Military & Aerospace

1971: Making Bangladesh a reality - III
Star Rating Loader Please wait...
Issue Book Excerpt: Indian Army After Independence | Date : 30 Mar , 2011

Dacca was by this time under threat from the advanced elements of 4 Corps, and Niazi was scraping the barrel for troops to defend it. Failing to get any from other sectors, he had ordered 93 Brigade to withdraw to Kaliakair, North-West of Dacca. The Brigade Commander, Brigadier Qadir reluctantly passed on this order to his battalions.

With 95 Brigade poised for the attack and the Pakistanis preparing to pull out, a piquant situation developed. Sultan underestimated the strength facing him and in repeated attempts to breakout during the night, his troops suffered heavily. Only small parties managed to get away. More than 380 prisoners were rounded up in the morning. The Pakistani garrison at Mymensingh was able to withdraw unmolested and FJ Force occupied the town on 11 December.

Map_Central_Sector

On the afternoon of 11 December, 2 (Para) Battalion Group was dropped about eight kilometres North-East of Tangail. The main task of this group was to cut off the retreat of the Pakistani 93 Brigade by seizing a five-span concrete bridge on the Mymensingh-Tangail road. This was the first major airborne operation by the Past-Independence Indian Army. Several parachute operations had been planned for the Bangladesh campaign but the ground operations went off so well that the other airborne missions were given up.The war in Bangladesh might have ended a few days earlier than it did if this battalion group had landed nearer Dacca and then linked up with the troops of 4 Corps, which were already in Narsingdi. As it was, Tangail was a hundred kilometres from Dacca. When it became obvious that things were moving fast, Major General I.S. Gill, Director of Military Operations at Army Headquarters, did make the suggestion that the venue of the drop be shifted to Kurmitola. The Air Force, however, refused to consider it as the venture was considered too risky. Even the drop at Tangail was scheduled for the night of 11 December and the timing was only later advanced to 1600 hours.

The war in Bangladesh might have ended a few days earlier than it did if this battalion group had landed nearer Dacca and then linked up with the troops of 4 Corps, which were already in Narsingdi.

2 (Para) Group was commanded by Lieutenant Colonel (later Brigadier) Kulwant Singh Pannu and included a Para Field battery, an Engineer platoon and Signal and Medical detachments from 50 (Para) Brigade, as also their equipment and guns. A sharp wind had arisen over Tangail during the afternoon and this spread out the drop. Some of the equipment landed in ponds and one Dakota discharged its load 17 kilometres away from the dropping zone. However, the Group was able to concentrate quickly enough after the drop. The local population was very helpful in retrieving and carrying their stores and equipment.

By the time the para-drop took place, most of Brigadier Qadir’s garrison from Mymensingh had reached Tangail, or gone further down the road to Dacca. He observed the drop from the Circuit House at Tangail, where he was resting at the time, and sent off the nearest company to deal with the paratroopers. The company commander, however, returned after half an hour with the report that it was the Chinese who had landed.The locals had told him this.

About this time Pakistani commanders had been led by their superiors in Islamabad to believe that help was expected from China and the USA. A cryptic message had been passed down saying: ‘friends from the North and friends from the South’ were soon going to intetvene. Though the thought that the paratroopers might be Chinese cheered up Qadir and his companions for a few moments, a little reflection was enough to dispel the misconception. The Brigadier now had two options. He could either take on the paratroopers, very vulnerable at the time of landing, or withdraw to Kaliakair in accordance with his orders. He chose to obey his orders.

Editor’s Pick

Unfortunately for him, a stray mine-explosion had occurred a little earlier on the Tangail-Dacca road, a few kilometres South of Tangail. On reaching the scene and hearing some shots, he and the officers and troops accompanying him abandoned their vehicles, split into groups and set out on a cross-country march to Kaliakair.

Meanwhile the paratroopers had captured their bridge and were lying in wait for the enemy. The first to appear was a Pakistani light battery (mortars) around 2030 hours. Its leading vehicle received a direct hit from an anti-tank rocket. Thereafter a larger force made an attempt to dislodge the paratroopers but was driven back with heavy losses. That night and till 1300 hours the next day, the enemy mounted several attacks but they were unco-ordinated actions which cost the enemy dearly. They lost 344 men, killed, wounded and taken prisoner. 2 (Para) Battalion Group’s own losses were light. After 1300 hours on 12 December the Pakistanis began to give the paratroopers a wide berth and took to cross-country paths. At 1700 hours 1 Maratha LI, the leading battalion of 95 Brigade, linked up with the paratroopers.
Map_Battle_of_Dacca

On arrival at Tangail, Nagra decided to push on to Dacca, though he had little transport, except what he had captured and what he could lay hands on locally. The advance began the next morning, 13 December, with 6 Sikh LI in the lead. Kaliakair was cleared around 2200 hours. According to the map with Nagra, two routes now led to Dacca. He could either cross the Turag River and then move by way of Chandna and Tungi, or go by way of Dhamrai and Mirpur (see Fig. 13.9). As the latter route involved the crossing of two rivers, Dhaleswari and the Burhi Ganga, Nagra chose the former. 6 Sikh LI continued their advance throughout the night and came up against the defences on the Turag the next morning. Here the enemy had tanks and advance was held up.

1 2 3 4 5
Rate this Article
Star Rating Loader Please wait...
The views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily represent the opinions or policies of the Indian Defence Review.

About the Author

More by the same author

Post your Comment

2000characters left