This was not acceptable to India, and so Mrs Gandhi had to return home empty handed except for the vocal sympathy of some Western leaders.
Mrs Gandhi also allayed Western fears about India’s involvement with the Soviet Union. She reiterated that the Indo-Soviet treaty was not directed against any particular country and did not in any way compromise India’s neutrality or freedom of action. She was able to a great extent to internationalise the refugee question, and also succeeded in winning sympathy for the aspirations of the people of East Bengal and India’s interest in a just solution of their cause.
But in Washington Nixon remained unconvinced. Advised by Kissinger, he had his own solution to offer. He proposed that both sides should withdraw their troops from the common border as a pre-requisite to talks between India and Pakistan to settle the East Pakistan and connected problems. Meanwhile, a UN observer group should be posted on both sides of the India-East Pakistan border.
“¦ in a TV interview: “Did the United States suggest some plan of action which you felt you could not accept?” She replied: “No plan of action has been suggested to us.”
Nixon assured Mrs Gandhi that Yahya Khan was moving towards democratisation of East Pakistan and should be given time to find mutually satisfactory solutions. Although the President did not specify the time frame in which Yahya Khan was working, one may assume that his proposals were intended to serve three purposes. Firstly, the Mukti Bahini would be denied the momentum of their guerilla operations in East Pakistan. Secondly, sealed off by the UN observer group from outside interference, the Pakistani Army would be able to come down on the Mukti Bahini with a heavy hand.
Thirdly, India would miss the opportunity of military intervention once the cold season, when the risk of Chinese collusion was at its minimum, was over. India might then have to wait another year, and by that time the situation would be quite different. World opinion, and the international sympathy painstakingly won by the Indian political campaign, was likely to wane with the passage of time.
These proposals were obviously contrived to bail Yahya Khan, a staunch friend of Nixon, out of a crisis of his own making. Their net outcome appeared to be that the refugee burden would continue to be inflicted on India, until Yahya Khan created “favourable conditions” which were never to materialise. The type of phony democratisation he had in mind would never have satisfied the Bangladesh leaders. This was not acceptable to India, and so Mrs Gandhi had to return home empty handed except for the vocal sympathy of some Western leaders.
Nixon justified his decision by saying that the discontinuance of supplies would be construed by Yahya Khan as leverage to influence the domestic policies of Pakistan.
Nixon claimed later in a message to the US Congress that he had projected a timebound programme for a political solution for East Pakistan. On the other hand, Mrs Gandhi was asked in a TV interview: “Did the United States suggest some plan of action which you felt you could not accept?” She replied: “No plan of action has been suggested to us.” This was never contradicted.
In pursuance of its pro-Pakistan policies, the US Administration allowed previously committed arms shipments to Pakistan to continue despite the earlier precedent set in the Indo-Pakistani conflict in 1965 when economic aid and arms supplied to both countries were immediately stopped. Nixon justified his decision by saying that the discontinuance of supplies would be construed by Yahya Khan as leverage to influence the domestic policies of Pakistan. By continuing aid, he argued, the US Administration would be able to have some say with the Pakistani authorities, and this would help in the long run. But India did not see much sense in this double-faced policy.In practice, however, the US maintained a flexible response to the prevailing situation, keeping its options open to back any individual or party which gained the upper hand. It supported Yahya Khan when he appeared to be winning and conveniently dropped him when he was not. Right up to 25 March, Washington advised him to come to terms with Sheikh Mujib as it was feared that armed action would mean the loss of East Pakistan. The Sheikh’s right-of-centre policies were at that time considered a safe bet for the US.
In fact, it was rumoured that the Awami League had been financed by the US in the assembly elections in 1970. When Yahya Khan stayed on in East Pakistan against American advice, the official reaction in Washington was unfavourable. But it progressively improved with the initial success of the Pakistani Army’s repressive action.
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American public opinion however protested against Tikka Khan’s brutal methods of repression and ruthless genocide, and the onset of the monsoon added to the army’s difficulties against the Mukti Bahini guerillas. From this period, US support on the political front appeared to be in a low key, but as soon as the rains were over and the army asserted itself, Washington’s support once again came to the fore. This fluctuation in American response was noticeable even in the Bangladesh war in December. If Niazi had not given up the struggle when he did, it was likely that the US Seventh Fleet would have intervened to get him out of his difficulties and the conflict would not have ended as swiftly as it did.
President Ayubs border settlement with China in the Karakorams, in the disputed territory in POK, and the subsequent construction of the highway joining Sinkiang in China with Gilgit in Pakistan, had ensured that Pakistan would get favoured treatment from Peking in time of need.
On the other hand, Yahya Khan counted heavily on China’s help for various reasons. From the time of the Chinese showdown with India in 1962, Peking’s foreign policy had always tilted towards Pakistan. To demonstrate this practically, aid in the form of military hardware had been pouring in to equip the Pakistani Army, especially when the US pipeline was blocked after the 1965 conflict. President Ayub’s border settlement with China in the Karakorams, in the disputed territory in the Pakistani-occupied region of Kashmir, and the subsequent construction of the highway joining Sinkiang in China with Gilgit in Pakistan, had ensured that Pakistan would get favoured treatment from Peking in time of need. On 13 April, Chou-En-lai promised to help Pakistan in maintaining its “territorial integrity” against all “external interference” and “the handful of people” in the eastern wing.
In an interview with Columbia Broadcasting System on 9 November Yahya Khan said: “The Chinese would intervene if India attacked Pakistan.” This impression was encouraged by the powerful pro-China lobby in Pakistan led by Bhutto. After acting the honest broker between Nixon and the Chinese rulers, Yahya Khan and his advisers counted on the Chinese adopting a more politically active, if not military, role than they had played in 1965.
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