Whenever the leading nations come around to bilaterally or multi-laterally agree to legal bindings to control destabilising technologies, they can prioritise by agreeing not to attack the C3I system of each other’s nuclear set-up by cyber or missiles. Secondly, they can agree not to launch autonomous swarm attacks on vital military targets or weapon systems including those that will be used for second or retaliatory strike. Secure control on automated decision support systems is another technology that needs to be prioritised. Primarily, all these controls should reduce the risk of rapid degradation of the adversary’s nuclear threshold which may accelerate the nuclear escalation ladder and initiate a nuclear strike. As most of these emerging technologies are in common usage in civil applications, a strong verification regime too needs to be set up to ensure that their usage in the military sphere adheres to international protocols.
Advances in science and technology have been used by humans to optimise their military potential since time immemorial. World War I witnessed the havoc created by chemical warfare and mines. World War II saw the application of nuclear technology against Hiroshima and Nagasaki. As their destructive capabilities dawned, human society has recoiled at its destructive ability and raised its voice to impose controls.
However, the world today is witnessing the rapid weaponisation of emerging cutting-edge technologies such as Artificial Intelligence (AI), robotics, cyberspace tools, remote sensing and nano electronics. A recent application of a combination of these resulted in the precision killing of Iranian nuclear scientist, Mohsen Fakrizadeh on November 27, 2020. In another instance, unprecedented cyber attacks were reported by the United States (US) in December 2020, targeting its Energy department – the department responsible for managing US nuclear weapons – the US Commerce and Treasury departments. Microsoft too reported cyber attacks against its facilities. Nearer home, October 12, 2020, witnessed a “power outage” in Mumbai which brought India’s financial capital to a grinding halt. The outage is suspected to have been caused by a cyber attack originating from China.
Even as the world grapples with weaponisation of these fast-emerging cutting-edge technologies, these are increasingly imperilling international peace and stability. The need of the day is to identify the risks posed by the weaponisation of emerging technologies and impose effective control.
The Race for Superiority
US, China and Russia, the today’s Big Three and other advanced nations are engaged in a race to achieve military advantage by weaponising emerging technologies. This high-end warfare is distinguished by increased lethality, its destabilising nature combining many domains with increasing speed and reach. Rapid technological advances and their weaponisation are changing the nature of warfare. And the world today is witnessing a relentless drive to develop and weaponise these emerging technologies.
The Denuding Nuclear Threshold
Emerging technologies have the capability to overwhelm the Strategic Command and Control infrastructure and create confusion. Emerging technologies can inflict greater losses on the enemy in a shorter timeframe than envisaged and lead to the “acceleration of the nuclear escalation ladder”. Between two nuclear armed adversaries, this will erode many checks and balances, if mistrust prevails.
During the Cold War, leaders of the US and erstwhile USSR (now Russia) realised that a nuclear confrontation will result in mutually assured destruction, forcing them to devise controls to prevent a conventional war from escalating into a nuclear conflict. Hotline communication, limitations and reduction treaties as well as ‘Open Sky’ policy were the outcomes of their sagacity. Thereafter, the world has enjoyed a long stretch of peace and stability with mankind prospering by leaps and bounds. These measures were to eliminate unintended escalation and to prevent denuding the adversary’s nuclear threshold.
In today’s strategic scenario, the increased lethality non-nuclear weapons due to incorporation of emerging technologies, is seriously challenging the nuclear doctrine of nuclear powers and many “limitation and reduction treaties” are becoming a casualty. New START, the last standing treaty of Cold War wisdom, was due to expire on February 05, 2021. A last minute renewal by the new US administration and Russia in late January 2021 witnessed the world gasp a huge sigh of relief. The answer to the threat of weaponisation of emerging technologies is sought by development of non-strategic nuclear weapons. Its incorporation in conventional weapons aims to paralyse the command-and-control structure of the adversary and to locate and destroy adversary’s nuclear arsenal and their delivery means, especially the nuclear Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence (C3I) set up.
This, in turn, is fast eroding the “no first use” resolve of many nuclear armed states. Post Balakot air strikes and the subsequent escalation by Pakistan by launching an air attack, India’s Defence Minister announced the abrogation of her long-standing ‘‘no first use” policy, knocking sense into Pakistan. Though none of the nine nuclear states in the world wants a nuclear war, in conventional war, they aim to destroy the adversary’s crucial military assets including his command and control (C3I) set up.
In most cases, the C3I set up is common to conduct both the nuclear and conventional war. Their destruction will seriously hamper the understanding of the war situation, degrade response and lead to unacceptable losses. To avoid this, a victim nation may trigger a nuclear response much earlier than its envisaged nuclear threshold. This highlights the threat the weaponisation of emerging technologies pose to the durability of the nuclear threshold.
The Danger of Nuclear Escalation
Incorporating emerging technologies in the sphere of conventional warfare could endanger the nuclear threshold mainly in the following four spheres. First, the path-breaking advances in aerial and marine autonomous weapon systems that are enabled with advanced sensors and emerging technologies, can not only be deployed as “killer robots”, as demonstrated in the killings of Iranian Major General Qasem Suleimaini and Mohsen Fakrizadeh, but also in mission-oriented “swarms”, to seek and destroy key military targets, specially C3I assets. A glimpse of “swarms” was displayed at the recent Army Day parade in New Delhi. To an adversary, key losses to its C3I systems and nuclear assets could be interpreted as a prelude to the ‘final blow’ or the nuclear first strike by the opponent, prompting it to pre-empt it by launching the nuclear strike first. In the second instance, multiple strikes by hypersonic missile such as the Russian “Kinzhal” could destroy the adversary’s major war making potential, seriously challenging its nuclear threshold, prompting it to regain the initiative in the war by launching its nuclear weapons first.
In the third scenario, a mass disinformation campaign by emerging technologies enabled Information Warfare before the war may spook the target nation and its leadership and make them hypersensitive. Hereafter, the onset of the war may witness a crippling cyber attack across the spectrum, paralysing/degrading the nation’s C3I, resulting in flawed decision-making and heavy losses. It may cripple the C3I of the nuclear command too, a scenario which may pre-empt an immediate nuclear response from the target nation. In its fourth dimension is the rapidly increasing speed and complexities of warfare due to weaponisation of the emerging technologies. To stay ahead, all advanced nations have incorporated AI, advanced electronics as well as cyber firewalls to safeguard strategic and operational C3I.
Today, AI and ‘machine learning’ enabled machines process the fast-changing scenario in the war, calculate enemy’s intentions and suggest optimal responses. These machines process information at a speed which may overload human thinking and decision making. It may cause fatigue and wrong decisions. Such fatigue may result in surrender of key combat decision-making to machines, a situation fraught with danger as the machines lack the capacity to gauge the social and political ramifications of its decisions.
These combat decision-aiding machines are also vulnerable to adversary’s Electronic and Cyber Warfare. If influenced/hacked, they may propose courses of action which may lead to heavy losses or inadvertent escalation. With both sides employing machines to enable and aid decision-making, this danger gets further compounded.
The Way Forward
Till now, most of the advanced nations have focussed on preventing autonomous weapons from creating collateral casualties when deployed in urban areas albeit with little success. Also, they have tried to ensure that cyberspace is not used for attacking military and civilian systems and in ensuring that emerging technologies-enabled weapons are reliable, safe and unbiased. These efforts, though noble, are probably idealistic and more for the ‘gallery’.
Efforts to limit emerging technologies have yet to be adopted as a legal binding. There should be an international ban on weapons empowered by the emerging technologies under the UN Convention of Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW), 1983. Nations are already raising a clamour in the UN for a ban on autonomous weapons.
In December 2018, the UN General Assembly (UNGA) adopted important resolutions on ‘Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security’ and on the ‘Advancing Responsible State Behaviour in Cyber-space in the Context of International Security’. By these two resolutions, the UNGA has set up two parallel processes for dealing with cyber security. But these are not legally binding yet. The need is to address weaponisation of emerging technologies that increase the risk of a conventional war turning inadvertently nuclear. To formulate a strategy to restrict military use of emerging technologies, the following path is recommended.
Building Awareness
Under the aegis of UN and regional bodies such as NATO, ASEAN, SAARC, SCO, a campaign to raise awareness amongst policy makers and the public, of the danger posed to nuclear stability by weaponising emerging technologies, needs to be undertaken post haste. Towards this end, the virtual conference held by Germany on “Capturing Technology, Rethinking Arms Control” in November 2020, with Netherlands, Finland, Czech Republic and Sweden, is indeed a laudable effort. Its joint declaration stated the mounting risks for international peace and stability created by the potential misuse of new technologies.
Track 2 Initiative
Today, the geo-political situation is so vitiated that China and Russia are hardly on talking terms with the US. In the absence of official interactions, the importance of talks between technology and arms control experts of G7 or G 20 countries have gained relevance. In these meetings, weaponisation of emerging technologies need to be discussed with a view to develop realistic measures for their regulation and control. Such discussions can suggest measures to limit/ban of use of hypersonic missiles and use of cyberspace and advanced weapons from attacking C3I systems. As discussions mature and awareness of the impending danger and the urgent need to reign it in becomes acceptable, government representatives too should then join talks, lending credibility to the discussions and laying the foundation for formal talks.
Standalone Measures
As the prevalent geo-political scenario is not conducive for bilateral talks, the Big Three are unlikely to agree to adopt formal controls of these destabilising technologies. This scenario dictates UN and the rest of the world to emphasise on the Big Three and other advanced nations of the dangers of weaponisation of emerging technologies. Such a movement will force them to see the light of the day and adopt unilateral measures of self-regulation and checks. This will impose caution on their private arms manufacturers too and on the others around the world.
Bilateral and Multilateral Initiatives
As nations unilaterally adopt ways to control weaponisation of emerging technologies, it will only be time that leaders of like-minded nations take the initiative to frame legal bindings to control them bilaterally or multilaterally. Initially, such treaties can be non-binding, but as the advantages accrued will dawn upon the world, it can be converted to an international law. The UN here can take the initiative to draw up a legally binding treaty akin to the Arms Control treaties.
Conclusion
Whenever the leading nations come around to bilaterally or multi-laterally agree to legal bindings to control destabilising technologies, they can prioritise by agreeing not to attack the C3I system of each other’s nuclear set-up by cyber or missiles. Secondly, they can agree not to launch autonomous swarm attacks on vital military targets or weapon systems including those that will be used for second or retaliatory strike. Secure control on automated decision support systems is another technology that needs to be prioritised. Primarily, all these controls should reduce the risk of rapid degradation of the adversary’s nuclear threshold which may accelerate the nuclear escalation ladder and initiate a nuclear strike. As most of these emerging technologies are in common usage in civil applications, a strong verification regime too needs to be set up to ensure that their usage in the military sphere adheres to international protocols.
In case the world continues to ignore the many live examples of the destabilising nature of weaponisation of emerging technologies any longer and does not hasten to control them, these fast-emerging, cutting-edge technologies will be weaponised by the nations endowed with them, specially the Big Three, and this will jeopardise world security. This highlights the importance of this facet of the arms race and lends urgency to the need to arrive at a common consensus to control them, before their weaponisation unleashes the next Armageddon.
Please wait...
1. At the outset, would like to thank the Author for highlighting the dangers involved in weaponisation of emerging technologies. We have had a good taste of such weaponisation in various parts of the world. Govts of USA, China and Russia and their affiliates are the major employers, though the easy availability of these technologies have enabled lone rangers, terrorist groups and developing countries to create devastating effects.
2. A few other aspects we need to keep in mind while working out our responses at the international levels:-
* Preventing use of technology through various UN mandated agreements is not likely to work out, especially with non state actors. Not incorporating new technologies, easily available to civil society, will leave a state defenceless against other non adherents.
* Destruction or paralysing the command control systems of the adversary is a legit military aim and will remain so. As such, all Nations, particularly nuclear ones, need to create infallible system of control and communication rather than depend upon goodwill of the adversary.
* Not incorporating new and emerging technologies in one’s offensive and defensive military platforms as well as not suitably modifying strategic and tactical concepts will have disastrous consequences. Offensive use of new technology enhanced weapons need to be countered by incorporating suitable counter technologies. Asking adversaries to not exploit her technological advantage through various arguments is a chimera bound to fail.
* We need to draw a line between nuclear weapons and the new technology enhanced platforms. A nuclear exchange would result in, as brought out by the author, Assured mutual destruction. The damage likely to be caused by new emerging technologies will mostly be well below the nuclear or even conventional threshold.
3. However, the changing contours of warfare are obvious and the international community will do well to have a de-novo look at old treaties.
A well researched article written on this topic. Highlights the issue on how a country’s policy maker(s) should understand the consequences of their growth rate on weaponization and technology.
Good information sir
Armageddon propelled by non nuclear weapons of late is scarier than before with advanced technology capable of dominating C3I systems before the first shot is fired. The fallout is well discussed in this thoughtful and timely article by the author, something our defense policy thinkers definitely need to address at the earliest .