Homeland Security

Why the Henderson-Brooks report has never been released! - II
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Issue Vol. 27.2 Apr-Jun 2012 | Date : 03 Apr , 2012

The September 08 Incident: The situation was getting hotter by the day. In Beijing, Mao Zedong had begun his comeback to the political stage in Beijing. In the morning of September 08, 1962, the Chinese launched a first offensive precisely, against the Dhola Post. The Official Report said: “Troops were noticed moving across the Namkha Chu in the Tawang sector. In a few hours about forty of them crossed the river, virtually surrounded Dhola and threatened the small post manned by troops from 9 Punjab. The Chinese troops also destroyed two bridges near the post of the Namkha Chu. The Chinese settled into positions near and dominating the post, thus repeating the tactics that they had adopted in the Northern sector against Indian posts.” It was panic in the Indian camp.

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While the Indian Army was trying to reorganise and hurriedly (and anarchically) send reinforcements to the Namkha river, the Chinese watched from their dominating position and this, for a week. But as the Official Report recorded: “The Chinese resumed firing after a short interval. After the incidents of September 20 and 21, there was intermittent firing from September 22 to 25. On September 28, the Chinese used automatic weapons. The Indian troops retaliated. In those bloody clashes, both sides suffered casualties. Suddenly, the Chinese stopped firing. But it turned out to be the proverbial lull before the storm.”

Lieutenant General Sen announced that the Thagla Ridge was Indian territory and that the Chinese would have to be “driven out.

That was it! The point of non-return had been reached. Mao could launch a full-fledged military campaign against India to ‘teach her a lesson’ that she would remember ‘for decades’. He had the necessary pretext – the Indians troops had crossed the Red Line of the 1914 map (though ironically, Beijing would continue to treat the Line as ‘illegal’).

On September 16, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Beijing in a Note to the Indian Embassy in China stated: “Indian troops recently again crossed the so-called ‘McMahon Line’, intruded into Che Dong [Dhola Post] of the Le village (approximately 27°49’ N, 91°48’ E) in China and constructed barracks and defence works there in preparation for prolonged entrenchment.” Beijing added: “After swallowing up by force large tracts of Chinese territory South of the ‘McMahon Line’ on the Eastern sector of the Sino-Indian border, the Indian side went further to intrude into Khinzemane North of the Line in 1959 and has since hung on there. And now, it has further intruded into Che Dong [Dhola Post]. These systematic nibbling activities fully reveal how ambitious the Indian side’s aggressive designs are. They also show that the Indian side is actively extending the tension to the entire Sino-Indian border. The Indian Government must be held responsible for all the consequences arising therefrom.”

Four days earlier, Niranjan Prasad had received Lieutenant General LP ‘Bogey’ Sen, the Army Commander based in Lucknow at the Tezpur airport: “He greeted me coldly; and during the drive back to Divisional Headquarters he did not utter one single word and, disconcertingly, ignored all my questions.” At a conference at Divisional Headquarters, Sen announced that the Thagla Ridge was Indian territory and that the Chinese would have to be “driven out, the operation, codenamed Operation Leghorn, was to be executed at all costs.”

Fifty years later, the mystery remains – ‘Who ordered the setting up of this particular post?’

On September 20, New Delhi complained that two Chinese soldiers had crept up to an Indian patrol post and thrown two hand grenades. The next day, Beijing retorted: “Indian troops in the Che Dong [Dhola Post] area of Tibet, China, North of the so-called McMahon Line, into which they had intruded, made a sudden armed attack on Chinese frontier sentries standing on guard West of the Che-jao bridge.” In these tense circumstances, one understands that there were no questions about rethinking India’s position on the border.

A Flamboyant Corps Commander

On October 03, Lieutenant General BM Kaul took over IV Corps that was especially created ‘to throw the Chinese out’. On his arrival in Tezpur, he had a briefing by Niranjan Prasad, the 4 Infantry Division Commander, who recorded: “My proposal was to have stronger posts further away from the border as bases for patrols operating up to our claim line.” Later, Kaul addressed the senior officers. According to Prasad: “At the conference, however, General Kaul’s mannerism changed completely.19 His reply to me was brusque and final: “The Prime Minister himself had ordered these posts to be set up and he had based his decision on the highest Intelligence advice.” Also, explicit in his reply was a warning that failure or dragging of feet in completing the task could result in serious consequences for those responsible in other words, for 4 Infantry Division. So that was that.” A story of utter confusion!

Not only was the Dhola Post disputed by the Chinese but worse, as Dalvi said, it was militarily unsound.

John Dalvi commented: “The [former] Chief of the General Staff, General Kaul too must have been aware of the background to the Dhola area, and the possible military repercussions of treading on dangerous ground. Was Dhola established under Government orders or was it established by the Army Command purely as ‘an operational matter’? Did the Government say that we must hold Dhola?”

Fifty years later, the mystery remains – ‘Who ordered the setting up of this particular post?’ The issue is a sensitive one for the Chinese because it is in the vicinity of this post that the Dalai Lama crossed over from Tibet to India in 1959,20 an event that had (and still has) not been digested by the Chinese. In many ways, this was the most sensitive area of the entire India-China border from Ladakh to the Burma tri-junction. It was a place heavily charged with history.

Though Nehru had apparently declared that posts should be established in places ‘where we are convinced it is ours’, Dalvi commentated: “The Chinese had raised a dispute about the exact alignment of the McMahon Line in the Thagla Ridge area [during the 1960 talks]. Therefore, the Thagla-Dhola area was not strictly a territory that ‘we should have been convinced was ours as directed by Prime Minister Nehru, and someone is guilty of exceeding the limits prescribed by him.”

There was a discrepancy between the Line printed on the map and the de facto border which included the watershed.

Indian historians had good reasons to be convinced that the Thagla ridge was the traditional border between India and Tibet, though the 1914 map shows it a couple of miles southward. One of the main proofs is that the pasture rights on the ridge have always been with the Pangchen villages which belong to the Monpa tribe, while the Lebus villages, North of the Thagla Ridge21 have always been under the jurisdiction of Tsona Dzong whose population are Tibetans.

But the point that the ‘historians’ did not grasp in 1962 was that the area around Khinzemane and Thagla ridge had a ‘historic’ significance for the Chinese. Historian G.N. Rao, who participated in the official talks of 1960 said that it was a mere theoretical difference, but a difference which was fully used by the Chinese as a pretext to attack India in self-defence, even though the extent of the attack demonstrates that it was just a pretext for Mao to reestablish his position inside the Chinese Communist hierarchy and to ‘teach India a lesson’.

Not only was the Dhola Post disputed by the Chinese but worse, as Dalvi said, it was militarily unsound: “Sometime in July or August 1962 GOC 4 Division represented the unsoundness of the location of Dhola to his superiors, but had not received a reply up to September 08, when the Chinese debouched across Thagla Ridge and threatened the post. The name of the person who did not give an answer, or failed to take a decision on this vital issue for over two months, will have to be made known as his was a major contribution to the events of September 1962.”

Editor’s Pick

There are many ‘guilty’ men, generals or civilians in this story, but let us forget them for the time being and return to the front and listen to Dalvi: “We knew (or should have known) that Chinese Officials in the 1960 discussions had not conceded our version of the Line in this particular area.” This is an important point, because though the Indian presentation was far more accurate than the Chinese one during the 1960 border talks, Beijing had not agreed to the Indian point of view.

This explains the unhappiness of the local Brigade Commanders in NEFA. Dalvi wrote: “The Thagla Ridge had a tactical significance for the Chinese as it overlooked their forward base at Le. Chinese counter-measures would place us at a grave disadvantage, both tactically and administratively.” India had simply tried to bite more than it was possible for her to chew at that time.

The McMahon Line Again

In his memoirs, General Prasad comes back to the McMahon Line: “…The McMahon Line generally follows the Himalayan watershed. The line then comes down to Khinzemane [the border post with Tibet, contested by China], and thence, instead of following the main watershed of the Thagla ridge, it is drawn in as a straight line running to the India–Tibet-Bhutan tri-junction. The details of the area shown on the maps then existing bore little resemblance to the actual configurations of the ground, presumably because this area had not been explored when the McMahon Line was drawn.” As we have seen, there was a discrepancy between the Line printed on the map and the de facto and historical border which took into account the watershed and the rights of pasturage on the slopes of the ridge.

Just before entering into his narrative of the Battle of the Tawang Chu, the Division Commander comes back once again to the incertitude vis-à-vis the line to be defended: “I would like to make a resume of the facts regarding the operational situation as I saw them and as I briefed General Kaul:

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Many generals, including General Umrao Singh, opposed the indiscriminate opening up of more posts.
  • The McMahon Line, drawn on the watershed principle but not drawn very precisely, purports to delineate the boundary between Tibet and India.
  • The maps issued to the Army showed Thagla Ridge and the Namka Chu as lying to the North of the McMahon Line.
  • The Ministry of External Affairs, in all the intervening years, had made no effort to demarcate the McMahon Line on the ground. The details shown on the maps of the area, particularly West of the Nyamjang Chu river, bore no relationship to the actual topography and this discrepancy had never been corrected.
  • Despite repeated requests for clarifications from higher authorities, the correct delineation of our claim line and the status of Dhola Post was never given to me.

It is in these circumstances that the Indian forces were asked to ‘throw the Chinese out’ of the Thagla Ridge. Brigadier John Dalvi put it rather bluntly: “It is known that many generals, including General Umrao Singh, opposed the indiscriminate opening up of more posts.”

The setting up of the Dhola Post was nonetheless the required spark that triggered an all-round attack on India.

The Henderson-Brooks Report probably shed some light on some of these issues, which could explain why it is still kept secret nearly fifty years after its publication. The names of the culprits are known but will probably remain a state secret for years to come.

After the War

The controversy about the exact location of the border between Tibet (China) and India continued well after the war. On November 14, the Indian Prime Minister wrote to his Chinese counterpart: “That the attack was premeditated and carefully planned is clear from the fact that this attack at the Thagla Ridge frontier which commenced on the morning of the October 20, 1962, was not an isolated move; similar attacks against Indian defence posts started simultaneously along other parts not only of the Eastern sector of the frontier, but also of the Western sector of the frontier.”

Although Nehru must bear the responsibility for the entire painful 1962 episode, he is however absolutely right when he points to the fact that the Chinese attack occurred simultaneously in all sectors. This is certainly proof that the operations had been prepared well in advance22 by the Communist regime in Beijing. The setting up of the Dhola Post was nonetheless the required spark that triggered an all-round attack on India.23

Although India rightly stated that the customary border was the Thagla Ridge, it had never been delineated.

One question remains: did the Chinese really believe that the Indian troops had crossed over to Chinese territory by setting a post on the Namkha Chu? It is possible; it is at least what the Chinese historians wrote, thereby justifying the massive attack six weeks later. But why the attacks all along the border then?

As mentioned earlier, the Forward Policy of Krishna Menon was a sort of psychological and political compensation – Delhi had made a fool of itself by not having noticed the occupation of the Aksai Chin for several years; something had to be done. It was the rationale of a new Policy.

Nehru bluntly told Zhou: “I do not want to go into the history of the last five years and the forcible, unilateral alteration of the status quo of the boundary by the Chinese forces in the western sector, on which a mass of notes and memoranda have been exchanged between our two Governments.” The Indian Prime Minister was absolutely correct. But the setting of the Dhola Post involved a far more sensitive issue: the welcome of the Dalai Lama in India at Khenzimane border post, in the vicinity of the Dhola Post.

Did the Chinese really believe that the Indian troops had crossed over to Chinese territory by setting a post on the Namkha Chu?

On December 04, Zhou Enlai answered Nehru: “So far as the eastern sector is concerned, I believe the Indian Government must be in possession of the 1914 original map of the so-called McMahon Line. According to the original map, the western end of the so-called McMahon Line clearly starts from 27°44.6’ N. Yet the Indian Government arbitrarily said that it started from 27°48’ N and, on this pretext, it not only refused to withdraw the Indian troops from the Kechilang River [Namkha Chu] area North of the Line but made active dispositions for a massive military attack, attempting to clear the area of Chinese frontier guards defending it. Such was the position in the eastern sector of the Sino-Indian boundary prior to September 8, 1962. How can the Chinese Government agree to revert to such a position?” The Chinese remained steady on their position.

The successive governments in Nanjing and Beijing have always considered that the agreement between the British and Tibetan plenipotentiaries in March 1914 in Simla was a ‘secret’ agreement: the fact that Tibet was considered an independent nation by the British at that time is unacceptable by China, though it is a fact of history that they themselves acknowledged by sitting at the same table with the British and Tibetan Plenipotentiaries for several months in Simla.

Also read:

The Chinese Note continues: “The reason why the Chinese Government pointed out the coordinates of the western extremity of the so-called McMahon Line was to show that Indian troops had crossed this line and intruded into the Kechilang River [Tawang Chu] area.” Here again it is a question of interpretation of the Simla agreement for demarcating the border between Tibet and British India. There are different views on the subject but even if one admits the principle of the ‘highest ridge’, the Himalayas do not always bend to the will of the cartographers.

Once again, Sir Henry McMahon never envisaged that the hurriedly conducted survey24 and his drawing of a thick red line on a map could trigger a war. The ‘massive attack’ supposedly planned by India cannot be taken seriously in view of the total lack of preparedness of the troops in terms of armament, ammunition, clothing and food supply. More than half of the casualties are said to have succumbed to the cold and the shortage of food. Some senior officers in the Army Headquarters in Delhi may have dreamt to ‘throw out the Chinese’ or take ‘the Thagla Ridge’, but in reality, it was a pipe dream only.

Further, the position of the Chinese government was ambiguous: on the one hand, they did not recognise the McMahon Line having been absent at the ‘secret negotiations’ between Sir Henry McMahon (and Charles Bell) with Lochen Shatra, the Tibetan Plenipotentiary in Simla in February/ March 1914, but at the same time, Beijing was ready to accept the Line as the Line of Actual Control.

Although India rightly stated that the customary border was the Thagla Ridge, it had never been delineated. It was only in 1951, that Major Khating and the Assam Riffles walked to Tawang, and further north. But Mao had needed a pretext, some Indian Army senior officers and politicians offered it to him, though one thing is sure, with or without pretext, the conflict would be happened anyway.

Notes

  1. The History of Conflict with China, 1962 (Chief Editor S.N Prasad), The History Division, Ministry of Defence, Government of India, 1992.
  2. The Sino-Indian Border Dispute (The Polo CIA series, XVI).
  3. Pradhan, R.D., 1965 War: The Inside Story, Defence Minister YB Chavan’s Diary of the Indo-Pakistan War.
  4. NEFA or North East Frontier Agency is the present Arunachal Pradesh.
  5. See, http://cic.gov.in/CIC-Orders/WB-19032009-04.pdf
  6. Maxwell, Neville, India’s China War (Delhi: Jaico Publishing, 1971)
  7. About Operation Leghorn, the information was absolutely correct as we shall see.
  8. Prasad writes ‘Towang’, though the correct name is ‘Tawang’, the place blessed by the horse. We have chosen to use the correct spelling ‘Tawang’ in this paper.
  9. In fact, red.
  10. Though different authors spell Thagla differently, we shall stick to ‘Thagla’, like Bomdila or Bumla.
  11. It is the word used by the Chinese.
  12. ‘Chu’ means ‘river in Tibetan or Monpa dialect.
  13. The operation did made no sense militarily, as the Indian Army was not prepared, and did not have the man power, armament or necessary basic supply. The ‘bosses’ in Delhi did not care much for these trivial contingencies.
  14. Captain Prasad, who later died heroically on the Namka Chu on October 20, 1962, was the nephew of Maj Gen Prasad.
  15. See Claude Arpi, https://www.indiandefencereview.com/spotlights/maos-return-to-power-passed-through-india/
  16. Later Major General.
  17. Jawaharlal Nehru’s biographer and son of President S. Radhakrishnan.
  18. According to Wikipedia, 91°38’34.44”E 27°45’40.15”N. Though it cannot be so accurate due the thickness of the Simla map (1’:8 miles).
  19. From the earlier private briefing.
  20. He entered via Khenzemane.
  21. The Le village, belonging to the Lebu group of villages.
  22. Though the final decision might only been taken in early October.
  23. The other factor was the return of Mao on the Chinese political stage.
  24. The survey was conducted by Captain Bailey.
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The views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily represent the opinions or policies of the Indian Defence Review.

About the Author

Claude Arpi

Writes regularly on Tibet, China, India and Indo-French relations. He is the author of 1962 and the McMahon Line Saga, Tibet: The Lost Frontier and Dharamshala and Beijing: the negotiations that never were.

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