Military & Aerospace

Veneration of a fallen enemy: A Missionary View
Star Rating Loader Please wait...
Issue Net Edition | Date : 21 Jan , 2013

People sleep peaceably in their beds at night only because rough men stand ready to do violence on their behalf.

Professional soldiers mutilate none, dead or alive, enemy or friend. Indeed, a martyred enemy is an object of sombre empathy and deep veneration. Pakistan Army soldiers – most of them – are highly professional and share the pristine military ethos with their Indian counterparts, as indeed that is so with the soldiers the world over. A more practical reason to uphold an impeccably honourable code of conduct lies in the eternal understanding that a warrior, if bereft of sublime moral fibre, will invariably be found to be cowardly in face of danger or death.

Gentlemanly conduct therefore is intrinsic to the profession of arms, and the military fraternity across all frontiers finds its breach to be abhorrent, despicable, indeed, downright unacceptable.

Meek capitulation of the Pakistan Army in 1971 after having sullied their calling in what was then East Pakistan, is the closest example of that eternal truth; that was experienced first hand by many of us. Gentlemanly conduct therefore is intrinsic to the profession of arms, and the military fraternity across all frontiers finds its breach to be abhorrent, despicable, indeed, downright unacceptable. Obviously therefore, the recent incident of decapitating a martyred Indian soldier to take the head back as a ‘trophy’, has raised widespread indignation in India – and surely even among the sensible in Pakistan. Consequently, as the stale farce of Pakistan’s show of indignant innocence is played out, Indo-Pak relations have touched another low.

Motivated Barbarism

Much analysis of the growing incidents of cease-fire violations in general, and this barbaric act in particular, has followed. Ramifications of this act on management of the Line of Control (LoC), growth of military-terrorist coalition in Pakistan and the situation in Afghanistan have been debated. Highly regarded analysts have expressed a range of opinions on these aspects. The observations range from the incident being attributable to Pakistani Army’s nexus with that despicable mutant – Hafeez Sayeed – and frustration in its failure to push terrorists across under the cover of cease fire violations, to the likelihood of playing out this episode to divert public attention from the bloody mess in Pakistan and to save the Pakistan Army from estrangement with the polity.

It has been further suggested that it could have well been a preparatory exercise  aimed at escalating tension between the two nations ahead of Pakistan’s foreign minister’s tour abroad, and so to attract attention of the international community towards the Kashmir issue. The myopia among the powerful arbitrators of world affairs, who remain captive ever to the expediency of assuagement of the habitual nuisance-maker – much to the reward of the latter – might have prompted that idea. In relation to Afghanistan, it has been suggested that this could be the first step in re-orienting the India-baiting army from its much detested diversion towards Pakistan’s western borders, a ‘correction’ that would afford ‘depth’ to her surreptitious machinations across the Durand Line. No doubt, all such possibilities are real; these need to be studied in reference to the observable signs that are garnered from our deeply troubled neighbourhood.

…since the beginning of the ‘proxy war’ in Kashmir, Pakistan Army’s propensity of breaching the cease-fire to cover infiltrating terrorists, have become a routine.

This stage offers an occasion to suggest another factor that could also have triggered the manifestation of Pakistan Army’s macabre design. This is a factor that has found ground among Pakistan’s post-1990 soldiery, and our military fraternity knows that.

Turning Soldiers into Murderers

Barbarism in the conduct of soldierly duties was apparently not prevalent in the Pakistan Army before the Zia era. It was General Zia ul Haq who, in a fit of self-destructive urge, institutionalised religious bigotry upon his society; even the soldiery was sought to be converted thus. Soon, there were treatise written on ‘islamic principles of warfare’ (!), and soldiers, rather being motivated to defend their nation with fortitude and foresight, were incited to lunge in blind frenzy at those, who having been born into other religions, were declared as bonafide targets for killing. Even those sects of Islam which do not subscribe to extreme forms of Salafist ideology were not spared that qualification. Such  a macabre ordination was ostensibly made for the sake of Islam –  a prophesy of compassion and peace.

The purpose was to find fodders for ‘proxy wars’ within Pakistan as well as in the neighbourhood. In Kashmir, it was envisaged that these robots would achieve what the regular Pakistan Army could not, that is, to ‘allow the Muslims of Kashmir the right to choose to merge with Pakistan’, as the conceited rhetoric goes. Indeed, wallowing  in blood and gore, there is little to differentiate between that kind of abuse of the religion and what the recent abuse of the dead represents. May be it is for our good – head hunters have generally found defeat at the end. We may salute those two martyrs for injecting their unworthy adversaries with the seeds of self-destruction in exchange for their severed heads.

In Military Domain

In Indian Army, there have also been breach of soldiery decorum in the past. As one recalls the court martials and summary dismissals in this context, such deviations have not gone unpunished.  Undoubtedly, any Indian soldier bringing a head, or for that matter found vandalising in any manner a body slain, would find himself condemned and ostracised for ever. Not so in Pakistan’s battalions today. There, perpetuators of such ‘Islamic’ conduct would find support from many of their platoon mates, endorsement from the company commander and acknowledgement, if embarrassed, of their commanding officer. At higher levels, whereas in the past this act would have raised indignation across the board, today there would be many who would not be able to suppress open expression of their glee, identifying themselves with the throat-splitting Al Qaeda, and so claim higher adherence to the tenets of Islam.

We cannot expect Pakistan Army to cure its compulsive intransigence. Invariably therefore, such violations would be repeated after a short interlude, and we will be obliged to remain stoical – unless debilitating retribution is delivered to chastise the obstinate.

News paper readers are aware that prompted by localised tensions, both sides have, in the past, executed raids across the LoC; besides, occasionally they have been  firing at each other. People on the ground are aware that snipers on both sides have many times felled an odd unsuspecting soldier who may have failed to observe due precautions. Even artillery duels have taken place in most sectors. Once, fed up of repeated shelling of a village close to the LoC, our Army had retaliated so vigorously that the Pakistanis had to extend a promise of good behaviour to be spared. The silence had lasted long thereafter. Of course, since the beginning of the ‘proxy war’ in Kashmir, Pakistan Army’s propensity of breaching the cease-fire to cover infiltrating terrorists, have become a routine. We are also privy to another incident a decade back when a Special Service Group commando-turned-terrorist, Illiyas Kashmiri, in association with Pakistani troops, had succeeded in raiding an Indian post on the LoC, and secured his place among the terrorists by carrying an Indian soldier’s severed head. Reportedly, Indian Army had avenged this failure sometime later, sans, of course, the mutilation part.

Indeed, for the Pakistan Army, cease-fire violation is not a choice, it is a compulsion  to sustain the mayhem in Kashmir. On India’s part, it is also true that beyond its possible ramifications upon bilateral as well as big-power relations, such developments hardly ever get to find place among the government’s primary concerns; the managers of national security may not have the vision, or the urge, to ‘feel’ the factors that determine the exactions of defending the LoC. The Army brass, stoic as they are by traditional disposition, prefer not to rake up the matter beyond a certain point, chary as they are of imposition of impractical restrictions from the mandarins of the South Block.

This case is, however, somewhat different. Offer of incentive to bring in a severed head had certainly been made. That this incentive originated from a terrorist organisation – apparently the Lashkar e-Taiba – and that it had active support from individual Pakistani officers in the direct chain of command, is also a foregone conclusion. So what next?

Practicable Options

There are two aspects to be considered in dealing with Pakistan’s misdemeanour. One, as her past record validates, she will continue to assume her traditional poker-face denials and blatant lying – as her Foreign Minister is engaged these days – till some years later when few of her worthies can no longer suppress their urge to let her people know of their purported ‘heroics’. Of course, there would be no show of embarrassment even then, a thick hide would take care of that. Therefore, it would be illusionary to expect Pakistan to stop violation of the cease-fire, just as it would be futile to expect Pakistan Army to act honourably in punishing the guilty and returning the head with due military decorum.

…for the Pakistan Army, cease-fire violation is not a choice, it is a compulsion  to sustain the mayhem in Kashmir.

Two, we cannot expect Pakistan Army to cure its compulsive intransigence. Invariably therefore, such violations would be repeated after a short interlude, and we will be obliged to remain stoical – unless debilitating retribution is delivered to chastise the obstinate. The duel will go on till that time in the unforeseen future when one of the polity blinks. However, there comes a chance of keeping the ‘rat’ in its hole and live through a longer interlude till it lasts. This is the option enunciated by the Indian Army brass when they made a promise to respond ‘at a time and place of own choosing’. Let the Damocles’ sword keep the cowardly lot cowering till that promise has to be implemented. May we sit tight and watch, sword in hand, and take our men into confidence regarding the promise to keep.

Morale Regardless

Many among the civilian fraternity have shown their concern over the effect that this incident, and the Indian government’s forbearance in handling this unacceptable event, would have on our troop’s morale. These well wishers may be assured of our military leadership’s competence in maintaining their soldier’s spirit. They have done so against equally serious machinations that have emanated from within the Indian state; there is no reason they would not do so against provocations thrown at them by the external adversaries. Indeed, there may be a need to convey that assurance to our civilian hierarchy too, bereft as most of them are of the understanding of soldier’s morale and its nuances that makes it neither fragile, nor permeable.

Rate this Article
Star Rating Loader Please wait...
The views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily represent the opinions or policies of the Indian Defence Review.

About the Author

Lt Gen Gautam Banerjee

former Commandant Officers Training Academy, Chennai.

More by the same author

Post your Comment

2000characters left

3 thoughts on “Veneration of a fallen enemy: A Missionary View

  1. Extremely well written and the correct stand. But the record of the Indian Army on the western front in 1971 war is nothing to be proud of. Lost Chamb and failed to launch counter-attack to regain the territory, failed to make headway in Poonch in spite of superiority in armor and numbers, only made some gains in the Zoji La sector since the Indians had night fighting gear from the Soviets … – all of this has been by now well documented by the (retd) military commanders themselves in IDR. Manekshaw was really bombastic. Even in Kargil, the army leadership failed. It is doubtful whether the Indian Army can take on the Pakistanis now or in the foreseeable future. The military needs to undertake a thorough introspection for its capability, efficiency and strategic infra-structure. May be that has been undertaken. It is true that the politicians and bureaucrats have done a mess, but the past performances of many of the commanders (Candeth, Bewoor …) in the battle field were questionable. Whether now they can rise to the occasion remains to be seen. But, once again the analysis and the vision presented by this general here is commendable.

  2. It is very important, to see the soldier, by another soldier, in a particular perspective. In the same way, if India sees Pakistan as a state promoting terrorism, then her own statehood will be undermined. It is much easier to take care of internal national security, to the maximum, and to pursue a relationship with Pakistan, which is extremely cordial, diplomatically. We cannot afford Pakistan to go the way of any state which existed in the past, and does not exist now. We are by no means a perfect democracy, and Pakistan is trying to follow democratic principles, and ideals. About the disproportionate number of officers in the Indian Army, then all the officers who command formations, can be at important locations. Then, it naturally follows, that the other formations also need officers. These officers could come from the non-commisioned officers as in the Second World War. We also need people to go to the N D A. People who want to go to the N D A, are either at sea, uncertain about how to become a member of the cadet community. It appears, that all the seats are occupied there. We could have one more such institution. The N D A seems to be an institution using precious resources, because there isn’t another. There are serving officers, who are training the cadets, perhaps. Also, members of the armed forces, who could be in other situations, but are at the N D A. I guess, there has to be some solution. India is significant, because Kitchener implemented his military reforms keeping in mind the Indian Army, for the entire British Army. The British Army not adequate in Britain, when they were needed. The only reform needed, is to get future officers to join the armed forces.

  3. First, I consider the recent LOC event as a lesson learnt/punishment for Indian Army for letting the guard down for allowing the enemy infiltrate, hide, wait and ambush our Jawans.

    Second, asking Pakistan to investigate the incident itself is meaningless because the incident happened in Indian Territory and NOT in POK Territory. Poor Pakistan failed to take advantage of this fact. Foolish Indians without realizing this fact keep ranting that Pakistan should investigate.

    Third, jumping to retaliate is no good. Pakistan as a rowdy neighbor keep harassing India obviously for 4 reasons. (1) To keep the national/international focus on Kashmir. (2) To keep the relevance of the Pakistan Army before the eyes of Pakistan public and continue to dominate Pakistan politics. (3) To satisfy the urge of their Jihadi infested rank and file’s Islamic lunacy. (4) To milk the international funding cows by showing them they are at war with infidels on behalf of Islam.

    By taking on Pakistan, we can force them to stone age. However, India too is NOT YET super rich OR an economic giant to afford such an adventure. We should be ready to take small pin pricks until and unless we gain confidence that we can afford. I guess it will take another 2 decades before we are ready.

    Fourth, However we should not drop our guard, and be ready to take time bound tactical action, at least cost – at a time and place of own choosing!

More Comments Loader Loading Comments