Geopolitics

The Political Dimensions of Sino-India Relations
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Issue Vol. 27.2 Apr-Jun 2012 | Date : 21 Jun , 2012

PM meeting with President of China Hu Jintao in New Delhi

Today, there is a pronounced asymmetry between India and China. This is visible in terms of international influence that China wields owing to its strategic stature that flows from its economic might, scientific strengths, technological advances and military muscle. As a result, Beijing enjoys a regional influence that stretches from West Asia through South and South East Asia and up to the Korean Peninsula. China has also sensed India’s inability and unwillingness to confront her. Steps initiated by India to reduce the trust deficit would, therefore, have to be carefully calibrated to demonstrate a forward movement while at the same time not compromising or foreclosing its options. China should also be required to reciprocate by addressing substantive issues of India’s interest. China continues to follow a policy of destabilisation that suits her strategy to keep relations with India within certain parameters.

“India’s ‘peaceful rise’ has obviously added to Beijing’s worries, especially the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) particularly the Hawks”.

The main difference between the two emerging powers in Asia – India and China lies in their political systems. India’s democratic system contrasts sharply with China’s authoritarian regime. The advantages of democratic systems in governance and conflict management are widely acknowledged and are attributed to India’s political stability. The common democratic traditions are regarded as the desire for a closer cooperation between India and like-minded systems such as the UK, USA, Canada and Europe.

The main difference between the two emerging powers in Asia – India and China lies in their political systems.

Since its Independence, India has had the unique experience of dealing with governments in its neighborhood that were represented by either a single political entity or regimes that subverted democracy and seized power for a variety of reasons. India’s political direction of its foreign policy and strategic affairs has remained constant, despite the inauguration of the coalition dharma in the mid-1980s. India’s political leadership was challenged immediately following Independence, beginning with Pakistan’s abortive attempt in 1948 to detach Kashmir from India. The other was China’s brazen military occupation of Tibet in 1950. Both developments altered India’s security environment considerably and resulted in complications that remain unresolved till today.

Trust Deficit

In 2010, India and China marked the 60th anniversary of establishment of bilateral relations. The Beijing-based China Institute of International Studies (CIIS) brought out a twelve-page article entitled ‘China-India Relations: New Starting Point and New Framework’ to mark the event. It made several noteworthy points especially on the political dimension of the relationship and spoke of a road map to further develop the bilateral interaction. Need to enhance mutual trust was advocated and it added that despite enormous efforts on either side by the political leadership, there was a negative perception created by the media and public opinion. The CIIS article did not bring anything new to the table when it highlighted the existence of trust deficit in India-China relations. Efforts to reduce the trust deficit between the two Asian neighbors are necessary to ensure peace and India’s smooth uninterrupted progress. Importantly, such efforts would be equally beneficial to China, which can continue its enunciated policy of keeping a peaceful border till it achieves its modernisation goals. It is imperative to note the backdrop in which such measures are initiated and not allow them to be interpreted as indicative of fear or weakness.

India’s democratic system contrasts sharply with China’s authoritarian regime.

Today, there is a pronounced asymmetry between India and China. This is visible in terms of international influence that China wields owing to its strategic stature that flows from its economic might, scientific strengths, technological advances and military muscle. As a result, Beijing enjoys a regional influence that stretches from West Asia through South and South East Asia and up to the Korean Peninsula. China has also sensed India’s inability and unwillingness to confront her. Steps initiated by India to reduce the trust deficit would, therefore, have to be carefully calibrated to demonstrate a forward movement while at the same time not compromising or foreclosing its options. China should also be required to reciprocate by addressing substantive issues of India’s interest. China continues to follow a policy of destabilisation that suits her strategy to keep relations with India within certain parameters.

Building Trust

Certain “red lines” will, therefore, have to be demarcated like non-interference in India’s internal affairs related to sanctuary given to the Dalai Lama, no territorial concessions on Tawang or in Arunachal Pradesh or in northern Sikkim or elsewhere in that state and insistence that Jammu and Kashmir is an integral part. Additionally, India must continue to follow an independent foreign policy tailored to meet her self-interests including inter-alia preservation of her interests in the neighborhood, highlighting her concerns over Pakistan and Sino-Pakistan collusion, concern at the diversion of Brahmaputra waters, climate change in Tibet, unrestricted preservation of its status as a nuclear power and her ambition of securing a permanent seat at the UNSC. Such a demarcation of these interests is necessary if India wants to avoid being muscled into granting concessions or being marginalised even in South Asia by China.

Steps to reduce the trust deficit between the two require to be gradual, deliberate and confined to areas where tangible results are visible.

In a major democracy like ours, steps to reduce trust deficit require to be gradual, deliberate and confined to areas where tangible results are visible. This will entail selection of mutually beneficial areas including those where the Chinese have indicated interest. Economic, cultural and education are the areas to make a good beginning. It would be prudent not to include the armed forces in the process at this stage as they are separately engaged in confidence building measures.

Political Matrix

There are certain questions that have been asked as to who formulates India’s foreign policy vis-à-vis China. Doubts have arisen out of several decisions taken by the Government that reflected an in-built reluctance to confront China on several important issues. This contrasts sharply to the strident policies of China. There is constant criticism of India in the Chinese media as also by the think-tanks. While the Ministry of External Affairs is the nodal agency to draft India’s external policies, it is not fully clear whether the inputs of other departments and agencies form part of the decision making process. The political leadership is the ultimate authority in all such cases including the strategic and economic regimes. This uniform pattern has been visible in the past over six decades. Each Prime Minister brought his own signature to the policy. The 1962 debacle is one example of a political decision to drive out the Chinese even before evaluating own preparedness and the possible consequences. On issues of national importance, there is absence of public debate. Such activity is confined to government circles. The information made available to the public by the government is also limited. Is there a role for civil society or think-tanks in policy formulation?

There is constant criticism of India in Chinese media as also by the think-tanks.

Mao Zedong is noted to have said, “Political power grows out of the barrel of a gun” and “the gun must never be allowed to command the party.” This has remained so till now. There have been aberrations in the past but the lines of command have remained clear. Participation by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in foreign affairs is through the Foreign Affairs Small Leadership Group (FASLG) in the party, a body is headed by Hu Jintao, Chairman of the CMC. The PLA is known to have had its way in several sensitive strategic issues. Ten of the 12 members in the CMC are Generals and are known to be outspoken critics of the United States. India may not be far behind the US is the above category. The other dimension relates to the Polit Bureau Standing Committee (PBSC), the highest policy making body in China. Of the nine-member PBSC, four that have visited India include Hu Jintao, President and General Secretary, Wu Bangguo, President of the National People’s Congress, Wen Jiabao, Prime Minister and Zhou Yangkang, Security and Legal affairs. Notably, Xi Jinping, Vice President and Li Keqiang, Deputy Prime Minister, two important leaders of the PBSC are yet to visit India. It remains to be seen how the next generation of leaders will relate to India.

The equation between the party and PLA under Xi Jinping regime will be a significant factor for consideration. There is also the fact that several important ministers such as of defence, commerce, finance and industry are yet to visit India. The approach of the new PBSC in the period 2012-2013 towards India-specific issues such as the future of bilateral relations, border dispute, Tibet, successor to the Dalai Lama and the South China Sea dispute, would have to be analysed.

India’s “peaceful” rise has obviously not gone down well with the hawks in the PLA.

Influence of the Military in Decision Making

The White Paper on “China’s National Defence – 2010” released in March 2011 laid down three basic tasks for the PLA, namely, to play an active role in dealing with various security threats, to safeguard national security and to play an important role in maintaining world peace and promoting common development. Currently, China does not face any external threat to its national security. Any threat arising in the future could be consequential to its actions overseas. Several academicians and strategic thinkers, both Indian and others, have followed the PLA’s growing influence in foreign policy formulation. China remains focused on Taiwan, Tibet, trade and now increasingly on securing its maritime interests. Salient points from their research with reference to India are as under:

  • Although the Foreign Office has a pre-eminent role in foreign policy formulation, the PLA has a major say in determining China’s equation with her neighbors and in the region.
  • As for India and especially on border related issues, the Chengdu and Lanzhou Military Regions are part of a consultation process and are credited with taking a strident and inflexible stance. They also deal with Pakistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan and Nepal.
  • It is understood that whenever the Special Representative talks are held between India and China, the Chinese envoy invariably is briefed by the military commanders responsible for Tibet and India-specific operations.
  • Responsible for national defence, the PLA has often been observed to be less willing to compromise on territorial claims with neighboring countries.
  • The PLA and the foreign office are not on the same page on several issues relating to South Asia, especially on the border dispute, nuclear and strategy towards India and Pakistan.
Editor’s Pick

A comprehensive coverage of this aspect by the Chennai Centre for China Studies in its paper 874 dated September 28, 2011, makes understanding the PLA-Party equation easier. It is pertinent to mention that it was the PLA that forced the cancellation of an official visit to China in 2010 by the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Northern Command, Indian Army, on the grounds that he was in-charge of forces in Jammu and Kashmir. It transpired that China’s political leadership was taken aback by the PLA’s decision which was instigated by Pakistan. The line of command was reiterated subsequently.

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The views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily represent the opinions or policies of the Indian Defence Review.

About the Author

PM Heblikar

retired as Special Secretary, Government of India, Cabinet Secretariat, New Delhi. Currently, the Managing Trustee, Institute of Contemporary Studies Bangalore (ICSB), he is also a visiting Professor, Department of Geopolitics and International Relations, Manipal University, Karnataka.  

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