Indian Defence Review

Kashmir defied a political decision despite prolonged negotiations between representatives of India and Pakistan countries. Frustrated by its inabiltiy to find a solution of the problem to its satisfaction and alarmed by the fast-growing tilt of military balance in India’s favour, Pakistan launched a war against India in 1965 with the active connivance of China. Although Ayub pitched high hopes on Chinese help China contented itself with loud verbal threats, saying that “unless India dismantled within three days all the military works for aggression… and returned all the Chinese sheep which had strayed across the China-Sikkim border, it must bear full responsibility for all the grave consequences.”

Also read: 1971: The Gradual Escalation – I

India did not act on this warning, but no grave consequences followed. The pro-China lobby in Islamabad said later that China had “meant business” and would have come in on the side of Pakistan in a big way had Ayub Khan prolonged the conflict to allow them to complete their build-up. Ayub Khan’s unwillingness or inability to carry on a prolonged military campaign however prevented enlargement of the conflict. The subsequent role of the Soviet Union as a mediator and signatory to the Tashkent Agreement alienated China from Pakistan for a while.

Click to buy:India’s wars since independence

Stoppage of arms supplied by the US and Britain in 1965 and the lack of hard currency to buy arms in the open market resulted in bringing India closer to Russia as its supplier. Although Russia offered the same facilites to Pakistan, that country chose to lean more on China. China was helping Pakistan in setting up armament production at Taxila, and the fact that the Chinese pipeline for supplying arms could be maintained along the new Sinkiang–Gilgit highway even during hostilities with India might have prompted Pakistan to make this choice. Russia, on the other hand, continued to treat India and Pakistan on equal terms, and this attitude continued till the breakdown of Sino-Russian political relations over the border incidents in 1969.

Frustrated by its inabiltiy to find a solution of the problem to its satisfaction and alarmed by the fast-growing tilt of military balance in Indias favour, Pakistan launched a war against India”¦

This breakdown led to the enunciation of Brezhnev’s plan for Asian collective security. The plan visualised an economic, political and military grouping in the region with the object of isolating China and further containing its influence in Southeast Asia. The Russian initiative for such a grouping of countries with common national interests came when the much-maligned policies of Dulles were being ushered out by Nixon’s disengagement from the area. From then onwards the Russians followed swiftly on the heels of the American withdrawal. Accordingly, they unfolded the Brezhnev plan both to India and Pakistan.

Pakistan chose to reject the proposal outright as it was not willing to seek any benefit from Russia at the expense of its dependable friend China, which had by now become its principal supplier of arms. On the other hand, India did not join the proposed grouping but, understanding Russian interests, was prepared to go along with Moscow without making any firm commitment. As a result, the Russian attitude to Pakistan hardenend considerably, and that brought New Delhi proportionately closer to Moscow. In this type of polarisation, two distinct camps — Russia and India, and China and Pakistan — should have emerged, making interdependence clearcut. Unfortunately, this did not happen as the Russians continued to strive to wean Pakistan away from China. Moscow therefore kept its resentment at the Pakistani refusal to join the regional grouping Brezhnev had proposed in a low key. Diplomatically, a door was kept open for Pakistan to walk into the Russian camp any time it liked. This was almost a favourite mistress treatment which puzzled India.

Ayub Khans unwillingness or inability to carry on a prolonged military campaign however prevented enlargement of the conflict.

Moscow’s first reaction to Pakistan’s crackdown in East Pakistan was a strongly worded letter from the President to Yahya Khan on 2 April 1971 cautioning the Pakistani leader on the course of events in East Bengal. But the letter did not even urge autonomy for the eastern wing, leave alone independence. The Russian leaders remained silent spectators of the genocide, the refugee exodus and the ruthless suppression of the voice of freedom, apparently waiting for the situation to crystallise in a manner favourable to their interests.

Like Washington, Moscow felt Yahya would be able to crush the rebellion, reestablish his authority in East Pakistan and eventually work out some sort of settlement with the political heirs of Sheikh Mujib. In any event, they always considered the Sheikh an American stooge. Up to the time of signing the Indo-Soviet treaty, the Russians continued to advise Yahya Khan and Mrs Gandhi “not to let the situation get out of hand.” This attitude was amply evidenced at the Inter-Parliamentary Union Conference in the first week of September, and Podgorny played the same tune as late as October, saying: “We consider that further sliding towards a military conflict must be prevented.” Moscow perhaps felt that a political solution was still possible, and if brought about would keep Pakistan on its side without antagonising “faithful” India. Little did the Russian leaders realise that events in East Pakistan had already slid out of control.

Unfortunately, this did not happen as the Russians continued to strive to wean Pakistan away from China.

Yahya Khan had hastened the process by arranging Kissinger’s clandestine flight to Peking in July. The Russians did not view the developing US-China axis connived at by Pakistan with favour, and this possibly hastened the signature of the treaty between India and the Soviet Union. The treaty encouraged India to adopt a stronger stance in relation to Pakistan than possible until then. The Indian Foreign Minister declared that India could count on Soviet aid under the treaty. Although he did not spell it out in so many words, it was construed that he implied aid against Chinese intervention.

The visit of a Soviet military team to assess India’s needs was announced, and this left no doubt among the countries concerned about the scope of the treaty. Throughout this period, till Yahya triggered the war in December 1971, Moscow continued to dissuade New Delhi from intervening militarily in East Pakistan. It is now known that the Russian leaders advised Mrs Gandhi on her Moscow visit the previous October against such a step.

Reportedly, Brezhnev cautioned her saying: “Remember Vietnam.” What worried the Soviet leaders was perhaps the extent of involvement Indian military action might lead the Soviet Union into if India got bogged down on the battlefield. China might be tempted to intervene to take advantage of India’s military difficulties.

And how would Washington react to Chinese intervention? The US might come to the rescue of Pakistan, its friend and ally, in coalition with China, a newly found friend. In that event, the Soviet Union was expected to come to India’s aid, and this might lead to global war. This was a course Moscow wished to avoid. But after years of waiting the Chinese had recently won the respectability of a place in the UN and its Security Council.

The Russians did not view the developing US-China axis connived at by Pakistan with favour, and this possibly hastened the signature of the treaty between India and the Soviet Union.

They were not likely to risk tarnishing their new image and embarking on a course of collision with the Russians in a hurry, especially when 40-odd Red Army divisions stood on the northern border of China in instant readiness for combat. The very great temptation of an easy military victory was accordingly necessary to make China intervene militarily in the quarrel between India and Pakistan.

It was imperative that military action to solve the Bangladesh issue should be brought to a swift conclusion. The Soviet leaders doubted India’s military as well as political capability to do so till events later belied their fears in this regard. That is why, up to the very end, they went on advising restraint and favoured a political solution short of war. India was in a great predicament for Yahya Khan, abetted by China and the US, was leading India into a war of Pakistan’s making while India’s friend Russia, hoping to retain some influence with Yahya Khan, was holding India back. Eventually, India decided to go it alone, hoping the Soviet Union would intervene if the other big powers came to the aid of Pakistan. India’s self-assurance at this juncture surprised friend and foe alike.

Along with political parleys, military preparations were continuing on both sides of the border to meet any contingency. The aim of Tikka Khan’s toughness had been amply achieved by the end of May 1971. Military repression had flushed out dissidents and terrified the remainder of the population into submission and they were looking forward to normalisation. The time was ripe for a political solution, but Yahya Khan and his advisers preferred to hold East Pakistan in the grip of terror. Actually, he had put himself in an awkward situation politically. By outlawing the Awami League, dubbing Mujibur Rahman a traitor, and generally expelling the insurgent leadership to India, he had created a political vacuum difficult to fill.Yahya Khan’s dilemma was that the longer he delayed a political solution the more fertile ground he provided for guerilla warfare. The absence of a political leadership which could fill the vacuum denied him the opportunity of a viable solution. As generally happens in such situations, he let matters drift, in the hope that they would find their own solutions, till August 1971, when a compromise came his way. Tikka Khan was replaced as governor by Dr A. M. Malik, a retired East Pakistani civil servant, thus giving the impression that civil authority had been restored.

Click to buy:India’s wars since independence

Tikka Khan, who had after the initial brutalities of the military managed to settle down to dealing with the economic and political problems of East Pakistan, was recalled to West Pakistan for another assignment. It was believed that his transfer was brought about by international pressures backed by adverse public opinion at his atrocities. The prevalent tension in East Pakistan could not be eased while he continued at the helm of affairs.

Before Niazi took over, an operational instruction for the defence of East Pakistan was issued. This was based on a series of war games held at formation levels under the code name Titu Mir.

The choice of Niazi to replace Tikka Khan was unfortunate for Pakistan. Whereas Tikka Khan had a dedicated application to national aims and political vision, Niazi was essentially a battalion commander in a general’s uniform. He inherited a delicate task of great politico-military significance, coupled with fighting insurgency in his command, well away from the hub of the decision-making headquarters in Islamabad. The situation in East Pakistan was out of the usual run and too complex for a conventional soldier. The post Niazi held required a man capable of thinking for himself and taking momentous decisions in a crisis, and then executing them without guidance or supervision as his higher-ups were too far removed physically to be aware of developments.

Niazi was not a man of that mettle. Although he was liked by his subordinates, his manner of handling the situation showed that his vision did not extend beyond deployment of companies and platoons, an unfortunate trait of senior infantry officers in both India and Pakistan. He was unimaginative and relied too much on his subordinates to run things while he indulged in the worldly pleasures his status bestowed on him. As a result, he was never master of the situation throughout his tenure as Martial Law Administrator.

Pakistani intelligence evaluated about this time that the insurgency would not only be stepped up but Indian intervention in aid of the Mukti Bahini was very much on the cards.

Before Niazi took over, an operational instruction for the defence of East Pakistan was issued. This was based on a series of war games held at formation levels under the code name Titu Mir. The aim of this plan was to defend the territorial integrity of the eastern region at all costs. Its defence was organised in tiers which visualised giving battle at a series of defence lines based on urban builtup areas and river obstacles. The troops, if hard pressed, were to fall back on the defences of Dacca, where the final battle was to be given. The plan envisaged uninterrupted lines of communication which would enable the withdrawal of formations without interference. By the time Niazi took over, the parameters on which this plan had been prepared had changed considerably.

With the reported training of large numbers of guerillas in India in the monsoon months, the insurgency was likely to be stepped up after the rains by the large-scale induction of such forces along the border from the Indian side. Pakistani intelligence evaluated about this time that the insurgency would not only be stepped up but Indian intervention in aid of the Mukti Bahini was very much on the cards. In view of the Indian support to the guerilla operations, the assessors recommended sealing the border to thwart. infiltration by Freedom Fighters. As it was, much damage and resultant demoralisation of civilian morale was caused by sabotage in the tea industry and in shipping, apart from the disruption of essential services throughout the province.

The pattern of these nibbling operations, widely spread along the border, may be compared to an attack by ants on a sleeping lion.

Based on intelligence reports, as also on his own observations after taking command, Niazi started revising the operational plan. After the surrender in December, he explained that he had not expected a major attack from India and felt that the Indian efforts would be confined to capturing a large chunk of territory adjacent to its own as a base for establishing a Bangladesh government. He therefore reoriented his plans for a forward posture of defence. This posture involved occupation of border outposts strongly and backing them with adequate reserves to restore the local situation in case they were attacked. Since effective sealing of the border meant establishing a large number of such BOPs, troops meant for setting up depth lines of defences, particularly around Dacca, were consumed. Niazi sacrificed depth for strength of the forward border posture, but this was a fatal mistake for which he was to pay dearly later.

Rebel activities progressively increased on the border as well as in the interior. Large-scale sabotage, attacks on police stations and other centres of government authority and killing collaborators instilled fear among the population and created a sense of insecurity. Yahya Khan warned India that if Indian troops attempted to enter East Pakistan this would be considered an open war against Pakistan and would be suitably dealt with. Niazi personally identified himself and his command with this policy without understanding its implications in the context of the developing possibility of Indian intervention. He kept on telling his troops “not an inch of territory would be allowed to be lost.” As events moved to a climax, he became obsessed with the idea that a tactical withdrawal from the forward posture would be a personal defeat for him and a stigma on his honour as a soldier.

The local military commander took appropriate action to repulse the Pakistani attacks. In this action, 13 Pakistani Chaffee tanks were destroyed.

Niazi was gradually squeezed by Mukti Bahini, and this inflamed the entire border with well-planned attacks on BOPs accompained by efforts to capture some salients inside East Pakistan which would help India’s eventual full-fledged intervention. These raids across the border were gradually built up from a low pitch to a crescendo from early October to the end of November with a purpose. The pattern of these nibbling operations, widely spread along the border, may be compared to an attack by ants on a sleeping lion. By the middle of November, Niazi was provoked to such a degree that the Pakistani troops started sallying very close to the Indian border, and at times even crossing it.

The pattern these forays followed was that the Mukti Bahini operated inside Pakistani territory supported by Indian artillery deployed on our side of the border. If Mukti Bahini men got into difficulties they were helped out by BSF and the Indian Army. To’ the extent possible, the use of regular Indian troops was avoided inside East Pakistan as this would have been an act of war, but there were occasions when the intensity of operations—like those at Bayra, Hilli, Kamalpur, Akhaura and Belonia-made this unavoidable. These Mukti Bahini actions were so numerous in terms of numbers and spread of time and space that it is difficult to describe them individually. It may be said however that by the time Yahya Khan declared war the net gains of these nibbling operations were considerable.

Niazi was gradually squeezed by Mukti Bahini, and this inflamed the entire border with well-planned attacks on BOPs accompained by efforts to capture some salients inside East Pakistan”¦

The biggest action in the southwestern sector was fought at Bayra, in the Jessore area, northeast of Calcutta. In an offensive defence action, 9 Infantry Division troops pursued Pakistani intruders across the border in strength. A fierce battle, involving the use of armour and air support on both sides, raged near the village of Gharibpur, about five miles inside Pakistani territory. The village exchanged hands a few times, but was eventually secured by the Indians on 23 November. Chaughacha town was also captured at the same time.

Mrs Gandhi made a statement on the incident in Parliament on 24 November: “On 21 November, Pakistan Infantry, supported by tanks and artillery, launched an offensive on the Mukti Bahini, which was holding the liberated area around Bayra, five miles from our eastern border. Pakistani armour, under heavy artillery cover, advanced to our border, threatening our defensive positions. Their shells fell in our territory, wounding a number of our men. The local military commander took appropriate action to repulse the Pakistani attacks. In this action, 13 Pakistani Chaffee tanks were destroyed.

“On 22 November, the Pakistani forces called up an air strike of four Sabrejets on our positions. These were intercepted within Indian territory by our Gnats, which destroyed three Sabrejets. Two of the Pakistani pilots who bailed out were captured in our territory, indicating the Pakistani air intrusion into Indian air space. We regard this as a purely local action.”

Enunciating policy regarding such local actions, sho said: “Pakistan armed forces have been shelling our border areas, inflicting damage on life and property. Its air force has wantonly violated our air space several times, and once came right up to Srinagar. Spies and saboteurs have been blowing up trains and bridges. Since March 1971, we have lodged 66 protests for border violation scovering 890 incidents. “However, these protests have had no effect, and to cover up their incessant violations Pakistan propaganda media have been putting out the story that we are engaged in an undeclared war and have launched massive attacks with tanks and troops. This is wholly untrue. In fact, it was Pakistan which threatened total war and moved its entire armed strength into operational positions on our borders and launched massive hate-India campaign with the slogan ‘Crush India.’ We had therefore to take appropriate measures and moved our forces to defensive positions in order to protect the integrity of our country and the lives and property of our citizens. It has never been our intention to escalate the situation or to start a conflict. To this end we have instructed our troops not to cross the border except in self-defence. We cannot ignore our experience of 947-48… and August-September 1965.”

Also read: 1971: The Gradual Escalation – I

On November 22, India claimed the destruction of 13 Pakistani tanks against six of our own and three Sabrejets shot down by IAF units supporting the land battle. This action prompted Yahya Khan to declare a national emergency the next day and complain to U Thant about an alleged Indian violation of the UN Charter. Mrs Gandhi replied that “even though Pakistan has declared an emergency, we shall refrain from taking a similar step unless further aggressive action by Pakistan compels us to do so in the interest of national security.”

Click to buy:India’s wars since independence

In the meantime, the country should remain “unruffled.” The net gain of this action at Bayra was that India reached almost halfway to Jessore up to Arpara on the Chaughcha-Jessore road and came in contact with the Pakistani defence west of Jessore town.

Mrs Gandhi replied that “even though Pakistan has declared an emergency, we shall refrain from taking a similar step unless further aggressive action by Pakistan compels us to do so in the interest of national security.”

Farther north, the liberation forces had captured Jiban Nagar, Uthalo and Darsana and were leaning on Khalispur on the Jiban Nagar-Kot Chandpur road. In the northwestern sector, some areas north and south of it had however been captured, but the Pakistanis continued to resist at Hilli. This small railway town on the border on top of the Balurghat bulge was held by 4 Frontier Force Battalion beefed up by elements of EPCAF, and these forces were a foil to activity in support of the Mukti Bahini. Attacks were launched on Hilli with about two battalions but did rot make much headway because of the stout resistance of the defenders.

These attacks went in frontally, in a [typically orthodox World War I manner, and suffered heavy casualties in 67 killed and 90 wounded. The first attack went in on 24 November. Fighting continued with varying intensity, and Hilli could eventually be cleared only as late as 11 December, and that too only because Indian out-flanking movements some distance away had made it untenable.

In the Dinajpur area, Khanpur and Mukandpur had been occupied on its southern approaches, and both banks of the Icchamati river were secured along the Sanjia-Phulbari axis. Meanwhile, a force advancing south on the Mirganj-Dinajpur road had secured the town of Thakargaon. In the Barakhata salient, Barakhata had been captured and Hathi Banda had been contacted and effectively contained. In the Nageshwari salient, all the area north of the Dharla river had been completely cleared.

This threat forced Niazi to rush reinforcements to the area, thus denuding some other important sectors of their defenders.

In the northern sector, the Kamalpur garrison, comprising a strong company group, had been completely surrounded by about a brigade strength, but it continued to hold out till the evening of 4 December after having beaten back two attempts at its capture. This position was held by a company of 31 Baluch Battalion augmented by elements of paramilitary forces under Capt Ashan Malik.

In the northeastern sector, Radhanagar had been captured north of Sylhet after overcoming BOPS at Takiganj and Atgram. In the area opposite Karimganj, the salient east of the general Chargram-Karimganj line had been secured. Similarly, Gazipur had been captured in the Kalaura area while Kalaura itself had been successfully invested. The Shamshernagar airfield fell into Indian hands, but a few Pakistani pockets continued to hold out. In the southeastern sector Ganganagar had been captured in the Akhaura area. The Akhaura defences were surrounded and expected to fall any moment. Farther south, the entire Belonia bulge had been cleared, and Mukti Bahini were holding positions directly threatening rail and road communications between Comilla and Chittagong in the area of Feni. This threat forced Niazi to rush reinforcements to the area, thus denuding some other important sectors of their defenders.

A special force operating towards Rangamati had pushed back Pakistan’s forward posts in the Chittagong Hill Tracts and was leaning against the Rangamati lake area and in occupation of the salient north of Ramgarh. This force was operating on a manpack basis, supported by helicopters and air supplies. The Pakistani opposition in this region was minimal. It appeared that Niazi, had given this area a low tactical priority.

The Pakistani opposition in this region was minimal. It appeared that Niazi, had given this area a low tactical priority.

In addition, Freedom Fighters’ raids were directed towards dislocating the local economy. They had damaged the tea and cement factories at Chhatak and the gas pipeline in Sunamganj. A tea estate at Dhalai was also captured and extensively damaged. The Dhalai position had repulsed the first attack with heavy casualties. An unorthodox second attempt carried the position and saved the day. Along with these attacks and raids close to the border, the intensity of the Mukti Bahini guerilla operations in the interior, particularly around Dacca, were stepped up to a high pitch. The rear lines of communication were extensively disrupted. Ambushes of convovys and raids on small bodies of troops were common. To hold the border, Niazi had to disperse his troops more widely, eventually leading to a breakdown of formations and of fire units in support to plug holes, here and there, and reinforce the defences at points where threats were increasing.

Bypassing the Pakistani defensive positions completely threw Niazis forward posture of balance, and he was never able to recover from it.

To complicate matters, a number of clearing operations were undertaken in the interior. Three noteworthy operations were organised: one to clear both sides of the Brahmaputra from Nagalbari Chat to Phulchari Ghat; the second to flush out guerillas of the Siddiqui group from the general area of Tangail-Mirzapur; and the third in Dacca city itself and in its vicinity. This resulted in a wide dispersal of troops and consequently loss of cohesion. Deployed on the forward posture along the border in a thin, long line, Niazi’s troops were getting into fixed positions, thus losing the ability to manoeuvre and obtain freedom of action. The sector reserves envisaged in the operational plan had by now been dissipated, and the original concept of fighting from strong points had gone by the board.

Meanwhile, the Indian Army had absorbed some good lessons from these preliminary engagements to modify suitably its original tactical plans. It was realised that wherever troops attacked fortified defensive positions the Pakistanis fought with courage and rare doggedness, as at Hilli and Kamalpur. The attacking troops suffered heavy casualities, and took inordinately long to clear the opposition.

It became apparent that the orthodox concept of step-by-step reduction of fortified defensive positions would not only prove costly in casualities but in time as well, and this was not acceptable in the context of the short war envisaged in the Indian operational plan. The solution therefore suggested itself that for speedy victory bypassing fortified positions was imperative. The collapse of the Pakistani Army in the eastern wing could only be achieved by out manoeuvring it and not by set-piece battles.

The collapse of the Pakistani Army in the eastern wing could only be achieved by out manoeuvring it and not by set-piece battles.

In this regard, the policy of provocative occupation of sensitive areas paid off. Niazi reacted very violently, launching repeated and often hurried counterattacks, suffering heavy casualties and causing his troops to lose their spirits well before the start of the actual war. For instance, Niazi lost 13 tanks and three aircraft in the Bayra battle besides large numbers of men, which he could ill afford, especially because of the precarious and long sea routes to his parent bases.

These initial Mukti Bahini operations helped the Indian Army, which got to know the Pakistani pattern and concept of fighting. In some instances, the initial ingress helped to cross obstacles close to the start lines well ahead of the opening of hostilities. The complete switchover from the original concept of direct to indirect approach, later explained as an “expanding torrent,” was itself a great achievement for a tradition-bound orthodox army. This switchover laid the foundation for the eventual Indian victory. Bypassing the Pakistani defensive positions completely threw Niazi’s forward posture of balance, and he was never able to recover from it.

Pakistani aircraft appeared over the forward Indian airfields, and started taking warlike action in the style of the preemptive Israeli attack on Egypt in 1967.

The day after the Bayra battle, Yahya Khan appealed to the UN once again saying: “I am addressing this message to you with a deep sense of urgency in view of the grave situation which has arisen in my country as a result of unprovoked and largescale attacks by Indian armed forces on various parts of Pakistan.” The Indian spokesman, replying to his charges of Indian aggression, said: “It is Bengali guerillas who are described as the Indian Army.”

At a banquet held in honour of a visiting Chinese delegation led by Li-Shui-ching, Minister of Machine Building, Yahya Khan declared almost prophetically: “In ten days time I may not be here in Pindi. I may be fighting a war.” The war did come off within this period, triggered by the gradual escalation of pressures exerted by the Mukti Bahini. On 2 December, a battle raged in the general area of Akhaura in defence of Agartala, headquarters of the Indian state of Tripura. Mrs Gandhi visited refugee camps in Calcutta on 3 December. She told a mass rally in the city: “India stands for peace, but if a war is thrust on us we are prepared to fight.” Denying the accusation that India was out to dismember Pakistan, she added: “No country would want an unstable neighbour… But at the same time India cannot ignore the fact that it has hrice been attacked by Pakistan.” And she conveyed in no uncertain terms that “India could no longer be pressurised and prevented from doing what she considered to be in her national intrest.” Obviously referring to American and other international pressures, she declared: “Today India can stand on her own legs if all foreign aid is stopped. We are not dependent on anyone, and we have the strength to overcome all difficulties.”

When Mrs Gandhi was informed in Calcutta, she flew at once to Delhi to address the nation. “The war in Bangladesh has become a war on India,” she said.

The same day, at 5.30 p.m., Yahya Khan opted for allout war against India. Pakistani aircraft appeared over the forward Indian airfields, and started taking warlike action in the style of the preemptive Israeli attack on Egypt in 1967. The first news of it trickled in at Army Headquarters after about five to ten minutes through the wife of an officer of the Military Intelligence Directorate who was visiting her parents at Amritsar. She vividly described the strafing of an air force radar station as seen from her bedroom window. The Chief received the news with his usual nonchalance and remarked to the officer giving him the tidings: “Don’t look so scared, sweetie. Do I look worried?”

How unexpected the timing of this war was to New Delhi may be judged from the fact that the Prime Minister was visiting Calcutta, Defence Minister Jagjivan Ram was visiting his constituency in Bihar, Finance Minister Chavan was in Bombay, and President Giri was attending a reception on the lawns of Parliament House when an air alert was sounded at 5.45 p.m. When Mrs Gandhi was informed in Calcutta, she flew at once to Delhi to address the nation. “The war in Bangladesh has become a war on India,” she said. Proclaiming a state of emergency, she assured the nation that the wanton and unprovoked aggression by Pakistan will be repelled.” As she spoke, Indian forces both on the western and eastern fronts were engaged in war. This was the culmination of the gradual escalation which started with the Pakistan crackdown in East Pakistan on 25 March.