Military & Aerospace

1971: Making Bangladesh a reality - II
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Issue Book Excerpt: Indian Army After Independence | Date : 29 Mar , 2011

2 Corps: (South-Western area of operations)

Like other senior commanders of the time, Lieutenant General Raina, Commander 2 Corps, had had his first battle experience during the Second World War. After service in the Middle East he had fought in Burma. We have earlier seen evidence of his leadership in the defence of Chushul in 1962. There Raina had fought against heavy odds. Things were different this time; with a corps of two divisions plus, he now faced Pakistan’s 9 Infantry Division, which had only two regular brigades, one ad hoc brigade, two field regiments of artillery and one reconnaissance and support battalion. Major General M.H. Ansari commanded this division, with Headquarters at Jessore. Given to piety and prayers, Ansari had during the counter-insurgency operations earned the Hilal-i-Jurat and promotion to major general, which had earlier been denied to him.

The border in this sector ran for about 600 kilometres, from the South bank of the Ganga to the Bay of Bengal. A North-South railway that had its terminus at Chalna in the South ran by way of Khulna, Jessore and Kushtia over the Hardinge Bridge to Bogra and Rangpur in the North-Western Sector (see Fig. 13.2). Another line, running West-East, connected the Indian border by way of Darsana and Kushtia to Goalundo Ghat and Faridpur, both ferry points for Dacca. The main arterial road ran between 50 and 80 kilometres from the Indian border and almost parallel to it. It connected Khulna, Jessore, Jhenida and Kushtia.

Barar had done well in defensive actions during the semi-war period.

A West-East road ran from Meherpur, on the border, to Jhenida, Magura and across the Madhumati, to Faridpur. The Madhumati was unbridged. Next to Dacca, Jessore was the most important town in East Pakistan. It was also the strongest fortress in Niazi’s defences. Fourty-six kilometres North of it was Jhenida, another fortress and road junction. Ansari had placed his ad hoc brigade at Khulna. Of his regular brigades, 107 was deployed for the defence of Jessore and 57 was guarding the Meherpur-Jhenida axis, with Headquarters at Jhenida.

Raina’s plan was to employ 4 Mountain Division, under Major General M.S. Barar, for an advance on Magura by way of Majdia, Jibannagar, Kotchandpur and Jhenida, so as to secure the ferry on the Madhumati. Thereafter this division was to be in readiness to secure Faridpur and the ferry at Goalundo Ghat; or, if the situation so demanded, carry out mopping-up operations in the Kushtia-Hardinge Bridge area and even further North around Bogra (in 33 Corps Sector). The main task of 9 Infantry Division, under Major General Dalbir Singh, was to capture Jessore, after which one of its brigade groups was to advance South to Khulna, while the rest of the division was to be in readness to assist 4 Division. Of the armour under him, Raina had given a squadron to 4 Division and the rest was with 9 Division.

Barar had done well in defensive actions during the semi-war period. As a result, the morning of 4 December found his 41 Mountain Brigade, under Brigadier (later Major General) A.H.E. Michigan, poised for the capture of Darsana, while his 62 Mountain Brigade, under Brigadier (later Major General) Rajendra Nath, was making for Kotchandpur. The division had already taken Jibannagar and Uthali. Its 7 Mountain Brigade under Brigadier Zail Singh, was in corps reserve.Darsana was not on the division’s line of advance, but lay on its Northern flank. It was known to be held in some strength by the enemy; Barar had, therefore, decided to remove this thorn from his side. The way for the capture of Darsana was cleared by 22 Rajput, who secured Akandabaria in a preliminary action. Darsana fell to a very young battalion, 5/1 Gorkha Rifles, supported by two troops from 45 Cavalry. It was a hard-fought action that saw much gallantry on the part of junior leaders. Uthali too had fallen to this very battalion. Lieutenant Colonel C. Venugopal (later Major General Venugopal, PVSM, MVC), the Battalion Commander, played a crucial part in both action. In both cases, after capturing the objective assigned to his battalion, he pushed on to take the objective allotted to other battalions in the second phase of the operation. The quick follow-up deprived the enemy of the chance to reorganize and make a further stand.9

Moving guns and bridging equipment for building a bridge on the Chitra was a tremendous task.

The battle for Kotchandpur was fought near an obscure village called Suadih. The enemy had bunkered defences astride the Uthali-Kotchandpur route and the fighting among them lasted throughout 4 December, 62 Brigade suffering heavy casualties. The brigade entered Kotchandpur the next day and received a tumultuous welcome from its people.

After Darsana. the Pakistanis thought that the next target would be Chuadanga, a town to the North which happened to be the native place of Dr. Malik, Governor of East Pakistan. Brigadier Manzoor Ahmed, Commander Pakistan’s 57 Infantry Brigade, had accordingly moved his troops there after their withdrawal from Darsana. Barar, however, had no intention of going further North and had set his sights on Jhenida. To block Manzoor Ahmed’s movement, he ordered 5 Guards and the armoured squadron to lay ambushes on the Chuadanga-Jhenida route. With these in position, 41 Brigade advanced for the kill.

The brigade moved by way of Kotchandpur and Talsar. Beyond Kotchandpur only a dirt-track existed and there were many water­ obstacles on the way, including the Chitra River which had no bridge at Talsar. Moving guns and bridging equipment for building a bridge on the Chitra was a tremendous task. The leading battalion, 5/1 Gorkha Rifles, set out from Uthali at dawn on 5 December. Continuing non-stop, they reached the Chitra the next morning, after covering a distance of 40 kilometres. The move beyond Kotchandpur had to be on foot. After the Gorkhas had gone over the Chitra the Engineers put up a bridge over it.

Indian intelligence about the enemy was poor despite the friendly attitude of the local population. It later came to be known that Major General Ansari had moved his Headquarters to Magura on the very first day of the war.

The brigade’s second battalion, 9 Dogra, set out in the early hours of 6 December from Kotchandpur, and reached the Chitra by the evening against minor opposition. Their advance continued during the night and by 0930 hours the next morning they were knocking upon the gates of Jhenida, The enemy was completely surprised by their unexpected appearance. A troop of tanks had by then joined the Dogras from one of the ambush sites while another troop was to join them by midday. With the defences held by only two enemy companies, the battalion was able to overcome all opposition by 1430 hours. Two of the bridges on the road to Kushtia were taken intact and the enemy left behind much booty: 30 vehicles, 500 lorry-loads of ammunition and the complete Headquarters of 57 Brigade together with maps and other documents.

The quick fall of Jhenida had its immediate impact in the enemy evacuation of Meherpur. Simultaneously with the advance of 41 Brigade to Jhenida, Barar had ordered 62 Brigade to capture Kaliganj, an important road junction South of Jhenida. As in the case of Kotchandpur, the battle for Kaliganj was fought on the road to that town. The enemy fought fanatically and suffered heavily as a result. Kaliganj was entered before noon on 7 December.

On the same day 9 Division entered Jessore. Eastern Command thereupon ordered Raina to capture Magura straightaway and placed 50 Independent (Para) Brigade (less a battalion) at his disposal. Aurora anticipated that Pakistani troops withdrawing from Jessore would fall back on Magura. As it was, Barar had also despatched 62 Brigade to Magura immediately after the fall of Jhenida.

The Para Brigade took the Churamankti-Khajura-Simakhali route which was long and difficult. While clearing some bunkers at Khajura on 8 December, its leading battalion (7 Para) lost four officers, including the commanding officer, and seven other ranks. On arrival near Arpara the next day, the brigade was ordered back as 62 Brigade had already taken Magura by then.10 The Pakistanis had evacuated the town without firing a shot.

The enemy fought fanatically and suffered heavily as a result. Kaliganj was entered before noon on 7 December.

Indian intelligence about the enemy was poor despite the friendly attitude of the local population. It later came to be known that Major General Ansari had moved his Headquarters to Magura on the very first day of the war. Also, 107 Brigade did not fall back on Magura after the fall of Jessore but withdrew to Khulna.

After Magura, 62 Brigade continued its advance and reached the West bank of the Madhumati around noon on 9 December. The stage was thus set for an advance to Faridpur. Instead of crossing the Madhumati, however, Barar got embroiled with Kushtia. This town, about 45 kilometres North of Jhenida, was not one of the objectives specified for 4 Division; it was meant to be taken as part of the mopping-up operations after the ferry on the Madhumati had been secured.

However, the quick fall of Jhenida and the release of 7 Brigade, till then in corps reserve, prompted Barar to despatch this brigade for its capture. He expected that with Kushtia in the bag, he would be able to cut off 57 Brigade’s withdrawal towards Goalundo Ghat, the only way open to it to rejoin its division at Faridpur. General Raina approved the plan and 7 Brigade was sent forward from Jhenida on the morning of 9 December with two troops of tanks and some artillery.The leading battalion (22 Rajput) and the tanks arrived in the vicinity of Kushtia around 1400 hours and debussed. Shortly thereafter Raina and Barar landed there by helicopter. The Corps Commander’s expectation was that Kushtia would fall as easily as Magura. Unfortunately, this was based upon conjecture, not firm intelligence. As it was, most of the enemy 57 Brigade was concentrated at Kushtia on this day as Manzoor Ahmed had brought it there on finding Jhenida in Indian hands. While 7 Brigade was making for Kushtia, some Razakars had rushed to Ahmed with the information that an Indian brigade was moving up. He quickly got ready to meet it.

The Pakistanis let the Rajputs and the tanks come forward till they were in the built-up area, where the tanks could not manoeuvre. Then they opened up with all they had: tanks, artillery, automatics and recoilless guns. Only one Indian tank managed to get away – the rest were either knocked out or captured. The vanguard company of the Rajputs suffered heavy casualties and the unexpectedly strong reaction of the enemy created some panic in the leading troops, which soon spread to those in the rear.

The area abounded in bils (lakes) and marshes; the Pakistanis made good use of them to throw up a defensive line by connecting them with anti-tank ditches and laying mines.

Zail Singh asked for air support but it took hours to materialize. He ordered the follow-up battalion to take up a firm base in the area where the brigade had earlier debussed, so that the Rajputs could withdraw and reorganize. This battalion (5 Jat) foiled several attempts by the Pakistanis to throw 7 Brigade further back. The day’s battle cost 111 casualties, including 6 officers. The loss was the result of neglecting normal battle procedures on the unfounded assumption that there would be no opposition.

By the evening the situation had stabilized. Unfortunately, Barar and Raina over-reacted to the reverse. During the evening the former ordered 41 Brigade to move from Jhenida to Kushtia. Later during the night Raina told Barar to move the third brigade also, leaving a battalion on the Madhumati. Thus by the evening of 10 December the whole division had assembled in front of Kushtia.

Meanwhile, finding things getting too hot with air-strikes and shelling, Manzoor Ahmed slipped out of Kushtia during the night. He was able to withdraw with most of his equipment across the Ganga by way of Hardinge Bridge, which had been roughly decked. The brigade thereafter came under Pakistan’s 16 Infantry Division. Zail Singh entered Kushtia the next day. On 12 December, 41 Mountain Brigade took Hardinge Bridge and Bheramara, unopposed. Both had well-prepared defences but the Pakistanis had withdrawn after blowing up a couple of spans of the bridge.

Barar now turned his attention to the ferry on the Madhumati. By the evening of 14 December, he had deployed two of his brigades on the river: 62 Brigade North of the Magura-Kamarkhali road and 7 Brigade South of it. The enemy had an ad hoc brigade of two weak battalions and a battery of 105-mm guns on the East bank. It had no tanks.

By the morning of 15 December, Barar was able to establish bridgeheads North and South of Kamarkhali, after a silent crossing during the early hours. Thereafter, 62 Brigade drove the enemy from its positions North of the Kamarkhali-Faridput road, while 7 Brigade blocked its escape route. The Pakistanis made determined attempts to break through the block, resulting in stiff fighting and heavy casualties to them.

On 16 December, Major General Ansari and his divisional staff surrendered to Barar at Kamarkhali, while his garrison at Faridpur, more than 3,000-strong, laid down arms before Brigadier Rajendra Nath. The 9 Infantry Division had to fight hard for Jessore. The Bayra action had given a lodgement to the division’s 42 Infantry Brigade under Brigadier J.S. Gharaya (see Fig. 13.3). After that clash, Pakistan’s 107 Brigade had fallen back to the general line Afra-Jhingergacha. The area abounded in bils (lakes) and marshes; the Pakistanis made good use of them to throw up a defensive line by connecting them with anti-tank ditches and laying mines. After the outbreak of open hostilities Major General Dalbir Singh launched 42 Brigade towards Arpara, North-West of Afra, to outflank the enemy defences. However, the enemy held this move. At the same time, 350 Infantry Brigade, under Brigadier H.S. Sandhu, which had been ordered to attack the centre of the defence-line also met very stiff resistance.Dalbir Singh now decided to swing the full weight of his division on the North-Western approach. He brought up most of 32 Infantry Brigade, commanded by Brigadier Tewari, till then held in reserve at Bangaon, to Bayra, his plan being to launch this brigade with all available armour and artillery after 42 Brigade had punched a hole in enemy defences.

The vanguard company of the Rajputs suffered heavy casualties and the unexpectedly strong reaction of the enemy created some panic in the leading troops, which soon spread to those in the rear.

The punching was done by 2 Sikh LI with a daylight attack an 6 December. In a short, sharp action, a Pakistani position North-East of Afra was captured at 1000 hours. Soon after, lanes were cleared through the minefield and around noon, 32 Brigade, led by 7 Punjab (Mechanized) and a squadran from 63 Cavalry, pushed through the gap. Earlier, Brigadier Gharaya had been wounded by an enemy shell, but refused to be evacuated till his brigade had completed its task.

The going was not too easy for 32 Brigade, the ground being marshy. However, by first light on 6 December, the armour had cut the Chaugacha­Jessore road, nearly six kilometres East of Afra. But the Pakistanis were still holding Afra and they could be driven from the area only by midnight. The clearing of mines thereafter took time and it was only on the morning of 7 December that 7 Punjab took the Jessore airfield. The city was occupied during the day.

According to Pakistani accounts, their 107 Brigade was holding positions East of Bayra, and Jessore itself had no regular troops. Before the Indian breakthrough, the brigade commander, Brigadier Makhmad Hayat, sought permission to withdraw to Jessore as he foresaw that it would be impossible to do so once the Indians had breached his defences. His request was, however, turned down owing to Niazi’s prerequisite of 75 percent casualties before any withdrawal. Shortly before the Indian breakthrough, Hayat took a bold decision. Concluding that in case he now withdrew to Jessore the Indians would not give him the chance to evacuate it later in an orderly manner, he decided to make for Khulna instead. This was a wise move as the marshy terrain an the route would make his pursuit difficult. The withdrawal began around 1500 hours on 6 December. Though there was same initial confusion due to his sudden decision, most of Hayat’s brigade was able to pull out unoalested.

This was a wise move as the marshy terrain an the route would make his pursuit difficult.

With both Jessore and Jhenida in the bag by 7 December, General Raina was well placed for a quick advance to Dacca. He was in a position to contain the remnants of Ansari’s two brigades in the Kushtia and Khulna areas with two of his own brigades, and push on to Faridpur and Golunda Ghat with the rest of his corps. However, as we have seen, he allowed 4 Division to get involved at Kushtia. In the event, 9 Division also got stuck on the road to Khulna. The opportunity to reach Dacca was thus lost.

Major General Dalbir Singh sent his 32 Brigade with a squadron of tanks in pursuit of the Pakistanis withdrawing to Khulna. The Indian estimate was that only about 500 of the enemy had gone that way and that the bulk of 107 Brigade had withdrawn towards Magura. Hayat carried out his withdrawal with skill by occupying successive delaying positions. Tewari found the terrain getting more marshy and wooded as he advanced further South. This made it difficult for him to use his armour. It was only on 11 December, when he cleared one of Hayat’s delaying positions after considerable fighting, that he realized he was facing almost the whole of 107 Brigade.

The next day, arriving in front of Daulatpur, a town about 14 kilometres from Khulna, Tewari found himself firmly held. The Pakistanis were occupying a position that had extensive marsh on one flank and the Bhairab River on the other. At this stage Dalbir Singh decided to move the rest of his division forward to reduce Daulatpur. A divisional attack was put in on 15 December and the operation was still in progress when the cease­-fire came into effect on 16 December. It is interesting to note that Khulna had been evacuated by the enemy on the night of 6/7 December when the ad hoc brigade there made for Dacca after getting news of the fall of Jessore.

33 Corps: (North-Western area of operations)

We have mentioned earlier that only a portion of 33 Corps was committed to the operations in East Pakistan. Lieutenant General Thapan, the Corps Commander, was a veteran of the Second World War and had commanded 26 Division during the 1965 conflict. He was known for a certain dourness of demeanour and adherence to set procedures. Aurora had suggested during September that Thapan’s Chief of Staff should take charge of the corps’ operations in East Pakistan, so that the corps commander could devote his attention entirely to the border. Thapan, however, did not agree.11 The suggestion was perhaps unfair; no commander worth his salt would like to keep out of action when his troops are committed.

The terrain in this sector was drier than the rest of East Pakistan. For this reason both India and Pakistan gave the maximum allotment of armour to their forces here. The Hardinge Bridge linked this sector by rail to the Jessore-Jhenida area in the South. An all-weather road ran North-South to connect the border areas in the North to some of the main cities of the region: Rangpur, Bogra, Nator. Other important towns, like Thakurgaon, Dinajpur, Saidpur, Rajshahi and Pabna were linked to this artery by lateral roads (see Fig. 13.4). The only major river within the sector was the Tista, which flowed North-West to South-East and joined the Brahmaputra at Chilmari.

The only regiment of armour with the enemy in East Pakistan was located in this sector, its four squadrons distributed among the regular brigades of 16 Division and other ad hoc formations.

In the Northern portion of the sector, fingers of enemy territory ran towards the Siliguri corridor, while its Western boundary caved inwards around the middle. The fingers in the North were a source of worry for the Indian planners but the curve in the West had its advantages. It provided Indian forces with jumping-off ground close to the enemy’s North-South lines of communication. The Indian city of Balurghat, situated in this curve, became the Headquarters of Major General Lachhman Singh, vrc, GOC 20 Infantry Division.

Pakistan’s 16 Infantry Division, commanded by Major General Nazar Hussain Shah, defended this sector; his Headquarters was at Bogra. One of his three regular brigades was deployed in the North, with Headquarters at Rangpur. A second held the centre and had its Headquarters at Bogra. The third brigade was in the South at Nator. An ad hoc brigade held Rajshahi. The only regiment of armour with the enemy in East Pakistan was located in this sector, its four squadrons distributed among the regular brigades of 16 Division and other ad hoc formations.

The operations in the Northern part of the sector were directly controlled by 33 Corps till 3 December. They were conducted by 71 Mountain Brigade, under Brigadier (later Lieutenant General) P.N. Kathpalia. Subsequently, this brigade came under 6 Mountain Division under Major General P.C. Reddy together with 9 Mountain Brigade, commanded by Brigadier Tirath Verma, and some Mukti Bahini elements. As part of India’s defensive measures, the two brigades removed Pakistani trouble-spots with considerable skill, using manoeuvre and superior force. By 3 December, Pachagarh, Patiram and Bhurungamari had been cleared. In fact 71 Brigade had by then reached Thakurgaon and 9 Brigade was in Kurigram.

Among the most hard-fought actions of the Bangladesh campaign were the battles around Hilli, East of Balurghat. The town was peculiarly situated. Lying on the old Calcutta-Siliguri rail-route, it had been a bustling trading centre in the pre-partition days. However, the Radcliffe Line divided the town, the railway station going to East Pakistan and the town itself to India. The Pakistani portion was sparsely populated and consisted of small villages. The enemy had fortified them and one of its crack infantry battalions, 4 Frontier Force, held the defences.

Hilli was important as it lay on the shortest route by which Indian troops could enter from the Balurghat bulge and cut the Pakistani lines of communication. The Pakistanis had been quite active around Hilli since May. On 1 November, they had shelled the Indian portion of the town and Balurghat. As a result, General Aurora decided to neutralize Hilli. Unfortunately, he chose to attack the enemy defences frontally. Thapan was opposed to the attack, but was overruled.12

The operation was launched under 202 Mountain Brigade, commanded by Brigadier F.P. Bhatty, sm, on the night of 22/23 November; 8 Guards were to put in the assault, while 5 Garhwal were to be in reserve. In support were two mountain regiments, one light battery, one medium regiment (less a battery) and a squadron of 63 Cavalry (T-55 tanks). The first enemy post fell without much trouble. However, at Morapara, the next village, the enemy fought back with all it had. Bitter fighting continued during the night but the Pakistanis managed to retain control of most of Morapara, with the Guards holding a small pocket. Towards dawn Brigadier Bhatty ordered 5 Garhwal to capture a locality from which the Pakistanis had been supporting Morapara. In a gallant assault, the battalion captured the enemy locality quickly.It had not been possible to employ armour at Morapara as two of the leading tanks bogged down during the approach. In aggressive patrolling on the following night, a major portion of Morapara was cleared, the Pakistanis later withdrawing from the village altogether. Indian losses killed and wounded in this action totalled 139, including 8 officers and 4 — JCOs.13 The Pakistanis too suffered heavy casualties.

Besides the security of the Siliguri corridor, the main task of 33 Corps was to contain Rangpur and Dinajpur in the North, capture Gaibanda and Bogra and thereafter exploit up to the Ganga. The earlier plan to advance through Hilli was given up after the action of 22/23 November. It was now to be outflanked from the North, after which the enemy lines of communication in the Pirganj-Gaibanda area were to be cut. With this in view, 165 Mountain Brigade, commanded by Brigadier R.S. Pannu, was ordered to hold the Balurghat base and relieve 202 Brigade at Hilli.

Indian losses killed and wounded in this action totalled 139, including 8 officers and 4 JCOs. The Pakistanis too suffered heavy casualties.

The later was to advance North and link up with 66 Mountain Brigade, under Brigadier G.S. Sharma, vrc, at Charkai, a border village 11 kilometres North of Hilli. Sharma was to advance to Charkai from Samjia by way of Phulbari. After the capture of Charkai, the division was to move East, cut the enemy’s North-South communication lines and go for Bogra. The fourth brigade in the division, 340 Mountain Brigade, under Brigadier Joginder Singh Bakshi, vsm, was to contain Dinajpur and remain in reserve.

Sharma took Charkai on 4 December. The enemy was surprised for he had not expected an advance through this area as it was full of bils nullas and therefore, unfit for manoeuvre by armour. When the Pakistanis at Charkai saw Indian troops approaching on tanks and reported the fact to their superior Headquarters, the latter refused to believe the report. The post commander, a captain, was told that tanks could not come through marsh and bils and that he must have seen buffaloes. In reply, the captain is said to have made this submission: “You may be right, Sir. But I swear the buffaloes have 100-mm guns fitted on them and they are picking off our bunkers one by one”.14

Meanwhile, Bhatty found it impossible to link up with Sharma as an enemy position halfway between Hilli and Charkai held him. There was bitter fighting when 5 Garawal tried to force their way. The battalion suffered 65 casualties, including five officers and four JCOs. The Pakistani company commander, Major Akram of the Frontier Force, won a posthumous Nishan-i-Haider, Pakistan’s highest award for gallantry, while defending the post. Only 40 of his men survived the battle.

The capture of Pirganj greatly surprised the Pakistanis. They had calculated that it would take the Indians several days to come…

On 5 December, Sharma captured Nawabganj, clearing the way to Pirganj, a town on the Rangpur-Bogra highway. With the stage thus set, the divisional commander ordered 340 Brigade to capture Pirganj. The brigade set out at first light on 7 December, with 2/5 Gorkha Rifles in the lead. By 1630 hours the highway had been cut. Considerable opposition had been expected but hardly any was met. The leading tanks shot up a small convoy of jeeps coming from the Rangpur side. Little did they know that one of the jeeps carried Major General Shah, the Pakistani divisional commander. His vehicle and a marked map were captured. He, however, escaped by jumping from the jeep and hiding behind a bush.

The capture of Pirganj greatly surprised the Pakistanis. They had calculated that it would take the Indians several days to come that far, as the advance required the building of a bridge over the Karatoya. Even after the ambush of the divisional commander’s party they thought that it was just a raid. In a hastily mounted counter-attack they lost a battalion commander and several men.

Lachhman Singh now decided to make for Bogra. He ordered 202 Brigade to advance East, link up with 66 Brigade in the Ghoraghat area and then march to Bogra by way of Khetal. Simultaneously, 66 Brigade was to capture Bhaduria, a village South of Nawabganj, and then advance to Ghoraghat and Gobindganj to link up with 340 Brigade. The latter was to push off from Pirganj, capture Gobindganj and then advance to Bogra by the main highway.

The multi-pronged approach resulted in a dispersal of the division’s resources. In the event it was Brigadier Bakshi who succeeded in getting to Bogra. Bhatty could clear the Hilli area only by 11 December. Thereafter, when his brigade was halfway to Bogra, an unbridged nulla held it up. By then it was realized that 340 Brigade would make Bogra on its own and Bhatty was ordered to countermarch and go for Rangpur, in the North. Sharma was held up at Bhaduria and the village could be cleared only on 11 December after a stiff battle in which 17 Kumaon lost 132 personnel, killed and wounded, including five officers and four JCOs.Gobindganj, on the South bank of the Karatoya, was taken by 5/11 Gorkha Rifles and a detachment of PT -76 tanks with an outflanking move. The Pakistanis had been expecting a frontal attack and in preparation they had blown up the bridge and were holding the South bank. Their surprise was great when they discovered on the afternoon of 11 December that the road behind them had been cut. They withdrew in small parties during the night, leaving all their heavy equipment behind.

The bridge at Gobindganj took time to rebuild. Meanwhile, 5/11 Gorkha Rifles and the tanks of 69 Armoured Regiment reached the Ichhamati River and found its South bank strongly held. However, during the night one company from the battalion managed to infiltrate to the South bank and establish a road-block about two kilometres South of the bridge. Later, the rest of the battalion crossed over and brushing aside the minor opposition they met, reached Mahasthan on the afternoon of 12 December. By the evening they had captured the bridge over the Karatoya.

All the same, both brigades had arrived on the Ghagat River, South-West of Rangpur, before the Pakistani surrender.

There was no water-obstacle now between 340 Brigade and Bogra. The Pakistani divisional commander knew where the next blow would fall and moved his Headquarters to Nator. Lachhman Singh’s plan was to cut off Bogra from the South with an outflanking move and then attack frontally. The first manoeuvre was completed on the morning of 14 December when 6 Guards and 69 Armoured Regiment (less a squadron) put up a road-block behind Bogra. The frontal attack was thereafter led by a squadron of 63 Cavalry and 2/5 Gorkha Rifles. To reinforce 340 Brigade, 4 Madras was now placed under its command.

The fighting in Bogra was stiff, especially after the centre of the town was reached and tanks found it difficult to manoeuvre. The Indian Air Force helped with close support. By midday on 14 December the whole area North of the railway-line had been taken, including the cantonment. A major portion of the enemy 205 Brigade was, however, still in the area and resisted the advance of the column from the South. Fighting continued on the following day with the Pakistanis sticking to a small perimeter. In the early hours of 16 December small groups began to surrender and later during the day came the orders to cease-fire.

On 13 December General Lachhman Singh had received orders for the immediate capture of Rangpur. This meant a 180-degree turn in his axis of advance. I have already mentioned the diversion of 202 Brigade to this task; another formation switched to it was 66 Brigade. The two were to make a two-pronged approach to the objective. However, on 15 December, while 202 Brigade was on its way to Rangpur, Lachhman Singh was ordered to despatch to Dacca the armour squadron that was supporting this brigade.15 The Pakistanis at Rangpur were known to have tanks and this order restricted the brigade’s advance to the hours of darkness. All the same, both brigades had arrived on the Ghagat River, South-West of Rangpur, before the Pakistani surrender.

The Pakistanis had been taking advantage of the proximity to the Indian lines of communication to the border. Shelling of Indian territory and sabotage were frequent and defensive measures had to be taken.

Of the two brigades under 6 Mountain Division, the 9th had taken Lalmanirhat by 6 December. Later it cleared the rest of the territory North of the Tista River. An ad hoc armoured squadron with 33 Corps had been given to 71 Brigade. Advancing from Thakurgaon this formation took Birganj on 5 December but could make no progress thereafter. After being informed that Dinajpur had been vacated by the enemy, Brigadier Kathpalia sent a raiding party of two companies to secure the town. However, the enemy was very much there and had armour. The raiding party not having taken armour with it the move failed. After this venture Kathpalia was ordered to go for Saidpur. The Pakistanis sent a motorized column to intercept Kathpalia but it was spotted in time by an air observation post pilot and dispersed with the help of artillery and air action. By the evening of 15 December, 71 Brigade had reached within a few kilometres of Saidpur. Its garrison surrendered to Kathpalia the next day.

Pakistan’s 57 Brigade, which had crossed over from the 2 Corps sector via Hardinge Bridge, took no part in the fighting in this sector. But it helped to swell the ranks of prisoners that surrendered to 33 Corps. The total came to 345 officers, 597 JCOs and 15,443 other ranks, besides 6,000 paramilitary personnel. The main contribution of the Mukti Bahini in this sector was the capture of Nawabganj, North-West of Rajshahi, on 12 December.

4 Corps:(Eastern area of operations)

As already mentioned, 4 Corps sector provided the shortest approach to Dacca, only 80 kilometres from Agartala by air. On both sides of the international border, surface communications ran mostly along it. Sylhet, at the Northern end of the sector, and Chittagong, near its Southern end, were connected with each other and with Dacca by rail and road, the bridge at Ashuganj providing the only link over the Meghna. The reader has already made his acquaintance with Lieutenant General Sagat Singh, the Corps Commander, in an earlier chapter. As Commander 50 (Para) Brigade he had led the Indian column that took Goa in 1961.16 The Pakistanis had been taking advantage of the proximity to the Indian lines of communication to the border. Shelling of Indian territory and sabotage were frequent and defensive measures had to be taken.

One of the early operations of this nature did not, however, go too well. It took place in the tea-garden area North of the border town of Kamalpur, in Tripura, which had been under frequent artillery and mortar fire. The Mukti Bahini could not eliminate the Pakistani locality at Dhalai, which had been responsible for the trouble. The problem was cleared by 61 Mountain Brigade after several attempts. The commander was wounded during one of these and there were other casualties as well.

The clearing of the Belonia bulge was another such operation. Here a tongue of East Pakistan territory, about 10 kilometres wide and 25 kilometres long, jutted into Tripura, and was a constant source of irritation. The area was cleared by 23 Mountain Division under Major General (later Lieutenant General) R.D. Hira, mvc, in operations spread over almost the whole of November.      ­

Sylhet

In the Northern part of 4 Corps Zone, 8 Mountain Division, commanded by Major General (later General) K.V. Krishna Rao conducted an operation against Atgram (see Fig. 13.5). Lying on the North-East approach to Sylhet, the Pakistani locality here was held by a company of their 31 Punjab and Razakars. The Mukti Bahini having failed to tackle the enemy, 59 Brigade, under Brigadier C.A. Quinn, was given the task. Quinn ordered 4/5 Gorkha Rifles to go in during the night of 20/21 November. The battalion was able to cross the Surla River undetected but there was heavy fighting on the objective. Khukris came into play freely and almost the entire enemy company was wiped out, Rifleman Dil Bahadur Chhetri accounting for eight of the Pakistanis.17 A large quantity of arms and ammunition was captured.

Two East Bengal battalions and 5/5 Gorkha Rifles had earlier been formed into E Force which had been exerting pressure upon Sylhet from the Jaintiapur side. This and the Atgram episode led the Pakistanis to believe that when the time came Sylhet would be attacked from the North and the East and they strengthened their defences on these flanks. However, General Rao had other plans and assembled his two regular brigades for an advance from the South: 59 Brigade at Dharmanagar, 81 Brigade under Brigadier R.C.V. Apte, at Kailashahar. The enemy had two brigades of its 14 Division in this area: 202 (ad hoc) at Sylhet and 313 at Maulvi Bazar. Its third brigade was deployed around Akhaura, opposite Agartala. Rao’s main task was to cut off the retreat of the two brigades in the Sylhet area towards Bhairab Bazar, the Headquaters of their 14 Division.

Shamshernagar was secured by 81 Brigade against moderate opposition. Ghazipur proved more stubborn and 4/5 Gorkha Rifles were ordered to go in on the night of 4 December. The battalion cleared the place after a hard­fought action, in which their losses were heavy. Among the nine killed was the second-in-command while the wounded numbered 64, including four officers. Meanwhile, 9 Guards had taken another Pakistani locality on the flank. This enabled the Gorkhas to capture Kulaura, unopposed, on 6 December. Kulaura was a road and rail centre of importance and its capture disorganized the enemy considerably. After its fall, 6 Rajput led the brigade’s advance towards Fenchuganj.

After 3 Punjab (81 Brigade) had taken Munshi Bazar, Indian intelligence concluded on the basis of radio intercepts that the Pakistanis were pulling out of Sylhet in a bid to concentrate around Ashuganj. The Corps Commander thought this was a good opportunity to seize Sylhet by a helicopter-borne operation. The assumption was that the town was lightly held and that E Force would link up with the heliborne troops within two days of the landing.Rao nominated 4/5 Gorkha Rifles for the mission. Though the battalion had earlier suffered fairly heavy casualties, the men were in good spirits, having got the better of the enemy every time. After an aerial reconnaissance on the morning of 7 December, the battalion began to land during the afternoon on the North bank of the Surma, about a kilometre and a half from the rail-bridge. The Indian Army had been using helicopters to lift troops for operations against insurgents in North-East India for some time but this was the first heliborne operation of the Bangladesh campaign.

The landing came as a complete surprise to the Sylhet garrison. However, the first flight was soon under small-arms and mortar fire and, after the second flight, the landings had to be suspended. By then, about 90 men, including Lieutenant Colonel A.B. Harolikar (later Brigadier Harolikar, MVC), the battalion commander, were on the ground. Harolikar’s orders were to capture the bridge over the Surma, the airfield and the radio station. However, with the enemy strength available in the town, this now looked impossible.

The wounded could not be evacuated as no landings were possible after 9 December. Only on 12 December did two helicopters brave enemy fire and take back the casualties.

Flights were resumed in the early hours of 8 December. By dawn the complete battalion group, together with two mountain guns, some engineer personnel and an air control team had landed. Meanwhile, Harolikar had kept the enemy at bay. Pakistani sources confirm that on 6 December their 313 Brigade was ordered by Major General Abdul Majid Qazi, GOC 14 Division, to link up with 27 Brigade in the Akhaura-Bhairab Bazar area. However, the Brigade Commander expressed his inability to do this as he was under pressure from Munshi Bazar and the Indian Air Force was strafing Maulvi Bazar heavily. As a result, he decided to fall back on Sylhet. He got there on the evening of 7 December and his troops followed him a day later.

Sylhet now had the remnants of two Pakistani brigades. Fortunately for 4/5 Gorkhas, Sylhet’s original garrison was mostly deployed on the Eastern and Northern approaches to the town. A welcome reinforcement for Harolikar was a company of 9 Guards, which was flown in on 9 December. The situation remained very tense for the small Indian force. The Gorkhas had landed with just a little over their pouch ammunition scale and shakarparas to last 48 hours. They were surrounded on three sides and there was no sign of the link-up from the North materializing. It had not been possible to drop food and ammunition to them owing to the proximity of the enemy and it was the Gorkha’s inborn ability to live off the land that helped the battalion. The wounded could not be evacuated as no landings were possible after 9 December. Only on 12 December did two helicopters brave enemy fire and take back the casualties.

A link-up from the South eventually took place on the night of 14 December when 6 Rajput reached the Southern bank of the Surma. By then 81 Brigade had also arrived in the vicinity of Sylhet. It would be pertinent to mention here that 59 Brigade (less 4/5 Gorkha Rifles) had been withdrawn to Kailashahar by the Corps Commander while it was advancing to Fenchuganj. He wanted the brigade to operate under 57 Mountain Division. However, when E Force failed to reach Sylhet, as planned, he switched back the brigade to this axis.

Things would have been very hard for the 4/5 Gorkhas had the Sylhet garrison made a determined effort to eject them. That it did not do so shows the demoralization that had set in amongst the enemy, as also the mettle of the men under Harolikar. In fact the Pakistanis had come to believe that a whole brigade had landed at Sylhet.

The operations of the other two divisions of 4 Corps were closely interlinked. The region they operated in was the vital quadrangle from which Dacca could be threatened closely. Allotted to the Northern portion of this region, 57 Mountain Division commanded by Major General B.F. Gonsalves, had the task of capturing Akhaura and then advancing South to reach the Meghna at Daudkandi. Of General Gonsalves’ three brigades, 61 Mountain Brigade was operating on a corps task with 23 Mountain Division. The remaining two – 73 Mountain Brigade under Brigadier M.L. Tuli and 311 Mountain Brigade commanded by Brigadier Misra – had concentrated in the Agartala area.

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