Homeland Security

Why the Henderson-Brooks report has never been released! - II
Star Rating Loader Please wait...
Issue Vol. 27.2 Apr-Jun 2012 | Date : 03 Apr , 2012

Just before entering into his narrative of the Battle of the Tawang Chu, the Division Commander comes back once again to the incertitude vis-à-vis the line to be defended: “I would like to make a resume of the facts regarding the operational situation as I saw them and as I briefed General Kaul:

Click for IDR subscription

Many generals, including General Umrao Singh, opposed the indiscriminate opening up of more posts.
  • The McMahon Line, drawn on the watershed principle but not drawn very precisely, purports to delineate the boundary between Tibet and India.
  • The maps issued to the Army showed Thagla Ridge and the Namka Chu as lying to the North of the McMahon Line.
  • The Ministry of External Affairs, in all the intervening years, had made no effort to demarcate the McMahon Line on the ground. The details shown on the maps of the area, particularly West of the Nyamjang Chu river, bore no relationship to the actual topography and this discrepancy had never been corrected.
  • Despite repeated requests for clarifications from higher authorities, the correct delineation of our claim line and the status of Dhola Post was never given to me.

It is in these circumstances that the Indian forces were asked to ‘throw the Chinese out’ of the Thagla Ridge. Brigadier John Dalvi put it rather bluntly: “It is known that many generals, including General Umrao Singh, opposed the indiscriminate opening up of more posts.”

The setting up of the Dhola Post was nonetheless the required spark that triggered an all-round attack on India.

The Henderson-Brooks Report probably shed some light on some of these issues, which could explain why it is still kept secret nearly fifty years after its publication. The names of the culprits are known but will probably remain a state secret for years to come.

After the War

The controversy about the exact location of the border between Tibet (China) and India continued well after the war. On November 14, the Indian Prime Minister wrote to his Chinese counterpart: “That the attack was premeditated and carefully planned is clear from the fact that this attack at the Thagla Ridge frontier which commenced on the morning of the October 20, 1962, was not an isolated move; similar attacks against Indian defence posts started simultaneously along other parts not only of the Eastern sector of the frontier, but also of the Western sector of the frontier.”

Although Nehru must bear the responsibility for the entire painful 1962 episode, he is however absolutely right when he points to the fact that the Chinese attack occurred simultaneously in all sectors. This is certainly proof that the operations had been prepared well in advance22 by the Communist regime in Beijing. The setting up of the Dhola Post was nonetheless the required spark that triggered an all-round attack on India.23

Although India rightly stated that the customary border was the Thagla Ridge, it had never been delineated.

One question remains: did the Chinese really believe that the Indian troops had crossed over to Chinese territory by setting a post on the Namkha Chu? It is possible; it is at least what the Chinese historians wrote, thereby justifying the massive attack six weeks later. But why the attacks all along the border then?

As mentioned earlier, the Forward Policy of Krishna Menon was a sort of psychological and political compensation – Delhi had made a fool of itself by not having noticed the occupation of the Aksai Chin for several years; something had to be done. It was the rationale of a new Policy.

Nehru bluntly told Zhou: “I do not want to go into the history of the last five years and the forcible, unilateral alteration of the status quo of the boundary by the Chinese forces in the western sector, on which a mass of notes and memoranda have been exchanged between our two Governments.” The Indian Prime Minister was absolutely correct. But the setting of the Dhola Post involved a far more sensitive issue: the welcome of the Dalai Lama in India at Khenzimane border post, in the vicinity of the Dhola Post.

Did the Chinese really believe that the Indian troops had crossed over to Chinese territory by setting a post on the Namkha Chu?

On December 04, Zhou Enlai answered Nehru: “So far as the eastern sector is concerned, I believe the Indian Government must be in possession of the 1914 original map of the so-called McMahon Line. According to the original map, the western end of the so-called McMahon Line clearly starts from 27°44.6’ N. Yet the Indian Government arbitrarily said that it started from 27°48’ N and, on this pretext, it not only refused to withdraw the Indian troops from the Kechilang River [Namkha Chu] area North of the Line but made active dispositions for a massive military attack, attempting to clear the area of Chinese frontier guards defending it. Such was the position in the eastern sector of the Sino-Indian boundary prior to September 8, 1962. How can the Chinese Government agree to revert to such a position?” The Chinese remained steady on their position.

The successive governments in Nanjing and Beijing have always considered that the agreement between the British and Tibetan plenipotentiaries in March 1914 in Simla was a ‘secret’ agreement: the fact that Tibet was considered an independent nation by the British at that time is unacceptable by China, though it is a fact of history that they themselves acknowledged by sitting at the same table with the British and Tibetan Plenipotentiaries for several months in Simla.

Also read:

The Chinese Note continues: “The reason why the Chinese Government pointed out the coordinates of the western extremity of the so-called McMahon Line was to show that Indian troops had crossed this line and intruded into the Kechilang River [Tawang Chu] area.” Here again it is a question of interpretation of the Simla agreement for demarcating the border between Tibet and British India. There are different views on the subject but even if one admits the principle of the ‘highest ridge’, the Himalayas do not always bend to the will of the cartographers.

Once again, Sir Henry McMahon never envisaged that the hurriedly conducted survey24 and his drawing of a thick red line on a map could trigger a war. The ‘massive attack’ supposedly planned by India cannot be taken seriously in view of the total lack of preparedness of the troops in terms of armament, ammunition, clothing and food supply. More than half of the casualties are said to have succumbed to the cold and the shortage of food. Some senior officers in the Army Headquarters in Delhi may have dreamt to ‘throw out the Chinese’ or take ‘the Thagla Ridge’, but in reality, it was a pipe dream only.

Further, the position of the Chinese government was ambiguous: on the one hand, they did not recognise the McMahon Line having been absent at the ‘secret negotiations’ between Sir Henry McMahon (and Charles Bell) with Lochen Shatra, the Tibetan Plenipotentiary in Simla in February/ March 1914, but at the same time, Beijing was ready to accept the Line as the Line of Actual Control.

Although India rightly stated that the customary border was the Thagla Ridge, it had never been delineated. It was only in 1951, that Major Khating and the Assam Riffles walked to Tawang, and further north. But Mao had needed a pretext, some Indian Army senior officers and politicians offered it to him, though one thing is sure, with or without pretext, the conflict would be happened anyway.

Notes

  1. The History of Conflict with China, 1962 (Chief Editor S.N Prasad), The History Division, Ministry of Defence, Government of India, 1992.
  2. The Sino-Indian Border Dispute (The Polo CIA series, XVI).
  3. Pradhan, R.D., 1965 War: The Inside Story, Defence Minister YB Chavan’s Diary of the Indo-Pakistan War.
  4. NEFA or North East Frontier Agency is the present Arunachal Pradesh.
  5. See, http://cic.gov.in/CIC-Orders/WB-19032009-04.pdf
  6. Maxwell, Neville, India’s China War (Delhi: Jaico Publishing, 1971)
  7. About Operation Leghorn, the information was absolutely correct as we shall see.
  8. Prasad writes ‘Towang’, though the correct name is ‘Tawang’, the place blessed by the horse. We have chosen to use the correct spelling ‘Tawang’ in this paper.
  9. In fact, red.
  10. Though different authors spell Thagla differently, we shall stick to ‘Thagla’, like Bomdila or Bumla.
  11. It is the word used by the Chinese.
  12. ‘Chu’ means ‘river in Tibetan or Monpa dialect.
  13. The operation did made no sense militarily, as the Indian Army was not prepared, and did not have the man power, armament or necessary basic supply. The ‘bosses’ in Delhi did not care much for these trivial contingencies.
  14. Captain Prasad, who later died heroically on the Namka Chu on October 20, 1962, was the nephew of Maj Gen Prasad.
  15. See Claude Arpi, https://www.indiandefencereview.com/spotlights/maos-return-to-power-passed-through-india/
  16. Later Major General.
  17. Jawaharlal Nehru’s biographer and son of President S. Radhakrishnan.
  18. According to Wikipedia, 91°38’34.44”E 27°45’40.15”N. Though it cannot be so accurate due the thickness of the Simla map (1’:8 miles).
  19. From the earlier private briefing.
  20. He entered via Khenzemane.
  21. The Le village, belonging to the Lebu group of villages.
  22. Though the final decision might only been taken in early October.
  23. The other factor was the return of Mao on the Chinese political stage.
  24. The survey was conducted by Captain Bailey.
1 2
Rate this Article
Star Rating Loader Please wait...
The views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily represent the opinions or policies of the Indian Defence Review.

About the Author

Claude Arpi

Writes regularly on Tibet, China, India and Indo-French relations. He is the author of 1962 and the McMahon Line Saga, Tibet: The Lost Frontier and Dharamshala and Beijing: the negotiations that never were.

More by the same author

Post your Comment

2000characters left