Indian Defence Review

Meanwhile, Pakistan had different plans. Maj Gen Iftikhar Khan, GOC Pakistan 23 Infantry Division, was given the task of securing Indian territory tip to the Manawar Wali Tawi. In addition to his integral two brigades employed in a holding role along the ceasefire line, he was allotted two more (66 and 111 Infantry), one armoured brigade (two regiments) and eight to ten artillery units. The operation envisaged withdrawal of the additional resources on completion of the task, leaving the holding troops dominating the river obstacle for better security of the sensitive Pakistani complexes of Gujrat and Kharian. Pakistani intelligence had a fair estimate of the Indian deployment opposite, especially in the Chhamb salient, as the troops had been in battle locations more than a month. Iftikhar Khan’s plan broadly envisaged containing the southern Indian defences through a series of local actions so as to develop his major thrust in the north towards Mandiala, where the opposition was negligible, and to capture the bridge over the river as part of the first phase of the operation.

After securing a bridgehead near the Mandiala crossing, he was to threaten Jaurian with a view to cutting off reinforcements for the troops deployed in the Chhamb salient as well as those facing the Nadala-Marchola approaches. By this envelopment he hoped to defeat 10 Infantry Division in detail and thereby achieve his aim plus, as the territory denied to Pakistan in 1965 would have been his for the taking right up to Akhnur. He grouped his resources accordingly and broadly employed them thus:

• 4 POK Brigade Group in the north to secure the Mandiala crossing and establish a bridgehead up to the Kachrael heights.
• In conjunction with the northern thrust 66 Infantry Brigade group to capture the Chhamb and Mandiala heights.
• 111 Infantry Brigade Group to contain the troops deployed from Barsala to Jhanda.
• 20 Infantry Brigade to attack from Jhanda to Manawar in the south.

Operation West of Manawar Wali Tawi

Information came through higher headquarters that the Indian air bases at Amritsar, Pathankot and Srinagar had been raided by air at dusk on 3 December. An undeclared war had been imposed on India by this preemptive Pakistani attack,⁶ and as a result a general alert was ordered in the divisional sector. Our troops did not have to wait long. At 2030 hours Pakistani artillery started shelling the defences west of Manawar Wali Tawi and all BOPs were simultaneously subjected to intense f i re. The main defences were contacted the same night, with the exception of a few BOPs which held out. The enemy made liberal use of artillery, and this had a telling effect on our troops.

At 0820 hours on 4 December some armour, later identified as 11 Cavalry, was seen advancing on the Dewa-Ghopar axis and heading for the Mandiala crossing. The advance was blunted by Deccan Horse and the recoilless guns of 5 Sikh, who shot up six leading enemy tanks. The Pakistanis tried later to manoeuvre some tanks and RCLs mounted on jeeps in front of Point 994. They were engaged by our tanks about 1130 hours, damaging two RCLs and six more tanks. But the enemy pressed home the attack in the north through Sukhtao nullah and captured Mandiala North by midday.

One infantry company was ordered to counterattack the position at last light, but it failed to make an impression. It was later decided to retake the position with an infantry battalion/armoured squadron group from across the river from the Chaprael side at night, using troops from the third brigade group at Akhnur. But as a result of intense shelling of the area and casualties among key personnel the Indian attack never got going. The Pakistani force was therefore able to consolidate its position further on Mandiala North by 4 December.

Activity by day was confined to local skirmishes, but by the end of it some troops in khaki were seen trying to cross the Tawi close to the Mandiala crossing. These were Pakistanis who were mistaken by our side for BSF personnel, and the crossing went on unhindered. Throughout the day efforts had been afoot to gather the original counterattack infantry battalion group for deployment in the gap between Buchoe Mandi and the bridge to cover the Mandiala crossing. But this could not be effected, and as a result the Pakistanis managed to get about two battalions (6 and 11 POK) across and ran straight into a medium artillery regiment deployed in the area.

While this resulted in confusion in the general area of the forward batteries, the depth batteries fired into the enemy over open sights, inflicting heavy casualties. The confused fighting continued throughout the night, and in the process five Indian guns were damaged. Some Pakistani tanks tried to cross the river in this rea next morning, but they were engaged in time by our armour on the home bank and five destroyed. By this time, the enemy offensive to secure the bridgehead was completely in disarray and he quickly withdrew across the Tawi. A spirited counterattack by a Gorkha company regained the Mandiala bridge by 1030 hours on 5 December.

Not dismayed by this reverse, Iftikhar Khan regrouped his force in the day and developed a thrust by last light between Chhamb and Manawar against Ghogi, Barsala and Point 951. The Pakistanis succeeded in capturing Gurha and Mandiala South in the north. They were also reported to be occupying Singri and progressing towards Chak Pandit. The jaws of the Pakistani thrust were closing on the likely crossing, jeopardising our troops west of the Tawi. Jaswant Singh, GOC 10 Infantry Division, tried to redeploy his troops in depth but failed because he lacked control of the withdrawing troops as a result of the confusion of battle.

At this stage, he decided to withdraw and stabilise the defence line on the eastern bank of the river. The withdrawal started at 2100 hours on 6 December and was completed by 2330 hours, when the bridge was blown up by rear parties to mark the end of the battle for the Chhamb salient. Some equipment and vehicles fell into Pakistani hands, but on the whole 191 Infantry Brigade came back in reasonable shape, was deployed in depth near the Troti heights and took no further part in the battle.

It is significant that the operations west of the Tawi were fought by 191 Infantry Brigade group on its own with the marginal reinforcement of three infantry companies, two armoured squadrons (T-55) and one field company inducted piecemeal to meet operational requirements from situation to situation over a period extending from the start of hostilities to withdrawal east of the Tawi.

Operations East of Manawar Wali Tawi

It was belatedly realised that it would no longer be possible to contain the Pakistani offensive west of the Tawi and the projected Indian offensive would not be forthcoming in the developing situation. As such, the follow-up brigades were deployed east of the Tawi and came in contact with the enemy on the withdrawal of 191 Infantry Brigade Group about midnight on 6/7 December. The enemy was not quick to follow up the withdrawal, and this gave the Indians an opportunity to improve their defences. The Pakistanis attempted to force the Raipur crossing on 8/9 December, but the attack was beaten back by the holding battalion 10 Garhwal Rifles, the Pakistanis leaving 39 dead and six prisoners of war and some arms and ammunition.

Probing attacks were made at night all over the front, but no ground was yielded by the defenders. Iftikhar Khan attempted to push forward his armour through Sukhtao nullah opposite Chaprael, but this was also thwarted. Undaunted by repeated failures to get across the Tawi, Pakistan launched 111 Infantry Brigade with 4 Punjab and 10 Baluch, supported by 28 Cavalry, at 0630 hours on 10 December through the Darh crossing, and succeeded in establishing a bridgehead approximately 3,650 metres wide and 900 metres deep.

9 Jat, the battalion deployed in the area, was completely surprised as, it transpired later, they did not have any surveillance elements ahead in the tall sarkanda grass. The enemy was not however allowed to make much headway by the timely strengthening of the forward line with tanks and infantry in the general area of Palatan. Gaps in the line were also filled promptly by the occupation of Darh, earlier vacated by 9 Jat, with elements of a reinforcing battalion. The Pakistani follow-up echelons walked straight into a hail of fire from the well-sited weapons of the Darh company and were badly mauled. This caused much confusion in the enemy ranks, and their will to proceed with the operation began to slacken. This was aggravated by lack of armour support as boggy ground arrested the movement of Pakistani tanks.

Jaswant Singh mustered one battalion and a mixed group of Deccan Horse and 72 Armoured Regiment tanks and launched a counterattack from the east. The tanks however got bogged down in the soft ground and the infantry could only get about 900 metres cast of the Darh crossing. The battalion dug itself in to prevent further ingress by the enemy. About this time, Iftikhar Khan, the Pakistani commander, was killed in a helicopter crash and conduct of the operation passed to his less resolute successor.

By midday on 10 December, Sartaj Singh arrived in the sector and ordered two-pronged counterattacks on the Pakistani bridgehead, from the north by two infantry companies with one squadron of 72 Armoured Regiment, and from the south with one infantry company. The attack went in at 1700 hours but hit thin air as, unknown to the Indians, the new Pakistani commander had called off the operation. His troops, severely shaken and disorganized, had been pulled out and the lodgment east of the Tawi vacated in the early noon of 10 December. The two prongs of the counterattack linked up about midnight on 10/11 December and the situation generally stabilized.

Next morning, the whole area was found littered with bodies, indicating the fierceness of the battle. Most of the dead were caught in the armoured assault. Six Pakistani tanks, including one serviceable, were found abandoned astride the river. Our tank losses were five.

Operation in the Hill Sector

The enemy attacked Picquet 707, Laleali and Dewa on 3 December, but his attacks were beaten back successfully except for Picket 707, where he initially managed to establish a foothold by overrunning our forward posts. But a spirited counterattack restored the situation and the enemy left behind about 50 dead, including Capt Mujib Fakhrullah Khan of 1 Masud Battalion. These attempts were repeated on 6 and 7 December, but proved unsuccessful against the stiff resistance of the Indian defences. One Pakistani OP aircraft was shot down by small arms fire from Laleali.

To reinforce our positions, one company was moved to Nathuan Tibba. On 5 December, Pakistan successfully infiltrated a platoon in the Batal area behind our defences and attacked the wagon lines of a battery. The enemy was evicted by the company moved from Nathuan Tibba, and from the dead and wounded it became known that 6 AK Battalion of Pakistan 23 Infantry Division was operating in the area.

About 1500 hours on 8 December Pakistan succeeded in capturing Dewa and the surrounding heights after heavy and fierce fighting, thus removing the Indian threat on its northern flank for good. After its capture Pakistan did not make any further progress in the hilly area, although probing actions all along the ceasefire line continued throughout the war.

The battle of Chhamb may be termed the most significant in the western theatre for a number of reasons. It resulted in the maximum loss of productive Indian territory⁷ in this war, about 21,000 hectares of fertile agricultural land. In consonance with the Simla Agreement which⁸ permitted retention of J and K state territory gained by either side across the ceasefire line, all this area had to be given up to Pakistan. This seemed paradoxical to many, considering that much longer areas of West Pakistani territory captured by India in the near vicinity had also to be returned. The displaced inhabitants of the area failed to understand what prevented the authorities from safeguarding their homes, especially when the Pakistani intentions in the area became apparent after the 1965 operations. Some dissatisfied elements doubted the Indian Army’s oft-professed invincibility and spread unpleasant rumours to further demoralize the refugees in camps.

Above all, the Indian Army suffered the maximum casualties of the war in this battle. They totalled 1,353—400 killed, 723 wounded, and 190 missing and prisoners of war. Eighteen tanks and a number of guns, vehicles and other equipment were also lost. It is estimated that the Pakistani attackers must have suffered losses about two to three times that number both in men and equipment. The exact figures of their casualties are not available from published postwar records, but Fazal Muqeem says in his book that they were heavy.

Why did India lose the Chhamb salient? Why did not the Indian military planners ensure that the story of 1965 was not repeated in 1971? It is felt that this happened through the accumulation of various shortcomings in Indian military thinking at the time. Although one of the tasks allotted to 10 Infantry Division was to defend the area of its operational responsibility, the higher command did not clarify how this was to be achieved. Jaswant Singh was a militarily well-educated officer, had a fair amount of war experience, and was very highly thought of by his fellow officers. His defensive plan was based on the premise that the battle would be on ground of his own choosing, primarily to cause attrition to the enemy without considering the loss of territory or the exact estimate of the effort required to regain it later.

His main defensive position was close to Kalit and the Troti heights, a good 20 kilometres from the ceasefire line with a major anti-tank obstacle in Manawar Wali Tawi between. This posture visualized covering troops operating west of the Tawi falling back to the main defences by merely achieving 48 hours of delay. Little did the General realize that if the Pakistanis managed to advance up to the heights, which was easy in view of the marginal opposition the covering troops offered, it would be difficult to push the enemy back across the line with his resources. In the context of the overall resources of the opposing forces in the theatre, the Pakistani reinforcing potential was greater than India could spare from other operational commitments in the existing equation of time and space. It is amazing how Jaswant Singh’s superiors accepted this backward planning, and further how he was allowed to implement it in the initial stages of deployment.

When the Chief pointed out that loss of territory was not acceptable and the plans had to be altered accordingly, the pendulum swung to the other extreme. On the premise that he would have the initiative to start the projected offensive, Jaswant Singh ordered 191 Infantry Brigade to establish a firm base west of the Tawi and act as a launching pad for the Indian thrusts. The bias of troop deployment was towards the south, and the northern routes of ingress into our territory were comparatively thinly defended. He was confident that once the battle was carried into Pakistani territory the threat to the Chhamb salient would automatically peter out.

He was imbued with an offensive spirit, and his energies were unreservedly directed towards preparations for the offensive operations of his formation. That is how he kept his followup brigades intact, fully organized and grouped, to be launched at short notice, and while laying mines in front of forward defences he deliberately kept wide gaps in the form of dummy minefields for his attacking troops to pass through. Out of his striking armour, he committed no more than one squadron along with the firm base brigade. His attention was so focussed on his objectives that he failed to notice the Pakistani buildup to nearly four times the estimated size right under his nose.

While Iftikhar Khan was poised for preemptive strikes against the divisional sector, Jaswant Singh was eagerly awaiting word to start his own. It was only on 1 December that his corps commander told him that the overall strategy necessitated our forces staying on the defensive till Pakistan started the war, and even then the offensive in this sector would be launched only after the enemy’s initial hand was revealed. The General obviously did not relish the change of emphasis in the plans and reacted by making no more than marginal readjustments by inducting another armoured squadron and some infantry to strengthen 191 Infantry Brigade. But there was no basic change in the original firm base posture.

As a result, when war came to the Chhamb salient on 3 December, the division was caught off balance. To regain it, the GOC did no more than feed armour and infantry reinforcements piecemeal, thus breaking up cohesive unit organisations, a process which was antagonistic to efficient functioning. The reserve brigade was moved forward only on 5 December, when the withdrawal of 191 Infantry Brigade was forced by the enemy.

In fact, out of the total resources of 10 Infantry Division, no more than a third came into direct contact with the enemy at any one time, and the full potential of the force was therefore never exploited to advantage in the critical stages of the battle. This was perhaps due to the fact that the General’s mental attitude remained attuned to an offensive despite the dictates of battle pointing to defence. This conflict between his concepts and the realities of battle seemed to have induced a state of paralysis so that he made no effort to wrest the initiative from the enemy at any stage.

It would have been advisable to adopt a posture of two up after the Chief’s clarifications. Two brigades should have been deployed west of the Tawi, and one brigade in depth to hold the crossing over the Tawi. This would have ensured our security of territory in full measure, and a switch from a defensive to an offensive posture would have been possible without resorting to major readjustments.

After 10 December, whence Pakistani bridgehead east of Tawi was eliminated, the General and the higher command were content to keep the defensive line stabilized on the Manawar Wali Tawi till the end of the war. Owing to an overall shortage of resources, Pakistan moved out additional troops to the Sialkot and Shakargarh sector, where a major Indian offensive was by then underway. The holding force opposite 10 Infantry Division along the Tawi was left with no more than a brigade plus of Pakistan 23 Infantry Division.

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The deployment pattern of enemy troops in contact, as also in the rear areas, was discernible, especially now that our troops in Laleali and the Nathuan Tibba areas commanded a view of the entire Chhamb salient. Exploiting the denudation of Pakistani strength in this sector, there was a good opportunity to regain the lost territory through an offensive by bringing in one or two armoured regiments from the neighbouring formations where the planned operations had already been accomplished. Instead, the General and the higher command sat out the rest of the war licking their wounds. Inactivity is inexcusable in the context of short wars.

Both in 1965 and 1971, the Indian formations defending the sector were surprised and trounced across the Manawar Wali Tawi in a matter of 48 to 72 hours by Pakistani forces with superiority of local armour in the sector. Our localities, defended with inadequate anti-tank potential, could not stand up to the Pakistani assaults and disintegrated after nominal resistance. In view of the terrain in the Chhamb salient, plain-like and negotiable by tanks, and elsewhere along the international border, a continuous artificial anti-tank obstacle should be created to enable our troops to hold out against surprise tank rushes. Especially so when loss of territory is not politically acceptable to the nation. Since in the present context India is not likely to have either the resources to create a temporary obstacle belt of this magnitude within the time frame of a preemptive Pakistani attack, it is imperative that a permanent obstacle in the form of a ditch be created all along the border in peacetime. Using this enhanced defence potential, India could save resources from dormant sectors to go on to the offensive and develop thrust lines into Pakistani territory on ground of our choosing.

1. Asian Recorder, Vol XI, No 37, “Massive Pakistani Infiltration into Jammu and Kashmir,” p. 6651.
2. Asian Recorder, Vol XI, No 37, “Armed Clashes,” p. 6652.
3. Asian Recorder, Vol XI, No 38, “Indian Forces Cross Ceasefire Line in Kashmir,” p. 6665.
4. Asian Recorder, Vol XI, No 40, “Massive Pakistani Attack on, Chhamb—India-Pakistan Fighting,” p. 6687.
5. Asian Recorder, Vol XI, No 40, “India Launched Three-pronged. Offensive into West Pakistan,” p. 6688.
6. Asian Recorder, Vol XVIII, No 2, “Pakistani Attack on Airfields,” P. 10535.
7. Asian Recorder, Vol XVIII, No 3, “Position at Time of Ceasefire,” p. 10569.
8. Asian Recorder, Vol XVIII, No 29, “Summit Talks in Simla- Clarification,” p. 10877.