At this stage, the failure of 39 Division to take the Dehlra-Chakra complex, East of the Karir, began to affect Pinto. On 8 December the enemy brought Dudwan Kalan under fire from across the Karir. The Pakistanis had a strong pivotal position in the Dehlra-Chakra area and unless it was eliminated, 54 Division’s East flank would remain under threat.
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Pinto gave the task to 74 Brigade, led by Brigadier Ujaggar Singh. It had to move all the way back via Bhoi Brahmnan, in the North. After reconnoitring the objective for two successive nights the attack took place on the night of 10/11 December. Chakra was attacked from the rear by 8 Grenadiers and a squadron of 4 Horse. The enemy fought hard and the position fell after a battle lasting over four hours. The enemy lost six M-47/48 Pattons during the action. Dehlra was taken by 6 Kumaon without trouble. The engineers’ contribution to the success of this operation was considerable. Under Major V.R. Chowdhary’s leadership, men of 9 Engineer Regiment cleared a lane through the minefield at Chakra in the face of intense enemy fire.
A few enemy pockets were holding out, particularly in the gap between the positions of the two forward battalions.
Pinto now ordered 91 Brigade, commanded by Brigadier (later Lieutenant General and Army Commander) A. Handoo, to pass through and exploit further South. Handoo expected strong enemy reaction and proceeded with caution. In the event, the brigade met desultory resistance and by 15 December, it was dominating the Shakargarh-Zafarwal road from positions at Ramri, Barwal and Chanda, about a kilometre from that highway.
Preparations for the division’s attack on the Supwal Ditch had begun on 12 December. The operation involved the turning of enemy defences across the Basantar River. Two brigades were to take part. A bridgehead was to be established by 47 Brigade in the Lalial-Sikandarpur-Barapind area, including the South-East shoulder of the Supwal Ditch. The rest of the Supwal Ditch was to be tackled by 74 Brigade in a follow-up operation. The East flank of the enemy defences was covered by a minefield laid in the bed of the river. It was 1,400 metres in depth and the clearing of lanes through it would be a formidable task for the engineers.
The Battle of Basantar
The task of providing a firm base for the operation was given to 91 Brigade and by 1600 hours on 14 December, 3/1 Gorkha Rifles captured Jhumbiyan Manhasan, East of the Basantar, against stiff opposition. The divisional attack was scheduled to go in that night but was postponed for 24 hours for further reconnaissance as very little was known of enemy dispositions or suitable crossing places over the Basantar. However, the postponement brought no advantage. Hardly any information of value was obtained, while the enemy gained time to regroup and reinforce its troops.
After the battle, it came to be known that three infantry battalions of Pakistan’s 24 Brigade were deployed in the Supwal Ditch-Rupo Chak-Jarpal-Barapind area. A company of their divisional reconnaissance and support battalion was on the West bank of the Basantar and a regiment minus of armour supported the brigade. In addition, 8 Independent Armoured Brigade, with at least two regiments of armour and an armoured infantry battalion, was at hand as reserves. A big surprise of the battle was the induction of Pakistan’s 124 Infantry Brigade. It was brought all the way from Rahimyar Khan, South of Multan and used in a fierce counter-attack on 17 December within hours of its arrival. The Pakistan Air Force was quite active in this sector. Having got wind of the coming attack, it put in about 30 sorties against 47 Brigade’s assembly area on 15 December.
In Bangladesh, Pakistani infantry had not shown much inclination to fight at close quarters. Here they were much more tenacious and had to be driven from each position by hand to hand combat.
Besides his three infantry battalions (3 Grenadiers, 6 Madras, 16 Madras), Brigadier Bhardwaj had under him 17 Horse7 and 18 Rajputana Rifles (less two companies). Supporting the operation was the divisional artillery brigade, two medium regiments from 41 Independent Artillery Brigade, the brigaded mortars of 91 Brigade and three field companies. His plan was simple. His leading battalion, 16 Madras, was to capture Saraj Chak and the 5r area. Thereafter, 3 Grenadiers would follow and take Jarpal and Lagwal. There was a considerable gap between the objectives of the two battalions. The third battalion, along with 17 Horse, was to close the gap and expand the bridgehead after first light.
The action began at 2000 hours. Both 16 Madras and 3 Grenadiers met very stiff resistance. In Bangladesh, Pakistani infantry had not shown much inclination to fight at close quarters. Here they were much more tenacious and had to be driven from each position by hand to hand combat. Saraj Chak, Jarpal and Lagwal were captured but the situation remained confused. Bhardwaj, therefore, decided to use 6 Madras to reinforce, rather than expand, the captured positions. A few enemy pockets were holding out, particularly in the gap between the positions of the two forward battalions. The engineers had done their job well and by first light, 17 Horse and 6 Madras arrived into the bridgehead.
The morning mist, common in the Punjab at this time of the year, delayed the forward move of the newly arrived troops. The enemy had the advantage of familiarity with the ground and dawn brought to light a number of machine-gun bunkers in the area not cleared during the night. Some of the enemy infantry had also infiltrated the bridgehead. Enemy artillery and these pockets caused many casualties. Lieutenant Colonel V. Ghai, the commanding officer of 16 Madras, was killed and his second-in-command and adjutant were wounded.
Around 0800 hours on 16 December, a major counter-attack developed from the direction of Lalial and Ghazipur. Two regiments of armour from Pakistan’s 8 Independent Armoured Brigade put in repeated assaults in echelon one at a time. First, 13 Lancers tried their hand. This regiment was decimated. The second regiment was 31 Cavalry which met the same fate. But 17 Horse, under Lieutenant Colonel (later Lieutenant General) Hanut Singh, and the three infantry battalions held the enemy. Good artillery support played its part. The enemy’s fury and desperation can be judged from the fact that by 1600 hours 46 of its tanks had been destroyed.
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The battle witnessed many acts of valour. The part played by Second Lieutenant Arun Khetarpal of 17 Horse shows the grit and dedication with which officers and men met the challenge. The Indian position at Jarpal was held by two troops from B Squadron of his regiment and 3 Grenadiers. When it came under severe pressure from enemy armour, Khetarpal’s troop and another under Lieutenant Ahlawat were ordered forward from Saraj Chak. While the two troops were advancing under Captain V. Malhotra, the second-in-command of their squadron, they came under attack from recoilless guns concealed in bunkers and groves that lay to a flank. To silence them, Malhotra and Khetarpal made a headlong charge, overran the guns and captured their crew at pistol-point. Then putting them on their tanks, they again moved forward. In the course of this action, the commander of the only other tank left in Khetarpal’s troops was also killed.
Nearing the position occupied by B Squadron, Malhotra saw some enemy tanks withdrawing towards Barapind. Straightaway, he and Khetarpal gave chase. The latter got within range of an M-47 Patton and shot it before the two were ordered to get back to B Squadron’s position.
Soon after, an enemy squadron was seen approaching for attack and a shoot-up ensued. The three tanks under Malhotra were mainly responsible for taking on the enemy and completely breaking up the assault. Ten Pakistani tanks were destroyed in quick succession. Of these, Khetarpal had accounted for four. During the engagement, Ahlawat’s tank was hit. He was wounded and had to be evacuated. Malhotra’s own gun jammed. This left Khetarpal facing the oncoming enemy alone. His tank was hit soon after whereupon it burst into flames and he was severely wounded. Seeing this, Malhotra ordered him to abandon his tank. Khetarpal, however, saw that the enemy was still pressing the attack and there was nothing to stop it from breaking through. So he decided to fight on and told Malhotra: “No, Sir, my gun is still functioning and I’ll get these bums”. Thereafter he kept engaging the enemy from his burning tank and destroyed a tank that was less than a hundred metres from him. That tank carried the commander of the Pakistani squadron, who, in turn, scored a hit on Khetarpal’s tank. This resulted in this brave and fearless officer’s death. Khetarpal’s citation later said: “His calculated and deliberate decision to fight from his burning tank was an act of valour and self-sacrifice beyond the call of duty”.The country paid a tribute to Arun Khetarpal with a posthumous award of the PVR.
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