He was asked in addition to carry out intensive patrolling and raids to retain an offensive posture and cause the maximum casualties to the withdrawing enemy in Pakistan.
At 2135 hours, Khambata reported that the enemy had been cleared from our territory in the Jaisalmer sector. Orders were issued for the defensive occupation of the Ghotaru, Longenwala, Sadhewala, Tanot and Kishengarh areas with one battalion group each and a divisional mobile reserve of one infantry battalion/one AMX squadron. He was asked in addition to carry out intensive patrolling and raids to retain an offensive posture and cause the maximum casualties to the withdrawing enemy in Pakistan. This was obviously a piece of play acting by Bewoor as it was obvious by then that Khambata was incapable of any pursuit because of the posture of his division. Besides, he was also asked to detach one brigade group and the major portion of his armour for operations in the Kutch sector.
Analysis of these figures indicate that the Pakistani offensive was based on two infantry battalions supported by a composite armour regiment of two squadrons of T-59s and one squadron of Shermans, possibly divided into two combat groups which, to their misfortune, had landed at the same place because of a navigational error. Of great significance was the fact that not a single prisoner had been captured nor body recovered, indicating that Bewoor’s deliberate counter-offensive went obviously in thin air. The credit for blunting this offensive should justifiably go to Bawa and his gallant pilots, who achieved this feat with only two serviceable aircraft. In fact, these two craft proved far more useful than Bewoor’s division in the sector.
“¦it should be remembered that if the Pakistani air had been active it could have destroyed our meagre aircraft strength”¦
On the other hand, it should be remembered that if the Pakistani air had been active it could have destroyed our meagre aircraft strength, and it was within the realm of possibility that the Pakistani columns could have reached Ramgarh, overcoming no more opposition than a couple of platoons and Longenwala. 12 Infantry Division, which was then leaving for Kishengarh for the impending offensive, would have been in an awkward situation, especially because Bewoor had no reserves.
10 December
Anand was still handicapped in the Barmer sector because of the slow build-up there. The causes were the same old ones of inadequacy of resources of troops and materials and ineptness in handling such situations. Consolidation went on in the southern sub-sector, and everywhere troops felt the inadequacy of administration.
Bewoor appeared personally for the first time in the Jaisalmer sector after the start of hostilities when everything is over. He discussed the defensive posture with Khambata and talked vaguely about his offensive plans in other sectors with which Khambata was not even remotely concerned. Meanwhile, on their own initiative and making use of the opportunities offered, some units had occupied Masitwari Bhit and captured Bhai Khan Wala Khu. They took 24 prisoners and three jeeps and killed about 100 camels, mostly by our air action. Vingour and Virawah posts in the Kutch sector were captured by BSF units.
BSF captured another Pakistani post at Jattalai in the Kutch sector. Pakistani aircraft attacked our post at Biarbet, but without causing much damage.
Bewoor confirmed accepting the modifications in regrouping his force for offensive operations in the Kutch sector, but he submitted that because he needed time to relieve 12 Infantry Division troops in contact and because of the rail movement involved to Bhuj he would not be able to launch an offensive before 18 December. The Chief did not see the difficulties confronting Bewoor. The enemy had slipped away almost from Khambata’s hands and there was no contact in the divisional sector. Rolling stock was in position in the region, and sufficient motor transport was also available. By Army Headquarters estimates the brigade group could be concentrated by the combined rail and road movement within 72 hours. The Chief asked Bewoor to speed up the movement, reminding him that time was always at a premium in short wars.
11 December
The followup brigade group managed to extend the firm base for attack and was leaning on the Parbat Ali feature in the Barmer sector. An effort to outflank the position with the armoured squadron had failed, resulting in the loss of four tanks. Meanwhile, the independent armoured squadron (T-55) released from the Jaisalmer sector was diverted towards 11 Infantry Division to give the thrust in the sector greater force. The Army Commander visited Anand and told him to go slow till his administration caught up.
Occupation of the vacated peripheral posts continued in the Jaisalmer sector. Some troops occupied Tamanchi WalaTobain the Kutch sector, and wireless intercepts indicated the vacation of the posts at Nabisar, Tibar and Paneli to concentrate at Wungee at 1100 hours.
The enemy was caught almost sleeping and did not fire till the assaulting troops were about 90 to 180 metres away. Hand-to-hand fighting ensued and resulted in the enemy leaving 57 dead and 35 prisoners of war.
Bewoor suddenly got cold feet and confided to Lt Gen Harparsad, Vice Chief of Army Staff, obviously for the Chief’s ears, that the offensive operations towards Badin would not be possible before 22 December. The reasons put forward for the postponement were mainly administrative and the movement problem involved in covering approximately 725 kilometres to Bhuj and beyond. Once again, he harped on the low mechanical reliability of AMX tanks. He asked for guaranteed additional air support. Bewoor was apparently assailed by inherent fear for the suggestion for the offensive had come from him. All the factors brought up by him at this stage had been present before. To get out of the commitment, he suggested that the scope of the offensive should be reduced to a raid on Badin by para-commandos.
12 December
Reconnaissance continued in the Barmer sector opposite Pakistan’s Nayachor defences, and it was discovered that the Parbat Ali feature was held strongly. Meanwhile, efforts were made to link the forward brigade by track with Munabao to build up for the divisional attack. The enemy carried out some’ air action along the railway line.
As the division was busy adopting the newly adopted defensive posture in the Jaisalmer sector, 12 Infantry Division was ordered to detach one brigade group with two squadrons of armour (one AMX and the other T-59) and supporting artillery. This brigade group was now diverted towards the Harmer sector for the divisional attack on Nayachor.
BSF captured another Pakistani post at Jattalai in the Kutch sector. Pakistani aircraft attacked our post at Biarbet, but without causing much damage. The para-commando battalion was ordered back to the Kutch sector after four days at Jodhpur to cause confusion in Tharparkar district, thereby facilitating the operations of 11 Infantry Division. Bewoor specifically allotted the commandos the following tasks:
The battalion group in the southern sub-sector made slow progress towards Umarkot through sandy stretches, where wheeled vehicles got stuck without encountering enemy opposition.
- Raid worthwhile targets and cause confusion in the area bounded by Mara-Badin-Mirpur-Batoro.
- Raid and destroy enemy troops and material in the Badin area at the discretion of the officer commanding the battalion.
It was visualized that the commando groups would infiltrate into Pakistani territory on the night of 15/16 December and exfiltrate on the next two nights. The targets the Army Commander gave were however so far from the lines of communications affecting the Nayachor area that the raids would have had no affect on the 11 Infantry Division battle. Employment of these groups at this stage seemed an afterthought on his part.
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