Military & Aerospace

1971: The Rajasthan Campaign - IV
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16 December: After suffering a few casualties in the probing mission in Barmer and believing that the enemy had reinforced his defences in the Nayachor and Umarkot areas, bewoor’s fears once again came to the fore. In his conversation with Colonel General Staff, he expressed fears that the enemy had reinforced Nayachor with approximately two squadrons of T-59s and one of Shermans. It is significant that the troops in contract had not reported such a development.Bewoor commanded that the piecemeal probing and nibbling should stop and a concerted attack should be planned after a proper buildup instead.

Also read: 1971: The Rajasthan Campaign – I

The battalion group leading the way to Umarkot in the southern sub-sector ha dreached Hingrotar, within striking distance of its traget, although the supporting artillery was taking some time to catch up because of the sandy terrain. Bewoor spelt out his fears to the poor Colonel General Staff, saying that Umarkot had been considerably reinforced by enemy tanks and it would be difficult to go to the unit’s aid if it got into trouble. In isolation, the battlion would be mauled badly. He directed the battalion advance to be halted forthwith and its pullback northeast of Chachro.

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By then, the battalion group had caught up with its leading elements in Hingrotar. The field guns had not yet arrived, but artillery support was available from one light battery. Anand, who was out visiting the forward troops, was briefed by Colonel General Staff about the Army Commander’s directions on his return to his headquarters. He apprized the Army Commander of his own estimate of the enemy opposition and informed him that our patrolling had revealed extensive anti-tank and anti-personnel minefields along the entire front in considerable depth. In addition, there were some nuisance mines along the tracks and the railway line. Efforts were afoot to create lanes for further progress.

He apprized the Army Commander of his own estimate of the enemy opposition and informed him that our patrolling had revealed extensive anti-tank and anti-personnel minefields along the entire front in considerable depth.

He felt that the battalion group near Umarkot could link up with the followup brigade established southeast of the Parbat All feature and proceed with the operations instead of pulling back, which would be psychologically wrong. In any case, the battalion was well away from Umarkot, and should help be necessary it could be rushed from the followup brigade group. The Army Commander heard him patiently and directed him to con-tinue to progress along the track and get the railway laid and complete the build-up speedily. He advised him to be careful of saboteurs and Pakistan SSG elements operating in the rear areas. Bewoor’s fears were steadily getting control of him.

BSF continued to expand its operations in Kutch ahead of the border posts, and these were yielding good dividends. The para-commando groups infiltrated towards their respective target areas overnight.

17 December

Two Bengali officers crossed over to the divisional sector in Barmer and surrendered in the morning. Both were junior captains, one an engineer and the other a doctor. They volunteered the following information:

  • Nayachor area was held by two battalions with reconnaissance and support elements, and a third battalion was at Umarkot. A fourth was deployed in Rahim-ki-Bazar area.
  • A large number of mines had been laid all along the Pakistani defended localities.
  • One brigade group from Pakistan 33 Infantry Division arrived on the night of 14/15 December.
  • One armoured regiment (T-59) from Pakistan 33 Artillery Brigade and eight Sherman tanks were in the area.

The battalion in the southern sub-sector was heavily shelled in its location at Hingrotar, and this was followed by an enemy attack supported by tanks. Though the initial enemy attack was contained, a major attack came later.

Apparently, the Pakistani commanders had beaten Bewoor to it. While the Army Commander was still building up his deliberate attack, involving protracted stocking, Pakistan had reinforced the sector, and it was now beyond Bewoor’s capability to tackle it.

The battalion in the southern sub-sector was heavily shelled in its location at Hingrotar, and this was followed by an enemy attack supported by tanks. Though the initial enemy attack was contained, a major attack came later. As the battalion was outside the range of our supporting artillery assisted by adequate anti-tank potential and had exhausted its ammunition, it withdrew to a locality within the range of its field artillery. The Pakistanis did not pursue. The expected aid from theup brigade did not materialize and the battalion rejoined the parent formation at Chachro rather dazed.

The command reserve battalion was placed under Kutch sector and moved to Dharamsala. Commando groups raided Islamkot and found it unoccupied. Then they operated towards Mithi, where they laid on an ambush about ten kilometres west of Islamkot and managed to kill about 19 enemy and take nine prisoners, including one junior commissioned officer. One vehicle and arms and equipment were captured.

In Pakistans overall strategy, the Rajasthan Desert was a low-priority area.

The unilateral Indian ceasefire, later accepted by Pakistan, came into force from 2000 hours, and thus the India-Pakistan war of 1971 came to a close. The situation at the time in Southern Command was that 11 Infantry Division had managed to penetrate the undefended desert belt against minimal opposition, traversing indifferent desert tracks for about 60 kilometres. It had contacted the Pakistani Nayachor defences within two days of the start of offensive operations. The next ten days were spent in rehabilitating the rail tracks and constructing the duckboard road for the build-up for a divisional attack, but did not become operative till well after the ceasefire.

The Pakistani planners had sought to use this sandy belt as a security zone by deliberately keeping it underdeveloped in communications and water supply.

This wait on the doorstep of the Pakistani defences overlooking the Nayachor defences stretched about ten days, enabling the Pakistani reinforcement of the position in such strength that even if the war had been prolonged it would have resulted in an impasse It was quite obvious that the division had overstretched itself without maintaining its administrative balance. 12 Infantry Division spent the war period adopting difficult tactical postures without getting to grips with the enemy. It watched helplessly the opportunity to destroy completely the Pakistani offensive force committed towards Longenwala go by.

While our Air Force destroyed the column, this formation helped only in counting the damage. Its contribution to blunting the offensive, except for the tenacity of a company’s worth of troops in holding out at Longenwala post, was negligible.

BSF had proved more aggressive in the Kutch and Bikaner sectors, and by the end of hostilities it had occupied about 50 peripheral Pakistan border posts which had either been vacated by the Rangers or Mujahids or where opposition was light. By the end of the war Southern Command was in occupation of approximately 12,200 square kilometres of sandy waste which proved an embarrassment by straining Bewoor’s ability to maintain troops across it rather than hurting Pakistan economically.

Pakistani aim was to compel the Indian forces to stay in the region so that within the stipulated time schedule of the major Pakistani thrust in the Punjab and Jammu and Kashmir sectors troops and equipment employed in Rajasthan could not be disengaged to influence the battles in the plains.

In Pakistan’s overall strategy, the Rajasthan Desert was a low-priority area. It was mostly in the province of Sind, and through it passed the road and rail arteries connecting Karachi with West Punjab, the main base of operations against Jammu and Kashmir and East Punjab. Once a desolate tract, the area had been partly opened up for agriculture by the construction of a barrage at Sukkur, near Rohri. A large number of irrigation canals run north to south and terminate in the desert.

There is a clear gap of sand between the border and the green agricultural belt between 48 and 65 kilometres in depth. The Pakistani planners had sought to use this sandy belt as a security zone by deliberately keeping it underdeveloped in communications and water supply. It is sparsely populated and economically so backward that its inhabitants hardly manage to exist.

Pakistani strategy visualizes holding the border by means of outposts varying in strength from a platoon to a company of paramilitary forces and securing the main routes of entry to the green belt along the canal lines with regular troops based on armour and infantry supported by artillery. Since the green belt is well served by rail and road communications and an abundance of water, administrative support presents no problem.

The main road and rail communications run parallel, though in considerable depth, to the border. Reserves can be moved with ease to reinforce the threatened sector before India is capable of building up for an attack. The number of troops required to defend the green belt is considerably reduced because of the incapacitating quality of the wastelands.

The strategic Pakistani aims in the sectors were three. Firstly, to protect the sensitive belt, including the rail and road arteries running west and east from Karachi. This was achieved as the Indian forces were nowhere able to reach it from Rajasthan. The occupation of about 11,700 square kilometres of waste cost India more than it did Pakistan. The ethnic minority, consisting of Soda Rajputs and business communities, had fled to India in thousands and had to be looked after in refugee camps in Rajasthan and Gujarat, where they were proving a political embarrassment.

Editor’s Pick

Bartering space for time is an age-old procedure in long wars before launching a counter-offensive. In short wars and the subsequent political settlements the trend has been for the contestants to return each other’s territory. This has been so in the Indian subcontinent too. After the war of 1965, all captured territory was returned. The Pakistani military planners had sought a trade-off on the sandy wastes in the Rajasthan sector which had saved them troops. They had employed only one infantry division to hold the sector for the defensive tasks visualized.

The second strategic Pakistani aim was to compel the Indian forces to stay in the region so that within the stipulated time schedule of the major Pakistani thrust in the Punjab and Jammu and Kashmir sectors troops and equipment employed in Rajasthan could not be disengaged to influence the battles in the plains. Pakistan achieved this in ample measure, thanks to Bewoor’s half-hearted offensive efforts on two divergent axes.

There was complete confusion in the orders as far as air support was concerned.

The third Pakistani aim was to cause as much attrition to the Indian forces as possible. But this could not be achieved because of the catastrophic failure of the Longenwala offensive.

The statistics of attrition go in favour of India, but it should be borne in mind that this damage was the direct result of the failure of the Pakistani offensive and not to any significant degree of Indian action, and whatever credit is due to the Indian side in this sector should go to the Air Force and not to the Army.

Pakistani aim was to cause as much attrition to the Indian forces as possible. But this could not be achieved because of the catastrophic failure of the Longenwala offensive.

There was nothing conceptually wrong in the Pakistani offensive. The fault lay in its timing and execution. It should have been launched after India had revealed its hand. Launching the formation 48 hours later would have paid big dividends. The scenario would then have been that Khambata would probably be held up in the sands short of Bhagla, neither able to proceed forward nor capable of coming back. The Pakistani strike force could then have had a free run despite its shortage of equipment. It might then have been able to annihilate the larger part of 12 Infantry Division, especially when Bewoor had hardly any reserves to send to his rescue.

Why did the Pakistani offensive fail? Fazal Muqeem spells it out thus:

The offensive was conceived at a later stage by the Army Chief of Staff on his visit to the formation, somewhat preemptorily and without due process of staff duty. The division was not prepared or equipped to fight in the desert. Its transport was not suitable for movement in the desert terrain and the logistical area was not in a position to support it. There was complete confusion in the orders as far as air support was concerned. It later transpired that the air force was waiting for a special request to activate Jacobabad airfield which was never received from the army.

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