Military & Aerospace

Why Henderson Brooks Report Cannot be De-classified
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Issue Net Edition | Date : 14 Jul , 2013

Nehru died a disillusioned man after telling the nation that “a powerful and unscrupulous opponent had responded with evil to our good”. The lessons of 1962 can be summarized as follows: China used deception at the highest political level in duping India’s political hierarchy into believing that China would never attack; lack of strategic thought and political beliefs devoid of reality led to the ill armed, ill equipped and ill trained state of Indian Army; India failed to read Chinese intentions despite Chinese ousting nationalists from Manchuria in 1948, sweeping into Tibet in 1951, occupying Sinkiang and shelling Taiwan in 1954, occupying Aksai Chin (38,000 sq kms) from 1955 to 1957, butchering own 30-40 million population during the ‘Great Leap’ and occupying Tibet in 1959 breaching promises made; military advice was totally ignored by Nehru and Krishna Menon; Thagla Ridge incident was mere excuse for PLA’s already planned pre-emptive strikes across a vast frontier creating massive shock action; China timed the offensive coinciding with the Cuban Missile Crisis to ensure US and USSR had no chance to look at the Sino-Indian border; Indian positions that had adequate fighting potential and could have been re-supplied by air too were ordered to withdraw due to poor higher leadership; IAF could have been used to bomb the enveloping movements, positions and administrative bases of the China as PLAAF was handicapped without requisite airbases in Tibet. However, this was not done; appointing BM Kaul as Corps Commander at the Chinese front and making him responsible for entire NEFA front was a huge mistake. He was ineffective in operations, reported sick at a crucial juncture and was sitting in a Delhi hospital while his troops were routed. He resigned after the war.

The danger is the debate that would follow about the dark side of Nehru’s Foreign Policy towards China and some of the legacies left by him

It is not that all the aforementioned is not known and has not been penned down by scholars, historians and participants of this unfortunate war over the years in books and articles. To that end, declassifying the Henderson Brooks is not going to bring out anything new. The danger is the debate that would follow about the dark side of Nehru’s Foreign Policy towards China and some of the legacies left by him: disdain for military; ignoring military advice; military kept out of strategic security considerations; disorganized higher defence set up; belief that political autocracy supported by bureaucracy is enough to run the country; utopian ideas of peace discounting ground realities – in plain terms no strategic sense whatsoever.

It may be argued that even the aforementioned issues are quite well known and so what is the problem in making the Henderson Brooks report public. The fear could well be whether India has been able to overcome these Nehruvian legacies, as mentioned above, or at least have we modified them to suit our national interests? This requires detailed analysis that may need many pages but a few examples as under could provide the cue:-

  •  India acknowledged Tibet in the Chinese sphere of influence without reciprocal commitment by China concerning status of the Sino-Indian boundary. Similarly, through the 1972 Shimla agreement, India returned 93,000 Pakistani prisoners without resolving the J&K issue, not even resolving the ambiguity of the CFL beyond NJ 9842 under the 1947 Karachi Agreement, and even more significantly, not getting our military prisoners released from Pakistani jails in exchange. If India had applied strategic sense, Pakistan should have been made to agree to extension of the CFL beyond NJ 9842 to the Wakhan Corridor to the north (northwestern extremity of J&K), which would have obviated the subsequent Siachen issue altogether.
  • When China made a road right through Aksai Chin in 1950’s, India came to know only one month before its completion, though Claud Arpi writes Nehru knew but kept quiet and “lied” to the Parliament in 1959. 60 years later, India came to know of 11000 Chinese having come into POK / Pakistan through a newspaper report in New York Times.
  • Zhou-en-Lai kept singing peace and both Nehru and Krishna Menon believed China will never attack us. China says the same today and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh told the nation last December that “China will not attack us”. This is despite R&AW has been warning that China may attack us and some national and international scholars have also voiced similar warnings.
  •  India’s forward infrastructure was atrocious in 1962. It is only slightly better today. Forward movement of forces, especially mechanized forces, remains problematic. Alternative alignments reconnoitered by army years back have not been cleared because of lack of operational priority communicated to the States by the Centre and concerned States stonewalling proposals on mundane grounds of tree cutting despite army assuring double the numbers the number of trees cut will be planted.
  •  The gap between the PLA and Indian Military was large in 1962. Today the gap is widening exponentially, more because of political and bureaucratic intransigence than lacking finances.
  • Nehru’s disdain for the military was well known but today an amazing situation exists in India, unparalleled anywhere in the world,  where military personnel have to approach the Civil Courts to get justice even for their authorized dues. It is not without reason Stephen Cohen’s wrote in his book on the Indian Army. “India has virtually ignored the military as a factor in nation building. This is surprising, for the military had a profound impact on the course of nationalist politics and also upon policies after 1947.”
  • India did not have an integrated tri-Service set up in 1962 and still is in the same state. HQ Integrated Defence Staff which should have been fully merged with the MoD has come up as a separate HQ altogether. There has been little movement towards creating Integrated Theatre Commands (ITCs) and Integrated Functional Commands (IFCs).
  •  No National security Strategy in 1962. We are in the same state today. The higher defence set up has only been tinkered with – not streamlined.
  •  India was bending backwards to China in 1962 and continues to do so. A 19 kilometres deep Chinese intrusion id described as “a small acme on the face” by our Foreign Minister. According to former ambassador P Stopden (himself native of Ladakh), over the years India has ceded to China over 400 square kilometres of territory in Ladakh alone. The implications are therefore clear – there have been many intrusions in the past that have been hushed up and similar may be the case in the eastern theatre. This apart, our political hierarchy is even acquiescing to Chinese in not hosting the Tricolor in open at Demchhok in Eastern Ladakh and stopping development work in border village Koyul in Leh.

Now why should the military not want the Henderson Brooks report de-classified when its de-classification can set in motion the much needed national debate and reforms? Though the media houses are in firm grip of the government why even allow such pinpricks? The bottom line is that the political hierarchy is taking refuge behind the cover that military cannot open its mouth and any reports of operations are always classified but then even in case of ‘Top Secret’ documents, which this report is not, a review is done afte10 years of its origin. Talk unofficially to any military officer and none would want this report to remain secret.  As regards the view that keeping this report under wraps is disservice to the nation, this is very true but only one among a long list of disservices. Inder Malhotra wrote in the Tribune on 12 April 2013, “Fourteen years after the formation of the National Security Council, this august body has met but rarely. During the last three years or so, it hasn’t met even once! Worse, to this day the second largest country in Asia does not have a national security doctrine ……The Army, the Navy and the Air Force each plough a lonely furrow in this day and age when every battle is a joint land-air-sea undertaking. The crux of the issue is what Trefor Moss wrote in The Diplomat dated 25 March 2012, saying, “The problem is the incoherence of India’s defense establishment, from industry through to government – therein lies the inferiority. It’s a danger to Indian security that has nothing to do with China, and that’s within India’s own power to put right.” But the question is does the political hierarchy have the will and inclination to do so? There appear to be no indications to this effect as of now!

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The views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily represent the opinions or policies of the Indian Defence Review.

About the Author

Lt Gen Prakash Katoch

is Former Director General of Information Systems and A Special Forces Veteran, Indian Army.

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6 thoughts on “Why Henderson Brooks Report Cannot be De-classified

  1. Ignorance and incompetence of Indian Army is appalling. If Katoch really believed mighty Chinese PLA could have been defeated if Indian Army was formed like that stupid wargame in Lucknow, he was not fit to be a general except in Indian Army. One has to question how he got all those promotions. May be he is the best worthless. In warfare, psychological propaganda and rhetoric are integral part. Our own position is glorified as the dharma while enemy is depicted as evil and cunning aggressor. That was the purpose of Nehru’s statement to his nation which was meant for consumption by the enemy as well as countries on sidelines. If a general like Katoch could not understand something so fundamental to warfare even with 55 year hindsight, how credible is this army as a fighting force? Katoch quotes Noorani of Nehru” shut the door to negotiations”. What Noorani was really saying is Chinese were trustworthy with whom Nehru should have negotiated. That is exact opposite of Katoch’s own claim and of Sardar Patel’s. So, why did Katoch stick that quote from Noorani in middle of blaming Nehru for “trusting Chinese”? Because Katoch knows his audience will not know the difference and consume mindlessly. Katoch’s motive is to bad mouth Nehru and demonize the black South Indian Krishna Menon. For 55 years India has seen these incoherent blogs written over and over. For how long will Indians mindlessly consume this nonsense?

  2. Sardar Patel knew nothing outside Gujarat. Katoch gloats about “India coming to know of 11000 Chinese come into POK / Pakistan through a report in New York Times” while he should be ashamed. Katoch’s own claim of “gap between the PLA and Indian Military widening exponentially since 1962” proves all this blame against Nehru and Krishna Menon is motivated either by ignorance by some other hidden agenda. Claims of Nehru “ignoring the military as a factor in nation building” and “Nehru’s disdain for the military” are plain lies. Many Gandhians wanted the Army (that committed atrocities like Jhallianwalabagh) disbanded. Nehru brushed aside those concerns and even gave cabinet ranks to the 3 heads. Krishna Menon modernized the armed forces like no other Defense Minister in the history of India. Under that same Krishna Menon, India defeated (NATO Member) Portugal and liberated Goa in December 1961. Claims of Krishna Menon rubbishing war game in Lucknow in 1961, which (supposedly) was exactly the way it happened in 1962” seems a fantastic story inspired by Schwarzkopf’s “Left Hook”. Katoch obviously does not know the story behind appointing BM Kaul (an Army Supply Corps officer) to head the IV Corps. That “IV Corps” never existed in reality. Neville Maxwell blames the same demonstrations and student demands which led the Nehru government pursue “Forward Policy”. But (per Maxwell) Gen. Umrao Singh refused to comply and hence Kaul had to be dispatched in a hurry. Kaul was in fact called back from personal leave in first week of October. In attempt to avoid ruffling feathers of Umrao Singh and to avoid exposure of Indian Army falling apart, a fictitious IV Corps was engineered and made “in-charge of Forward Policy”. Katoch’s depiction of that desperation as “Kaul being thrust as Corps Commander” is naivete and laughable. As Katoch points out, if Cuban Missile Crisis did not happen, the IV Corps probably would become reality.

  3. Brooks-Bhagat had no authority to investigate political decisions while VK Krishna Menon confirmed that they never interviewed him. Arpi’s claims of Nehru or Krishna Menon “emerging in bad light” are just clever lies. I’m sure Arun Jaitley also hoped for juice but found none and hence refused to declassify in 2014. Gen. Katoch’s slanderous claims of Krishna Menon making money manipulating Jeep prices are immoral and deplorable. If he made such statement about a Punjabi or a Gujarati or a Bengali, by now hell would break loose. Neville Maxwell called Krishna Menon “the only honest Indian”. “..army had to fight in canvas shoes, sans winter clothing at those heights and meager amount of ammunition, should (indeed) put the hierarchy to shame” Is it the job of PM or Defense Minister to dress up the solders and make sure there are bullets in magazines? Maxwell writes that the Airforce dropped the supplies into enemy positions and into gorges and valleys. Why didn’t the Army dress up soldiers properly when they redeployed from Punjab to Se La and Bomdi La? India had money for INS Vikrant and MIGs but not for clothing 5,000 soldiers? For how long will the Army and Airforce refuse to take responsibility and blame the black South Indian? Claim of BM Kaul being made in-charge of NEFA is false. The North Eastern Commander was Gen LP Sen who ranked higher than Kaul. China is founding member of UNSC since 1945. That seat was never offered to India and hence no question of “magnanimously given away to China”. Argument that Nehru should have deployed Airforce is naive. If we lost all the aircraft in 1962, we would be sitting ducks in 1965. Nehru pushed the Chinese back without ever deploying Airforce. Blaming Nehru for not stopping Tibet invasion are even more bizarre. If Indian Army was not ready for China in 1962, how could they be ready in 1950? Who else is supposed to stop them?

  4. VK Krishna Menon is the best Defense Minister India ever had. No number of statues, institutes and memorials of Sardar Patel or Subhas Bose ever suffice for Gujaratis and Bengalis. But a South Indian cannot have a single road named after him nor can anybody garland his statue on his birth anniversary. I’m unsure if generals like Katoch really don’t understand warfare or just spread this myth to fool people. Neville Maxwell never considered Indian Army a serious fighting force against PLA. Neither Noorani nor Maxwell support this theory of “China Attacking India”. They in fact argue other way around. Nehru saying “a powerful and unscrupulous opponent had responded with evil to our good”, was just war rhetoric and for consumption. Claims of Nehru dying a broken man are immoral. Nehru was at his best when things were at their worst. Nehru presided over million deaths each in 1946/47 and largest mass migration in human history. Nobody could be as resilient as Nehru. Despite failure of Army, Nehru stood like a man and faced the challenge. When China occupied Arunachal Pradesh and offered ceasefire, Nehru flatly declined and vowed to fight. China had to back down and retreat to pre-war position. When enemy retreats any other nation claims victory. Only Indians can insist they were defeated and humiliated.

  5. Excellent article by Gen Prakash Katoch. Our political leaders especially Nehru, Menon and some others never liked the Army and totally ignored the professional advice by Gen Thimayya and Lt Gen Thorat who in the mid 1950s had warned Nehru that the PRC-PLA posed the real and potent threat to our security. Thimayya had recommended that Thorat, a thorough professional and very able general should take over from him. But, Thapar was appointed the COAS in mid 1961 since he was a pliant general and lacking moral courage to stand up to Nehru and Menon. It was our misfortune to have Thapar and Kaul at the apex of Army hierarchy. Naturally, we got clobbered by PLA in the 1962 War. Am sure had Manekshaw or a general of his abilities and moral courage been at the helm in 1962 we would have given a much better account. In the Battle of Walong Oct-Nov ’62, I was part of 11 Mtn Bde and fought at Trijunction (13500 feet). The atrocious and shocking misdirection of the War by the political and military high command along with lessons learnt has been covered briefy in my book THROUGH WARS and INSURGENCY – DIARY OF AN ARMY OFFICER.
    My fear is that in real terms we are even worse off than we were in 1962 vis-a-vis China.

    • Indian Army needs to accept their incompetence sooner or later. Gen Timmayya DID NOT believe PRC-PLA was a threat. To the contrary, Timmayya believed Pakistan to be real enemy and that Aksai Chin had no strategic value for India. In fact the differences between Timmayya and Krishna Menon started when later indeed adopted Thorat’s suggestions. Does anybody in Indian Army even know what happened in 1962? Why did Gen Umrao Singh refuse to forward his troops if there really was such a threat from PRC-PLA? Claim of Thapar/Kaul being in-charge exposes your ignorance. North Eastern Commander in 1962 was Gen LP Sen, the defender of Srinagar (in 1947). Despite pathetic performance of Indian Army, Jawaharlal Nehru stood like a man he was and forced PRC-PLA retreat to pre-war position. When enemy retreats, any other nation claims victory. Only Indian Army can be so clueless to claim defeat and humiliation. Nehru and Krishna Menon bent over backwards to make excuses for Army and Air Force’s incompetence. You in turn betray those great leaders.

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