When the first group jumped into the water, they found it six feet deep. The group happened to be Gorkhas and two of them were drowned. The operation was thereafter halted.
After reaching Chandpur, 301 Brigade was busy rounding up Pakistani stragglers. About 700 were brought in. They were bedraggled, hungry and badly shaken. Most of them were keen to give themselves up, but not to the Mukti Bahini as they were very scared of it. A party of 60, under a subedar-major, surrendered to two unarmed jawans who had gone to the riverside for a stroll. The party had been in hiding, waiting for an opportunity to surrender. There were some encounters with Pakistanis attempting to flee towards Dacca in launches and steamers. Many of these attempts were foiled.
On 11 December, Brigadier Sodhi was told that his brigade should move to Daudkandi, cross the Meghna, secure Baidya Bazar and then cross the Lakhya River South-East of Dacca. Chandpur was not linked to Daudkandi by road. 301 Brigade had, therefore, to go back the way it had come and take the Comilla-Daudkandi road. It was ferried across the Meghna partly by river-craft and partly by helicopters. The advance to the Lakhya on 15 December was virtually unopposed. However, the enemy was present in some strength in the built-up area opposite Narayanganj and 14 Jat suffered heavy casualties in clearing it. By the time Sodhi heard the news of the surrender, 1/11 Gorkha Rifles had crossed the Lakhya. Two brigades of 57 Division were also poised for an attack on Dacca from the North-East at this time.
After the fall of Laksham, 83 Brigade was ordered to join Kilo force, then advancing on Chittagong. The terrain was difficult and opposition quite stiff. The combined force was still fighting near Sitakund when Dacca fell.
A seaborne landing was launched against Cox’s Bazar on 12 December after reports had reached Army Headquarters that some Pakistani troops were escaping into Burma that way. The Task Force consisted of the Headquarters of 2 Corps Artillery Brigade, a battalion and a half of infantry and some supporting troops. It embarked at Calcutta and arrived at its rendezvous with the Eastern Fleet during the night of 13/14 December. There it was transferred to landing craft with some difficulty.
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The tide conditions being unfavourable, the troops stayed in the landing craft till 0130 hours on 15 December when they finally moved towards the coast. However, the craft could not beach due to sandbars and unsuitable beaches. The troops were then ordered to wade ashore when about a hundred metres or so from land. When the first group jumped into the water, they found it six feet deep. The group happened to be Gorkhas and two of them were drowned. The operation was thereafter halted.
In the morning some country boats arrived on the scene with the news that there were no Pakistanis in the area. The troops were now ferried across in these very boats, a process that took two days. By then the war was over.
Central Sector and the fall of Dacca
Like the Indians, the Pakistanis had also given the least importance to the Mymensingh-Tangail area. Only their 93 Brigade (with two regular battalions) held it. Even this force was withdrawn at a crucial moment, leaving the way clear for forces initially under Headquarters 101 Communications Zone to reach Dacca before 4 Corps.
The Pakistanis had a stronger delaying position South of Kamalpur, at Bakshiganj. But they withdrew from it without giving much of a fight.
From India the approach into this sector was through Meghalaya; Kamalpur and Haluaghat being the two entry points. The route by way of the former led to Jamalpur, while the latter took one to Mymensingh (see Fig. 13.8). Both Jamalpur and Mymensingh were connected to Dacca by rail and lay on the Southern bank of an off-flow of the Brahmaputra. In its lower reaches this branch of the river is known as the Lakhya. Jamalpur was held by 31 Baluch while Mymensingh had 33 Punjab and Headquarters 93 Independent Infantry Brigade. Both battalions had detachments guarding border posts.
Major General Gill decided to launch his 95 Mountain Brigade under Brigadier H.S. Kler, on the Kamalpur-Jamalpur axis, and FJ Force led by Brigadier Sant Singh, mvc, on the Haluaghat-Mymensingh route. Towards the end of November several attempts had been made to neutralize Kamalpur but its Baluchi garrison had stood firm. Though surrounded it refused to surrender. On 4 December, Kamalpur was subjected to repeated air-strikes. After one such raid, Gill sent a message through a Mukti Bahini volunteer advising the position comrnander to surrender. The latter did not reply as he expected help from his battalion. However, when none came, he surrendered during the evening.
The Pakistanis had a stronger delaying position South of Kamalpur, at Bakshiganj. But they withdrew from it without giving much of a fight. On the morning of 5 December, General Gill went forward to Bakshiganj in a jeep driven by Kler. Unfortunately, the jeep struck a mine and Gill was wounded and evacuated. The same day Major General G.C. Nagra came over from 2 Mountain Division to assume command. He brought with him some of his senior staff, engineer and signal resources from his division.Nagra decided to take Jamalpur with an outflanking move from the West while holding the enemy frontally. Two battalions – 1 Maratha LI and 13 Guards – were to do the outflanking and establish a block South of Jamalpur. They moved manpack, bullock-carts carrying their equipment and guns. The river was crossed about eight kilometres West of Jamalpur.
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However, the slow movement of the bullock-carts led to delay and the leading battalion could hit the Jamalpur-Tangail road only by first light on 9 December. Nagra felt the need for one more infantry battalion to complete the ring round Jamalpur before attacking it. At this stage, Eastern Command came to his help and placed 167 Mountain Brigade, commanded by Brigadier Irani, under him. From this formation 6 Sikh LI joined the two battalions South of Jamalpur in the early hours of 10 December.
Dacca was by this time under threat from the advanced elements of 4 Corps, and Niazi was scraping the barrel for troops to defend it.
The Jamalpur garrison had been under heavy air-strikes and artillery concentrations since 7 December. On 9 December, Kler sent a message through a courier to Lieutenant Colonel Sultan, the commanding officer of the Baluchis, asking him to surrender. In reply he received a bullet together with a note advising him to fight it out instead of writing letters. Kler’s attack on Jamalpur was scheduled for the night of 10 December. Unknown to him the Baluchis were planning to break out that night.
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