Indian Defence Review

16 December: After suffering a few casualties in the probing mission in Barmer and believing that the enemy had reinforced his defences in the Nayachor and Umarkot areas, bewoor’s fears once again came to the fore. In his conversation with Colonel General Staff, he expressed fears that the enemy had reinforced Nayachor with approximately two squadrons of T-59s and one of Shermans. It is significant that the troops in contract had not reported such a development.Bewoor commanded that the piecemeal probing and nibbling should stop and a concerted attack should be planned after a proper buildup instead.

Also read: 1971: The Rajasthan Campaign – I

The battalion group leading the way to Umarkot in the southern sub-sector ha dreached Hingrotar, within striking distance of its traget, although the supporting artillery was taking some time to catch up because of the sandy terrain. Bewoor spelt out his fears to the poor Colonel General Staff, saying that Umarkot had been considerably reinforced by enemy tanks and it would be difficult to go to the unit’s aid if it got into trouble. In isolation, the battlion would be mauled badly. He directed the battalion advance to be halted forthwith and its pullback northeast of Chachro.

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By then, the battalion group had caught up with its leading elements in Hingrotar. The field guns had not yet arrived, but artillery support was available from one light battery. Anand, who was out visiting the forward troops, was briefed by Colonel General Staff about the Army Commander’s directions on his return to his headquarters. He apprized the Army Commander of his own estimate of the enemy opposition and informed him that our patrolling had revealed extensive anti-tank and anti-personnel minefields along the entire front in considerable depth. In addition, there were some nuisance mines along the tracks and the railway line. Efforts were afoot to create lanes for further progress.

He apprized the Army Commander of his own estimate of the enemy opposition and informed him that our patrolling had revealed extensive anti-tank and anti-personnel minefields along the entire front in considerable depth.

He felt that the battalion group near Umarkot could link up with the followup brigade established southeast of the Parbat All feature and proceed with the operations instead of pulling back, which would be psychologically wrong. In any case, the battalion was well away from Umarkot, and should help be necessary it could be rushed from the followup brigade group. The Army Commander heard him patiently and directed him to con-tinue to progress along the track and get the railway laid and complete the build-up speedily. He advised him to be careful of saboteurs and Pakistan SSG elements operating in the rear areas. Bewoor’s fears were steadily getting control of him.

BSF continued to expand its operations in Kutch ahead of the border posts, and these were yielding good dividends. The para-commando groups infiltrated towards their respective target areas overnight.

17 December

Two Bengali officers crossed over to the divisional sector in Barmer and surrendered in the morning. Both were junior captains, one an engineer and the other a doctor. They volunteered the following information:

The battalion in the southern sub-sector was heavily shelled in its location at Hingrotar, and this was followed by an enemy attack supported by tanks. Though the initial enemy attack was contained, a major attack came later.

Apparently, the Pakistani commanders had beaten Bewoor to it. While the Army Commander was still building up his deliberate attack, involving protracted stocking, Pakistan had reinforced the sector, and it was now beyond Bewoor’s capability to tackle it.

The battalion in the southern sub-sector was heavily shelled in its location at Hingrotar, and this was followed by an enemy attack supported by tanks. Though the initial enemy attack was contained, a major attack came later. As the battalion was outside the range of our supporting artillery assisted by adequate anti-tank potential and had exhausted its ammunition, it withdrew to a locality within the range of its field artillery. The Pakistanis did not pursue. The expected aid from theup brigade did not materialize and the battalion rejoined the parent formation at Chachro rather dazed.

The command reserve battalion was placed under Kutch sector and moved to Dharamsala. Commando groups raided Islamkot and found it unoccupied. Then they operated towards Mithi, where they laid on an ambush about ten kilometres west of Islamkot and managed to kill about 19 enemy and take nine prisoners, including one junior commissioned officer. One vehicle and arms and equipment were captured.

In Pakistans overall strategy, the Rajasthan Desert was a low-priority area.

The unilateral Indian ceasefire, later accepted by Pakistan, came into force from 2000 hours, and thus the India-Pakistan war of 1971 came to a close. The situation at the time in Southern Command was that 11 Infantry Division had managed to penetrate the undefended desert belt against minimal opposition, traversing indifferent desert tracks for about 60 kilometres. It had contacted the Pakistani Nayachor defences within two days of the start of offensive operations. The next ten days were spent in rehabilitating the rail tracks and constructing the duckboard road for the build-up for a divisional attack, but did not become operative till well after the ceasefire.

The Pakistani planners had sought to use this sandy belt as a security zone by deliberately keeping it underdeveloped in communications and water supply.

This wait on the doorstep of the Pakistani defences overlooking the Nayachor defences stretched about ten days, enabling the Pakistani reinforcement of the position in such strength that even if the war had been prolonged it would have resulted in an impasse It was quite obvious that the division had overstretched itself without maintaining its administrative balance. 12 Infantry Division spent the war period adopting difficult tactical postures without getting to grips with the enemy. It watched helplessly the opportunity to destroy completely the Pakistani offensive force committed towards Longenwala go by.

While our Air Force destroyed the column, this formation helped only in counting the damage. Its contribution to blunting the offensive, except for the tenacity of a company’s worth of troops in holding out at Longenwala post, was negligible.

BSF had proved more aggressive in the Kutch and Bikaner sectors, and by the end of hostilities it had occupied about 50 peripheral Pakistan border posts which had either been vacated by the Rangers or Mujahids or where opposition was light. By the end of the war Southern Command was in occupation of approximately 12,200 square kilometres of sandy waste which proved an embarrassment by straining Bewoor’s ability to maintain troops across it rather than hurting Pakistan economically.

Pakistani aim was to compel the Indian forces to stay in the region so that within the stipulated time schedule of the major Pakistani thrust in the Punjab and Jammu and Kashmir sectors troops and equipment employed in Rajasthan could not be disengaged to influence the battles in the plains.

In Pakistan’s overall strategy, the Rajasthan Desert was a low-priority area. It was mostly in the province of Sind, and through it passed the road and rail arteries connecting Karachi with West Punjab, the main base of operations against Jammu and Kashmir and East Punjab. Once a desolate tract, the area had been partly opened up for agriculture by the construction of a barrage at Sukkur, near Rohri. A large number of irrigation canals run north to south and terminate in the desert.

There is a clear gap of sand between the border and the green agricultural belt between 48 and 65 kilometres in depth. The Pakistani planners had sought to use this sandy belt as a security zone by deliberately keeping it underdeveloped in communications and water supply. It is sparsely populated and economically so backward that its inhabitants hardly manage to exist.

Pakistani strategy visualizes holding the border by means of outposts varying in strength from a platoon to a company of paramilitary forces and securing the main routes of entry to the green belt along the canal lines with regular troops based on armour and infantry supported by artillery. Since the green belt is well served by rail and road communications and an abundance of water, administrative support presents no problem.

The main road and rail communications run parallel, though in considerable depth, to the border. Reserves can be moved with ease to reinforce the threatened sector before India is capable of building up for an attack. The number of troops required to defend the green belt is considerably reduced because of the incapacitating quality of the wastelands.

The strategic Pakistani aims in the sectors were three. Firstly, to protect the sensitive belt, including the rail and road arteries running west and east from Karachi. This was achieved as the Indian forces were nowhere able to reach it from Rajasthan. The occupation of about 11,700 square kilometres of waste cost India more than it did Pakistan. The ethnic minority, consisting of Soda Rajputs and business communities, had fled to India in thousands and had to be looked after in refugee camps in Rajasthan and Gujarat, where they were proving a political embarrassment.

Bartering space for time is an age-old procedure in long wars before launching a counter-offensive. In short wars and the subsequent political settlements the trend has been for the contestants to return each other’s territory. This has been so in the Indian subcontinent too. After the war of 1965, all captured territory was returned. The Pakistani military planners had sought a trade-off on the sandy wastes in the Rajasthan sector which had saved them troops. They had employed only one infantry division to hold the sector for the defensive tasks visualized.

The second strategic Pakistani aim was to compel the Indian forces to stay in the region so that within the stipulated time schedule of the major Pakistani thrust in the Punjab and Jammu and Kashmir sectors troops and equipment employed in Rajasthan could not be disengaged to influence the battles in the plains. Pakistan achieved this in ample measure, thanks to Bewoor’s half-hearted offensive efforts on two divergent axes.

There was complete confusion in the orders as far as air support was concerned.

The third Pakistani aim was to cause as much attrition to the Indian forces as possible. But this could not be achieved because of the catastrophic failure of the Longenwala offensive.

The statistics of attrition go in favour of India, but it should be borne in mind that this damage was the direct result of the failure of the Pakistani offensive and not to any significant degree of Indian action, and whatever credit is due to the Indian side in this sector should go to the Air Force and not to the Army.

Pakistani aim was to cause as much attrition to the Indian forces as possible. But this could not be achieved because of the catastrophic failure of the Longenwala offensive.

There was nothing conceptually wrong in the Pakistani offensive. The fault lay in its timing and execution. It should have been launched after India had revealed its hand. Launching the formation 48 hours later would have paid big dividends. The scenario would then have been that Khambata would probably be held up in the sands short of Bhagla, neither able to proceed forward nor capable of coming back. The Pakistani strike force could then have had a free run despite its shortage of equipment. It might then have been able to annihilate the larger part of 12 Infantry Division, especially when Bewoor had hardly any reserves to send to his rescue.

Why did the Pakistani offensive fail? Fazal Muqeem spells it out thus:

The offensive was conceived at a later stage by the Army Chief of Staff on his visit to the formation, somewhat preemptorily and without due process of staff duty. The division was not prepared or equipped to fight in the desert. Its transport was not suitable for movement in the desert terrain and the logistical area was not in a position to support it. There was complete confusion in the orders as far as air support was concerned. It later transpired that the air force was waiting for a special request to activate Jacobabad airfield which was never received from the army.

The most unfortunate part was that the air plan had never been demanded by the army or presented in detail by the air force. All the support, including air and logistic support, promised to the division was not forthcoming. The commanders had no heart in the operation. The artillery commander and the brigade commander had vehemently objected to the operation.

On the other hand, the Indian forces operating in the sector had failed to carry out the tasks allotted to Southern Command except for defence of the territorial integrity of the region. The 12 Infantry Division offensive was preempted by the Pakistani offensive and thus failed to intercept rail and road communication in the general area of Khanpur-Rahim Yar Khan-Khairpur.The destruction of the enemy forces operating in the sector to the extent achieved was incidental to the air action against the Longenwala offensive. The contribution of the ground force to this destruction was negligible. As the division got nowhere near the Rahim Yar Khan area the question of developing operations farther towards Sukkur and Bahawalpur did not arise.

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11 Infantry Division failed to impose severe attrition on the Pakistani forces deployed in the Barmer sector, and since the division failed to capture Nayachor-Umarkot developing operations towards Hyderabad were ruled out. In the sectors of Kutch and Bikaner, the task was mainly containment, and this was achieved in good measure.

In a short war this had no meaning as the military depots and production units of limited war material were located in Punjab itself and could look after the needs of the dependent forces.

Apart from defending our territory, the strategic Indian aims in the Rajasthan sector were primarily directed towards threatening sensitive Pakistani areas in the Rahim Yar Khan and Hyderabad regions so as to draw maximum Pakistani reserves away from the plains of Punjab. The mere denudation of the Punjab sector to reinforce opposite Rajasthan eased the tasks in the Punjab battle. The distance involved in committing reserves were such that in a short war these could not be effective on both fronts. In this regard, the Barmer sector was preferable because Indian forces were able to withdraw one brigade group from 33 Indian Division towards Nayachor as the war reached its end. To that extent the offensive potential of the Pakistani strike force (II Corps) was reduced.

The second strategic aim was severance of Karachi, the only commercial port, from the battle fronts of Punjab and of Jammu and Kashmir. In a short war this had no meaning as the military depots and production units of limited war material were located in Punjab itself and could look after the needs of the dependent forces. Moreover, Pakistan had developed alternative rail and road communication connecting Karachi with the hinterland Although circuitous and more time-consuming, the uninterrupted flow of war traffic between the port and the interior of Punjab was maintained.

The appreciation clearly indicated that Pakistan had the capability to raise one brigade group with two armour regiments for a limited action towards Ramgarh and Jaisalmer.

Army Headquarters’ estimate of Pakistani strength, its deployment and likely actions were as accurate as crystal gazing allowed, even up to anticipating the Pakistani offensive towards Longenwala-Ramgarh. The appreciation clearly indicated that Pakistan had the capability to raise one brigade group with two armour regiments for a limited action towards Ramgarh and Jaisalmer.

Indian intelligence however failed on two counts. It had indicated earlier that Pakistan 18 Infantry Division had two armoured regiments of Shermans, but with Chinese military aid pouring in before the war it should have foreseen that one of them had been requipped with T-59s. The other omission pertained to the road between Khokhrapar-Nayachor, which was shown as tarmac class when it was really a desert track. That our intelligence did not know road conditions within six kilometres of our border was inexcusable, but this should not necessarily have upset the development of our operations as a railway with much larger capacity ran parallel to it.

The Indian failure to achieve its strategic aims may be attributed to overall weakness in command plans, in that we undertook to conduct two divisional operations on two divergent axes separated by about 240 kilometres without worthwhile reserves in either sector to meet unforeseen contingencies or to influence the battle when required. It would have been better to contain one sector and go all out in the other by concentrating resources where a decision was sought.

 Aircraft could have been similarly concentrated to achieve much-needed aerial superiority in the sector.

It should have been possible to concentrate in the Jaisalmer sector about one armour regiment (AMX) less one squadron (which could be detached for a holding role in the Barmer sector), two armoured squadrons (T-55), one medium regiment from 11 Infantry Division, two engineer regiments (one from 11 Infantry Division and the other command reserve) and pool track construction materials.

Aircraft could have been similarly concentrated to achieve much-needed aerial superiority in the sector. The effect of this force launching a counter-offensive either in accordance with the original plans towards Rahim Yar Khan or to trap the Pakistani strike force opposite Longenwala would have unnerved the enemy and achieved our strategic aims to a good measure.

It was due to the bankruptcy of Bewoor’s military thinking that he resorted instead to a mathematical distribution of his resources on the two axes with adequate reserves and as a result came nowhere near achieving our strategic aims. Army Headquarters visualized such an employment as the allotment of tasks indicated severe attrition of the Pakistani forces in the Barmer sector initially and subsequent development of operations towards Hyderabad. It is apparent that the plan involved switching forces to this sector after completing the tasks in the Jaisalmer sector. It is a great pity that the Chief did not inform Bewoor of these intentions in time.

The Indian failure to achieve its strategic aims may be attributed to overall weakness in command plans”¦

It appears that neither Bewoor nor his commanders had taken the full measure of what an offensive deep in Pakistani territory involved in tangible terms of resources, time schedules and organisation. The problem was basically one of crossing a desert belt of 40 to 48 kilometres in depth. Our strategic roads led up to or fell a little short of the border, and beyond lay a waterless tract of sand dunes with poor roads and track systems unable to sustain wheeled traffic.

So the operation in this terrain involved an initial crossing of the desert belt swiftly and establishing a bridgehead in the greet belt, building roads behind and a subsequent build-up of the force to resume the offensive almost like river-crossing operations. All this had to be achieved in such a time frame that Pakistan would be unable to reinforce or adopt other countermeasures.

Like the Pakistanis, the Indian divisions were neither organized nor equipped to throw up such a mobile force.

It therefore became imperative for the leading formations/groups to have sufficient mobility to get over the sand dunes, to establish a strong bridgehead with supporting arms and logistics, and to withstand the possible enemy reactions till roads/tracks caught up. Like the Pakistanis, the Indian divisions were neither organized nor equipped to throw up such a mobile force. Bewoor tried to improvize such a force in the Jaisalmer sector by pooling one armour regiment (AMX) with one infantry battalion and one light regiment (120-mm mortars) mounted on 4 X 4 one-tonners fitted with balloon tyres and one field regiment (25-pounders). Of this heterogeneous group the AMX regiment was not mechanically reliable because its tank fleet was aging and the field regiment with towed guns was incapable of travelling cross-country among the dunes.

It is doubtful whether this force could have withstood the Pakistani reactions on its own before the road/track was extended to enable a further troop and logistic build-up. As it was, the duckboard track resources permitting, it could have caught up only in ten days, and by that time this force would have been decimated.

Our strategic roads led up to or fell a little short of the border, and beyond lay a waterless tract of sand dunes with poor roads and track systems unable to sustain wheeled traffic.

If however Bewoor had gone on the offensive only in one sector, he had the resources to pool two T-59 squadrons with the AMX regiment less one squadron, one infantry battalion and one light regiment mounted on balloon tyred one-tonners and a medium artillery regiment in support. Since the duckboard trackmaking process was slow, it would have been preferable to undertake an offensive in the Barmer sector, where the railway could have been used.

Moreover, the Pakistani reaction time in this sector being longer it would have enabled the build-up to proceed uninterrupted a little longer. By deciding to go on the offensive in both sectors, Bewoor jeopardized his chances of success before he started. The Indian formations allotted for operations in the desert were not suitably equipped or organized to meet the demands of warfare in such conditions. They required leading formations based on armour, mechanised infantry and helicopter or cross-country, vehicle-borne logistics and sufficient engineers and track material to bring up the roads speedily. Organisations suitable for desert warfare are discussed in a subsequent chapter.

What appeared at that time to be Khambata’s ineptness in setting off his offensive, namely postponement of the operation from 4 December by 24 hours, proved a blessing in disguise for Bewoor. It is horrifying, though nonetheless true, that as the plan stood the greater part of 12 Infantry Division would have been immobilized in the sands between Islamgarh and Bhagla by the time the Pakistani thrust crystallized at Longenwala. It would have been very difficult to extricate sufficient forces to meet the developing contingency.

“¦he was able to save his face first by proclaiming that he had blunted the Pakistani offensive and later parading the achievement of the Air Force as his own.

As it was, the slow manoeuvres Khambata and his formation commanders executed resulted in opportunities slipping by. If worst had come to worst, Bewoor would have looked a fool, unable to hide his mistakes even from our easily gullible public. But he was able to save his face first by proclaiming that he had blunted the Pakistani offensive and later parading the achievement of the Air Force as his own.

When I visited the scene of the battle of Longenwala after hostilities ended, I was told by the Collector of Jaisalmer district that he had informed 12 Infantry Division Headquarters about 30 November that the Pakistani villages along the border were being vacated. He also reported that the Pakistanis were improving the tracks from Gabbar to Sadhewala and Longenwala. In fact, the Pakistani boast of “having breakfast at Ramgarh and lunch at Jaisalmer” gathered by his contacts was also conveyed.

Whether Khambata conveyed these reported Pakistan activities to Bewoor is not known. It may be assumed from their relations before the war that even if he had done so Bewoor would have dismissed them as Khambata’s fears. It was later revealed that the Pakistani force which struck at Longenwala at approximately 0100 hours on 5 December started from its concentration areas in Reti and Gabbar sometime on the night of 2/3 December. This means that the columns traversed about 105 kilometres in 94 hours. Khambata got to know about this movement when Maj Govindpuri, company commander at Longenwala, reported that it had crossed the border, where our patrols were operating at the time.

The Pakistani troops appeared exhausted at the end of a gruelling approach march through the inhospitable sands. With a little dash they could have carried the post or bypassed it, and then nothing would have stood between them and breakfast at Rangarh.

On the first and second time Govindpuri reported the crossing, the battalion commander did not believe him and spoke disparagingly of his vivid imagination. When Govindpuri insisted that the noise of the Pakistani tanks was getting louder, the battalion commander dispatched two RCL guns as reinforcement at about 0300 hours, hoping this would keep Govindpuri quiet at least for some time. He however reported the matter to brigade headquarters, which in turn informed divisional headquarters.

By the time this information trickled down to Bewoor, it was approximately 0500 hours. The Longenwala post was then held by one platoon plus and not one company as was commonly believed. Luckily, the leading Pakistani elements did not press the attack on the post on contact, nor did they try to contain or bypass it. They also failed to establish roadblocks along the Sadhewala-Longenwala and Raigarh-Longenwala roads. They just positioned themselves before the post and allowed it to be reinforced in broad daylight by one troop of AMX tanks raised from the Armoured Delivery Squadron and one field battery. The Pakistani troops appeared exhausted at the end of a gruelling approach march through the inhospitable sands. With a little dash they could have carried the post or bypassed it, and then nothing would have stood between them and breakfast at Rangarh.

Wing Commander Bawa, Air Force Station Commander at Jaisalmer, had only four aircraft at his disposal on and before 5 December. Reconnaissance sorties were concentrated along the Islamgarh-Bhagla-Rahim Yar Khan axis while the Reti-Gabbar-Longenwala area remained uncovered. The two serviceable aircraft flew about 11 and five sorties on 5 and 6 December respectively. It speaks well for the base organisation that they made repeated sorties with such dispatch while most of the tanks and other vehicles were stuck in the sand in trying to get off the track.

Targets were difficult to pick out against the drab sandy background, and as a result the aircraft had to be directed from an improvised airborne FAC by Maj Atma Singh, flight commander. Throughout, there was no enemy air activity over the area, and this enabled our planes to operate without interference and make the maximum gain from this limited effort.Almost alone, they frustrated the Pakistani thrust, but what would have happened if the Pakistani planners had not slipped up on providing air cover for the operation is not difficult to visualize. With our divisional posture at the time, lunch at Jaisalmer was by no means beyond realisation.

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Our counter-offensive to trap the retreating enemy started only about 1900 hours on 7 December, 48 hours after the situation had crystallised. The counter-offensive consisted broadly of advancing along the enemy’s route of withdrawal with one brigade group on either side of the axis. The enemy rear showed some fight at Kharotar, but on the whole the Pakistani commander managed to extricate his fit men and equipment intact. He had in fact withdrawn on the night of 7/8 December long before the Indian offensive got underway. The offensive was called off on reaching the border.

The enemy rear showed some fight at Kharotar, but on the whole the Pakistani commander managed to extricate his fit men and equipment intact.

Analysis of the inordinately long reaction time of Bewoor and Khambata appears to reveal a defect in our planning procedures and the preparation of orders to execute them. At the divisional level, after having considered the courses open, we select one and then spend much time on repetitive war games to justify its efficacy and generally improve its finer points from time to time. Planning is based on intelligence regarding the enemy strength, disposition, capability and terrain.

In our deliberate and repetitive preparations for the task, our thinking is wedded to the plan to such an extent that we fail to see any flaw in it. When contact with the enemy is made, various imponderables come into play, the enemy does not act as visualised in the plan, the terrain turns out to be different from what one expected and so on. It is at such times that one needs flexibility of mind and a high standard of training our troops to meet a developing situation promptly and seize the opportunities offered by an enemy slip.

We failed in this respect. We were slow to react and let opportunities slip by. Our planning procedures and shape of operational orders need rethinking. Instead of following a rigid programme, our planning should consist of a series of contin-gency plans to carry out a given task. Each plan should enumerate imperatives to be adhered to in its execution. Thus the initial posture of our troops would be a combination of imperatives entailed in our contingency plans and would provide the balance necessary to meet any expected enemy reaction.

In assessing the allotted task, due consideration should have been given to the actual state and performance value of the equipment employed. But Bewoor had not learnt to face reality.

One excuse offered for not undertaking deep outflanking moves to trap the retreating enemy columns was the poor mechanical condition of our vintage AMX tanks. On further questioning, it was said that although the original plan required these tanks to operate right up to Rahim Yar Khan they could not have done so as their subsequent performance revealed, and this was generally known to all concerned. In assessing the allotted task, due consideration should have been given to the actual state and performance value of the equipment employed. But Bewoor had not learnt to face reality.

Starting at 1830 hours on 4 December, 11 Infantry Division advanced along the Munabao-Nayachor axis against very light opposition and managed to contact the enemy screen for the Nayachor main defence by 11 December. The formation had covered some 48 kilometres in seven days, averaging about six kilometres a day. In the process, it had just managed to follow the withdrawing enemy without trapping troops or equipment. The screen was cleared by 0730 hours on 13 December. After contacting the main defences of Nayachor, it was not found possible logistically to build up the division on the leading brigade group and the necessary administrative backing to launch a divisional attack till the end of the war. By that time, Pakistan had Managed to reinforce Nayachor with one brigade group, and it become almost impossible to make further progress.

The axis was served by an indifferent sandy track and a railway line. The entire command track material resources as well as Army Headquarters reserve were diverted to build the track. The track could catch up only after the cessation of hostilities. The railway was however put through on 7 December, but could not be fully used because of enemy interference from the air. It is difficult to understand why trains were not run in the hours of darkness because the distance to be covered was no more than 48 kilometres. With good organisation, a train could easily make four trips each night, and with its tonnage capability the division could have been built up much earlier.

“¦the commandos spent more time on moving to and fro waiting for the tasks at Jodhpur and Bhuj than in Pakistani territory on the tasks. In the end, they achieved very little.

The column operating towards Umarkot had to be withdrawn as the supporting artillery could not catch up with it on indifferent sandy tracks. The division was held up everywhere and further progress had become almost impossible.

Uttarlai airfield, which saved the sector, had a mix of HF-24 and Gnat aircraft. None of these had sufficient endurance to ensure non-interference in the Barmer sector. No supply mission by air transport could be undertaken because of this unfavourable situation.

It is worth noting that there were only four Hunter aircraft at Jaisalmer, and of them just two were serviceable. The station was reinforced only after 7 December. The HF-24s and Gnats operating from Uttarlai with limited endurance could not create a favourable air situation to enable sizable movements in 11 Infantry Division sector by day. At one stage, when the leading troops had outstripped their maintenance backing and clamoured for food and water to be airdropped, this could not be done because of aerial interference.

Pilots faced other difficulties in the featureless desert, where targets and bomb lines could not be picked up at high speeds. Ground forward controllers could not see beyond the next sand dune. Slow-moving, fixed-wing aircraft acted as airborne controllers. As war demands increased, experience showed that close interdiction paid greater dividends than strike on points in contact where recognizing a target in a short period of endurance was very limited.

Bewoor failed to ensure in joint planning that a favourable air situation prevailed over his operations. This appears to have been a great lapse, for otherwise it is inexplicable that 12 Infantry Division should have only four aircraft on 5 December to support the impending offensive

Bewoor failed to ensure in joint planning that a favourable air situation prevailed over his operations. This appears to have been a great lapse, for otherwise it is inexplicable that 12 Infantry Division should have only four aircraft on 5 December to support the impending offensive and 11 Infantry Division should operate against heavy interference. Pooling air resources, as in the case of ground forces, could have created the necessary superiority to achieve a favourable air situation. To eradicate the shortcomings in close air support, experience indicated the following remedial action:

“¦our territorial gains were about 12,200 square miles. This figure might be impressive as propaganda to be fed to the gullible on the home front, woefully ignorant of military affairs, but it certainly made no impact on Pakistans political negotiators for a postwar settlement.

Para-commandos were employed for various tasks directly under Headquarters Southern Command. The commando group in para role was not used because the 12 Infantry Division offensive was cancelled. The other groups, mounted on Jonga-type four-wheel-drive jeeps, were used from time to time. Initially, two groups were infiltrated to raid Chachro and Umarkot. They managed to raid Chachro at night and were diverted towards Virawah because of the reported opposition at Umarkot. They raided Virawah at night, after which they were pulled back to Jodhpur for want of subsequent tasks in command planning. As an afterthought the commandos were inducted into the Kutch sector to raid Bad in and other sensitive targets in the vicinity. But reconnaissance proved the impracticability of these tasks, and an ambush was laid later west of Islamkot with some success.

Were these raids of any tactical or strategical value? Apparently not. The troops ordered to capture Chachro encountered stiff opposition when they contacted the town 24 hours after the commando raid. It was well after 48 hours that our troops entered Virawah after a fresh fight. These raids should have been coordinated to coincide with the capture of Chachro and Virawah so that the task of capturing these objectives could be simplified. The roadblock west of Islamkot was of such a short duration that it made no impact whatever as far as interrupting the build-up in the battle zone of Umarkot-Nayachor was concerned. But for the ambush of a Pakistani vehicle and the capture of some prisoners and equipment it made no impact on the 11 Infantry Division battle. The results achieved were not commensurate with the effort involved.

Overall, the commando groups in Southern Command were under employed. Bewoor had no concept of using commandos and fumbled from task to task. In the context of a short war, the strategic and tactical tasks of commandos should have a direct bearing on waging war in the region. They should aim at short-range interdiction so as to isolate the battle zone and prevent reinforcement and destruction of war material dumps in the forward area so that the enemy’s capacity to wage war is directly weakened. Preplanning should go into the minutest details so that no time is lost in war to assess the feasibility of certain tasks as happened in this case. In fact, the commandos spent more time on moving to and fro waiting for the tasks at Jodhpur and Bhuj than in Pakistani territory on the tasks. In the end, they achieved very little.

To sum up the achievements of the war in the Rajasthan sector, it is claimed that the Pakistanis were not permitted to occupy even an inch of Indian territory. Viewed in the light of the overall Pakistani operational plans, it would be seen that apart from their offensive in the Jaisalmer sector Pakistan had no plans to grab territory in the region. The logistic difficulties of supporting widespread encroachments across the desert belt forbade such an attempt. So, as a result of lack of effort on the part of Pakistan to defend all its share of the desert sands, it many be said that Bewoor defended our territory.

It is a pity that even after his poor performance in that war our government selected Bewoor to be the next Chief of Army Staff. His tenure of office retarded the progress of the fast-emerging military strength of India.

The second claim was that our territorial gains were about 12,200 square miles. This figure might be impressive as propaganda to be fed to the gullible on the home front, woefully ignorant of military affairs, but it certainly made no impact on Pakistan’s political negotiators for a postwar settlement. The captured area consisted of miles of waterless sands, which in terms of productivity made no dent on Pakistan’s economy and political prestige.

On the other hand, it caused much political embarrassment to India in the negotiations for the return to Pakistan of Hindu refugees who where in camps in Rajasthan and Gujarat. The area was sparsely populated by nomads, very few of whom moved into Pakistan. As such, there was no refugee pressure on Pakistan from this region as well as from Punjab and Jammu and Kashmir to come to terms with India.

The list is forbidding on the debit side. Among them was failure to trap the Pakistani offensive columns in the Longenwala sub-sector, because of the sluggish manoeuvres which let the opportunity to make the most of the Pakistani mistake slip by. The failure of Bewoor’s troops to participate in the battle already won by the Air Force by inept, frontal and painfully slow pursuit will never be forgiven by posterity, at least in the annals of military history. Failure to press the attack after contact with Nayachor defences and the hopelessly long wait at the gates of Nayachor for our administration to catch up will always be remembered for lack of imagination in planning and lack of urge to go ahead in execution.

In short, the very concept of Bewoor’s plans, his outmoded thinking, and inability to handle a fast-developing situation speak poorly of him and his commanders in the field. It is a pity that even after his poor performance in that war our government selected Bewoor to be the next Chief of Army Staff. His tenure of office retarded the progress of the fast-emerging military strength of India. It is a sad commentary on our system of promotion that officers like Bewoor are picked for posts calling for outstanding leadership. It is sadder still that such leadership perpetuates itself.