Indian Defence Review

Russia will hardly remain aloof in case of conflict in the Western Pacific. John McCain may call Russian President Vladimir Putin bigger threat to America than Islamic State terrorists on account of the surprise results of the US Presidential Elections held last year, but there are concerns in the West about three Russian ‘killer’ satellites ((Kosmos-2491, Kosmos-2499, and Kosmos-2504) that have been reactivated and are now moving after year-long silence, while their purpose when launched (between 2013 and 2015) has been kept under wraps.

In March 2017, reports emerged about Russia to soon begin serial production of hypersonic missile Tsirkon or Zircon; the missile capable of travelling at speeds up to 7,400 kmph making it almost impossible to be stopped. According to UK’s ‘Independent’, the Royal Navy’s new aircraft carriers would be unable to stop the Zircon, while US Navy is worried that Russia may fit Zircon to its nuclear-powered Kirkov warships. India is developing BrahMos-II in collaboration Russia using the same scramjet technology that Zircon has albeit the range will be 600 kms – missile is expected to be ready for testing by 2020.

As mentioned above, Russia has said it can detect and neutralize any target from a ship’s system and a radar, to a satellite, immobilize entire US Navy with an electronic bomb and, create electronic jamming domes over Russian bases that make them invisible on radar screens. So any conflict situation in Western Pacific will in all probability have the big three (US, China, Russia) covertly exercising their soft-kill weapons: War in Upper Stratum.

What are our plans to contend with this ‘War in Upper Stratum’ and why is the military not fully integrated in these plans? On January 3, 2016, Prime Minister, Narendra Modi delivered the inaugural address at the 103rd Session of Indian Science Congress, in Mysuru. Following his address, the PM released ‘Technology Vision 2035’ prepared by the Technology Information, Forecasting and Assessment Council (TIFAC) under the Ministry of Science & Technology. The vision identified the challenges ahead and how they can be dealt with through technological interventions while realizing the dream of a developed India by the year 2035. It gives details of 12 sectors and technologies that in some cases exist but need to be deployed, some in the pilot stage that must be scaled up and technologies in R&D stage.

The vision talks about future technologies ranging from flying cars, real time translation software, personalized medicine, wearable devices, e-sensing (e-nose and e-tongue) to 100% recyclable materials among others which may be used in different areas to solve day-to-day problems. Interestingly, the document also talks of ‘Blue Sky Research’; imagination that may lead to reality through curiosity driven, paradigm shattering research – like virtual courts and digital evidence, complex real-time dynamic disaster management response systems, sensing devices to be able to feel the product on internet before buying it, machines / robots to connect all personal and emotional needs, intelligence vehicles to detect emergency situations and take over the control and inter-planetary communications systems and the like. It also mentions environment, information & communication technologies, infrastructure, materials, habitat and water as important areas where future technologies will be able to solve day-to-day problems of citizens by better utilization of available resources and skilled manpower.

Significantly, the first such document ‘Technology Vision 2020’ had come under Dr APJ Abdul Kalam in 1996. It would be fruitful to list out how much we have actually progressed under the first such vision because that would indicate where the pitfalls and problems are.

Above takes us to the ‘Technology Perspective and Capability Roadmap (TPCR) issued in April 2013 by HQ IDS with a forward by the then Defence Minister AK Anthony. It lists out some 21 key technological requirements:

•  Battlefield Transparency;

•  Command and Control Architecture;

•  Communication Systems;

•  Smart Radios;

•  Information Dominance;

•  Electronic Warfare;

•  Nano Technology / Micro Electro-Mechanical Systems (MESM),

•  Artificial Intelligence and Robotics;

•  Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) Defence;

•  Miniaturization; ten, Unmanned Systems;

•  Advanced Weapon Systems – PGMs, air-to-air weapons, Hard Kill Weapons;

•   Electro-Magnetic Pulse (EMP) Weapons;

•  Adaptive Warheads;

•  Weapon Guidance;

•  Space-Based Radars; fourteen, Stealth,

•  Digital Systems;

•  Adaptive Antenna Signatures;

•  SAGW;

•  Sensors; and

•  Sensor Fusion.

There is further elaboration in terms of aviation, land warfare and maritime. The TPCR covers the period 2012-2027. But is a mere forward by Defence Minister on the TPCR enough to consider it a MoD document? If so, should the preamble not have listed out the futuristic threats including ongoing hybrid and asymmetric wars? What about self-sufficiency in semi-conductors, computers and telecommunication equipment? What about exploiting technologies like Steerable Beam Technology, Wide Band / Software Defined Radios, Network Security, Common GIS, Data Fusion & Analysis, alternatives to GPS, Dynamic Bandwidth Management, Shooting down UAVs electronically or through other means, camouflage etc? What about ‘blue sky research’ in defence?

How about ‘mind control’? Considering that the TPCR commenced 2012, what is the progress that is made in the last five years, if at all? The fact is that presently the military does not even have common data structures and interoperable protocols; true ‘system of systems’ approach appears decades away. The status of the military’s C4I2SR is nowhere near the required. Even the mapping requirements are decades behind schedule. Does the MoD have attitudinal change to accommodate the concept of NCW in the first place? These are hardly issues that the MoD should be glossing over? Issuing a TPCR by itself is only a small part. A review every 3-5 years and periodic corrective actions are must.

China’s formidable cyber warfare capabilities are well known. The WannaCry ransomware offensive may have been caused by  the group called ‘Shadow Brokers’ who last year had claimed to have stolen a cache of “cyber weapons” from the US National Security Agency (NSA), or by the North Koreans but China has been indulging in hacking, stealing, spying, cloning, reverse engineering for decades. China has specialized units for carrying out offensive cyber attacks.

In our context, international analysts point out that the small amount that India sends on building cyber capability, mostly gets expended on foreign vendors, rather than domestic producers. This is very true. We actually have considerable number of small companies in the  cyber field but ironically our big IT companies are more interested in expanding and linking up with Silicon Valley rather than optimizing this indigenous resource. At the national level, we appear to be focused only on foreign countries to boost our cyber-warfare capabilities, whereas, we must ‘also’ apply the ‘Make in India’ yardstick to this field.

We have the National Technical Research Organization (NTRO) and the Computer Emergency Response Team-India (CERT-IN) primarily focused towards protection of our critical infrastructure, institutions and terrorism related data mining etc. But this is hardly sufficient despite occasional hits on Pakistani military and governmental sites. Most importantly, where is the synergy in whatever little cyber capacity we are trying to build up? The onus for this is on the National Cyber Security Coordinator, appointed to NCSC as part of NSC Secretariat under the NSA in April 2015.

However, despite two years plus gone by no policy has been issued.  The National Critical Information Infrastructure Protection Centre (NCIIPC) is under NTRO which is under the MHA, while CERT-IN is under the Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology (MeITy). So how do you identify a malware to be attacking a critical or non-critical infrastructure? This is where a centralized agency was required for coordination but the National Cyber Security Coordinator has failed to coordinate the effort with the concerned ministries.

The issues discussed above should make it clear that we need to develop holistic offensive capabilities in the cyber field. Despite the vital operational need, the proposed Cyber Command is not taking off and the unlike China and the US whose militaries are leading respective cyber warfare programs, our military is being kept away from nation’s cyber warfare program perhaps because of reasons similar to why the Army’s Technical Support Division (TSD) was disbanded – to prevent skeletons of India’s ‘deep state’ from tumbling out.

KALI notwithstanding, we need a holistic plan and roadmap for winning the War in Upper Stratagem. The military must also be closely integrated into the space programs. There is need for the PMO to closely monitor upgrading defence capabilities and initiate reorganization of the higher defence structures including the MoD,. With his fondness for acronyms, the Prime Minister would do well to push for vigorous defence capacity building in ACE – Aerospace, Cyber and Electromagnetic.