Pakistan’s 13 Cavalry had mounted this counter-attack. Major Nisar, the squadron commander who led the charge, had abandoned his tank after it had been shot up by Khetarpal. He was so impressed by the gallantry of the three tank commanders who had broken up his assault that he came across to meet them after the cease-fire. He could, however, only meet one of them, Captain Malhotra.
The night of 16/17 December was relatively quiet. It was, however, to be the calm before another storm. Just before dawn, the second and third major counter-attacks developed. Massive artillery shelling preceded infantry assaults in brigade strength. Two battalions of the enemy’s recently arrived 124 Brigade attacked vigorously from the direction of Barapind but were thrown back. This was made possible by the determination of the jawans to hold on to what they had taken and the excellent artillery support they received. 3 Grenadiers’ success in repulsing the enemy owed much to Major Hoshiar Singh’s gallantry and his conduct is sure to inspire future generations of officers of the Indian Army.Hoshiar Singh was in command of the left forward company of his battalion. He had led it in the storming of Jarpal. During the enemy’s counter-attack on 16 December, he went from trench to trench to cheer his men, disregarding the bullets that flew around him. When the Pakistanis counter-attacked on the morning of 17 December his company faced an assault by one battalion (39 Frontier Force). He was seriously wounded by a shell-splinter in the bombardment that preceded the attack.
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Despite his wound and in utter disregard of his own safety, he again moved about in the open from position to position to encourage his men. When a shell landed near one of his machine-gun posts, injuring its crew, he manned the gun himself and accounted for a good number of the enemy. After the battle, 85 enemy dead were counted on the company’s front, including the commanding officer of the enemy battalion and three other officers. Even after the attack was repulsed, Hoshiar Singh refused to be evacuated till the cease-fire was declared. His superb leadership and dauntless courage brought him the PVR. He was the third man in the history of the Indian Army to live to receive this award.
Due to lack of intelligence on the Pakistani defensive layout and their tactics, 1 Corps commenced operations in an area which was very heavily defended by minefields.
About 1000 hours the enemy laid a smoke-screen covering the whole front, obviously in preparation for launching another attack. Defensive artillery fire was therefore, continued and the attack, if any, fizzled out. That day, 4 Horse (less a squadron) moved into the bridgehead. Thereafter the enemy’s chances of success withered away. With the cease-fire coming into effect during the evening, the Indian advance also came to a halt, seven kilometres short of Zafarwal.
36 Infantry Division
Turning to 36 Division, we find that this formation was on a watching brief till 8 December. Under Major General B.S. Ahluwalia, it had till that day only two infantry brigades – 18 and 115 – and a regiment of armour.115 Infantry Brigade had only two battalions (4 Grenadiers and 10 Guards), 1 Mahar having been placed under 39 Division earlier. However, the reorganization of 12 December gave Ahluwalia 87 Brigade, till then marking time in the Bamial-Parol area. The Mahars also returned to 115 Brigade. In the shape of armour, 36 Division now had the Headquarters of 2 Independent Armoured Brigade, 1 Horse, 14 Horse and one squadron from 64 Cavalry (of 14 Independent Armoured Brigade). Its artillery comprised two medium regiments, two field regiments, one heavy mortar battery and one air defence battery. Three engineer regiments and 1 Dogra Mechanized (less a company) completed its order of battle in so far as fighting elements were concerned.
A spring-board for launching the division was secured early enough. On the night of 5/6 December, 18 Brigade, under Brigadier (later Major General) Prithvi Raj, secured the Lasian Enclave East of the Ravi thus obtaining a good crossing over the river. This action would not have gone unnoticed by the Pakistanis and it certainly helped to divide their attention to the area East of the Bein River. However, it was only after the advance of 39 Division was checked that the corps commander ordered Ahluwalia to advance towards Shakargarh by way of Nurkot. Ahluwalia gave the task to 115 Brigade, commanded by Brigadier (later Lieutenant General) H. Kaul. A battalion from 18 Brigade and 14 Horse were placed under Kaul for the operation.
Surprisingly, the operation was mounted that very night by 115 Brigade. The results were disastrous.
The advance began on the night of 8/9 December. By next morning the Engineers had a Class 9 bridge ready over the Ravi. Nainakot, the first likely enemy position in the brigade’s path, was occupied without opposition around noon on 10 December: the enemy had vacated it earlier. During the advance, 14 Horse encountered a squadron of Pakistan’s 33 Cavalry (M-47/48 Pattons) on 11 December and put in a brisk action, destroying eight enemy tanks for no loss of theirs. By noon on 12 December, the East bank of the Bein was secured. It was only thereafter that things started going wrong.
On 12 December, Candeth visited this sector and met the corps commander. After the meeting, the latter outlined his plan for the capture of Shakargarh. By this time, 87 Brigade had advanced from its base and crossed the Ujh and Tarnah Rivers. Its orders were to make for Shakargarh by way of Ikhlaspur. In doing so, it would not only protect 36 Division’s Northern flank, but also pose a convergent threat to Shakargarh while 115 Brigade advanced for the kill from the East. Another move to help the capture of the objective would be a simultaneous advance towards it by 72 Brigade. The Southern flank of 115 Brigade was to be covered by 2 Independent Armoured Brigade. The corps commander made it very clear that the attack on Shakargarh would only be put in after due preparation. Ahluwalia assured him that it would be feasible to go in on the night of 13/14 December. The next day in the evening, he rang up the corps commander and asked for a postponement for 24 hours saying preparations were not yet complete. The corps commander agreed.
Surprisingly, the operation was mounted that very night by 115 Brigade. The results were disastrous. A company of 4 Grenadiers was sent across the Bein with the aim of securing a foothold West of the river. No reconnaissance appears to have been carried out as the troops were unaware of the minefield covering Shakargarh from the East. After this company had crossed over, the rest of the battalion and a squadron of 14 Horse were ordered to build up on it. Meanwhile, the enemy encircled the company on the West bank and the tanks ran into a minefield while trying to cross over. The infantry and the armour then came under intense fire and were ordered back. Besides other casualties, the Grenadiers lost 72 all ranks as prisoners. On the Northern axis, 87 Brigade made good progress. By the morning of 14 December it had captured two villages, Bhatti and Shahpur Chinjore, on the East bank of the Bein.
The corps commander went to 36 Division that morning to see things for himself. He could get no satisfactory explanation for the previous night’s happenings. Ahluwalia now told him of his plan for another assault that night (14/15 December). The corps commander could see for himself that preparations, such as artillery fire tasks and Engineers’ co-ordination, were not yet complete. But he did not postpone the operation as Ahluwalia was confident of success.
The second assault ended in a fiasco. For unknown reasons, 4 Grenadiers, who had received a severe mauling the previous night, were again given the leading role.
The second assault ended in a fiasco. For unknown reasons, 4 Grenadiers, who had received a severe mauling the previous night, were again given the leading role. Enemy guns opened up while they were in the forming-up place. One of the companies was caught in the open and, although the casualties were not many, some of the sub-units got scattered and the attack had to be called off.
On the Eastern approach, 3/9 Gorkha Rifles, the leading battalion of 87 Brigade, put in a spirited attack. A village on the outskirts of Shakargarh was its objective. The battalion struggled valiantly on the wrong side of the minefield until orders were given to the assault companies to withdraw. The mine-breaching operation had let down the Gorkhas. It could not begin on time and the breach, when made, was not successful. The battalion suffered heavily and some of its men were taken prisoner.
The second attack having fizzled out, the corps commander now decided to bring up 18 Brigade and put in a third attempt on the night of 17/18 December. Preparations commenced straightaway but the timing coincided with the cease-fire, and it had to be abandoned. The advance of 72 Brigade also did not make much headway as the armour was obstructed by minefields.
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Thus ended 1 Corps’ offensive without the capture of its initial objectives. All it had achieved in doing was to drive the enemy’s covering troops to its main defended positions. During 12 days it had advanced about 13 kilometres. The lack of spectacular results was mainly due to the dispersal of resources. Four infantry brigades were tied up in base areas and the multi-pronged approach precluded the concentration of adequate strength for a decisive breakthrough. Of the two armoured brigades with the corps, not more than one regiment was in contact with the enemy at any point of time.
The complete command structure of 1 Corps was smitten with indecision. A constant narrowing down of objectives – from Ravi-Marala Link Canal to Zafarwal-Dhamthal to Zafarwal and Shakargarh – took place giving the Pakistanis enough time to discern major thrusts and therefore objectives. GOC 1 Corps, by subordinating his two armoured brigades to his infantry division commanders, surrendered all mobile assets. In the event, neither were these formations successful nor did he have the infantry divisions to crack open the series of obstacles by combined action. The six long-range medium regiments were also unable to suppress Pakistani artillery which took a heavy toll.
Due to lack of intelligence on the Pakistani defensive layout and their tactics, 1 Corps commenced operations in an area which was very heavily defended by minefields. GOC 1 Corps and his formation commanders walked into this sector blindfolded and made no attempts to break free of its shackles by concerted, orchestrated offensive action.
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