The ongoing conflict in Afghanistan has further accentuated the polarisation process. Following the fall of the Taliban regime in 2001, the erstwhile leadership elements in Afghanistan relocated to Baluchistan, FATA and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Prominent among these are: the Quetta Shura Taliban (QST) of Mullah Mohammed Omar, the Haqqani network and the Hizb-e Islami-Gulbuddin. The Pakistan Taliban (a home grown organisation) also came into being in this period called the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan or the TTP. Formed in 2007 by the late Baitullah Mehsud in South Waziristan, the group is currently led by Hakimullah Mehsud, and poses a serious challenge to the Pakistani state. Efforts by the Pakistan Army to eliminate the TTP have proved futile despite the use of air and heavy artillery.
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Earlier, in 1992, another radical group, the Tehreek-e-Nafaze-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM) was formed with the avowed aim of imposing Sharia in all of Pakistan. Though banned by Musharraf in 2002, the rebel group had taken control of most of Swat by 2007. While it has been cleared from the Valley by continuous military operations, it has not been eliminated and remains active in the region. The brutal handling of the conflict by security forces against militant groups in FATA and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa has led to the destruction of entire villages and rendered more than a million people homeless.
Pakistan’s fight against terrorism is handicapped by conflicting notions and imperatives. The desire to support the Afghan Taliban to retain influence in a future Afghanistan dispensation, devoid of US presence makes her an unwilling partner in the war against terror. The TTP is targeted but there is a marked reluctance to take on Afghan militant groups. At home, Pakistan continues to support and nurture a wide variety of terrorist organisations such as the Lashkar-e-Taiba, Jaish-e-Mohammad, Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami and the Hizbul Mujahideen which were created by Pakistani intelligence to fight against India’s interests in Kashmir and are considered as strategic assets. These groups are now not fully under the control of their mentors and often team up with Pashtun groups and the Pakistani Taliban in actions inimical to Pakistani interests.
The educational system has therefore contributed in large measure to the polarisation of society and the Jihadi mindsets.
The country’s economic indicators also do not present an encouraging picture. The last three years have witnessed a slow growth rate of about 2 to 3 percent with inflation as high as 10 to 15 percent. The country’s economy remains vulnerable to internal and external shocks due to internal security concerns and the global financial crises. In October 2008, Pakistan entered into a 23-month Stand-By Arrangement with the IMF for a USD 11.3 billion loan in order to keep the country solvent and to support its foreign exchange reserves, which had fallen to precariously low levels. Pakistan remains dependent on IMF and other international assistance for budgetary support and to keep the country solvent.
Pakistan’s manufacturing sector accounts for about 25 percent of GDP. Cotton textile production and apparel manufacturing are Pakistan’s largest industries, accounting for about 51.4 percent of total exports. However, the ongoing energy crisis and security concerns, together with a decline in global demand, have hampered Pakistan’s textile-reliant export base. The floods which occurred in mid 2010 also played havoc with the economy.
This time around, foreign aid to combat the tragedy has not been as forthcoming as witnessed when the country was hit by a severe earthquake a few years earlier. Pakistan’s search for additional foreign direct investment has been hampered by concerns about the security situation, domestic and regional political uncertainties, and questions about judicial transparency. Poor economic indicators further strain the credibility of the government leading to exacerbating existing fissiparous tendencies.At the strategic level, the US will begin the pull out of its forces from Afghanistan in 2011 as announced by President Obama in his address at the US military Academy at West Point in December 2009. This is however likely to be a token gesture, as complete withdrawal will depend on the ability of the Afghanistan government and its security forces to tackle terrorist forces within Afghanistan and keep Al Qaeda out of any future security calculation. As the likelihood of such an outcome in the near future is remote it would dictate prolonged US military presence in Afghanistan which may not be viewed favourably by US public opinion.
The possibility of partitioning Afghanistan has again been suggested by Robert Blackwill, a former US ambassador to India, as a way out. Blackwill argues that de facto partition offers the Obama administration the best available alternative to strategic defeat. The essence of Blackwill’s proposal is: ‘Washington should accept that the Taliban will inevitably control most of the Pashtun south and east and that the price of forestalling that outcome is far too high for Americans to continue paying. The United States and its partners should stop fighting and dying in the Pashtun homeland and let the local correlation of forces take its course – while deploying US air power and Special Forces to ensure that the north and west of Afghanistan do not succumb to the Taliban’.
“¦the US will begin the pull out of its forces from Afghanistan in 2011 as announced by President Obama in his address at the US military Academy at West Point in December 2009. This is however likely to be a token gesture”¦
Blackwill’s proposal has come under tremendous criticism both within the United States as well as sections of the diplomatic and strategic community in India. But the possibility of partitioning Afghanistan on ethnic lines is not such a far-fetched scenario and may well be the silver bullet which brings peace to the region. In any case, India needs to seriously consider the possibility and be prepared for likely fallouts should such an outcome come about.
A common refrain in strategic circles is a reiteration that the days of map making are over and that partitioning Afghanistan will not be in India’s interest as it will promote greater regional instability. While this position can be challenged, the fact remains that India is not a player in the decision making process to decide the future of Afghanistan and can do precious little to affect any outcome. But, should a partitioning take place, a certain outcome will be a demand of the Pashtun’s on either side of the Durand Line to be united in a common Pashtun homeland. The Government of Afghanistan has never accepted the Durand Line and on the ground its applicability is followed only in its breach. The Pakistan Army will be hard put to ensure its writ in the region with 15 percent of its army being drawn from the area.
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