Indian Defence Review

A Challenge Unprecedented

On Sunday April 04, 2010, during a visit to Lalgarh in West Bengal, the Home Minister PC Chidambaram called upon the Maoists to abjure violence and come forward for talks, “if they really want to solve the problems of the people” he said. Dubbing the Maoists as cowards, the Home Minister renewed his offer for dialogue. In his perception, the Maoist challenge would be neutralized in the next two years or so. The level of confidence was indeed reassuring!

At around the same time, a popular Indian Television channel was carrying a documentary set in Chhattisgarh on the Maoist threat. As per the journalist embedded with security forces on a mission, the tide was definitely turning in favour of the government. He felt that the security forces were catching up on their training oriented to anti-insurgency operations and would be able to restore normalcy soon.

Just two days later, the Maoists delivered a devastating blow in Dantewada, Chhatisgarh when at dawn, 75 policemen of the CRPF were massacred in an ambush, making it the worst carnage in the four decades of the history of Naxal violence. The debacle also exposed the fact that as a nation we are not in a position to successfully thwart the Maoist violence. This is no longer a simple law and order problem that the police organisations are accustomed to dealing with. It is a war thrust upon the state from within. The police forces at present do not have adequate training, equipment, leadership, experience or doctrine to fight such a war.

The innocent inhabitants of the region understandably look for security from whoever is prepared and is capable of providing regardless of their affiliation.

It will take considerable time and effort both at the levels of central and state governments to revamp and reorient the police forces to take on the Maoist challenge. Therefore, there is an urgent need for true introspection and for evolving a coherent or comprehensive strategy to deal with the situation that threatens to spiral out of control. Apart from the heavy loss of life in this episode, what is of greater concern is the fact that after the massacre of 24 policemen in West Bengal and 12 in Bihar during the last few months, this was yet another audacious assault by the outlawed Maoists to undermine the authority of the state.

Operation “Green Hunt” was launched last year with paramilitary forces having limited experience in counter insurgency operations essentially to augment the inadequately trained and poorly equipped police forces of the state deployed to take on the Maoists. Since then the paramilitary forces continue to be inducted in increasing numbers to contain the spreading rebellion in the remote and underdeveloped areas of the affected states, long neglected by the respective state governments. Caught between the radical left wing guerrilla movement and the government forces, the poor innocent inhabitants across the vast swathes of India thus live under a state of siege. Today Maoist threat has undoubtedly emerged as a security challenge unprecedented and most daunting. If not tackled effectively now, it could only worsen with passage of time.

Historical Perspective

The first signs of Maoist movement appeared in 1946 – the Tebhaga movement in undivided Bengal which was soon followed by an uprising against the feudal rule of the Nizam in Telangana. Over 4000 lives were lost before the movement was withdrawn. Naxalbari movement first began in 1967 with a revolt against landlords in three police stations of Naxalbari, Kharibari and Phansideva. This movement gave birth to formation of Communist Party of India Marxists-Leninist (CPI-ML) on April 22, 1969. The movement also spread to Srikakulam in the Eastern Ghats and became bloodier with the passage of time. Tribals organised themselves into guerrilla squads called Dalams and eliminated prominent landlords who had grabbed their land.

Today Maoist threat has undoubtedly emerged as a security challenge unprecedented and most daunting. If not tackled effectively now, it could only worsen with passage of time.

The movement spread to other districts of West Bengal, Bihar, Orissa Pradesh, Andhra Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh and Maharashtra. The movement was organized and coordinated by CPI (ML) groups in the respective states. The top leaders like Charu Mazumdar in Bengal and Satya Narain Singh of Bihar, however, lacked military sense and vision. They attempted to build a Peoples Liberation Army consisting of peasants but the movement could not develop any significant momentum against the state and especially so when Kannu Sanyal went into hiding while many other top leaders including Charu Mazumdar were arrested. Charu Mazumdar died soon after, but tragically the state governments did not act decisively to address the root cause of insurgency.

Exploitation continued and peasants remained in a state of continued bondage.

After a lull for over two decades, there was a resurgence of the Naxalbari movement, essentially a Maoist effort, in 1981-82 in the Telangana area. After the death of Charu Mazumdar in 1972, it re-emerged as Peoples War Group (PWG) in 1980 under the banner of CPI (ML) in Andhra Pradesh. The historical merger of CPML – PW and MCCI to form CPI Maoists in October 2004 led to phenomenal expansion of the movement. The concept of Compact Revolutionary Zone (CRZ) known as the Red Corridor was mooted to encompass areas from Bihar to Andhra Pradesh through the dense forest of Central India. Since then it has continued to grow in strength covering over 200 districts of the seven most affected states. “They can dream. They have the privilege to dream in a democracy” said the Home Secretary GK Pillai responding to Kishenji or Koteshwar Rao’s prognostication of the Maoists overthrowing the National Government by 2050 or even earlier.

in the massacre carried out by 200 Maoists on February 17, 2010 in a village near Jamui in Bihar, there were at least 50 children involved.

One is reminded of what the former President of India Dr APJ Abdul Kalam once said, “Dream, dream, dream; dream transforms into thoughts and thoughts result in action. You have to dream before your dreams can come true,” statement from the Maoist leadership therefore ought not to be taken lightly.

The Basic Problem

The Maoist campaign ought not to be seen only as a foreign inspired onslaught on the Indian state. While there is undoubtedly support for the indigenous brand of Maoists from powers inimical to India, the root cause however, is the fear in the minds of tribals who are not Maoists per se, of losing their land, natural resources and livelihood to the urban rich whose sole interest in their perception is economic exploitation. Suffering from a powerful sense of deprivation, the tribals have been engaged in a struggle to regain what they have lost or to preserve what is left and are fearful of losing. The Maoists have only successfully superimposed their brand of politics of violence and power through the barrel of the gun on the tribals and are only exploiting the situation to convert a tribal struggle to the level of a war against the state.

The Maoists have enlarged their footprint across remote, mostly inaccessible parts of rural India over the last four decades taking advantage of the voids left by inadequacies of governance. The so called ‘Red Corridor’ now stretches across West Bengal, Jharkhand, Bihar, Orissa, Chhattisgarh, Madhya Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh, Karnataka, and Andhra Pradesh and to parts of Maharashtra. It spans vast stretches of land where lack of administration and effective control by the state government provides the Maoists the necessary freedom to operate at will and expand their influence. The innocent inhabitants of the region understandably look for security from whoever is prepared and is capable of providing regardless of their affiliation. “In this kind of situation, there is never a middle path and people are forced to take sides”, says Menakshi Ganguly of Human Right Watch.

The Teenage Maoists

Perhaps the most disturbing aspect and a new dimension of the Maoist movement that one generally fails to take cognizance of is the induction of teenagers in numbers large enough to perpetuate the mass movement and compromise the future of the population in large segments of rural India. In the report published in the Times of India (TOI) of February 20, 2010, New Delhi edition that as Operation Green Hunt progresses, security forces may encounter a Maoist army of heavily armed teenagers both male and female, trained in guerrilla warfare. In an attack on a police camp, it was reported that the raiding party included at least 25 girls in their teens. Their ferocity and ruthlessness had left the villagers shell-shocked. The TOI report was followed by an admission by the state government that in the massacre carried out by 200 Maoists on February 17, 2010 in a village near Jamui in Bihar, there were at least 50 children involved in the Naxal ranks who unleashed the rampage.

“¦ the ex-servicemen community in ungoverned rural areas fall easy prey to Maoist lure or pressure. Their involvement and collaboration could be either voluntary for self preservation, under coercion “¦

In the vast rural areas under their control, Maoists have virtually destroyed the primary education system where school buildings that are often used to set up police camps, have been blown up. Teachers have been driven away from schools under threat of dire consequences. With no schools to go to, the children with age profile as low as six years are forcibly recruited into the rank and file of Maoist guerrillas and are compelled to join “Bal Sangham” where they receive initial indoctrination into Maoist ideology. On attaining the age of 12, the children graduate to handling weapons and explosives. Progressively they evolve into battle – hardened combatants. With the system of recruitment of children perpetuated, the Maoists movement appears all set to transform itself into a revolution.

Child Soldiers in Modern Warfare

Employment of children in warfare is not a new phenomenon in the history of conflict the world over. Young boys often took part in battles during early modern warfare. A film based on the Battle of Waterloo graphically depicts French drummer boys leading the initial attack by Napoleon’s army, only to be gunned down mercilessly by the enemy. Up to the Second World War, combat operations were undertaken primarily by regular troops. Children however did play a role in resistance movements in Europe and were sometimes arrested and even deported to concentration camps. In the civil war in Sri Lanka wherein the LTTE was known to have recruited thousands of teenagers who were deployed as frontline troops.

Experience in recent conflicts in different parts of the world indicates increasing trend of employment of heavily armed young boys and girls in guerilla warfare. Unlike seasoned adults, children engaged in guerilla warfare are relatively more vulnerable as they are not as well versed with the nuances of guerilla tactics and their self-preservation instincts are less acute. Despite international effort to eliminate the involvement of children in armed conflicts, this practice remains rampant the world over. We have ratified the “Convention on the Rights of the Child” on December 11, 1992. However, protection of the rights of children especially with regard to preventing their recruitment for armed conflicts is an area in which lot more still needs to be done.

Human Rights Watch website in July 2007 records, “In over twenty countries around the world, children have been direct participants in war. Denied their childhood and frequently subjected to horrific violence, an estimated 200,000 to 300,000 children are serving as soldiers for both rebel groups and government forces in current armed conflicts”. Experience gained from the UN peace keeping missions both at Rwanda and Burundi in the years 1994-95 and 2005 – 06 respectively, I am inclined to support the credibility of the report which estimates that hundreds of children were serving with ‘Forces National pour la Liberation” (FNL) an armed rebel Hutu group in Burundi. A similar situation prevailed in other zones of conflict in Africa such as in Chad, Ivory Coast, The Democratic Republic of Congo, Somalia, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Uganda and Zimbabwe. Asia and the Middle East have also not been different with countries like Afghanistan where propaganda video showing boys marching in combat gear chanting slogans of martyrdom was released in 2009 in Pakistan by the Afghan Taliban leadership.

There is, therefore, an imperative need to take unconventional measures to prevent the Maoists from achieving their goal to overthrow the national government and seize power by 2050.

Iran too is known to have recruited young boys as volunteers to wage a holy war against Iraq. The child soldiers wore keys around their neck to signify their belief in the philosophy that the path to heaven lay in martyrdom. Iraq, Lebanon and Palestine too were no different. Abu Sayyaf group in the Philippines is known to have recruited thousands of children to participate in their struggle to establish an Islamic state. Although a peace agreement is in place in Nepal, the Maoists have not yet demobilized children from their ranks

Role of Ex-Servicemen & Intellectuals

There are unconfirmed media reports suggestive of the involvement of ex-servicemen in the training of the armed cadres of the Maoists. Large segments of service personnel hail from areas affected by Maoist violence. Having retired from military service in their thirties or forties, skilled in business of arms and without opportunities of remunerative employment, the ex-servicemen community in ungoverned rural areas fall easy prey to Maoist lure or pressure. Their involvement and collaboration could be either voluntary for self preservation, under coercion or possibly due to sympathy when influenced by Maoist ideology. Such reports in the media would undoubtedly be a cause for cheer for the Maoists and who would be even more encouraged in their endeavour.

Maoists also receive considerable moral support from leftist intellectual groups or individuals publicly espousing their cause, justifying their struggle, raising issues related to human rights violation on their behest and opposing the policies of the government. Sometimes such campaigns are driven by entirely private agenda such as promotion of literary endeavour, to gain entry into public life or even to double as Over-Ground Workers (OGWs). Such trends are potentially dangerous as they could fuel the fire. These elements ought to be moderated by the government and the society within the norms of democracy.

The Response

While the causes of insurgency are well known, what should also be understood is that this in essence is not a problem that should be left only to the security forces to solve. Direct involvement of the security forces without attendant support of governance and developmental activities tantamount to being a case wherein the cure is worse than the disease. Years of neglect, lack of development, absence of educational facilities and employment opportunity, lack of governance, corruption, depletion of forest and forest produce and alienation – all these afflicting just under 10 per cent of India’s population inhabiting the affected areas, have provided fertile ground for breeding insurgency. These need to be addressed urgently by the state governments with simultaneous action on several fronts with a multi- pronged strategy. It would be necessary to achieve a high level of synergy between the government at the centre and in the states to weaken the foundations that support insurgency and isolate the tribals from the Maoists. Eradicating the root cause of insurgency is the most appropriate and possibly the only viable response to the problem.

Paramilitary forces must also assist in enforcing forest laws to protect the interests of the tribals. Once sanctuary is denied, it would be easier to identify and eliminate the Maoists cadres progressively.

But tragically, the situation today appears extremely difficult if not irredeemable as the opportunity to re-establish the fundamentals of governance seems to be receding into oblivion. The first step therefore is to contain the violence so as to create the necessary space to set the stage for local governance to re-establish their roots in the affected areas. Thereafter, the state governments would have to implement a properly crafted strategy to remove the conditions that lead to the creation of ungoverned space. This needs to begin by demonstrating the necessary will and congruity in political thought, enhancing informational, economic and law enforcement paradigms.

As part of broad contours of the strategy implementation process the police and paramilitary forces must show an increased visible presence of well trained and equipped police personnel in areas controlled by the Maoists. Simultaneously measures must be taken to moderate the intellectuals supporting the cause of Maoists and manage the media to apply necessary objectivity and discretion in reporting. An empowered appointed body by the government must engage the top Maoist leadership into constant dialogue indicating readiness for ceasefire. In the absence of the desired response from the Maoists the security forces must take the war into the enemy camp and target the second rung leadership who control the armed cadres and execute missions.

To begin with, the government could also consider simultaneously increasing the recruitment through an ordinance if required to fill the void at all levels in the rank and file of the police forces of the affected states as well as that of the central paramilitary forces. Recruitment of ex-servicemen in police and paramilitary forces especially in the Maoist affected areas could also be considered. This would not only cover the existing deficiency in rank and file on a fast track and minimize training requirements apart from providing local intelligence as well; it would also deny the Maoists access to this disciplined and well trained human resource. Feasibility of lateral transfer of battle-hardened middle level military officers into police and paramilitary forces deployed to tackle Maoists with an option of absorption into permanent cadre could also be examined. This will enhance availability of experienced leadership in a short time frame. All agencies engaged in tackling the Maoists challenge must shed inhibitions and mutual suspicion as also desist from turf wars in the interest of national security.

It goes without saying that extraordinary situations require extraordinary measures. There is, therefore, an imperative need to take unconventional measures to prevent the Maoists from achieving their goal to overthrow the national government and seize power by 2050. Available paramilitary forces must be redeployed throughout the Red Corridor drawing fresh operational boundaries based on terrain, areas of operation, and tactical considerations. These boundaries may not always be coincident with the existing state boundaries. All paramilitary forces and the state police engaged in operations against the Maoists must be brought under a single unified command logically under the Home Ministry at the center. While operations by the paramilitary forces may transcend state boundaries, deployment and operations by the state police may be confined to state boundaries.

The Maoists certainly lack the capacity to threaten the National government but they do have the power to deter investments and development in some of the poorest regions which also happens to be among the richest in some vital resources ““ notably iron and coal.

Security forces must commence operations by clearing pockets and axes connecting these pockets in the areas under Maoist control. Simultaneously, the state government machinery must move in and quickly establish administrative control. Hand in hand, political parties must take steps to reassure the tribals about the security of their assets and their future. They need to organize a mass movement to counter the Maoist influence. There would obviously be a need for proper coordination amongst security forces, the administrative machinery, NGOs and political parties.

The central and state governments must set up coordinating agencies and in consultation adopt special measures on a war footing to wean away children from the clutches of the Maoists. The state governments must take over the responsibility of the education and care of children to prevent them succumbing to Maoist influence. While dealing with those children already in the rank and file of the Maoists, security forces will have to display a high level of maturity and restraint. Employment of the gun against them will be counterproductive as its deleterious effects have been witnessed in the Palestine Intifada. Every effort will have to be directed towards apprehending the child combatants instead of eliminating them. Apprehended children should then be sent to reform centres especially set up at state level for de-indoctrination and subsequently restored to their families and school.

The bottom line therefore, is that a clearly defined strategy and humane approach are needed to deal with combatant children. Security forces would also have to religiously guard against using locals and children for obtaining information either voluntarily or through coercion even when such denial is at the cost of undermining tactical or operational level plans. This will be a small price to pay for the sake of success in the long run. If the locals are not compelled to take sides, then over a period of time, it would be easier to win their hearts and minds. The local government will need to ensure that the tribals are accorded rights over forest produce and encouraged to trade through cooperatives. Schools, basic health care programme, functioning of local governing bodies comprising tribals and other important schemes, like the National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme, must be revived.

The government must direct banks to move into such areas and offer easy financing options. Paramilitary forces must also assist in enforcing forest laws to protect the interests of the tribals. Once sanctuary is denied, it would be easier to identify and eliminate the Maoists cadres progressively. Sanctuary denial and interdiction are typical means for setting the stage for the government to address the root causes of insurgency.

Conclusion

Change of power always comes through the people. Those that are exploited and suffer deprivation have little to lose and easily succumb to Maoist pressure to supporting their movement. Intervention through education and care by revival of especially the primary education in areas affected by Maoist violence is perhaps the only viable option available in the immediate time frame to keep the children away from the Maoist influence. The support base may only increase further if the problem is not addressed through a well thought out long term strategy and implementation of plans. Procrastination will inspire intellectuals to enhance support of the Maoist movement and encourage India’s adversaries to embark on adventurism complicating matters further. Realisation of the Maoist dream may not appear feasible in the foreseeable future, but if appropriate corrective steps are not taken soon, such dreams will be kept alive by the Maoist leadership with increasing conviction taking deeper roots in the hearts and mind of their rank and file. Maoist movement in military terms essentially is an insurgency and therefore it can gain momentum if not intervened decisively.

The Maoists certainly lack the capacity to threaten the National government but they do have the power to deter investments and development in some of the poorest regions which also happens to be among the richest in some vital resources – notably iron and coal. At present the movement is largely confined to forest and tribal dominated areas but it has the potential to add a new dimension to the internal security challenge when it begins to target the urban pockets. We as a nation, therefore, have to act swiftly lest future generations inherit the legacy of misperception of the Maoist threat, inadequate governance and lack of resolute action. What is most visible and assuring today is that the government possesses the necessary strength, the will and determination to tackle this unprecedented challenge. The setback in Dantewada is only temporary. All agencies together need to take stock of the situation, review and rework their strategy, provide the police and paramilitary forces with the necessary resources and then move with steadfast determination to not only respond to the recent carnage but to launch a broad based campaign to turn the tide against the Maoists.

Notes

1. Article ‘Rise of Naxalism and its implication for National Security’ by Mr EN Ramohan, IPS (retd) published in a Study Report titled ‘India’s Comprehensive National Power: Synergy through Joint Decision Making’, CENJOWS Publication.
2. NDC Research Paper 01-2008 , ‘Left wing extremism – causes and perspectives’ by AK Patnaik, IPS
3. Book, ‘Ignited Minds’ by Dr APJ Abdul Kalam
4. Magazine, ‘Outlook’ Oct 26, 2009
5. News Paper, ‘Times of India’ dated Feb 20, 2010, ‘Indian Express’ dated April 08, 09 and 10, 2010.
6. Website/Link
7. http://www.merinews.com/article/bihar-police-claims-naxal-attackers-included-children/15798792.shtml
8. http://www.indiaedunews.net/Chhattisgarh/Maoist_militancy_takes_heavy_toll_on_school_education_10668/
9. http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2008/07/14/being-neutral-our-biggest-crime-0
10. http://en.wikipedia.org/militancy_use_of_children