The ambush of a Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) party by Maoists, also known as Naxals, on 03 April this year has put the spotlight back on the ongoing insurgency in India’s hinterland. South Asia Intelligence Review (SAIR) in itsweekly assessment of 05 April quotes Chattisgarh DIG (Anti Maoist Operations) Shri OP Pal to say that – “Separate joint teams of security forces, over 2,000 in number, had launched a major anti Maoist operation from Bijapur and SukmaDistricts in the South Bastar forests, considered as the Maoist stronghold, on Friday [April 2] night. Around noon on Saturday [April 3], an encounter broke out between the patrolling team that was dispatched from Tarrem and ultras belonging to the PLGA [Peoples’ Liberation Guerilla Army] battalion of Maoists near Jonaguda village under Jagargundapolice station area (in Sukma)….”. The SAIR report addedthat the 2,000 strong force was a mix of troops from a CoBRABattalion (a specialized CRPF unit), the Bastariya Battalion of the CRPF, regular CRPF units as well as the state police’s District Reserve Guard (DRG).
Expectedly, based on intelligence inputs, this large, composite force was dispatched on multiple axes to eliminate the Maoists, estimates of whose strength vary from 200 to 600. Intelligence had also revealed that Hidma, the commander of Battalion No 1 of the PLGA and a prize catch, was part of this group. In the firefight that continued into the night, 22 security personnel were killed and one CoBRA jawan taken prisoner, to be released subsequently. Over 30 security personnel were injured. Figures of weapons lost are not available but as per India Today, ‘Naxals seem to have decamped with the weapons, bullet-proof jackets, and even the shoes of dead soldiers’. The body of one Maoist has been recovered though reports indicate more casualties. Media coverage from the site of the encounter itself has been exhaustive, providing a real time sense of the ground situation, supplemented by videos uploaded on social media by others.
Now over 50 years old, the Maoist insurgency has grown to what former Prime Minister Manmohan Singh once famously described as India’s ‘single biggest internal security challenge’ . By then, terms like ‘Red Corridor’ stretching from ‘Pashupati to Tirupati’ had already entered the lexicon of India’s security establishment. At its height the insurgency had spread across eight states ( West Bengal, Bihar, Jharkhand, Orissa, Madhya Pradesh, Chhatisgarh, Andhra Pradesh and Maharashtra), and subsequently Telengana after its formation. This expansion was the fallout of merging of various groups – the Communist Party of India (Maoist Leninist), the Peoples’ War Group (PWG), the Maoist Communist Centre of India (MCCI) and various armed factions of the Communist Party of India (Maoist) in 2004.
2004 also saw the release of the only available document to date pertaining to the Maoist struggle in India. The document titled ‘Strategy and Tactics of the Indian Revolution’ was conceived by the Joint Central Committee of the PWG and MCCI prior to their merger in September 2004, and states that the central task of the revolution, as envisaged, is the ‘seizure of political power through protracted armed struggle’. While it is not the purpose of this paper to discuss the political aims of the Maoists nor the causes for insurgency, what emerges clearly from the document is their willingness to take up arms to achieve their ends, while labelling all those opposing this endeavour as enemies. That includes the security forces of the Indian Union and any other arm of the state.
Though the level of violence has abated over the years as security forces have gradually gained the upper hand, any encounter where they suffer disproportionate casualties gives rise to mutual recrimination between affected parties with most of the finger pointing directed at the State and CAPFs.For an objective analysis however, it is necessary to first appreciate the quantum of effort made at the Centre and State level over the years towards amelioration of the situation. At the macro level, a sense can be gleaned by perusal of various reports and recommendations of concerned organs of government, available in the open domain. In the instant case, a perusal of the Annual Reports of the Ministry of Home Affairs , reports of other ministries which are tabled in Parliament, as also the Action Taken Report on the Recommendations of the Estimates Committee of the 16th Lok Sabha tabled in the Lok Sabha in September 2020 on ‘Central Armed Police Forces and Internal Security Challenges – Evaluation and Response Mechanism’ – dealing with improving the lot of the CAPFs – is particularly instructive.
The Annual Report of the Ministry of Home Affairs for 2019-20 devotes close to seven pages to explain the ‘Government’s Approach and Action Plan to deal with LWE’. The report outlines a National Policy and Action Plan that adopts a ‘multi pronged strategy in the areas of security, development, ensuring rights and entitlements of local communities’. Coordinated security measures include enhanced intelligence sharing through the Multi Agency Centre (MAC) at the Centre and State MACs (SMACs), establishment of Joint Command and Control Centers at Jagdalpur and Gaya and strengthening of State Intelligence Bureaus (SIBs) in addition to promoting Best Practices in IED management amongst others. Focused development measures such as diversion of forest land for creating different categories of infrastructure relating to schools, dispensaries/ hospitals, electrical and telecommunication lines, drinking water projects, water harvesting, construction of irrigation canals, harnessing non-conventional energy sources, skill upgradation and vocational training, construction of rural roads have been undertaken.
Specifically, road connectivity in 34 LWE districts of five states covering a total of 5433 Km under Road Requirement Plan 1 is nearing completion with 4902 Km completed by 31 March 2020. Road Requirement Plan 2 which commenced in December 2016 envisages construction of 5412 Km of rural roads of which 1373 Km have been constructed. Phase 2 of the Department of Telecommunications LWE Project approved in May 2018 envisages setting up of 4072 additional mobile towers, of which tendering for over 50 percent standscompleted. Earlier, Phase 1 of the project saw operationalization of 1836 towers. Schemes of skill development envisage construction of one Industrial Training Institute (ITI) in 47 districts, and two Skill Development Centers in 34 districts. The Department of School Education and Literacy under the Ministry of HRD has opened seven new Kendriya Vidyalas (KVs) and six new JawaharNavodyaya Vidyalayas. Four new KVs have been sanctioned.
For assisting security forces in tackling the insurgency, the MHA launched Op SAMADHAN in May 2017, in the aftermath of a previous encounter at Sukma where 25 CRPF men were killed. This scheme envisaged allocation of at least one UAV/mini UAV per CRPF battalion, increased flying hours for helicopters, joint task forces for operations across state borders, fortifying 400 police stations across the Naxal belt, training of troops by specialists like the Greyhounds and fast tracking building infrastructure. The next year the Central Government launched Modernisation Plan -III for the CAPFs, with a total outlay of Rs.1053 crore. The Centre is also supplementing efforts of States for equipping and modernizing police forces through the scheme of ‘Assistance to States for Modernisation of Police’.
Today CRPF units in states affected by Maoist violence are being progressively equipped with the AK series of rifles following a conscious decision by the MHA in this regard. CRPF had started acquisition of drones in earnest from end 2017, to augment its (then) holding of 40 UAVs. Its Annual Procurement Plan for 2019-20 (available on the CRPF website) envisages purchase of items such as 38mm Multi Shell Launchers, Trichy Assault Rifles, 40 mm Under BarrelGrenade Launchers, 5.56mm Joint Venture Protective Carbines (JVPC), 20 mini UAVs, 50 micro UAVs, various types of radio sets, light and heavy bullet proof vehicles, mine protected vehicles, bullet proof jackets and patkas among others. Most importantly, a three-stage process of procurement has been reduced to two, thereby cutting down procurement time substantially. Concurrently the Force has been beefing up capacities in training and logistics. In 2017 itself, it had 20 sanctioned training institutions of various types while 39 Field Surgical Units FSUs were established in LWE areas along with raising of four field hospitals from January 2015 onwards in different areas of Chhatisgarh.
There has been no laxity in planning for the wellbeing of the CAPFs either, with a cadre review planned every five years, a projected ‘housing satisfaction level’ of 51.88 per cent after construction of additional dwelling units and filling up vacant positions of doctors in 39 composite hospitals. Additionally construction of a Central Armed Police Force Institute of Medical Sciences (CAPFIMS) with an outlay of Rs.1300 crore has also commenced in July 2017. It is gratifying to see that the all important aspect of welfare is getting the importance it deserves.
Given that all the measures listed above are either ongoing or at various stages of completion, it is clear that the outline strategy of the Government is unexceptionable. However, the perceived lack of legitimacy of the Indian state in the eyes of tribal society as a result of Maoist propaganda poses hurdles in implementation of schemes, resulting in delays with little or no innovation on ground. It is equally clear that today the CRPF is a far better fighting force in terms of both capability and capacity. What then explains the incident at Sukma, which has been labelled as a ‘massacre’ by some? Specially so, since Merriam Webster defines that term as ‘the act or instance of killing a number of usually helpless or unresisting human beings under circumstances of atrocity or cruelty’. Despite the constraints that the force still suffers from –frequent movements all over the country, consequent lack of training and poor motivation, more often employed to supplement local police forces which does not auger well for camaraderie, cadre and promotion tussles between the IPS and CRPF. For any large scale operation to result in such casualties and ignominy cannot be an acceptable end state for an armed force of the Indian Union.
In the instant case, the answer is unequivocal, and points to flaws in leadership, institutionalized procedures, faulty intelligence assessment, an abject absence of tactical acumen and most importantly, unfamiliarity with the ‘soldiers’ ethos essential under fire – ‘my brother to my left, my brother to my right, together we stand, together we fight’ – in respect of the concerned unit. How elements of a proud force have been brought to such a state needs introspection and ruthless cleansing of those responsible at the concerned levels, combined with reworking of the regimental ethos of the concerned unit (s), which abandoned their comrades with their weapons when under fire. Senior retired officers of the CAPFshave themselves offered a far more damning indictment of the present leadership and state of affairs, calling the act of sending troops into action without any intelligence at all, ‘an act of criminal negligence’, and blaming top IPS officers for the same.
To prevent such incidents which cast a shadow over its achievements, the CRPF will have to look for answers within– be the issue either organizational or pertaining to training and HRD. But as regards tactical acumen and fighting spirit, it just needs to look at a sister force operating in similar circumstances – the exploits of Alpha Company of 114 BSF Battalion, which faced an ambush on April 4, 2019 again in Chhatisgarh, just one km short of its Company Operating Base in the jungles of the Abujhmarh region in Kankerdistrict. The ambush commenced with Maoists detonatingradio-controlled Improvised Explosive Devices (RCIEDs), lobbying shells from improvised mortars, firing ‘arrow bombs’ and tossing Molotov cocktails, which set the dry leaves on the forest floor ablaze. While four BSF men were killed in the initial burst of fire, ‘Constable Kajal Saikh, took position behind a tree and opened fire with his INSAS light machine gun. Over the next hour, he fired over 400 rounds at the Maoists, changing a dozen magazines to keep them at bay. His action bought the security forces enough time to bring in reinforcements from their COB. Thirty two troopers rushed to the rescue and fired on the Maoists, lobbing 25 high explosive rounds from their 51 mm mortars. A Mine Protected Vehicle (MPV) was rushed to the spot with additional ammunition and took back the casualties. The Maoists retreated, taking their dead with them’.
This is what a motivated and well trained armed police force can do. It is now up to the concerned leadership to derive lessons for implementation.
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Insightful
Nicely articulated article. The red corridor should have been converted to green by now. It’s the oldest maoist/naxal insurgency in the heartland of India, wherein one an’t blame the adversaries. The intent is lacking in the governments at the centre. The backwardness of the tribal areas ensures support to the naxals and lack of intelligence to CRPF and local police.
What explains the Sukma incident? …the author queries .
It’s total failure of leadership Sir. Twenty dead over a fairly large area and no offr amongst them , not one of the offr cadre injured even are clear indications of poor leadership.And this isn’t the first time and definitely wasn’t the last as no lessons will be learnt by the leadership of these anti naxal forces .
For them a deputation to anti naxal operations is an important stepping stone in their career , nothing more. They come for three years, have barely any knowledge of the men they command nor much effort is made to kniw them.
IPS offr are supposed to be masters in Int collection and in making sources within the Nation but time and again, in Naxal areas, they fail.
They too are supposed to understand the pulse of the people as public dealing is their bread and butter from day one but in Naxal areas they fail to develop any rapport with the local populace and thereby the locals remain sympathisers of the naxals .
Of the CRPF foot soldiers, the three strippers and the inspector level cadres is overaged and physically unfit for such a strenuous task of curbing the Naxals . The IPS offrs are a shade better.
Poorly led at all levels, poor int , poor local support is a sure recipe for disaster, however well armed they may be.
But is an adhoc organisation of Ex Army people like the Salwa Judum an answer. No & I hope the Indian state doesn’t repeat this mistake.
Hand over this Area to Armed Forces for ten years, back it with an honest and able administration who will do real development as the Army stabilises the situation and we have a win win situation.
But keep the political interests and their nexus with private entrepreneurs for over exploitation of minerals in this area , at bay .
Let Security- extraction of national wealth – development of humans and their means of subsistence go on concurrently , under Armed Forces and Civil administration. Give it a ten year run minimum.
Very nice sir. Well said.
When MHA is not serious about his job, and is busy electioneering and buying legislators, how do you expect anyone in the chain of command to bother? Has anybody been held accountable for the debacle? The stories put out by constabulary is barely true or credible. I am sure we can expect a sukma every month. Unfortunate.