Military & Aerospace

1962 War: The Chinese invasion - II
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Issue Book Excerpt: Indian Army After Independence | Date : 12 Mar , 2011

The Chinese appear to have used a regiment against the Rajputs.

Some days earlier, a reorganization of sectors put the Nyamjang Chu Valley sector directly under Command Headquarters 4 Division. It was therefore ‘commanding’ widely dispersed sub-units echeloned back from the Namka Chu junction as well as the Hathung La track from Ziminthang. Whatever the Indians tried the Chinese had forestalled them.

Dalvi had correctly forecast D-day but he did not foresee the speed and the strength of the attack. In a telephone conversation earlier, he had told Niranjan Prasad that the Chinese would take about three days to finish his brigade. In the event, they took just that many hours. The shelling, which lasted an hour, was followed by well-coordinated infantry assaults. The telephone lines within the brigade were cut, either by shelling or by Chinese infiltrating groups.

Thus, from the moment the battle began, Dalvi could not communicate with his battalion commanders. Unit radio operators closed down their sets as they had to man the defences when the Chinese began to attack their Headquarters. However, Dalvi was able to maintain radio contact with Divisional Headquarters and 1/9 Gorkha Rifles till about 0800 hours.

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The senior artillery officer at brigade Headquarters could not get in touch with the guns at Tsangdhar as the Chinese had jammed the radio frequency used by the Gunners. The guns did not fire a single round. The brigade had no layback positions, and no orders on how and where to withdraw.

The Chinese appear to have used a regiment against the Rajputs. They had infiltrated a part of this force between Bridges IV and V on the night of 19/20 October and on the morning of 20 October, struck the Rajputs from the South as well as the North. It is likely that they used another regiment against the Gorkhas and infiltrated a portion of this force under cover of the heavy firing on Tsangle on the night of 18/19 October. On the morning of 20 October, the Chinese appeared all over Tsangdhar; they did not, however, attack Tsangle itself. They used their third regiment on the Khinzemane approach. A part of it seized Hathung La, cutting off the Grenadiers and the Punjabis from Lumpu. A column advancing down the Nyamjang Chu threatened the Headquarters of 4 Division at Ziminthang.

Of the units on the Namka Chu, the Rajputs suffered the most. They lived up to the highest traditions of their regiment, facing overwhelming odds with courage. Their companies were widely dispersed and each fought its own battle, taking on wave after wave of the enemy as long as men remained standing. In many cases, entire platoons were wiped out.

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After most of the defended localities had been overrun, the battalion’s Second-in-Command, Major Gurdial Singh, rallied the remnants and led them in a final charge. Most of these men died fighting, or fell wounded; Gurdial Singh was overpowered and captured. The battalion’s command post was the last to be overrun. The commanding officer was taken prisoner after he was wounded.The ferocity of the battle can be judged from the fact that of a total of 513 all ranks on the battalion’s strength that morning 282 were killed; the wounded whom the Chinese captured numbered 81; the unwounded whom the Chinese took prisoner numbered 90. Only 60 of the battalion survived and they were mostly from detachments at Tsangdhar, Lumpu and Towang.

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The Gorkhas on the Northern slopes of Tsangdhar must have felt more secure than the troops on the river. They were, therefore, surprised when they were attacked suddenly from the flanks and later from the rear. They fought back as best as they could but by 0715 hours, the Commanding Officer, Lieutenant Colonel (later Major General) Balwant Singh Ahluwalia, ordered a withdrawal to the Tsangdhar Ridge, where the battalion had a company (less a platoon) guarding the dropping zone.

The Chinese were prepared for a very swift victory and were not going to give the adversary any quarter.

In the prevailing conditions, however, the withdrawal was confused, a party making for Rong La. Those who reached the ridge included Ahluwalia, who had been severely wounded. They discovered that the dropping zone was already under attack and took shelter in a hideout below the ridge. Subsequently, this party split up and withdrew through Bhutan by way of Dum Dum La (5,570 metres). Ahluwalia could not accompany his men and was taken prisoner.

The trek through Bhutan was extremely arduous. There were many cases of frostbite and the seriously affected had to be left behind in villages, to be evacuated later on ponies. The battalion’s casualties totalled 226. Of these, 80 had been killed, or were presumed to have died, 44 were wounded and 102 captured. Though outmanoeuvred and outnumbered, the Gorkhas fought well and won several awards for gallantry, including two MVCs.

By 1230 hours, the Chinese had captured the Tsangdhar Ridge. The attack started at 0900 hours from the West, where the Gorkhas had been in position. After overrunning them, they turned to the Gunners. The Para Gunners took on the Chinese with small-arms fire. When the Chinese called out to them to surrender, they took no notice, and fought on until one-third had been killed or wounded and their light machine gun knocked out. The rest were captured.

By 0800 hours Brigade Headquarters had come under small-arms fire. His front and left flank having already collapsed, Dalvi decided to pull back to Tsangdhar, where he hoped to re-form and give battle. He got the necessary permission from Niranjan Prasad and through him informed the Punjabis and the Grenadiers of his decision. Apparently, the kind of campaign that the Chinese had unleashed was beyond the ken of Dalvi and those above him. The Chinese were prepared for a very swift victory and were not going to give the adversary any quarter.

The Indian Army of 1962 had no emergency rations, although during the Second World War officers and troops in all theatres carried this item in their haversacks.

Dalvi, his Headquarters, the Field Company and others who had joined him, left Rong La in two batches. It did not take long for him to realize that the fate of Tsangdhar was sealed and he decided to make for Serkhim, where he hoped to join the Grenadiers. On the following day, Dalvi’s party split up as some of the officers and men could not keep up due to sickness or exhaustion. Without any map to help him, Dalvi lost his way several times. But he and his small band kept going, though they had not had any food since their last meal on 19 October.

The Indian Army of 1962 had no emergency rations, although during the Second World War officers and troops in all theatres carried this item in their haversacks. It was a chocolate-based energy food, packed in a sealed tin, which was meant to last 24 hours. During the First World War and in the Frontier operations, Indian troops had carried parched gram and jaggery as emergency rations. It was humble fare but sustained the men when their normal rations could not reach them. However, during the 1962 compaign many men perished due to starvation and hundreds suffered extreme exhaustion due to the lack of food while trekking through the wilderess of NEFA.

On the morning of 22 October, Dalvi saw a Chinese column moving towards Lumpu. He, therefore, decided to turn East and join the Divisional Headquarters at Ziminthang, not knowing that Niranjan Prasad was at this time trekking back to Towang. Dalvi’s wanderings ended a little later that day when he ran into a company of the Chinese and was taken prisoner along with his companions. The second party from Rong La was more lucky; it reached Darranga on 31 October. A reception camp had been set up at this place, near the Bhutan border.

The Punjabis had not been shelled on the morning of 20 October. Around 1100 hours, Niranjan Prasad ordered them to pull back to Hathung La. However, when the withdrawal began, the Chinese brought down mortar and small-arms fire on their position and followed up with an assault. Heavy fighting ensued but the Punjabis managed to break contact and withdraw. The Chinese had, however, reached Hathung La before the Punjabis could get there. Lumpu, their next choice, was also found to be in enemy hands. The battalion, therefore, withdrew through Bhutan, its company at Tsangle also taking the same route.

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During the actions on 10 and 20 October, the Punjabis fought with great skill and courage, many of the officers and men winning awards for gallantry. These included three MVC.

The Grenadiers’ company at Drokung Samba was attacked by a Chinese battalion on the morning of 20 October. The enemy had blown up the bridge on the Nyamjang Chu. With the bridge gone, there was no prospect of this company joining their battalion and, under their young commander, Second lieutenant G.V.P. Rao, they fought with their backs to the wall. He and a score of his men were killed, many more were wounded or captured but a few managed to reach Ziminthang.

The main body of the Grenadiers had received the withdrawal order at the same time as the Punjabis. Like them, they withdrew through Bhutan.

This was the end of 7 Brigade. Within hours, the Chinese had smashed it into bits and pieces. The only formed body of this once-famous brigade that was visible on 20 October was the long line of prisoners being led into captivity across Thag La. But let it be said: no man flinched or ran. As an organized formation 7 Brigade ceased to exist by 1200 hours on 20 October, but this cannot be placed on the head of the individual fighting man. There were simply too many negatives working against it.

Without any map to help him, Dalvi lost his way several times. But he and his small band kept going, though they had not had any food since their last meal on 19 October.

The tactical Headquarters of 4 Division withdrew from Ziminthang on the morning of 21 October when it was closely threatened. A company of 4 Garhwal Rifles, which was covering this Headquarters, also fell back. While Niranjan Prasad was trekking back to Towang, he received a message appointing him corps commander in officiating capacity. Had he been given the appointment four days earlier, he might have authorized 7 Brigade to move to more defensible positions.

Having reached the Serkhim-Lumpu area, the Chinese commander sent the main body of his troops on to Towang, keeping some behind to clear the captured areas. By the morning of 23 October, the Chinese reached Lum La, South-West of Towang. In the early hours of that morning, they launched their main attack against Towang from the North, bringing up a fresh division for the task.

Even the swift rout of 7 Brigade did not bring home to those in authority the gravity of the situation, and they merely contented themselves by issuing text-book appreciations and orders, the kind practised during annual manoeuvres. An instance of this was a report that 4 Corps sent around 2300 hours on 20 October to Eastern Command and Army Headquarters. The report said that the Corps’ intention was to keep the enemy out of heavy mortar range of the dropping zone at Lumpu. Then, during the night of 21/22 October, the same Headquarters sent an order to 4 Division Artillery Brigade to occupy a compact and mutually supporting defended sector for the defence of Towang, as though the Chinese, advancing with two divisions would wait while the meagre garrison of this monastery town got ready for battle. Had a realistic appraisal of the situation been made and a bold decision taken to withdraw quickly to Bomdi La, the heavy losses that the Indian Army suffered at Towang and Se La would have been avoided. The loss was the greater in self-esteem, morale and a complete lack of confidence in the higher commanders.

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I have earlier noted the last-minute efforts to reinforce NEFA. Kaul had asked for 11 Infantry Brigade, but Sen could not pull out this formation as it was committed around Manipur in a counter-insurgency role. He, however, told Kaul to make use of the Headquarters of 62 Infantry Brigade, which had been kicking its heels since its arrival from Ramgarh. He would give him the infantry element for it as battalions became available. The first unit to join 62 Brigade was 13 Dogra (from 11 Brigade). Two companies of the battalion arrived at Towang on the night of 21 October together with the Brigade Headquarters.Of the infantry units already at Towang, 1 Sikh held the forward-most positions on the Bum La approach. One of its platoons was on the IB Ridge, two kilometres South of the border; the Battalion Headquarters was at Milakteng La together with one company, while the remaining companies held features dominating the tracks that led to Towang. 4 Garhwal Rifles, which had arrived a fortnight earlier, had its Headquarters and one company at Towang, another company at Landa, on the track that led from Bum La to Jang and the third company at Pankentang, North of Towang (see Fig).

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The eight guns of 97 Field Battery were a short distance from Towang, at a spot where the road in the direction of Bum La ended. The two mountain batteries – 7 (Bengal) and 2 (Derajat) – were deployed in support of the two infantry battalions; a troop of heavy mortars was in position West of Milakteng La. Detachments of the Assam Rifles held border posts, including the one at Bum La. This pass was out of range of Indian artillery, as positioned. Soon after their arrival, therefore, the two companies of the Dogras had been sent out to hold the Western approach to Towang.

Towang_defended_sector

The Chinese made a three-pronged advance on Towang from the North. One of their columns came down the Bum La- Tongpeng La route. Another went South-East in the direction of Jang. The third prong consisted of a part of their Khinzemane column; it advanced by way of Samatso. The column advancing on Tongpeng La overran the Assam Rifles’ post at Bum La around 0430 hours on 23 October. Soon after, the Sikhs’ platoon on the IB Ridge came under attack from a company of the enemy. The platoon commander was a doughty JCO, Subedar Joginder Singh, a veteran of the Second World War. He was ready for the Chinese and his platoon mowed down a good number from the first wave.Half an hour later came a second attack. Again, the Sikhs held their ground. Joginder Singh was wounded but retained command. At 0600 hours a third attack came. By then, casualties had reduced his platoon to half. Joginder Singh himself took up a light machine gun but the Chinese kept advancing despite heavy losses. In desperation, this dauntless Sikh ordered his men to fix bayonets and charged the oncoming enemy, killing many. Only four men of this platoon later managed to reach their main company position. Joginder Singh was taken prisoner and died of his wounds in captivity. His gallantry was of the highest order and the Government recognized it with an award of the PVC.

The decision to evacuate Towang was taken by Sen. He had arrived there the previous day (22 October) and the orders and counter-orders that he issued “˜turned the fluid situation then prevailing into utter confusion.

By 0730 hours, the Chinese reached 1 Sikh company’s delaying position at Tongpeng La. Here, too, the Sikhs fought with determination against heavy odds. They held the position till 1100 hours, when they received orders to pull out. Bengal Mountain Battery gave good support to the Sikhs at this position. The field guns of 97 Field Battery engaged Chinese concentrations within their reach, each piece firing off about 300 rounds per gun.

The decision to evacuate Towang was taken by Sen. He had arrived there the previous day (22 October) and the orders and counter-orders that he issued ‘turned the fluid situation then prevailing into utter confusion’. First he ordered that Towang would be held at all costs; he was going to induct two more brigades to reinforce the garrison, he gave out. He stayed that night at Towang and met Niranjan Prasad, who got there around 1800 hours from Ziminthang, making good time. However, the swift Chinese advance on the morning of 23 October made him change his mind. The Chinese column advancing on the Landa-Jang axis had brought the Garhwal Company on that route under heavy fire. The enemy was evidently making a bid to cut off 4 Division by capturing the bridge over the Towang Chu at Jang.

Sen’s orders, which he issued before flying back from Towang, were that the forward troops should break contact; thereafter they, together with the garrison in Towang, should fall laterally back on Jang. In case Jang was already in enemy hands, the troops were to make for Bomdi La, where he intended to position 65 Infantry Brigade. This formation, under Brigadier Sayeed, was then on the move from Secunderabad.

These orders were, however, changed that night. The changed orders, issued by 4 Corps, required 62 Brigade to hold Se La with 1 Sikh and 4 Sikh LI. The latter, from 48 Infantry Brigade, was being flown from Punjab. Jang was to be held by Headquarters 4 Artillery Brigade with some troops which were already there and 4 Garhwal Rifles. The decision to hold Se La had a profound effect on the campaign.

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Holding Se La was tempting in many ways. ‘Holding it would mean loss of less territory; an important consideration politically. . . ’. Many people thought Se La was impregnable due to its height, 4,180 metres. There was a steep climb to the pass from the Towang Chu Valley and the road was dominated by the pass and the peaks on its flanks. All these factors made Se La a strong position. But it was not impregnable and there were tracks that by passed it. The Chinese were not road-bound like the Indian Army and could isolate Se La. They had already proved that their speed of movement in organized fighting bodies upto regimental strength was remarkable. The main disadvantage of holding it, except as a delaying position, was its distance from Indian bases. Its very height was another disadvantage; its garrison would have to operate at high altitudes. Also, the long line of communication from Bomdi La would need protection. In the event, the Chinese succeeded in cutting the road before they attacked Se La itself. The decision to hold Se La has been attributed to a visit by Thapar to Headquarters 4 Corps on 23 October. He was accompanied by Palit, his Director of Military Operations.

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