Indian Defence Review

The enclave had strong defences and the battalion had a fine operational record. However, the Pakistani attack; launched soon, after dusk on 3 December, took the Punjabis by complete surprise. Most of their officers and JCOs had assembled during the afternoon at battalion Headquarters for a farewell tea-party to their subedar major, who was retiring from service. The Headquarters was South of the river and the party was still on when the attack came. The enemy had pin-pointed its initial objectives and some of them were already in its hands before the command group could come to grips with the situation.9

The companies manning the defences fought hard but faced superior numbers. The enemy attacked with two battalions ex 106 Infantry Brigade, supported by a squadron of armour. The battalion commander despatched a troop of tanks to reinforce his beleaguered troops. However, in the confusion of battle, the bridge, which had been prepared for demolition, was blown through panicky action while one tank was still on the far end, dropping a span. The withdrawing Centurion, carrying a number of wounded, fell into the river. Fighting continued till late in the night, with the remnants of the forward companies valiantly trying to hold on to what remained in their hands. Their radio communication with battalion Headquarters had broken down but the battalion commander made no effort go forward and see things for himself.

“¦the Indian Air Force attacked enemy troops several times and the artillery pounded them continuously.

The next morning, the Indian Air Force attacked enemy troops several times and the artillery pounded them continuously. The Punjabis had suffered heavy casualties, mainly in missing men but they still had a good deal of fight left in them. Instead of reinforcing them, however, the brigade commander recommended a withdrawal. The divisional commander was too far away to leave his Headquarters at Patti. The corps commander could also not come to see things for himself as his helicopter had developed a mechanical fault. He accepted the brigade commander’s recommendation and Hussainiwala was abandoned that night.

Pakistan’s 2 Corps and her GHQ reserve in the Multan-Okara-Montgomery area were cause for worry to the Indian high command. It was considered likely that the enemy would use these forces for an advance across the Sutlej between Ferozepur and Fazilka, or in the desert region between Fazilka and Anupgarh. Prisoners of war and other sources later confirmed that Pakistan did have plans to launch a major offensive into the Ganganagar region, but these were not put into effect for various reasons.10 It was to counter this threat that Army Headquarters positioned its 1 Armoured Division, commanded by Major General Gurbachan Singh, and 14 Infantry Division under Major General Harish Bakhshi, in the Muktsar-Kot Kapura-Faridkot area. However, 14 Division was weakened before the start of hostilities by the transfer of one of its infantry brigades to Ajnala, under 15 Division. Of its remairiing strength, 35 Infantry Brigade was placed under 7 Division. This brigade, however, reverted to 14 Division after the loss of Hussainiwala. With two brigades now under him, Bakhshi was made responsible for the area from the Harike headworks upto Fazilka, the city of Ferozepur being one of his defensive commitments.

Bakhshi did not stay long with 14 Division. On the night of 4/5 December the BSF vacated two posts, Joginder and Raja Mahatam, after they were subjected to heavy shelling. Joginder was recaptured without difficulty but the Pakistanis holding Raja Mahatam showed more spirit. After the latter’s recapture, Bakhshi was wounded by a mine-blast when he visited the post, and was later evacuated.­

The new GOC was Major General Onkar Singh Kalkat. He infused a new spirit into his command and showed the aggressiveness essential to offensive defence. He decided to use the forward troops of 35 Brigade to push back some of the enemy border posts opposite Ferozepur. Basti and New Kasoke, North of Ferozepur, were captured by 15 Dogra on the night of 6/7 December. Soon after, it was decided to clear the Pakistani enclave opposite Mamdot. As part of this operation, 15 Dogra took Rangewala at heavy cost and later followed up by seizing Jaluke Dhuan and Amrud Wali. Another battalion, 13 Punjab, captured Dona Beta, Pira Kana and Jaloke Hithar.

Furthet South, 116 Brigade was deployed to hold two axes: Ferozepur-Guru Harsarai and Muktsar-Jalalabad. In the absence of any move by the enemy, Kalkat ordered the capture of certain border posts to improve his posture. As a result, Pireke, Gatti Bharola, Kali Sahu, Ghurka and Amin Bhaini were added to the division’s bag. These posts were mostly taken, by smart manoeuvre, at small cost. After the cease-fire, the enemy tried to recapture Kali Sahu on 3 January but the attempt was foiled with heavy losses to the enemy.

After the experience of 1965, India had put up a wet ditch-cum-bund for the protection of Fazilka.

From Fazilka to Anupgarh the border was placed under an ad hoc division-sized formation, called ‘F’ Sector. Raised in July 1971, under Major General Ram Singh, it had its Headquarters at Abohar. He had three infantry brigades under him and a complement of other arms, these being 166 Field Regiment, 18 Cavalry less a squadron (T-54), one independent squadron (Sherman), four 130-mm medium batteries, a parachute field regiment and an engineer brigade equivalent. The enemy had two independent infantry brigades facing the sector: 105 at Sulaimanke and 25 at Bahawalnagar. The main threat, however, was from the forces held further back, which we have mentioned earlier.

Though Pakistan did not launch these reserves, her Sulaimanke brigade­ mounted a local action against Fazilka. Its aim was to bolster the defences of the Sulaimanke headworks, situated only about 1,500 metres from Indian territory. After the experience of 1965, India had put up a wet ditch-cum-bund for the protection of Fazilka. The Sabuna distributary, as it was called ran parallel to the border and about four to five kilometres from it. A few strongpoints had also been developed ahead of the distributary. The case was the same for the Pakistanis as for the Indians at Hussainiwala, except that the Sulaimanke Enclave did not have a continuous river obstacle to its rear.

The defence of Fazilka was assigned to 67 Infantry Brigade, under Brigadier S.S. Chowdhary. Chowdhary had under him three infantry battalions (4 Jat, 15 Rajput and 3 Assam), approximately two battalions of BSF, two squadrons of armour (‘B’ Squadron, 18 Cavalry [T-54] and 4 Independent Armoured Squadron [Scinde Horse]), 166 Field Regiment and a medium battery. His orders were to contain the Sulaimanke position and defend Fazilka (see Eig. 14.4). Like other border towns in ‘F’ Sector, Fazilka had been turned into a fortress. Chowdhary deployed most of 4 Jat and 15 Rajput for its close defence, while 3 Assam held the Sabuna distributary and the strongpoints ahead of it. The BSF manned the border posts.

A basic weakness in the brigade’s deployment was that the positions on the distributary, the strongpoints and the fortress did not form an integrated network of defences. Fazilka town was almost ten kilometres from the distributary. The brigade commander had further unbalanced himself by deploying three companies of 3 Assam on the strongpoints, while the distributary itself was held by a weak company and some battalion Headquarter personnel. The disposition implied firstly that the strong points would be held against enemy attack till a counter-stroke was delivered to relieve them. Unfortunately, most of them were abandoned on first contact. Secondly, troops in the strongpoints ahead, which had to fall back on the distributary or hold on till another unit could man the obstacle, again by implication, did not do so.When the first shots were fired on the evening of 3 December one of the strongpoints came under attack. Chowdhary ordered its garrison to fall back, leaving a small number of men to maintain contact with the enemy. The locality fell soon after and the enemy followed up with an attack on the distributary itself. By 2030 hours, a considerable portion of it had fallen, together with a bridge near the village of Beriwala.

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Chowdhary now ordered a company of 4 Jat and a squadron (less two troops) of armour to clear the enemy from the distributary. Some of the tanks, however, got bogged before reaching the objective and some others were destroyed by enemy action. It was still touch and go for the weak company of 6 Frontier Force on the Sabuna. As the tanks closed up the men started falling back. The company officer tried his hand with a strim anti-tank grenade and a T-54 caught fire. The men rallied bravely. 6 Frontier Force was thereafter able to reinforce the captured segment with recoilless and machine guns.