Indian Defence Review

At the end of the Jammu and Kashmir operations in 1948, the ceasefire line emerged from the hills west of Dewa and ran through the plain west of Manawar, where it joined the international border, and linked up with the Chenab east of the Marala headworks. This flat area included the largish village named Chhamb and had a predominantly Hindu population of some 20,00. It was important strategically to the Pakistani military planners. Should India take the initiative and resort to preemptive action, it could easily block the movement of a Pakistani strike force from the Kharian-Jhelum complex towards the Lahore and Sialkot sectors and interfere with any buildup along the main communication artery of the Rawalpindi-Lahore road-rail systems.

On the other hand, its early capture by Pakistan provided sufficient territorial depth to its sensitive areas and released troops in time for their effective employment elsewhere, especially to reinforce the neighbouring sectors of Sialkot and Lahore. Tactically, both Pakistan’s flanks were secured, by the hills in the north and the Chenab in the south, while the Indians were at a disadvantage with a river obstacle behind them. Possession of Akhnur would sever the main road communication with the Indian troops employed west of the Chenab and responsible for the general areas of Nowshera, Rajauri and Poonch. The capture of the bridge over the Chenab at Akhnur could open the way for operations directed at Jammu from the west.

Politically, the loss of Akhnur town and the agricultural tracts of Chhamb and Jaurian could cause considerable embarrassment to India, partly because of loss of prestige and partly the more tangible refugee problems, especially from Dogra quarters. Militarily, with the receipt of aid from the US, the Pakistani Army was armour heavy, and the only portion of territory along the ceasefire line where armour could be exploited with quick results was obviously the Chhamb sector.

Topographically, the terrain in general is open and interspersed with seasonal nullahs. The Chenab, running northeast to southwest, is perennial and a major obstacle to trans-river movement except over the only road bridge, near Akhnur town. Halfway, another river, the Manawar Wali Tawi, flows north to south and drains into the Chenab above Marala headworks. For most of the year this river is fordable at certain points near Mandiala, Chhamb, Darh and Raipur. The area west of Chhamb is gently undulating and fairly open for employing armour.

The country east of Manawar Wali Tawi is comparatively lowlying with a profuse growth of sarkanda. It becomes boggy when the water level in the rivers is high. Otherwise, it is fairly dry and hard. The area to the north consists mostly of hills and ravines, with the precipitous Kalidhar range towering in the background. The inward convergence of hills in the north and the River Chenab in the south form a funnel towards Akhnur, where all roads and tracks meet and lead towards Jammu, across the river, over a light girder bridge. The population is predominantly Hindu, agricultural and comparatively prosperous.

The Karachi Agreement stipulated the number of troops India could keep in Jammu and Kashmir, and no additional induction could take place without reference to the chief of the United Nations Military Observer Group. In the event of allout war, the time frame for additional inductions from the Indian heartland over the vulnerable road communications from Pathankot to Akhnur running close to the Pakistan border was no less than two to three days. But it was easy for Pakistan to commit its strike force from the Kharian-Gujrat sector before Indian reinforcements materialised.

This sector was the operational responsibility of 191 Infantry Brigade Group before the 1965 war, and it was deployed with two battalions plus in the hilly portion of the sector north of Dewa to hold the main Kalidhar ridge and foothills, and similar strength along with one armoured squadron (AMX-13 tanks) in the plain portion of the sector. The broad deployment in the plain sector was to hold the ceasefire line with covering troops, consisting of four infantry companies supported by the AMX squadron, from Nathan to Burejal, a distance of obout 16 kilometres, and the main defensive position with two battalions, one holding the Mandiala heights overlooking the only bridge over Manawar Wali Tawi and the other, less two companies, posted at Sakrana. Brigade headquarters and the supporting artillery were deployed east of the river in the general area of the Kachrael heights north of Palanwala. There were no depth positions from Manawar Wali Tawi to Akhnur to cope with a breakthrough in the defences west of the river.

The Chhamb sector had seen considerable fighting in the 1965 conflict with Pakistan. Pakistani infiltration operations started on 5 August 1955 throughout Jammu and Kashmir.¹ Our military camps were attacked as deep as Jaurian, necessitating anti-infiltration operations. Intermittent shelling of and raids on border posts followed. On 15 August, Brig B F Master, the brigade commander, was killed and some of our guns damaged by Pakistani shelling. Eight posts had been lost by 25 August,² and the intensity of shelling increased to cover the buildup across the border for a full-fledged attack a week later. Headquarters 10 Infantry Division, which was in the process of raising, was inducted to take over the operational responsibility in this sector on 27 August.³ The same formation was to fight the 1971 battle in the same area.

In the early hours of 1 September,⁴ the Pakistani shelled all the forward posts heavily and developed three armoured thrusts concurrently, one from the south towards Manawar, the second from the southeast towards Dalla and the third from the west towards Dhok, all converging at Chhamb. The tank squadron was ordered to contain these thrusts, which slowed down as a result of some tank casualties. Exploiting the movement of the armour to the south and southwest, Pakistan launched the main thrust, with a combat group of possibly a Patton regiment and a mechanised battalion, from the direction of Pir Manguwali Dewa towards Mandiala.

Because our armour was not able to come northwards, this thrust made rapid progress and attacked the battalion holding the Mandiala bridge by 1600 hours. But our RCLs took a heavy toll of the leading tanks and caution in their otherwise rapid progress. Meanwhile, our covering positions, bereft of anti-tank obstacles, were overrun by Pakistani tanks and fell back in disarray. About this time, the Indian Air Force was brought into the battle. Four sorties of Vampires were flown, followed by an equal number of Mysteres. These aircraft, especially the Vampires, being inferior in performance to the Pakistani Sabrejets, were soon shot out of the skies.

Although no material damage was caused to the enemy, the introduction of IAF certainly proved a deterrent to the advance of its armour. In the ensuing melee, our aircraft knocked out some of our own ammunition lorries. The enemy had crossed Manawar Wali Tawi with about a squadron of tanks by night. This was not however followed by infantry, otherwise the development of the thrust towards Palanwala could have trapped the entire brigade headquarters and most of the artillery elements.

But since the routes were still open that night, the remnants of the brigade group in the hill sector withdrew to the Kalidhar ridge, and in the plains to Akhnur, where they took positions in defence of the town and the bridge across the Chenab. It later transpired that in this attack Pakistan had committed its 7 Infantry Division, a part of its strike element, with two regiments of tanks, under the command of Maj Gen Yahya Khan.

Having secured all the territory west of Manawar Wali Tawi, Yahya Khan took too long to follow up 191 Infantry Brigade Group towards Akhnur. In fact, it was not till 4 September that he attacked our depth position on the Kalit-Troti heights, hastily prepared by a brigade brought from the valley a day earlier. Our infantry could not stand the armour rushes and this position was also overrun that night. Next morning, Pakistani leading elements captured Jaurian and contacted our depth position in the Kanik-Fatewal area, also prepared only on 4 September by another brigade rushed to meet the enemy thrust.

Mercifully, Yahya Khan did not persist in the pursuit towards Akhnur, and to meet the pressing demands in the Sialkot sector the Pakistani armour and a good portion of 7 Infantry Division were withdrawn. The front in the plains of the Chhamb-Jaurian sector was stabilised although there was some infiltration in the hilly area in a bid to cut the Akhnur-Rajauri road.

A more enterprising enemy would have enveloped 191 Infantry Brigade Group by crossing Manawar Wali Tawi at the uncovered fords at Darh and Raipur and would have made a dash for the Akhnur brigade before we could have mustered reinforcements. The road to Akhnur lay absolutely open on 2 September, reinforcements arriving only on 4 and 5 September. The battle for the Akhnur bridge could have thus been brought to a successful conclusion by that time.

The rapid Indian collapse in the Chhamb sector was due to lack of anti-tank potential in our defended localities. Since the main defences lay ahead of the river, a partial anti-tank obstacle, it was necessary to improvise artificial obstacles in the way of laying minefields. But for want of resources and time this could not be executed properly. India’s greatest inferiority lay in its lean armour. The only armoured squadron had about 11 AMX tanks, which were lost against two Pakistani tank regiments, superior in quality as well as numbers west of the river. Thus, when enemy tanks crossed the Manawar Wali Tawi there was not a single Indian tank opposing their advance. The Indian infantry, inept at dealing with tank rushes on their defences, broke line frequently, and as a result its resistance collapsed in no time. Thus ended the first battle of Chhamb.⁵

In 1971, XV Corps, operationally responsible for Jammu and Kashmir, was given the task of defending our territory, and on the outbreak of hostilities that of improving the defensive posture through local offensive actions without upsetting the overall balance within the corps zone. As part of the overall Indian military strategy in the western theatre, the corps was to launch a sizable offensive in the Sialkot sector so as to draw a portion of the Pakistan reserves away from the main Indian thrust in the general area of Shakargarh-Zafarwal.

Lieut Gen Sartaj Singh, commander of the corps, decided to go on the offensive on both sides of the Chenab on staggered timings, depending upon the resources available on the induction of I Corps into the theatre. The formations were moved to battle locations sometime in the middle of October to frustrate a preemptive strike by Yahya Khan. I visited the formations on 26 October and found that both of them, 10 and 26 Infantry Divisions, had based their defensive postures on the British colonial war pattern, with their main defences well in depth and covering troops operating forward along the ceasefire line and the international border.

10 Infantry Division, then under the command of Maj Gen Jaswant Singh, had occupied the main defences in the general area of the Kalit-Troti heights with a brigade group and had pushed forward covering troops of about a battalion and one armoured squadron west of the Manawar Wali Tawi, and one armoured regiment less one squadron plus two infantry companies to southeast of the river to cover the approaches from the Nadala-Marchola salient of Pakistan. The remainder of the force was suitably grouped and kept ready in the rear for the impending offensive.

One of these brigade groups was located at Akhnur to cover any threat to the bridge through Chicken’s Neck, a Pakistani salient east of the Chenab. The offensive visualised the establishment of a firm base by a brigade group west of the Manawar Wali Tawi by D minus 2, crossing the ceasefire line by two brigade groups close to each other and securing a sizable lodgment area by D plus 2, and a breakout by an armoured brigade towards the depth objectives. The armoured brigade was located east of the Chenab and had to be ferried across the river in the hours of darkness, an operation which was expected to take five nights or so.

The opposition expected was about one brigade group of Pakistan 23 Infantry Division and a regiment of armour (Sherman 76 mm) initially, possibly to be built up with an independent armoured brigade. In that event, the deep thrust by our armoured brigade was to be reduced to containment. The plan had the blessing of the corps commander, and the GOC was confident of pulling it off. But there were two major snags. Firstly, the covering troops were not strong enough to cope with their allotted task of delaying the Pakistanis about 48 hours, involving a defensive battle somewhere near the Troti heights. This meant loss of the entire territory up to the main defensive position almost to the gates to Jaurian without giving a serious battle.

If it was intended to use the offensive as part of the defensive action to preserve our territorial integrity this was based on a mistaken premise. Since in the overall context the Indian Army was to conduct a holding action only in the west while decisions were being sought in the east, the initiative for starting a war rested with Pakistan. It would have been imprudent to assume that the start of our offensive would automatically ensure our territorial integrity since any preemptive action on the part of Pakistan would have resulted in certain loss of territory.

Secondly, the movement of the armoured brigade across the Chenab would have started by D minus 5 Day, and the strength of armour in 26 Infantry Division deployed in defence of Jammu would have progressively diminished till on D Day there would have been only one armoured regiment left to the divisions. This would have left the formation unbalanced in an offensive against Jammu in the critical period of suspense before the war.

These weaknesses in the plans were brought to the Chief’s notice. He accordingly flew to the sector on 1 November, met the corps and divisional commanders and gave the following on-the-spot decisions for immediate implementation. The pertinent aspects of these with regard to 10 Infantry Division were:

Accordingly, GOC 10 Infantry Division pushed forward 191 Infantry Brigade Group west of the Manawar Wali Tawi on the night of 2/3 November. They occupied defences on the Mandiala heights-Gurha-Phagla ridge-Barsala-Jhanda-Manawar line west of the river, mainly to cover the approaches to the fords in three tiers, and Chhati Tahli-Nawan Hamirpur east of the river. The screens and patrols were maintained along the ceasefire line and the international boundary. One infantry battalion was deployed in the foothills on the Laleali-Point 707-Dewa-Nathuan Tibba line on the northern flank.

The artillery units in support were deployed to cover our forward dispositions. The depth position near the Troti heights was occupied by the second brigade group with one of its battalions deployed for the protection of the Akhnur bridge in isolation, while the third brigade group was concentrated at Akhnur to be available as the leading brigade for the projected offensive. These troops remained in this posture throughout November and were possibly picked up by Pakistani intelligence.

Warning was received on 2 December of the imminence of hostilities and as a result the deployment was readjusted to meet the threat to the sector. This meant building up the Chhati Tahli and Nawan Hamirpur position by the second brigade less one battalion, and moving a battalion of the third brigade to Troti heights to take over the defences vacated by the second. Mines were laid ahead of the defended area, leaving a gap between Barsala and Jhande covered by a dummy minefield, through which gap the division planned to launch its offensive.

The Deccan Horse, the divisional armoured regiment (T-54), was broadly deployed to have one squadron west of the Manawar Wali Tawi, one in the area of Khaur to cover the Nadala salient, and the regiment less two squadrons in the area of Kachrael to reinforce both sectors. The second armoured regiment was concentrated in the rear and the independent squadron in the Akhnur area. This posture, whereby the bulk of the force remained uncommitted to the ground, was primarily offensive-oriented as the intention of the GOC was to attack at the earliest opportunity.

According to intelligence estimates, 20 Infantry and 4 POK Brigades of Pakistan 23 Infantry Division were employed opposite the sector in a holding role both in the plains and hilly areas. 26 Cavalry was known to be deployed in the general area of Tanda-Kuri-Mattewal-Hunj with one squadron in the area of Padhar. Apart from the integral artillery of these two brigades, one heavy regiment or a major portion of it was reported to be located in Tanda.

Pakistan 17 Infantry Division, comprising 66 and 67 Infantry Brigades, was located in the depth area of Jalalpur-Peroshah, with one battalion protecting the Marala headworks. An independent armoured brigade, comprising 10 and 11 Cavalry Regiments, was known to be located in the Kharian complex within access of the Chhamb sector. The presence of a few Patton tanks was noticed in the Nadala-Marchola salient. Some T series tanks were also seen on the Mattewal ridge, but their number and identity were not known.

Meanwhile, Pakistan had different plans. Maj Gen Iftikhar Khan, GOC Pakistan 23 Infantry Division, was given the task of securing Indian territory tip to the Manawar Wali Tawi. In addition to his integral two brigades employed in a holding role along the ceasefire line, he was allotted two more (66 and 111 Infantry), one armoured brigade (two regiments) and eight to ten artillery units. The operation envisaged withdrawal of the additional resources on completion of the task, leaving the holding troops dominating the river obstacle for better security of the sensitive Pakistani complexes of Gujrat and Kharian. Pakistani intelligence had a fair estimate of the Indian deployment opposite, especially in the Chhamb salient, as the troops had been in battle locations more than a month. Iftikhar Khan’s plan broadly envisaged containing the southern Indian defences through a series of local actions so as to develop his major thrust in the north towards Mandiala, where the opposition was negligible, and to capture the bridge over the river as part of the first phase of the operation.

After securing a bridgehead near the Mandiala crossing, he was to threaten Jaurian with a view to cutting off reinforcements for the troops deployed in the Chhamb salient as well as those facing the Nadala-Marchola approaches. By this envelopment he hoped to defeat 10 Infantry Division in detail and thereby achieve his aim plus, as the territory denied to Pakistan in 1965 would have been his for the taking right up to Akhnur. He grouped his resources accordingly and broadly employed them thus:

• 4 POK Brigade Group in the north to secure the Mandiala crossing and establish a bridgehead up to the Kachrael heights.
• In conjunction with the northern thrust 66 Infantry Brigade group to capture the Chhamb and Mandiala heights.
• 111 Infantry Brigade Group to contain the troops deployed from Barsala to Jhanda.
• 20 Infantry Brigade to attack from Jhanda to Manawar in the south.

Operation West of Manawar Wali Tawi

Information came through higher headquarters that the Indian air bases at Amritsar, Pathankot and Srinagar had been raided by air at dusk on 3 December. An undeclared war had been imposed on India by this preemptive Pakistani attack,⁶ and as a result a general alert was ordered in the divisional sector. Our troops did not have to wait long. At 2030 hours Pakistani artillery started shelling the defences west of Manawar Wali Tawi and all BOPs were simultaneously subjected to intense f i re. The main defences were contacted the same night, with the exception of a few BOPs which held out. The enemy made liberal use of artillery, and this had a telling effect on our troops.

At 0820 hours on 4 December some armour, later identified as 11 Cavalry, was seen advancing on the Dewa-Ghopar axis and heading for the Mandiala crossing. The advance was blunted by Deccan Horse and the recoilless guns of 5 Sikh, who shot up six leading enemy tanks. The Pakistanis tried later to manoeuvre some tanks and RCLs mounted on jeeps in front of Point 994. They were engaged by our tanks about 1130 hours, damaging two RCLs and six more tanks. But the enemy pressed home the attack in the north through Sukhtao nullah and captured Mandiala North by midday.

One infantry company was ordered to counterattack the position at last light, but it failed to make an impression. It was later decided to retake the position with an infantry battalion/armoured squadron group from across the river from the Chaprael side at night, using troops from the third brigade group at Akhnur. But as a result of intense shelling of the area and casualties among key personnel the Indian attack never got going. The Pakistani force was therefore able to consolidate its position further on Mandiala North by 4 December.

Activity by day was confined to local skirmishes, but by the end of it some troops in khaki were seen trying to cross the Tawi close to the Mandiala crossing. These were Pakistanis who were mistaken by our side for BSF personnel, and the crossing went on unhindered. Throughout the day efforts had been afoot to gather the original counterattack infantry battalion group for deployment in the gap between Buchoe Mandi and the bridge to cover the Mandiala crossing. But this could not be effected, and as a result the Pakistanis managed to get about two battalions (6 and 11 POK) across and ran straight into a medium artillery regiment deployed in the area.

While this resulted in confusion in the general area of the forward batteries, the depth batteries fired into the enemy over open sights, inflicting heavy casualties. The confused fighting continued throughout the night, and in the process five Indian guns were damaged. Some Pakistani tanks tried to cross the river in this rea next morning, but they were engaged in time by our armour on the home bank and five destroyed. By this time, the enemy offensive to secure the bridgehead was completely in disarray and he quickly withdrew across the Tawi. A spirited counterattack by a Gorkha company regained the Mandiala bridge by 1030 hours on 5 December.

Not dismayed by this reverse, Iftikhar Khan regrouped his force in the day and developed a thrust by last light between Chhamb and Manawar against Ghogi, Barsala and Point 951. The Pakistanis succeeded in capturing Gurha and Mandiala South in the north. They were also reported to be occupying Singri and progressing towards Chak Pandit. The jaws of the Pakistani thrust were closing on the likely crossing, jeopardising our troops west of the Tawi. Jaswant Singh, GOC 10 Infantry Division, tried to redeploy his troops in depth but failed because he lacked control of the withdrawing troops as a result of the confusion of battle.

At this stage, he decided to withdraw and stabilise the defence line on the eastern bank of the river. The withdrawal started at 2100 hours on 6 December and was completed by 2330 hours, when the bridge was blown up by rear parties to mark the end of the battle for the Chhamb salient. Some equipment and vehicles fell into Pakistani hands, but on the whole 191 Infantry Brigade came back in reasonable shape, was deployed in depth near the Troti heights and took no further part in the battle.

It is significant that the operations west of the Tawi were fought by 191 Infantry Brigade group on its own with the marginal reinforcement of three infantry companies, two armoured squadrons (T-55) and one field company inducted piecemeal to meet operational requirements from situation to situation over a period extending from the start of hostilities to withdrawal east of the Tawi.

Operations East of Manawar Wali Tawi

It was belatedly realised that it would no longer be possible to contain the Pakistani offensive west of the Tawi and the projected Indian offensive would not be forthcoming in the developing situation. As such, the follow-up brigades were deployed east of the Tawi and came in contact with the enemy on the withdrawal of 191 Infantry Brigade Group about midnight on 6/7 December. The enemy was not quick to follow up the withdrawal, and this gave the Indians an opportunity to improve their defences. The Pakistanis attempted to force the Raipur crossing on 8/9 December, but the attack was beaten back by the holding battalion 10 Garhwal Rifles, the Pakistanis leaving 39 dead and six prisoners of war and some arms and ammunition.

Probing attacks were made at night all over the front, but no ground was yielded by the defenders. Iftikhar Khan attempted to push forward his armour through Sukhtao nullah opposite Chaprael, but this was also thwarted. Undaunted by repeated failures to get across the Tawi, Pakistan launched 111 Infantry Brigade with 4 Punjab and 10 Baluch, supported by 28 Cavalry, at 0630 hours on 10 December through the Darh crossing, and succeeded in establishing a bridgehead approximately 3,650 metres wide and 900 metres deep.

9 Jat, the battalion deployed in the area, was completely surprised as, it transpired later, they did not have any surveillance elements ahead in the tall sarkanda grass. The enemy was not however allowed to make much headway by the timely strengthening of the forward line with tanks and infantry in the general area of Palatan. Gaps in the line were also filled promptly by the occupation of Darh, earlier vacated by 9 Jat, with elements of a reinforcing battalion. The Pakistani follow-up echelons walked straight into a hail of fire from the well-sited weapons of the Darh company and were badly mauled. This caused much confusion in the enemy ranks, and their will to proceed with the operation began to slacken. This was aggravated by lack of armour support as boggy ground arrested the movement of Pakistani tanks.

Jaswant Singh mustered one battalion and a mixed group of Deccan Horse and 72 Armoured Regiment tanks and launched a counterattack from the east. The tanks however got bogged down in the soft ground and the infantry could only get about 900 metres cast of the Darh crossing. The battalion dug itself in to prevent further ingress by the enemy. About this time, Iftikhar Khan, the Pakistani commander, was killed in a helicopter crash and conduct of the operation passed to his less resolute successor.

By midday on 10 December, Sartaj Singh arrived in the sector and ordered two-pronged counterattacks on the Pakistani bridgehead, from the north by two infantry companies with one squadron of 72 Armoured Regiment, and from the south with one infantry company. The attack went in at 1700 hours but hit thin air as, unknown to the Indians, the new Pakistani commander had called off the operation. His troops, severely shaken and disorganized, had been pulled out and the lodgment east of the Tawi vacated in the early noon of 10 December. The two prongs of the counterattack linked up about midnight on 10/11 December and the situation generally stabilized.

Next morning, the whole area was found littered with bodies, indicating the fierceness of the battle. Most of the dead were caught in the armoured assault. Six Pakistani tanks, including one serviceable, were found abandoned astride the river. Our tank losses were five.

Operation in the Hill Sector

The enemy attacked Picquet 707, Laleali and Dewa on 3 December, but his attacks were beaten back successfully except for Picket 707, where he initially managed to establish a foothold by overrunning our forward posts. But a spirited counterattack restored the situation and the enemy left behind about 50 dead, including Capt Mujib Fakhrullah Khan of 1 Masud Battalion. These attempts were repeated on 6 and 7 December, but proved unsuccessful against the stiff resistance of the Indian defences. One Pakistani OP aircraft was shot down by small arms fire from Laleali.

To reinforce our positions, one company was moved to Nathuan Tibba. On 5 December, Pakistan successfully infiltrated a platoon in the Batal area behind our defences and attacked the wagon lines of a battery. The enemy was evicted by the company moved from Nathuan Tibba, and from the dead and wounded it became known that 6 AK Battalion of Pakistan 23 Infantry Division was operating in the area.

About 1500 hours on 8 December Pakistan succeeded in capturing Dewa and the surrounding heights after heavy and fierce fighting, thus removing the Indian threat on its northern flank for good. After its capture Pakistan did not make any further progress in the hilly area, although probing actions all along the ceasefire line continued throughout the war.

The battle of Chhamb may be termed the most significant in the western theatre for a number of reasons. It resulted in the maximum loss of productive Indian territory⁷ in this war, about 21,000 hectares of fertile agricultural land. In consonance with the Simla Agreement which⁸ permitted retention of J and K state territory gained by either side across the ceasefire line, all this area had to be given up to Pakistan. This seemed paradoxical to many, considering that much longer areas of West Pakistani territory captured by India in the near vicinity had also to be returned. The displaced inhabitants of the area failed to understand what prevented the authorities from safeguarding their homes, especially when the Pakistani intentions in the area became apparent after the 1965 operations. Some dissatisfied elements doubted the Indian Army’s oft-professed invincibility and spread unpleasant rumours to further demoralize the refugees in camps.

Above all, the Indian Army suffered the maximum casualties of the war in this battle. They totalled 1,353—400 killed, 723 wounded, and 190 missing and prisoners of war. Eighteen tanks and a number of guns, vehicles and other equipment were also lost. It is estimated that the Pakistani attackers must have suffered losses about two to three times that number both in men and equipment. The exact figures of their casualties are not available from published postwar records, but Fazal Muqeem says in his book that they were heavy.

Why did India lose the Chhamb salient? Why did not the Indian military planners ensure that the story of 1965 was not repeated in 1971? It is felt that this happened through the accumulation of various shortcomings in Indian military thinking at the time. Although one of the tasks allotted to 10 Infantry Division was to defend the area of its operational responsibility, the higher command did not clarify how this was to be achieved. Jaswant Singh was a militarily well-educated officer, had a fair amount of war experience, and was very highly thought of by his fellow officers. His defensive plan was based on the premise that the battle would be on ground of his own choosing, primarily to cause attrition to the enemy without considering the loss of territory or the exact estimate of the effort required to regain it later.

His main defensive position was close to Kalit and the Troti heights, a good 20 kilometres from the ceasefire line with a major anti-tank obstacle in Manawar Wali Tawi between. This posture visualized covering troops operating west of the Tawi falling back to the main defences by merely achieving 48 hours of delay. Little did the General realize that if the Pakistanis managed to advance up to the heights, which was easy in view of the marginal opposition the covering troops offered, it would be difficult to push the enemy back across the line with his resources. In the context of the overall resources of the opposing forces in the theatre, the Pakistani reinforcing potential was greater than India could spare from other operational commitments in the existing equation of time and space. It is amazing how Jaswant Singh’s superiors accepted this backward planning, and further how he was allowed to implement it in the initial stages of deployment.

When the Chief pointed out that loss of territory was not acceptable and the plans had to be altered accordingly, the pendulum swung to the other extreme. On the premise that he would have the initiative to start the projected offensive, Jaswant Singh ordered 191 Infantry Brigade to establish a firm base west of the Tawi and act as a launching pad for the Indian thrusts. The bias of troop deployment was towards the south, and the northern routes of ingress into our territory were comparatively thinly defended. He was confident that once the battle was carried into Pakistani territory the threat to the Chhamb salient would automatically peter out.

He was imbued with an offensive spirit, and his energies were unreservedly directed towards preparations for the offensive operations of his formation. That is how he kept his followup brigades intact, fully organized and grouped, to be launched at short notice, and while laying mines in front of forward defences he deliberately kept wide gaps in the form of dummy minefields for his attacking troops to pass through. Out of his striking armour, he committed no more than one squadron along with the firm base brigade. His attention was so focussed on his objectives that he failed to notice the Pakistani buildup to nearly four times the estimated size right under his nose.

While Iftikhar Khan was poised for preemptive strikes against the divisional sector, Jaswant Singh was eagerly awaiting word to start his own. It was only on 1 December that his corps commander told him that the overall strategy necessitated our forces staying on the defensive till Pakistan started the war, and even then the offensive in this sector would be launched only after the enemy’s initial hand was revealed. The General obviously did not relish the change of emphasis in the plans and reacted by making no more than marginal readjustments by inducting another armoured squadron and some infantry to strengthen 191 Infantry Brigade. But there was no basic change in the original firm base posture.

As a result, when war came to the Chhamb salient on 3 December, the division was caught off balance. To regain it, the GOC did no more than feed armour and infantry reinforcements piecemeal, thus breaking up cohesive unit organisations, a process which was antagonistic to efficient functioning. The reserve brigade was moved forward only on 5 December, when the withdrawal of 191 Infantry Brigade was forced by the enemy.

In fact, out of the total resources of 10 Infantry Division, no more than a third came into direct contact with the enemy at any one time, and the full potential of the force was therefore never exploited to advantage in the critical stages of the battle. This was perhaps due to the fact that the General’s mental attitude remained attuned to an offensive despite the dictates of battle pointing to defence. This conflict between his concepts and the realities of battle seemed to have induced a state of paralysis so that he made no effort to wrest the initiative from the enemy at any stage.

It would have been advisable to adopt a posture of two up after the Chief’s clarifications. Two brigades should have been deployed west of the Tawi, and one brigade in depth to hold the crossing over the Tawi. This would have ensured our security of territory in full measure, and a switch from a defensive to an offensive posture would have been possible without resorting to major readjustments.

After 10 December, whence Pakistani bridgehead east of Tawi was eliminated, the General and the higher command were content to keep the defensive line stabilized on the Manawar Wali Tawi till the end of the war. Owing to an overall shortage of resources, Pakistan moved out additional troops to the Sialkot and Shakargarh sector, where a major Indian offensive was by then underway. The holding force opposite 10 Infantry Division along the Tawi was left with no more than a brigade plus of Pakistan 23 Infantry Division.

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The deployment pattern of enemy troops in contact, as also in the rear areas, was discernible, especially now that our troops in Laleali and the Nathuan Tibba areas commanded a view of the entire Chhamb salient. Exploiting the denudation of Pakistani strength in this sector, there was a good opportunity to regain the lost territory through an offensive by bringing in one or two armoured regiments from the neighbouring formations where the planned operations had already been accomplished. Instead, the General and the higher command sat out the rest of the war licking their wounds. Inactivity is inexcusable in the context of short wars.

Both in 1965 and 1971, the Indian formations defending the sector were surprised and trounced across the Manawar Wali Tawi in a matter of 48 to 72 hours by Pakistani forces with superiority of local armour in the sector. Our localities, defended with inadequate anti-tank potential, could not stand up to the Pakistani assaults and disintegrated after nominal resistance. In view of the terrain in the Chhamb salient, plain-like and negotiable by tanks, and elsewhere along the international border, a continuous artificial anti-tank obstacle should be created to enable our troops to hold out against surprise tank rushes. Especially so when loss of territory is not politically acceptable to the nation. Since in the present context India is not likely to have either the resources to create a temporary obstacle belt of this magnitude within the time frame of a preemptive Pakistani attack, it is imperative that a permanent obstacle in the form of a ditch be created all along the border in peacetime. Using this enhanced defence potential, India could save resources from dormant sectors to go on to the offensive and develop thrust lines into Pakistani territory on ground of our choosing.

1. Asian Recorder, Vol XI, No 37, “Massive Pakistani Infiltration into Jammu and Kashmir,” p. 6651.
2. Asian Recorder, Vol XI, No 37, “Armed Clashes,” p. 6652.
3. Asian Recorder, Vol XI, No 38, “Indian Forces Cross Ceasefire Line in Kashmir,” p. 6665.
4. Asian Recorder, Vol XI, No 40, “Massive Pakistani Attack on, Chhamb—India-Pakistan Fighting,” p. 6687.
5. Asian Recorder, Vol XI, No 40, “India Launched Three-pronged. Offensive into West Pakistan,” p. 6688.
6. Asian Recorder, Vol XVIII, No 2, “Pakistani Attack on Airfields,” P. 10535.
7. Asian Recorder, Vol XVIII, No 3, “Position at Time of Ceasefire,” p. 10569.
8. Asian Recorder, Vol XVIII, No 29, “Summit Talks in Simla- Clarification,” p. 10877.