Homeland Security

Training for anti-Maoist Operations
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Issue Vol 26.1 Jan-Mar 2011 | Date : 07 Mar , 2011

Last minute requisition (or release) of CPO causes many problems – the unit or sub-unit commanders have to rely on the tactical wisdom and ground knowledge of others as they did not have a chance to reconnoiter the area. The unit may get deployed in a tactically unsuitable area. Due to administrative problems commanders are loathe to relocate and continue occupying wrong locations, inviting offensive actions from the insurgents. Such mistakes have often proved fatal.

Intelligence Network

Short notice move of units and sub-units adversely affects establishment of intelligence network and the unit has to depend on the view point (may be biased) of the district officials. As an input their view point may work but it has to be worked upon by developing new sources and spreading the area of influence. For the success of a unit in anti-Maoist operations, tactical intelligence is important; strategic intelligence is just a ‘could know’ subject and matters very little.

For the success of a unit in anti-Maoist operations, tactical intelligence is important; strategic intelligence is just a “˜could know subject and matters very little.

Poor intelligence has been the most profound cause of recent reverses suffered by CPOs. Otherwise, how does one explain the inability of oblivious troops to discern the presence of hundreds of Maoist cadres in the near vicinity of a camp location, assembled with an intention to carry out a raid or ambush?

Intelligence gathering is a dynamic process. Commanders cannot be rooted to their bases, if the intelligence is to be generated. They have to devise an intelligence collection plan, employ troops, sources and other agencies to collect intelligence. At the same time intelligence to Maoists has to be denied. Human-intelligence and technical-intelligence should complement each other. Flow of intelligence in real-time for units and sub-units to act up on is necessary. There is a palpable frustration among the commanders regarding the paucity of intelligence in anti-Maoist operations. They need to be patient and try all alternatives. Flow of intelligence is related to the degree of the fear of Maoists in the hearts and minds of population – more the fear, lesser the intelligence.

Equipment Profile

Post-Dantewada a debate in the media was unleashed about the use of ‘third dimension’ for fighting the Maoist. Lots of views regarding use of helicopters, unmanned aerial vehicles, drones and aerial fire power were put forth by the informed and otherwise. No one cared to ask the troops or units on the ground about their requirement in terms of small arms, night vision devices, communication sets, body armour, mine detectors, anti-mine vehicles, electronic intelligence devices, etc.

Also read: Army: A Need for Introspection

Techniques and equipment for LICO have undergone sea change. Technology is all pervasive and is helping police and armies in fighting insurgents at minimal casualties. It would be prudent if we learn from all available sources and then calibrate our operational responses. Procurement of modern gadgetry is need-based. It has to be fulfilling an operational void. It should be a force multiplier. Training and administrative requirements arising from such procurements should also look in to.

Maoists’ Attacks: Post-event Analysis

Singur_anandabazarPost-event analysis of Maoist attacks (2005-2010) establishes a pattern of operation by Maoists against CPOs:-

  • Deployment of company and platoon posts in government and private buildings, which were indefensible, was attacked after a careful study of the “routine at the post”.
  • Most of the attacks on CPOs were in retaliation, as these were preceded by successful encounters against Maoists.
  • Attacks were daring; carried out by a large number of cadres after blocking all routes of exit and possible reinforcement. Posts were overwhelmed by a large number of attackers – armed and unarmed. Attacks carried on even after the daybreak.
  • Standoff attacks were carried out on posts in the past to test the response of the troops. Posts which displayed passivity were engaged later on.
  • Secrecy about the attacks was maintained; a large number of cadres assembled in the nearby villages and jungles for attack, but no information could reach the posts. It demonstrates two things; one, failure of intelligence gathering network at company and battalion level and, two, complete hold of Maoist over the population that no one passed on information to troops.
  • Posts were stormed with complete surprise. Inability of troops to perceive danger at such close quarters can only be attributed to poor threat perception and risk analysis ability of company, platoon and section commanders and absence of basic drills that a post should observe in case of a raid.
  • Troops did not get a chance to break the attack or ambush, which shows lack of drills and procedures for such eventualities.
  • Attackers inflicted casualties, took hostages, looted arms, ammunition, explosives and took away the loot with the help of unarmed cadres.
  • No help reached to troops even after the attackers had decamped, because the reserves were being engaged in mock attack by rebels and all routes to the posts were blocked. The civilians were too scared to help because of possible backlash both from Maoists.
  • Post-event, the nearby villages were deserted by all able-bodied men and women to prevent inquiry and save populace from a possible backlash. Such exodus cannot happen without advance planning. Yet the forces had no clue.
  • The site was revisited by the attackers after some days, to intimidate or execute ‘informers’ and assess post-strike damage on the forces.
  • Methods employed against the troops and sympathizers were most violent and brutal; beheading, mutilation, torture; all have been employed to cause terror in the hearts and minds of troops and locals.
  • After executing a high profile attack, the cadres did not leave their area, because their hold over population is complete as state sympathizers have been eliminated and they do not fear reprisal from police.

Also read: India losing war against terrorism

Same applies to the incidents of improvised explosive device (IED) attacks, deliberate and chance ambushes and attacks on unsuspecting body of troops – the elements of thoroughness of preparation, secrecy, surprise and boldness in execution are the hallmark of all Maoist attacks against the CPOs.

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The views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily represent the opinions or policies of the Indian Defence Review.

About the Author

Col US Rathore

has commanded 17 Maratha Light Infantry. He is a defence and security analyst.  

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