Indian Defence Review

Troops at Siachen

Further, Kanwal argues that air and electronic surveillance will suffice to detect small intrusions which can be attacked from the air. The difficulty of spotting small groups of troops in that high-altitude wilderness is immense, and our aging helicopters which are already working above their altitude limit (flight time and fuel load are a delicate daily compromise, ask any army pilot who has operated in Siachen) cannot detect AND engage such groups. Kanwal’s suggestion is unworkable. Detection will have to be followed by a full-scale military operation that can and will spread to other zones. But let us turn our attention to Noorani’s pitch for settling the Siachen dispute by demilitarization now.

Noorani’s arguments

Noorani begins with saying that a “virtually done deal” for demilitarizing the glacier was scuttled 20 years ago. The use of the word “glacier” is very important, as in the foregoing discussion. But apart from that, we need to recall that much has happened between Pakistan and India since 1992. For example, Kargil happened in 1999 and Mumbai happened in 2006, and then there was the attack on India’s Parliament House, to name just the serious issues. If the deal had gone through in 1992, would it have obviated these breaches of peace by Pakistan? That is, would such an agreement have made Pakistan look at India with less animosity? Why is India attempting to grasp the bait of “peaceful coexistence” suggested by, of all persons, Pakistan’s army chief?

Next, Noorani approvingly writes that in 1992, Pakistan did not press its claim that the “delineated LoC (from point NJ9842 to the Karakoram Pass) must end up at the Karakoram Pass”. Are we to give credit to Pakistani negotiators for not pressing what is plainly an unreasonable and illegal claim? He goes on to argue that “Pakistan’s revised proposal fully met India’s insistence on authentication of existing positions“, and “surely to specify existing points to be vacated and record them in an annex is to “authenticate” them“. In his eagerness to argue for peace-by-demilitarization “now”, Noorani appears to slip into arguing Pakistan’s point! The point made in the 1992 negotiations regarding surveillance by helicopter was impractical then even as it is now, as argued above.

Let us give some credit to India’s Prime Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao for understanding the prevailing circumstances when he “scuttled the deal” in 1992. It is noteworthy that soon after (1994), Pakistan’s Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto “denied the agreement”. True, the “agreement” had not been signed, but denial by Ms.Bhutto displayed the mindset of the Pakistani establishment then. Its mindset has not changed with respect to India in any substantial way, except that show of military force is not possible any more and so they are resorting to guile by donning dove’s wings of peace.

The 1972 Simla Agreement says, “Pending the final settlement of any of the problems between the two countries, neither side shall unilaterally alter this position.” Noorani argues that by occupying Siachen glacier (in 1984), India violated the Simla Agreement. Would it be unfair to ask whether Pakistan violating the same Simla Agreement by sending its military-cum-mountaineering expeditions to Karakoram Pass pre-dating India’s occupation of Siachen glacier, was not the provocation for Indian occupation?

Here we come to two very important points argued by Noorani. One, he writes, “Trust is a political decision for the highest leadership to take, based inter alia on military advice. No government can allow a veto to the army”. It is true that trust in international relations is a political decision. But when the military is not involved in national decision making by carefully being excluded from the National Security Council in favour of a bureaucrat as National Security Advisor to the Prime Minister, can it be said that the military advice has been sought except perfunctorily? In a democracy like ours, the military must necessarily be ruled by the cabinet, but omission of the military from the nation’s highest security decision-making body, and trusting Pakistan’s “peace” overtures over India’s own military advice may not be in India’s strategic best interest.

Two, Noorani approvingly writes, “Gen. Kayani hinted at much more than a Siachen settlement. He said that “peaceful coexistence is necessary for both countries. There is no doubt about that””. It is passing strange that an Indian with the standing of Mr.Noorani should fall for Gen A.P.Kayani’s “peace” speil and brush off Indian military advice by disallowing it a veto that it never had. Why did it take five years for Gen Kayani (he took charge as army chief in 2007 and has earlier commanded Pakistan’s ISI) to discover that “peaceful coexistence is necessary for both countries”? Is he talking “peace” because he is in trouble? Are there also other factors at play, like Pakistan’s recent antipathy to USA and its need to cement stronger ties with China?

On trusting Gen Kayani

Proponents of immediate or very early demilitarization of Siachen to settle the Siachen dispute “now” need to re-think the matter. The Indian Defence Secretary, in this writer’s humble view, needs to work in tandem with India’s army chief when negotiating the Siachen imbroglio. India may make a very serious mistake by agreeing to demilitarizing Siachen at the present juncture, even though in the long term, peace between India Pakistan is desirable for both countries. Noorani concludes with Demosthenes’ advice that “In important transactions, opportunities are fleeting; once missed they cannot be recovered”. That is true, but equally true is Aesop’s advice in his Fox and the Goat fable: “Never trust the advice (in this case Gen Kayani’s peace offer) of a man in difficulties”.

Finally, the sub-title of Gurmeet Kanwal’s article², namely, “A low-risk option to test Pak army’s sincerity” betrays acceptance of “low-risk” of Indian troops withdrawing from the Siachen heights to test the Pakistan army’s sincerity. Which military man with first-hand knowledge of Siachen would play down Indian troops’ huge sacrifice of life and limb to weather, avalanche and Pakistan military action? In another article⁵ Kanwal writes, “Trust begets trust and it will be well worth taking a political and military risk to give peace a chance”. He neglects the strategic risk and the fact that India’s trust of Pakistan has been repeatedly betrayed. For a trusting Kanwal, George Santayana’s quote is appropriate: “Those who do not learn from history are doomed to repeat it”.