined by cyber-attacks¹⁶ on command centres and networks. Thereafter (or simultaneously), any other desired military branch or division can go on with its electronic-based operation and work with yet another military branch or division via electronic networks.

There are many electronic applications prior to, or simultaneous with, first strikes. Among the best examples of this is Israel’s strike on Syrian nuclear-developing targets, when in order to throw off the Syrian air defence system they used the American-made “Senior Sutter” cyber-weapon, which had the ability to take control of the enemy’s air defence network and falsify data.¹⁷ The USA had long ago realised this program.¹⁸ This is one of those exceptional occurrences when, during a separated and short operation, firepower and electronic strikes were combined.

With this, the electro-fire battle unites the electronic strike with the firepower strike¹⁹, although the strikes can also be separated. And here cyber operations, which certain specialists inaccurately label as cyberwars, are the electronic battles as a separated component, and they can make up both parts of warfare as well as security. In 2010, we witnessed the first military cyber attack when the “Stuxnet” computer worm (or virus) threw off the Iranian Bushehr atomic centrifuge computing program²⁰. It was a clear system-annihilating means, yet this is merely a small incident where the virtual-striking means resolved a tactical military problem, with the general target having much operational significance. These incidents are merely small examples of virtual strikes. They throw-off and disrupt the electronic networks of their adversaries, which on a given occasion have the function of a strike, and they realise a corresponding informational function which is a matter of security.

SIDENOTE: Troops have been created for military operations of this nature²¹, and in the US there is such a military unit, more as cyber command working under strategic commanders. The noted American command is closely integrated not only with the various military branches, but also with other forces. That command today has a number of troop formations and can carry out tasks throughout the world. And because the Net’s global management is realised in the US, in this realm it can defeat any country. In 2014, the entire budget for the US’ various government institution’s cyber-defense subdivisions combined was $1.4 billion. In the US, there is a state document on strategy for operating in cyberspace which coordinates all work²². However, all of this does not mean that cyber-operations are wars. Wars have a function of an expansive nature, which includes larger forces and means, larger territorial scope, more military branches, involving more layers of the government and public spheres, and it certainly involves the physical destruction of a large number of people. The military operations executed by the military branch are not removed wars. The information is used by all military branches, yet that is only one component in the securing of those military branches’ primary functions. Any given military branch only engages in military operations with a range of other components. The American document precisely clarifying this issue is named “National Military Strategy for Cyberspace Operation”.²³

Because, per those same specialists, the so called “cyberwars” conduct military operations in the fifth dimension (virtual dimension), they are contradicting themselves, since operations in the other individual fields are not removed wars either, but rather multi-dimensional. Fascist Germany of 1940-1941, for a few continuous months, was fighting with Great Britain in the aerial field, yet they were referred to as “Battle for Britain”. On the whole, all fields are war’s acting stages or fields of operations. The same way, long-range strikes cannot be categorised as wars. Those captivated by purely long-range strike operations think that alone is going to be the future of wars. This view is also incorrect. We noted that those are very important, but only in the best circumstances are they an isolated battle or operation. Of course, operative and strategic surprise strikes without complete, major preparations (which is realised by the American Sea-Air component) can be a determinant for many wars. Yet they may not be the war in and of itself; by themselves they are purely a striking function, which cannot be applied everywhere.²⁴

The above mentioned partial examples cover an extremely small area, small tasks, and are not in any manner cyberwars. With a limited view, a cyberwar can take place when machines are fully integrated with humans and not only virtual, but also when real-life cyber-attacks and battles take place. For example, when it is possible, by interfering with certain networks to use units for other purposes or for poisoning huge reserves of drinking water, which will bring forth large scale casualties. Such actions are currently unreal, and even then when it is partially applied cannot be correctly referred to as “war”.²⁵

Information-psychological work, with its deep layers and multi-function, is today widely being spread as merely a higher level component of electro-fire battle.²⁶ That is, electronisation is fused with the striking element, or is entirely centralised, in all phases and sublayers of the organisation and execution of the classic battle and military operation: reconnaissance, situation analysis, target categorisation, decision-making, collimation, electronic attacks and interferences²⁷, strikes, assessment, ongoing altering of decisions. The electronic component’s physical and virtual elements exist in all other functions, and all of that has long been air-based. Consequently, the strikes with aerial means are already electro-fire in nature, yet they too can not be wars on their own.

Today, in warfare, we are witnesses to fundamental changes, where thanks to synthesized air-based superiority, combined arms battles have clearly become electro-fire. That battle, in case of increase in its level, turns classical military rules into military operations, and the reasoning doesn’t change: It turns from electro-fire battle to electro-fire military operations. Here, already, the electro-fire military operation’s electronic component incorporates information-psychological functions as well, which are separate information-psychological operations. Those, being at a higher level, form the parts of electro-fire military operations as well as network-centric wars.

There are specialists who note that the cyber-operations of 2007 Estonia, 2008 attacks on Georgian sites and the so called “Arab Spring”, are already instances of separate cyberwars, where special American cyber subdivisions delivered blows, and they directed everything to create a public opinion in order to induce action. But as we have already pointed out, wars are a different species. These instances, or for example the ill-fated WikiLeaks, can be cyber-operations at the operative or tactical levels, which fit into the rationale of American foreign policy. In any event, it may be considered a total information-economic-political network centric war. However, it is incorrect to refer to these as examples of separate wars. In cases which lack a vast and active combat operation, no matter how wide-scale they may be, they can be called information-psychological strategic operations but not wars, since wars are a larger totality.

The above-mentioned massive airstrikes, which were essentially electro-fire battles or operations, reluctantly gave birth to a new theory of war – platform centric wars. The network-centric and platform-centric wars are interlinked, though they are also capable of coming about separately. In time, with their amalgamation which is believed to be a matter of time, there may come forth a new term, Net-Platform-Centric Wars.²⁸ Such wars proportionally increase overt attack operations, while the defensive aspect is understated.

First of all, with the increase of air attack means’ inclusion in combined arms battles, American strategists changed the philosophy of combat. The increased roles of air attack means, means of mobility and descent have turned combat into one of air-land, which has displayed its effectiveness in a number of wars. With that, the aerial means, transportation, and devices have a pivotal effect on all other components of warfare. Air-land operations, in themselves, present two ideas: combined arms battle and long range military operations.²⁹ It may not work in total war but even in such a war, it remains advantageous. Along with network-centric wars, which are fundamentally revolutionary with respect to the components of control and supervision, the American military also brought forward the understanding of platform-centric wars, which implies operations of shear strikes without so-called direct contact with the adversary. That is, this too is revolutionary with respect to the component of strikes. Traditional shelling and missile strike means, accreting with airpower, became air attack means which come into play during specific operations with lucidity and regularity.

As we noted, electro-fire battle, with its natural advancement, can blossom into electro-fire grand battle and military operations. These are already new ways and trends of functional operations³⁰, albeit without clear boundaries. One such prototypical example of such an operation is that of the 1998 operation in Iraq headed by the US and UK, Operation Desert Fox. This 73-hour operation consisted of four blows of six to nine hours of massive aircraft missile strikes.³¹ The addition of strike time gives evidence that the capabilities of the intelligence-based strike are functioning brilliantly. The strike time is not longer, at the account of a larger number of previously-known targets, but rather due to the increases and changes of targets during the strikes.

That is, in this type of battle, the first strikes are still being delivered to the previously known targets, yet during those strikes, thanks to immediate verification and the capability of passing on intelligence, new or survived targets are being arranged so quickly, and the means to destroy them are being put into play so quickly, that targets are continually struck without interruption. Certain strike means even have the capability of receiving orders of changes to targets during a given strike. This is also being applied to the 2014 strikes on targets in Iraq and Syria.

Advancements in technology, particularly with respect to airpower and the ability to communicate with and manage troops, have allowed this type of battle to be a reality. But they are not taking place with the mere discretion or moods of troops. All of the examples above showed that such actions are taking place with clear guidelines. They are:

• The group of aircraft must comprise approximately 50 to 60 per cent fighter aircraft and 40 to 50 per cent protective aircraft, against specialised aircraft. These include, for starters, the intelligence-based, aerial management and electronic warfare fighter aircraft. This percentage can definitely decrease taking into account the new generation of fighter aircraft which with similar success combine the strike capability with other abilities. The enumerated non-striking, special purpose aircraft are essential for air superiority yet sometimes they are mistakenly disregarded. For example, if US fighter aircraft are two to three times more than that of Russia or China, then with respect to the special purpose aircraft, also including UAVs, their numbers are also six to eight times more than Russia, or 12 to 14 times that of China. The school and tradition of air superiority are also characterised by these indices.
• At the time of first strikes while air superiority is not fully secured, the density of the strike means must be a minimum of 1.5 to 2 times more than the air defence’s target guideline. The complementary fighter aircraft, with their secondary tasks, can further complicate the situation for air-based air defence, yet as soon as strike means are needed to be in range. The numeric formula is in relation to not only surface-based air defence, but also to countering enemy fighter aircraft, which are more dangerous for achieving or maintaining air superiority. The quantities are secured by complex rules. It is possible to have few aircraft take off, yet the missiles launched from them, also becoming targets themselves, may overwhelm the air defence system.

• First strikes must be electro-fire at a ratio of 1-2 or 1-1. That is, for every individual electronic warfare fighter aircraft, there is one or two striking aircraft. Irrespective of electronic warfare’s superior means which secure total pressure, from which the inferior mean can benefit, these ratios are essential at the start of strikes. If it has its own powerful electronic warfare means, the striking mean can count as a suppressive means; yet as a rule they are few.³² The striking fighter aircraft’s entire section and tactical flexibility are largely dependent on these requirements. Given the circumstance, the striking groups can be separated into sub-groups, pairs. However, at the core they must always take into account the situation where every single strike group or separate target must be secured with an adequate level of electronic security. American airpower ordinarily delivers the strike with up to 400 aircraft not including cruise missiles or UAVs. That quantity is primarily divided into eight to ten airplanes, but it can be divided even down to pairs. However, this is not a dogma and is dictated by the circumstances, superior support and available resources.
• The preliminary strikes, if not entirely, then superbly, must be executed by multi-precision means. It is preferred these strikes are mainly executed with cruise missiles.
• Since the adversary’s air defence system is still not fundamentally destroyed, 70 to 80 per cent of fighter aircraft must work to accomplish just that. This forms the first round of strikes.³³ The subsequent rounds must continue to have this function by dedicating resources, and not only for fighter aircraft flights. Even in the case of full aerial superiority, nearly ten per cent of fighter flights are conducted to resolve these issues. In the case of eliminating separate, spread-out air defenses, other air attack means are applied, particularly tactical and operative multi-precision ballistic missiles.
• The primary part of all strikes must be capable against moving targets, because a well prepared adversary disguises targets well, and will quickly mobilise them immediately after the first strike. Although in 1991, 1999, and 2001-2003, American airpower was delivering brilliant blows, commanders were continually complaining about the standard in the case of striking moving targets. However, the strikes delivered against the ISIS, from August to October of 2014, was startling and there are thousands of video footage online. Moving targets are being destroyed that are moving 80 to 100 kmph. Here, incidentally, some information came to surface that the US, for the first time, put into use its new generation’s first fighter, the F-22. In order to defeat the classically entrenched adversary, the three first points are necessary, however for a more up-to-date adversary, a fourth point is needed as well.

These are the primary though not exhaustive, conditions where a ground or even air-based air defence system of nearly any sophistication, or both the air force and air defence based on it together, can be broken.³⁴

As noted above, during the 1982 and 1990-1991 wars, the new theory that appeared worked brilliantly. That was initially called a purely air-land or air-sea operation, yet it had new elements. Specialists later realised that this was the birth of a new theory, yet it still required development. From the start, there was the possibility to transfer the incoming data to a few sources and announce a post where all commanding takes place from. Subsequently, more participants took part during joint or combined arms operations, which also encompassed a larger area.

During the above-mentioned applications, the systemic reconnaissance and fighter aircraft and air platforms were primarily working separately, although they were staunchly interconnected and cooperated well with one another on the same network. During the application of complicated systems, American strategists came to the conclusion that, within the components of the system, the intelligence elements worked clearer and more dependably than the striking elements. Put simply, raw data is easier to get than it is to develop that data, inform the strike units, destroy the targets and verify the results of the strikes. Presently, Americans are able to secure an all-seeing surveillance network over vast strategic areas where nothing can move or change without being noticed with respect to guiding points, communication systems and, especially, the unification of the “E-3”, “E-8”, “E-6”, “RQ-4 Global Hawk”, “KH-11” reconnaissance platforms and that of others. That is, with respect to the adversary, they have the “informational advantage”.

The transfer of data to commanding points and receiving replies nevertheless requires extra time. To transform the informational advantage into an actual weapon, a further step had to be taken. Aside from minimising time, it was also important to reduce the quantity of steps for securing communication. There was talk going around about what we now know as smart-strike means (guided bombs) even in the 1970-1990s, that is, during those times when in the US fundamental analyses were taking place.

In other words, the perception of the issues brought forth the Network-Centric Warfare theory. The idea is not new. It was born even in the late 1970s, when there clearly appeared huge possibilities in general, aerial intelligence and control means, and technical means. In 1991, during Desert War, the American intelligence systems were ahead of its communication systems, which were immediately growing in fighting situations. When the forces had just set up camp, the intelligence data being developed and delivered to forces was up in two days, but immediately at the start of military operations that time was reduced to up to 13 hours, which was still not quick enough.³⁵

The principles of conduct for such wars are formulated in the following way: forces with multiple, reliable means of communication receive exchangeable information of improved opportunities, which increases the quality of communication and even the possibility of being fully informed, especially with respect to ongoing situations. In its right, this brings the enhancement of cooperation between forces, self-sufficiency, stability of command and execution, speed and clarity.³⁶ As a whole, the battle moves forward more efficiently.

Network-centric wars will already bring together all of the various forces on a single, all-inclusive network. That is, the networks will not be separate supervising and information network, strikes platform network, strike means network as well as the network that unites all of the other networks. Taking this into consideration, today, American theorists, passing the theory of network-centric wars, apart from everything, have bunched together the intelligence component with the fighter aircraft, finally realising the intelligent-strike complex. Following this example, as a preliminary step, it is first necessary to pass from an “intelligence-command-strike” scheme to an “intelligence-strike” scheme, where the commanding aspect doesn’t require an extra step and waste precious time. The next step is to centralise all of these means into a single organ. This is precisely the main purpose of network-centric wars, one of the American military’s two new complementary programs. That is, an unfolding story at any given place in the world must be observable and assailable as quickly as possible. Various reconnaissance means must be in place, and striking means must work very efficiently, and the entire event must be exhibited in the presence of the corresponding commanders. In network-centric wars, a commander, secured by ubiquitous informational fields in all planes, can intervene in any operation when it becomes necessary. At any given moment he will be able to put into practice the most convenient or most appropriate strike means, which may be multifarious, substitutable or supporting; that is, separable.

Of course, for the systemic application of intelligence-based strike fighter aircraft and air platforms, more complicated complexes are incorporated along with their more complicated technologies of management. In network-centric wars, at the time of the systemic application of air platforms, as we noted, the issue is not only with intelligence data which must be refined and put to use without delay and further, the action must be such that it can be monitored. The commander can receive information about the same target from various sources simultaneously and refined information at that. As they say, they can be “online”. What is needed for striking located targets is permanently secured coordinates and verifiability of results, which is a complicated system, yet it is unarguably more reliable and productive. Americans call the new model, “the integration of machines” or Constellation Net.³⁷ In the West, certain similarly changed systems dependent or new possibilities, in the 1990s were called “C4 I” ³⁸, and later “C4 ISR” ³⁹, and new generation fighter aircraft use Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Combat Systems, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C5 ISR).

Plainly put, this is a system where the Commander’s orders, clearly surveyed and supplanted with a wide array of information, reaches the executor and is put in play. Here the network is also a complementary variety of the multilayered striking means, which have their own network, yet are more productive, of course, when working jointly with the management system.⁴⁰ Talk about the network of other striking and security means has given many interesting past examples and shed light on future plans. After 1991, the Americans tried to make aerial superiority collaborative primarily by means of aerial guided navigation. That is, the aircraft of allies also connected to that network, and they got the opportunity to also participate in joint strikes. This was especially important for the European allies.

Of course, those advancements remain in the past. Today, due to unitary aerial guided points and unitary strike means, the American aerial superiority is transforming into inter allied aerial superiority. For example, the E-3 aerial guided aircraft are also widely used by the allies, and the Aegis global sea system secures peaceful air-sea visual fields thanks to the fact that Japanese fleet are also equipped with the same system. And the F-35 fighter is the best example in this respect as a unitary fighter for the US and its allies including Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, Australia, Saudi Arabia, Israel, nearly all of NATO’s member nations. Evidently, one must deal with not just American aerial superiority, but rather with global aerial superiority, which we can also label as international aerial superiority.

The applying of such systems, with all of its complexities, gives commanders the ability to resolve major systemic issues. In network-centric wars, the model for systemic application of the air force or air attack means is not so simple; it involves intelligence satellites, massive and complex analytic computers, as well as other highly complicated equipment requiring vast areas and without time limitations. The devices are also capable of upsetting the adversary’s air defence system’s means with the help of radio influencing means, which is a small part of the system, by complicating the aerial situation with the presentation of false targets with ordinary flights.

Here is where the importance of the network-centric war’s complementary (or component) theory comes in, that of the “Prompt Global Strike”. This comes from the idea that the American armed forces, thanks to new kinds of air attack means, are able to strike at any point in the world within an hour. For the sake of comparison, let us note that currently at any given point on the globe, given the amount of secured superiority by air attack means, the American military can properly strike at best in 48 hours.⁴¹ Of course, at first glimpse this seems like a long time, yet it is important to mention that no other state comes anywhere close to this capability. In all of the above mentioned wars, it is also this figure that has secured victories. Presently, the Prompt Global Strike (PGS) project, along with the network-centric wars theory, is obstinately being pushed forward, which is forming the foundation for the platform-base centered. This may be considered the new generation war’s premier, longest-range and fastest strike means.

After evaluating the new concept of the intelligence-based strike complexes and American armaments, we have reflected on the full depth of the issue and came to have a new perception. Evidently, on the stage of warfare, there mustn’t be undiscovered targets and as soon as those targets are discovered, they are destroyed immediately and the results are immediately determined, thus additional verification is unnecessary. At that, for the discovery and destruction, multiple complementary means are applied. In other words, “To discover is to destroy”.

Taking all of this into consideration, we can now speak of the new type of war that introduces a new model of strike and management, which in turn we can conventionally name net-platform-centric wars.⁴²

To put it another way, the formula is the following: In the presence of an all-seeing network, that which moves is destroyed. That which remains still has a small probability of survival, yet no chance for victory. Evidently, the intelligence-based strike complexes are at the second stage of the aircraft system’s application, which better corresponds with the air platform. The predecessor was the intelligence and striking aircraft’s ability to work well together, yet separate application. Without the possibilities of applying air platform’s system, they will be limited.

Military aircraft and UAV scan be applied during both offensive and defensive battles. With this, they are the most important components in this new type of combined arms complete electro-fire battle. In this combined arms battle, being platform-centric comes about also with other forces and arms. For example, armoured means can also first be modular, with a platform-based structure and later release another multi-composite means. That is, the artillery has projectiles that are also themselves platforms. Platform-presenting multifarious land, air and sea machines are being created, missiles and cannons, even rifles, from which surveillance projectiles are released.

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Evidently, the new combined arms battles, or electro-fire battles, highest strategic stage is turning into a synthesis of network centric and platform centric wars. It is the superior manifestation of the application of means and management of operations. It is the fine-tuned version of America’s military culture, which has been cultivated for decades. This developed standard, besides the advanced speed which is primarily due to the air attack means⁴³, by combining the devices that accomplish the noted functions, allows for the sparing of a considerable amount of means and simplifies the work of people in charge in various spheres. During the net-platform-centric wars, the air attack means systemic application, with a complete data field, gives the possibility to go beyond the adversary’s common primary targets and on to ones that will have the desired “effect” in turn.⁴⁴

Yet it is the serviceman, who has been and will remain as the chief figure, who must be able to think and punctually work with the same speed. American military theorists, with all of these revolutionary technical and theoretical developments, have never lost sight of this, particularly with respect to the responsibilities and preparedness of their commanders. The US’s future military guiding “Joint Vision 2020” doctrine, along with all the documents that stem from it, emphasise the important role of commanders above the role of any technology. For the realisation of any given military operation, they have a few underlying principles, where each of them implies the obligatory high standard of the human factor.⁴⁵ They are:

• Complete harmonisation, meaning all kinds of arms and means are joined for the purpose of accomplishing a single goal
• Mobility and manoeuverability
• Network centralisation, meaning frictionless-communication and harmonious operations
• Decentralisation, meaning the mid-level ranks’ independence and freedom to act around a single, complete goal
• Flexibility, meaning, ability to work with the given situation
• Advantages in making decisions. That is, fast and accurate decision making
• Powerful strike capability

This is how the new generation, net-platform-centric wars will be.