Indian Defence Review

China’s Strategy in the Taiwan Strait

Beijing appears prepared to defer unification as long as it sees the tendency of events to advance that goal, or the cost of conflict outweighing the benefits. The mainland employs all instruments of power political, economic, cultural, legal, diplomatic, and military at its disposal in a coercive strategy aimed at resolving the Taiwan issue in its favor. In the near term, Beijing’s focus is on preventing Taiwan from moving towards dejure independence. However, China is unwilling to rule out the use of force to achieve this objective.

The PLA is developing capabilities that will enable it to pursue several courses of action against Taiwan, allowing Beijing to apply pressure more flexibly against the island while minimizing the risks of confrontation with the United States.

China continues to offer a peaceful resolution under the “one country, two systems” framework that would provide Taiwan a degree of autonomy in exchange for its unification with the mainland. China’s military expansion and ongoing deployment of some 710-790 short range ballistic missiles, enhanced amphibious warfare capabilities, and modern, long-range anti-air systems opposite Taiwan are reminders of Beijing’s unwillingness to renounce the use of force. China sees the threat of force as an integral part of its overall policy to dissuade Taiwan from pursuing independence and pressuring it to unite with the mainland. Beijing, in its March 2005 “anti-secession law,” codified this threat and attempted to legitimize it through legal instruments, as part of what some Chinese military strategists refer to as “legal warfare.”

The circumstances in which Beijing has historically claimed it would use force against the island include: a formal declaration of independence by Taipei; undefined moves “toward independence;” foreign intervention in Taiwan’s internal affairs; indefinite delays in the resumption of cross-Strait dialogue; Taiwan’s acquisition of nuclear weapons; and internal unrest on Taiwan. These circumstances are not fixed and have evolved over time in response to Taiwan’s declarations about its political status and other actions, changes in China’s own military capabilities, and Beijing’s view of other countries’ relations with Taiwan. China’s “red lines” are vague, which allows Beijing to determine the nature, timing, and form of its response.

Beijing’s Options for Action against Taiwan

The PLA is developing capabilities that will enable it to pursue several courses of action against Taiwan, allowing Beijing to apply pressure more flexibly against the island while minimizing the risks of confrontation with the United States. The PLA is simultaneously developing the capability to deter and/or slow third party, including US, intervention to assist Taiwan; to defeat such intervention in an asymmetric, limited, quick war; or, fight to a standstill and pursue a protracted conflict.

 PLAs special operation forces infiltrated into Taiwan could conduct acts of economic, political and military sabotage. Beijing might also believe that it could use small numbers of coordinated SRBMs and air strikes against air fields, radar and communications facilities on Taiwan”¦

Persuasion and Coercion: With increased economic links, Beijing enjoys increased influence on Taiwan. It seeks to attract Taiwan investment in the mainland, while emphasizing that peace in the Strait will bring prosperity. At the same time, accelerating economic integration with the mainland also makes Taiwan increasingly vulnerable to Chinese economic leverage. Beijing is Taipei’s largest trading partner. It is Taipei’s largest destination for exports and foreign direct investment and the production site for many of Taipei’s most profitable information technology exports, Beijing is attempting to exploit these ties to press Taiwanese businessmen operating on the mainland to refrain from openly supporting pro-independence parties or persons in Taiwan.

Beijing has also intensified its campaign to further constrain Taiwan’s international profile. It competes with Taiwan in the developing world for diplomatic recognition and priorities. Its activities in these regions are to erode support among Taiwan’s 25 remaining diplomatic partners. In October 2005, Senegal became the latest nation to switch recognition to Beijing. China simultaneously employs diplomatic and commercial levers including its seat on the UN Security Council to increase pressure on other states to limit their relationships with Taiwan and discourage it from making any moves towards de jure independence.

The sustained military threat to Taiwan serves as an important backdrop to the overall political, economic and diplomatic campaign of persuasion and coercion. Exercises, deployments and media operation all contribute to the creation of an environment of intimidation.