Indian Defence Review

To revert to the Indian side, subsequently Divisional-sized counter-offensives by 4 Division and 10 Division also met with no success, due to inadequate preparations. These were launched within a matter of twenty-four hours or so.

All these bring out the need for pre-planning to the extent possible during peace time, subsequent refining of plans when the actual war starts, adequate reconnaissance and preparations, thorough coordination and vigorous execution of plans. Some of the other points needing attention, that came out were as under:

1. Re-organization on a captured objective must be carried out speedily and efficiently.
2. Armour must move to the captured objective at the earliest, in order to prevent enemy armour overrunning the captured objective.
3. Subsequent phases of an attack must be launched without loss of time.
4. Commanders must be well forward, in order to acquaint themselves with the developing situation and to take speedy decisions.
5. Frontal attack should be avoided. The potential of outflanking movement must be fully exploited.
6. Bold use should be made of armour, to achieve worthwhile results. Cooperation between infantry and tanks should be intimate.
7. Failures should not be reinforced, to the extent possible. On the other hand, success should be exploited, to achieve the ultimate aim of the commander.
8. Fire plan must be thoroughly coordinated and adequate support ensured for an attack.
9. An attack must always be launched from a secure base.

Defensive Operations
In Jammu and Kashmir, India chose to remain basically on the defensive. Despite large scale infiltration by Pakistan, and despite being cut off or the threat of being cut off, the Indian forces held to their ground, unlike what happened in the Kameng Sector in 1962. Further, it was also realized that, for defence to be successful, a certain amount of local offensive operations have to be launched; in other words, it had to be offensive defence. Thus, the capture of Hajipur which had not only resulted in capturing a major base of Pakistani operations, but had also relieved pressure in other sectors, was a significant achievement for the Indian Army. The capture of the Bugina Bulge in the Tithwal sector, was a creditable achievement too. In the Turtok sector in the North also, a local offensive prevented the Pakistanis from posing any serious threat to Ladakh or against the communications to Ladakh.

Some of the important lessons that came out of defensive operations were as under:

1. In the plains, the positions selected should be such, that outflanking movements should not be possible.
2. When a defensive position is to be occupied at short notice in the face of the enemy, adequate elements must be deployed forward to delay the enemy and to gain the requisite time for preparations of the defences.
3. The vital need for speedily digging down, in order to minimise casualties, cannot be over emphasized.
4. Effective coordination must be carried out to the extent possible, even if time is short in particular, maximum fire support should be available at the point of attack by the enemy.
5. The main thrust of the enemy must be carefully discerned, before deciding to commit the reserve.
6. Defence must be carried out aggressively and maximum attrition imposed on the enemy.
7. The importance of aggressive patrolling and tank hunting.
8. The need for timely and accurate intelligence about enemy concentrations, particularly his armour.
9. Troops must be trained to withstand heavy artillery and tank fire. For this purpose, battle inoculation during peace time is important.

Intelligence

It has been brought out that large numbers of irregular forces were infiltrated into ‘Jammu and Kashmir during the period August 5 to 10, 1965, in columns of 600 or more. It had later transpired that the recruitment, training and organization for infiltration operations started as early as May 1965. Yet, no clear assessment of Pakistan’s intention to launch a large-scale infiltration campaign in Jammu and Kashmir in this manner was ever made by our Intelligence Agencies. Similarly, it was reiterated that Pakistani 1 Armoured Division had moved to Kharian after ‘Op Ablaze’ whereas it was discovered later that the Division had stayed back in area Raiwind. The fact that Pakistani 6 Armoured Division was equipped with Patton tanks was also not known, nor that they had raised four tank destroyer units. The concentration of Pakistani 7 Infantry Division for attack on Chhamb, was also not known. The raising of 11 Division was not brought to notice either.

As far as Pakistan was concerned, despite the Indian Prime Minister declaring openly to the effect that India would retaliate wherever it suits her, the Pakistan Army was not properly prepared for an Indian attack across the International Border in the Lahore Sector. Defences on the Ichhogil Canal were not manned, when Indian forces reached the line on the night of September 5/6 and the Lahore Divisional Commander as well as his Division were still reportedly in the contentment area during that night! It was only on the morning of September 6 that the formation reacted.

In this connection, Brig. Riazul Karim (retired) wrote. “In the Lahore Sector, it was Allah who saved us by making the Indians falter on their own and stop at the Batapur canal thinking there was some trapped on by the Pakistan forces. On receiving flash information from our screen, troops located on the canal banks. Our main forces went forward on 6th morning after they had done their morning PT in the unit lines”. Another writer Colonel Irshad Rashad (retired) stated, “It would not be incorrect say in all honesty that on the night of September 5/6, when the Indians attacked the bulk of the forward divisions of the Pakistan Army were not in their battle locations”. Further, from the panic reactions in the Sialkot Sector, it is apparent that Pakistan did not have adequate information of the Indian 1 Corps thrusts from the Jammu Sector on September 8.

From the above examples, it would be apparent that a lot was left to be desired on both sides as far as intelligence was concerned.

Surprise

Despite the Indian Prime Minister’s open declaration that India would retaliate wherever it chooses to, the Pakistani high command was surprised when an’ actual attack was launched by India across the International Border on the night of September 5/6. This was mainly due to a mental fixation that India may not actually do so, due to likely international repercussions. Of course, lack of intelligence also contributed to this situation. On the other hand, Indian forces achieved initial surprise, but did not exploit the situation due to clumsy handling by some local commanders in tile Lahore Sector. Equally, while initial surprise was achieved in the Sialkot Sector it was not fully exploited due to inadequate boldness and aggressiveness in the handling of armour. Earlier Indian Forces allowed themselves to be surprised by the Pakistani infiltration into Jammu and Kashmir, as well as by the attack on Chhamb. As the Kashmir question remains unresolved the threat of infiltration which is a low cost option, would always be there; and appropriate and effective measures need to be taken, to prevent it from succeeding.

Unity of Command

One of the main reasons for the initial success of infiltration into Jammu and Kashmir was because the various agencies responsible for dealing with the threat were functioning on their own. These included the Army the Jammu and Kashmir Militia, the Armed Police Battalions the Jammu and Kashmir Police and so on. Each of these forces had their own control Headquarters and were receiving conflicting directions or in some cases inadequate guidance. To deal with a threat of the magnitude that took place, it was obvious that all the forces should have been put under the operational control of the local Army formation commanders so that their actions could be fully coordinated and an integrated plan could be evolved and implemented.

Entity of Formations

In this war almost all the Divisions of 11 Corps, functioned with only two brigades under command the third brigade having been assigned other tasks. Thus, when attacks were held up they found themselves at a disadvantage due to the lack of the requisite reserves. There was of course, the problems of shortage of troops to man the long border, as well as lack of adequate reserves at the Corps level. There were other deficiencies too, such as no availability of an integral armoured regiment in the infantry division, no availability of a medium artillery regiment and so on. 4 Mountain Division had its own organizational weaknesses, being a Mountain Division with a task in the plains. A number of these deficiencies have been made up. or are being made up. It must be ensured that a formation’s or a unit’s entity is always maintained. Any detachment should be an exception rather than the rule. Equally, if a Mountain Division has an alternative role in the plains. the requisite equipment for plains warfare must be catered for and the necessary training imparted for the purpose.

Effect of Weather

One of the considerations with regard to the timing of a war has always been the question of suitability of the weather. This war was fought towards the later part of the monsoon. Owing to the ground conditions, the offensive operations were adversely affected to some extent. The ground imposes serious constraints on the employment of armour. However, it has to be remembered that in between the spells of rain, if there is a long enough gap, some movement does become possible. There is also the problem of the numerous innocent looking streams and minor rivers which become heavily flooded soon after a rain. but become passable after a suitable lapse of time. It would thus be incorrect, to rule out military operations altogether, during the monsoon period. Equally, it has to be accepted that certain constraints would be imposed by weather on the smooth conduct of operations.

Air Support

During this war, it was felt that air support was inadequate. Substantial part of it was apparently directed towards strategic tasks and air defence. Thus, for close support of the Army, sufficient air support was not forthcoming. The available air effort was kept centralised at Advance Headquarters Western Air Command and it took time for formations to receive air support. Further, the aircraft were moved to airfields well away from the theatre, for reasons of security. There were other weaknesses, such as unsatisfactory communications between JOCs and airfields, limited range of wireless sets, inexperienced officers with ACTs, inadequate training in aircraft recognition and so on. The problem of enemy aircraft being superior in some respects was also there. Many of these weaknesses were remedied subsequently after the war.

The Navy

In this war, ships of the Indian Navy maintained vigil and ensured the defence of sea lanes and shore facilities. There were, however, no clashes with the Pakistani Navy.

Logistics

A major achievement of the Indians was the concentration of 1 Corps in the Jammu Sector at very short notice, from its peace time locations in Central India. This was done very efficiently, with the help of the railways and civilian transport from States. As Indian cantonments are far away from the borders, this will always be a basic requirement in a war. The need for proper planning of moves during peace, and cooperation and coordination between various agencies at the imminence of a war, cannot be over­emphasized. The Railways, Airlines and State Governments have an important responsi­bility in this regard.

Enemy Tactical Concepts

Originally, the technical concepts followed both by India and Pakistan, were based on the British Indian Army concepts. However, after receipt of significant military assistance from the USA, including training facilities, there was a change in the Pakistani tactical concepts. These were more of the American type, which are somewhat different from the British type, for various reasons. In the 1965 War, these concepts came to light for the first time. It may be mentioned that in the 1962 War, the Chinese tactical concepts also came to light for the first time. All these bring out the need for studying the potential adversaries in a comprehensive manner during peace time. This will ‘ensure that troops are not surprised when the war starts.

Equipment

In this war, Pakistan entered the field with superior military equipment In fact, one of the main reasons for her starting the war, was the perceived qualitative superiority of her personnel and equipment over the Indians. On the Indian side, the arms and equipment were still of Second World War Vintage due to which the troops were at a disadvantage. However, the Pakistani personnel found it difficult to handle the sophisticated arm our (Patton tanks), as opposed to the Indians who, though equipped with older Centurious and Shermans, managed to get the first shot in. This brings out the need for proper training of personnel. The requirement of up-to-date equipment for a modem army is of course unexceptionable. Further, it would be wrong to assume that Pakistan has not learnt its lesson. In case of a future confrontation, it should be excepted that their personnel would be well trained in handling the equipment at their disposal. There should be no complacency in this regard.