Indian Defence Review

The Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and the three Service Chiefs paying homage at the Amar Jawan Jyoti

‘Jointmanship’ in the history of warfare reached its maturity in World War II, especially during Operation Overlord involving landing by the allied forces on the beaches of Normandy. The other example of effective ‘jointmanship’ was the landing at Inchon by UN forces during the Korean War. The lessons of the Vietnam War inspired a change in the functioning of the command and control structure of the US military and led to the new statute called “The Goldwater-Nichols Act” that fostered better ‘jointmanship’ among the different wings of the US armed forces.

For decades military strategists the world over have emphasized the criticality of jointmanship in the prosecution of war. It is common knowledge that Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) as also other modern concepts such as Cyber Warfare, Information Warfare and Network-Centric Warfare constitute the key to battlefield dominance and military superiority. RMA pre-supposes total tri-service integration in thought, word and action. The character of future battle space environment, therefore, makes it imperative for the armed forces to fight an integrated battle. In the Indian context, the concept of ‘jointmanship’ envisages the conduct of air-land, air-maritime and tri-service campaigns with a common military strategy in pursuance of national security objectives.

However, despite claims, true integration has eluded the Indian military. Why is this so and what are the challenges that need to be managed or changes that need to be effected for the Indian military to function as homogenous entity?

Historical Perspective

‘Jointmanship’ in the history of warfare reached its maturity in World War II, especially during Operation Overlord involving landing by the allied forces on the beaches of Normandy. The other example of effective ‘jointmanship’ was the landing at Inchon by UN forces during the Korean War. The lessons of the Vietnam War inspired a change in the functioning of the command and control structure of the US military and led to the new statute called “The Goldwater-Nichols Act” that fostered better ‘jointmanship’ among the different wings of the US armed forces.

Operation Urgent Fury in Grenada, though a prime example of failure of ‘jointmanship’, was successful only due to the bold action by the US forces. It was planned with virtually no advance warning and executed by diverse units with no opportunity to train jointly before the operation began. The Operation suffered from shortcomings that cost lives. Intelligence was sketchy and communications were often unreliable, particularly in coordinating air attacks and naval gunfire with ground operations. Operations Desert Fox and Desert Storm in Iraq are perfect examples of how all elements, land, air and sea, integrated completely and achieved stupendous success.

In Operation Desert Storm, air power was employed to deliver shock and awe, decimating the Iraqi Air Force and Air Defence to enable the land forces to subdue the Iraqi Army with ease. The Arab-Israeli Wars also are unique examples of ‘jointmanship’, specifically for the Israelis as ‘jointmanship’ is both essential for their survival and as an article of faith, which underscored its success in war.

Closer home, it was in the war with Pakistan in 1971, that the Indian armed forces experienced a modest degree of ‘jointmanship’. During the attack on the harbours at Karachi and Chittagong, both the Indian Air Force (IAF) and the Indian Navy attacked in concert with devastating effect. The heliborne operations on December 09, 1971, referred to as the “Meghna Heli Bridge” and the Para landings at Tangail the following day during the advance to Dacca, are good examples of ‘jointmanship’. Thereafter, till the Kargil War in 1999, there was not much jointmanship visible in the Indian armed forces. Experience in the Kargil War revealed the need for better jointmanship in planning, training and execution of military operations. Since then, as a follow up to the Kargil Report by K Subramanyam, the Integrated Defence Staff (IDS) was formed; a Joint Services Doctrine was drafted as also Andaman Nicobar Command and the Strategic Forces Command, both joint commands, were established. However, owing to a number of reasons, political and otherwise, the post of Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), the principal advisor to the Raksha Mantri, is yet to become a reality.

How then can true jointmanship amongst the three services be realised? The solution lies in the establishment of a proper command and control structure, a joint approach towards prioritisation in budgeting and planning, understanding the importance of domain expertise, revamp of joint training and finally, appropriate Human Resource Development (HRD).

Command and Control Structure

The strength of the Indian Army is around ten times that of the IAF and twenty times that of the Indian Navy. The apprehensions of the IAF and the Navy of being swamped by the Army and the need to preserve their identity, needs to be addressed. At the same time, there is a requirement for a single defence services advisor who will represent the views and collective interest of the three services in an unbiased manner to the government in matters pertaining to planning force levels, resource allocation and budgeting. The appointment of the CDS, the first serving five-star defence services officer, is an inescapable necessity and ought to be considered by the government on high priority.

‘Jointmanship’ is ultimately about parity amongst the services with regard to effect and not size alone. Hence, to address the concerns of the smaller services, the first CDS could be appointed either from the IAF or the Indian Navy and subsequently, in rotation representing all three services. A fixed tenure of three years irrespective of the retirement age for the CDS and also that of the three Service Chiefs could be introduced to ensure stability of tenure. The CDS should have overriding powers to decide on the prioritisation in budgeting of plans and projects for the three services.

Joint Services Command

The next step would be for the three services to set up six Joint Services Commands i.e. in the Western, Northern, Central, Eastern, Southern and South-Western sectors of the country. The ideal situation would be to have the Command Headquarters (HQ) of the three services collocated. This is a difficult proposition, as separate infrastructure for both official and domestic accommodation for each of the three services’ Command HQ already exists on the ground. Hence, as an alternative, there should be a merger of the land, air and naval areas of responsibility and where necessary, fresh boundaries delineated, so that the Command HQ of each service has the same area of responsibility.

Following this, the Joint Forces Commander (JFC) be appointed to head each of the Joint Services Command. To ensure equitable representation, the Northern and Eastern Commands be headed by the Army, the Southern and the South Western Command by the Navy, the Western and Central Command by the IAF. This will ensure equitable distribution as each service will head two Joint Commands. A critical aspect of these changes would be the need for an arbitrator to resolve issues between JFCs relating to force levels and other concerns. The CDS would be ideally suited for this responsibility. The role of the three Service Chiefs will then become that of Chiefs of Staff who will formulate their individual service plans and training programs as well as set up their respective maintenance infrastructure. This is where this template may not find favour with one or the other stakeholder. The government may not like to give such wide ranging powers of both operational and budgetary control over the three services to a single entity.

The concept of a one-man Election Commission was not acceptable to the government and the Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) may suffer the same fate. The bureaucracy in the Ministry of Defence (MoD) may have their own apprehensions about the appointment of CDS, a man in uniform having direct access to the Raksha Mantri overriding the Defence Secretary. The three Service Chiefs too, in all likelihood, would vehemently oppose the proposal as the appointment of a CDS would whittle down their operational powers. Perhaps, what would be more easily acceptable would be to have function-specific Joint Force Commanders heading Special Forces, Aerospace and Cyber Warfare. This concept was spoken about by the present Chief of the Air Staff in an interview recently.

Planning and Budgeting

Keeping the operational control aspect of the CDS and the JFC aside, in the present circumstances, the immediate task for the CDS and his staff if appointed, would be to coordinate plans and budgeting for the three Services. Modern battle space would be increasingly affected by resource constraints and budgetary pressures, given the high costs of new technologies and modern military equipment. These concerns would need to be addressed during peacetime. Based on the military strategy, which would be an important component of national security strategy, a long-term and sustained development of the armed forces would be necessary.

Based on the government’s objectives spelt out for the military, the CDS should be tasked along with the three Service Chiefs to work out the requirement of manpower and the weapon systems that the three Services would need for their tasks. Take the case of protecting the sea lanes of communication from the Gulf of Aden to the Strait of Malacca, the mix of ships, the number of carriers and supporting vessels, escorts, ASW capability, missile frigates and minesweepers need to be determined, along with the requisite air support for maritime reconnaissance and attack. A similar exercise for the defence of land borders, the aerospace security requirement, need for reconnaissance and surveillance systems would also need to be worked out. From the joint plans would be derived the individual service plans and estimate of funds required to build up the required force levels. The question of the numbers and types of weapons systems for the IAF, the Indian Navy and the Indian Army would need to be worked out with appropriate cost-benefit analysis. Procurement of common systems should be done on high priority and early so that the country benefits from volumes of items purchased and in setting up infrastructure for maintenance and training to obviate the possibility of duplication and effect savings in manpower and funds.

Joint mechanisms need to be evolved to obtain the best value for money and the best operational choice. Which would be more effective in the Himalayas, attack helicopters or fighter aircraft, UAVs or fighter aircraft for dull, dreary and dangerous missions, fighter aircraft or long range missiles, long-range fighter aircraft with refuellers and MR aircraft or a carrier group consisting of ASW craft, submarines, destroyer escorts, minesweepers and the like? Or which combination of these types would provide the optimum combat effectiveness based on a common military strategy and a common vision of the battle space. A SWOT analysis should be done, the battle situation war gamed using simulation techniques and where possible, played out in a simulated setting to determine the optimum choice. A joint approach towards defence planning and development of the armed forces would ensure maximum “Bang for the Buck!”

Domain Expertise

Domain expertise is also associated with a cost-effective approach towards every aspect of operations. This applies principally to the supporting roles by the IAF to the Army and the Navy and to other weapon systems and structures like air defence systems which impinge on the other service.

The main impediment in the air-land collaboration has been the argument on the importance of the air superiority campaign vis-à-vis that of offensive air support missions. It is perceived in many quarters that the battle for air superiority is an air force’s private battle as air power and airmen are detached from the situation on the ground. However, the point that is often missed is that no surface movement would be possible without a modicum of air superiority. The battle for air superiority is as vital for the unimpeded movement of the land or maritime forces as it is for the air force. The battle is thus a means to an operational level end. That the land forces in the Gulf War were able to carry out their tasks, without any Interference from the Iraqi Air Force, bears testimony to the need for air superiority as a pre-requisite in a campaign.

The second and perhaps a thornier issue between the two Services is that of close air support. History has revealed that in most situations, the primary task of air power is to attain air superiority, but priorities can be altered with close air support preceding air superiority. This was done in the war in 1973 by the Israeli Air Force during the 1973 Yom Kippur War to prevent the Israeli army from the Israelis to prevent their ground forces from being overrun by the armoured columns of the Egyptians and Syrians. Priorities can change with offensive and defensive campaigns. This is best done when all air power assets are brought to bear on the centre of gravity when the situation demands.

The other aspect is that aircraft are ubiquitous by design. In fact, practically all fighter, transport and rotary wing aircraft are capable of multiple tasks. Helicopters, for example, can, with modification, perform a variety of tasks such as ground attack, airlift of men and material, casualty evacuation, electronic warfare and even for interception of enemy helicopters or transport aircraft. Take the case of attack helicopters. They are effective not only in disrupting the advance of armoured columns but also for attacking enemy radars, escorting heavy and medium-lift helicopters in the tactical theatre. The attack helicopters, close support aircraft and a number of other platforms when used creatively and with a full understanding of their potential vulnerabilities, are critical to the success of conflict. Ownership or command and control issues will also have to be resolved during peacetime. UAVs and long range missiles are the other systems that would come under this rubric.

Besides operational aspects, one needs to consider the duplication in training and maintenance infrastructure. Take the case of the same type of helicopter being operated by two or three services. As soon as the acquisition of helicopters reaches a respectable figure, that particular service may place a request for setting up separate training and maintenance facilities, to focus on their service specific tasks. This will result in duplication of effort, especially when both services are operating the same type of aircraft. Reducing this type of duplication will free some manpower and funds budgeted for individual service needs in other areas.

Joint Training

The next aspect, joint training offers the most optimum route to enhance ‘jointmanship’ in the three Services. The keystone to joint operations is not structures alone, but synergistic thinking which needs to be developed from the early stages of the career of an officer and a soldier/sailor/airman. Presently, airmen of the IAF of all trades have to undergo basic drill and physical fitness training jointly, before they branch out to their trade-specific training. This initial training can be done at a training institution run jointly by staff from the three Services. Also, wherever possible, joint training for trades such as Mechanical Transport, Communication and Electronics, Logistics can be carried out at one tri-service training institution. Inter-operability of equipment will further make this mode the preferable one.

As for officers, the National Defence Academy is the first joint training institution for new entrants for the three Services. The initial two years are devoted to academics, general and physical training. Service-specific training is imparted in the third year. This pattern could be modified to expose all trainees irrespective of the service they are recruited for, to all the basics of three services from the very beginning. At the Defence Services Staff College, where junior officers of the three services are trained together in staff work, the pattern of study presently for the army wing is focused on army operations at the tactical level, while the curriculum for the air force and the naval wings is pitched at the operational and strategic level. This pattern may be modified to raise the study of operations for the army wing to the operational level of division/corps. This will make it easier for all service officers to operate at similar levels and also appreciate the impact of air, land and naval power in different operational scenarios.

Furthermore, an analytical study by officers of the three wings of the impact of air, land and naval power in previous wars and how they influenced the course of the war needs to be carried out. Wherever possible, studies of common topics like strategy, doctrine, the effect of technology on the doctrine of the three Services, cyber warfare, information warfare and logistics should also be conducted jointly. Undoubtedly, there would be many more areas where joint training could be made more meaningful.

Joint Training Exercises

It is important for the three Services Commanders at each Command HQ to sit together with their respective staff and formulate joint plans. Plans need to be followed up with simulated exercises employing Operations Research techniques. This would enable the Commanders to plan the sequencing of the actions by two or more services, for each phase of the battle plan. This should be followed by periodic joint exercises where the entire planning and conduct is carried out centrally by a core group of planners from the three Services in each command. These joint exercises should not be an overlay of singly appreciated plans by individual services, as is the case now, but should originate from a jointly appreciated threat leading to the formulation of a joint plan. Significant emphasis should be placed on time spent in formulating the strategic decision and evolving a joint plan rather than focusing on the tactical level activities.

Each command’s training capsules would be the basis of forging ‘jointness’ through the entire rank structure of the three Services. Once the common objectives are stated and the individual objectives defined, it will take knowledge, practice and time as officers and men of the three Services interact with each other to understand the commonalities between each Service and their uniqueness. Also, it will be easier to work out a focused ISR approach, a common communications and cyber protocol, a common EW plan, an integrated aerospace defence and logistics plan using air, land and naval assets.

Human Resource Development

Finally, the important aspect of Human Resource Development that will bring the three Services on to a common platform that will serve as an enabler to ‘jointmanship’.

Cross Posting

Cross postings of officers of the three Services at junior levels be made a preferable requirement for promotion to higher ranks. For example, it should be possible for junior officers of the three services to be posted against staff vacancies of other service HQ for a tenure and their performance assessed. They then return to their parent service till completion of a command or staff assignment. Subsequently, they could be posted to staff posts in the other Service’s operational commands, in similar posts in the operations, maintenance, logistics and administrative disciplines. Officers who have done well in these joint appointments be given preference in promotion.

Norms for Promotion

Each Service follows its own pattern of annual assessment and norms for promotion. However, in an environment where there would be a mix of officers of the three Services and required to be assessed by officers of the other Services, it makes abundant sense to have a common format for appraisal to cover the essential qualities in professional aptitude and character.

Conclusion

Appointment of the CDS, an understanding of the importance of domain expertise and impetus to joint training/ HRD aspects, will promote closer interaction and understanding of the distinctive characteristics of each service. This process will enable continuous communication between officers and men of the three services. These measures should ensure adequate inter-service exposure of officers beginning at junior levels to enable them to acquire broader vision with advancements in career. The essence of true ‘jointmanship’ lies not in merely setting up additional operational structures but in breaking established mindsets. This is in fact, the preliminary, but the most difficult part of achieving ‘jointness’. True coherence will come in joint operations when we can think past individual service integration, to think about integrating forces within the domains of attack, manoeuvre and defence. Services must look beyond inter-service conflict and rivalry that result in dysfunctional force applications or the absence of needed war fighting doctrine and procedures. But this will take time and will demand enlightened leadership.