Indian Defence Review

The Chinese have long realised that technology is the cutting edge in modern combat. Accordingly, China has embarked on an ambitious programme to revamp its technological capability and this process is likely to take between fifteen to twenty years. Evidence suggests the PLA is engaged in a sustained effort to interdict, at long ranges, aircraft carrier and expeditionary strike groups that might deploy in the Western Pacific. Following the experience of US intervention with Carrier Battle Groups during the 1995 and 1996 Taiwan Strait crises, evidence suggests the Chinese military has invested in research, development, and technology acquisition oriented on anti-carrier operations. Similarly, China’s placement of long-range SAM systems capable of providing coverage over Taiwan’s airspace, combined with expansion of SRBM and amphibious forces, has introduced a destabilising capability.

“We should achieve developments by leaps and bounds in the modernisation of weaponry in our armed forces.” —General Li Jinai

China has stated its intentions and allocated resources to pursue a broad-based military build-up encompassing force-wise professionalisation, improved training, more robust and realistic joint exercises as also accelerated acquisition of modern weapons. The Intelligence Community estimates that China will take until the end of this decade or later for its military modernisation programme to produce a modern force capable of defeating a moderate-size adversary. Recognising this deficiency, China’s leaders have placed a near-term emphasis on asymmetric programmes and systems to leverage China’s advantages while exploiting the perceived vulnerabilities of potential opponents – so-called Assassin’s Mace (Sha Shou Jian) programmes. Although military modernisation figured last among Deng Xiao Ping’s Four Modernisation, there are increasing signs that China has embarked on its military modernisation to turn its People’s Liberation Army (PLA) into a modern force capable of defeating a moderate size adversary.

The Chinese have long realised that technology is the cutting edge in modern combat. Accordingly, China has embarked on an ambitious programme to revamp its technological capability and this process is likely to take between 15 to 20 years. Evidence suggests the PLA is engaged in a sustained effort to develop the capability to interdict at long range, aircraft carrier and expeditionary strike groups that might deploy in the Western Pacific. Following the experience of US intervention with Carrier Battle Groups during the 1995 and 1996 Taiwan Strait crises, evidence suggests the Chinese military has invested in research, development and technology acquisition oriented on anti-carrier operations. Similarly, China’s placement of long-range SAM systems capable of providing coverage over Taiwan’s airspace, combined with expansion of SRBM and amphibious forces, has introduced a destabilising capability.

As far as technological advancement of the PLA Ground Force is concerned, it will have the following postulates:

•  Improvement in the battlefield survivability of Armoured and Mechanised Forces

•  Fire power, synchronisation and economy of force.

•  Operational concepts aimed at preventing an adversary from deploying military forces to forward operating locations and thus, rapidly destabilise critical military balance.

•  Emphasis on asymmetric programmes and systems to leakage China’s advantages while exploiting the vulnerabilities of potential opponents.

•  Creation of Rapid Reaction Force in order to respond in real time to rapidly changing battle scenario.

•  Capability to launch precision strikes.

•  Improving expeditionary operation.

•  Logistics reforms for integration of the civil sector with military procurement system and acquire dual technology.

•  Strategic reconnaissance capability.

•  Network Centric operations.

The Most Likely Military Strategy

•  Emphasis on active defence.

•  Control and use of Armed Forces and other coercive instrument of power essential components of security strata.

•  Coercive military capabilities including air power, missiles and information about operations.

•  Employment of ground forces for final ‘shock value’ to destroy adversary’s will to resist.

•  Creation of Rapid Reaction Formations (RRF) equipped with hi-tech weapons for flexible use in regional contingencies.

The Most Likely Modernisation Strategy

•  New ideas are being studied to incorporate new concepts including rethinking assumptions about the value of long-range precision strikes, independent of ground forces, in a Taiwan conflict scenario, integration of psychological operations with air and rapid ground operations and improving joint operations capability by developing advance C4ISR systems and improving inter-service cooperation.

•  Increased interaction and cooperation with foreign military to improve political and military ties.

•  China’s extensive and well established ballistic missile industrial infrastructure continues to concentrate on replacing liquid propellant missiles with mobile solid propellant ones, reflecting concerns for survivability, maintenance and reliability as also developing high priority ICBMs for theatre and strategic missions.

•  Research and development to produce a variety of systems including tactical and special purpose (aerial refueling tankers, airborne early warning and electronic counter measures) aircraft as well as modern turbofan engine technology.

•  Building modern and combat-capable surface combatants, submarines and amphibious vessels.

•  Producing advanced armoured systems, upgrading older models and developing next generation missiles.

Doctrine

Mao’s doctrine of a People’s War has now been revamped to cater for the following three possibilities:

•  A People’s War under modern conditions

•  Local war under hi-tech conditions (jubu zhanzhing zai gao jishu tiaojian xia)

•  Asymmetric warfare (bu dimchen zhan zheng)

Force Restructuring

•  Force Restructuring programme is based on the following parameters:

•  Reduction in Military Regions (MR)

•  Merging of traditional field armies into group armies.

•  Raising of Rapid Reaction Forces.

•  Raising of Special Forces.

Modernisation Parameters: Area Denial Capability

China is developing forces and concepts focused on denying an adversary the ability to deploy to locations from which it can conduct military operations. Increasingly, China’s area denial forces overlap, providing multiple layers of offensive capability. PLA planners are focused on targeting surface ships and submarines at long ranges. Analysis of current and projected force structure improvements suggest that in the near term, China is seeking the capacity to hold surface ships at risk through a layered defence that reaches out to the ‘second island chain’. China has expressed interest in developing naval anti-access capabilities that use a comprehensive C4ISR network to direct and coordinate naval, air, space and missile forces.

One area of apparent investment involves the pursuit of medium-range ballistic missiles, an extensive C4ISR system for geo-location of targets and onboard guidance systems for terminal homing to strike surface ships on the high seas or their onshore support infrastructure. This capability would have particular significance for regional stability, owing to the preemptive and coercive options that it would provide China’s leaders.

A layered system to achieve local sea denial would also employ submarines, maritime strike aircraft, and modern surface combatants equipped with Anti-Ship Cruise Missiles (ASCMs). China’s development of numerous varieties of mines, its acquisition of the KILO, SONG, and YUAN class diesel submarines and development of the SHANG class SSN illustrate the importance the PLA is placing on undersea warfare in its pursuit of sea denial. The purchase of two new Russian SOVREMENNYY II-class DDGs and indigenous production of the LUYANG I/LUYANGII DDGs equipped with long-range ASCM and SAM systems demonstrate a continuing emphasis on improving anti-surface warfare capabilities combined with mobile, wide area air control.

Strengthened Nuclear Deterrence

China is qualitatively and quantitatively improving its long-range nuclear missile force. China is pursuing strategic forces modernisation to provide a credible, survivable nuclear deterrent and counterstrike capability in response to its perception of an increasingly complex nuclear security environment.

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The PLA Second Artillery is fielding mobile, more survivable missiles capable of targeting the US, Japan, India, Russia and other targets in Asia and the rest of the world. It currently deploys approximately 20 silo-based, liquid-fuelled CSS-4 ICBMs, which constitute its primary nuclear means of holding continental US targets at risk. In addition, it maintains approximately 20 liquid-fuelled, limited range CSS-3 ICBMs that enable it to attach targets in the Asia region.

China’s ‘theatre’ nuclear force is made up of the CSS-2 IRBMs and solid propellant, road-mobile CSS-5 MRBMs.

Building Capacity for Precision Strike

PLA planners have observed the primacy of precision strike in modern warfare and are investing in both the offensive and defensive elements of this emerging regime. China is pursuing an array of improved ISR assets ranging from UAVs, constellations of various satellites and more ‘informationalised’ Special Operations forces. Such forces could provide targeting data for long range precision strikes when strikes are linked by more robust communications systems.

To carry out the precision strike, in the near future, China will have the following:

• Short Range Ballistic Missiles (SRBMs) conventionally armed.
• Land Attack Cruise Missiles (LACMs) conventionally armed.
• Air-to-Surface Missiles (ASMs)
• Anti-ship Cruise Missiles (ASCMs)
• Anti-Radiation Missiles (ARMs)
• Precision Artillery

Improving Expeditionary Operations

PLA expeditionary forces include three airborne divisions, two amphibious infantry divisions, two marine brigades, about seven Special Operations groups and one regimental size reconnaissance element in the Second Artillery. The capabilities of these units are steadily improving with the introduction of new equipment, improved unit-level tactics, and greater coordination of joint operations.

In addition to amphibious assaults, missions for these forces could include; Special Operations to facilitate amphibious operations and disrupt communications nodes, air defence and the movement of reserve forces reacting to amphibious operations; airborne assaults to seize airfields for follow-on infantry forces and reconnaissance to provide targeting information and battle damage assessments.

PLA ground forces in the Nanjing and Guangzhou Military Regions have received upgraded amphibious armour and other vehicles, such as tanks and armoured personnel carriers and may deploy additional armoured vehicles and air cushioned troops vehicles to improve lethality and speed for seaborne assaults. Airborne forces are likely to receive the newly purchased IL-76/CANDIDs from Russia and may acquire modern, armoured vehicles that can be airdropped. The quality and quantity of army aviation training has improved in recent years. Army aviation regiments actively study and explore new fighting tactics and training methods to increase their joint operations capability.

Expanding Air Defence

The PLA has shifted from point defence of key military, industrial and political targets to a new Joint Anti-Air Raid Campaign doctrine based on a modern, integrated air defence system capable of effective Offensive Counter Air (OCA) and Defensive Counter Air (DCA). Under this doctrine, the PLA will use aircraft, surface-to-surface missiles, long range artillery, special operations forces, naval forces and guerrilla units to destroy an enemy’s ability to conduct offensive air operations and provide comprehensive defence of PRC airspace.

Space and Counter-space Developments

China has accorded building a modern ISR architecture a high priority in its comprehensive military modernisation, in particular the development of advanced space-based C4ISR and targeting capabilities. China’s access to space will continue to improve as it develops newer boosters to replace the aging Long March system. Acquiring more sophisticated space systems will allow China to expand the reach of its anti-access forces and could serve as a key enabler for regional power projection.

Small Satellites

China is studying and seeking foreign assistance for developing small satellites. It has launched a number of them since 2000, including an oceanographic research satellite, imagery satellites and environmental research satellites. China is also developing microsatellites, weighing less than 100 kg for remote sensing and networks of electro-optical and radar satellites. These developments could allow for a more rapid reconstitution or expansion of their satellite force given any disruption in coverage.

Anti-Satellite (ASAT) Weapons

Beijing continues to pursue an offensive anti-satellite system. China can currently destroy or disable satellites only by launching a ballistic missile or space-launch vehicle armed with a nuclear weapon. However, there are many risks associated with this method including adverse consequences from the use of nuclear weapons. Evidence exists that China is improving its situational awareness in space, which will give it the ability to track and identify most satellites. Such capability will allow for the de-confliction of Chinese satellites, and would also be required for offensive action. At least one of the satellite attack systems appears to be a ground-based laser designed to damage or blind imaging satellites.

Enhanced Reconnaissance Capability

China participated in the China-Brazil Earth Resources Satellite (CBERS) programme with the CBERS-1 and CBERS-2 remote sensing satellites. These satellites can take 20 metre resolution images in swaths exceeding 100 kilometres and transmit those digital images to earth stations. The programme will continue with follow-on satellite CBERS-2B, CBERS-3 and CBERS-4 which reportedly increase camera resolution substantially.

China is interested in acquiring a disaster environmental/monitoring satellite constellation called Huanjing. Phase 1 of the programme calls for three satellites, two of which are equipped for visible, infrared and multi-spectral imaging while the third will possess a Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) to see through weather. Phase 2 of the Huanjing programme allows for eight satellites (four imaging and four SAR) in orbit simultaneously.

In the next decade, Beijing most likely will field radar, ocean surveillance and high resolution photoreconnaissance satellites. China will eventually deploy advanced imagery, reconnaissance and Earth resource systems with military applications. In the interim, China probably will supplement existing coverage with commercial SPOT, LANDSAT, RADARSAT Ikonos and Russian satellite imagery.

Exploiting Information Warfare

The PLA considers active offence to be the most important requirement for information warfare to destroy or disrupt an adversary’s capability to receive and process data. Launched mainly by remote combat and covert methods, the PLA could employ information warfare preemptively to gain the initiative in a crisis. Specified information warfare objectives include the targeting and destruction of an enemy’s command system, shortening the duration of war, minimising casualties on both sides, enhancing operational efficiency, reducing effects on domestic populations and gaining support from the international community. The PLA’s information warfare practices also reflect investment in electronic countermeasures and defence against electronic attack (e.g. electronic and infrared decoys, angle reflectors and false target generators).

China’s Future Technological Profile: 2020

Land-Based Missile Technology

Ground-based cruise missile capability is likely to have been developed. In addition, ground silo-based CSS-4, CSS-3, CSS-5 solid fuel ICBMS, road mobile DF31 and DF31A would have been developed.

Air Defence

The most important aspect of the PLA’s Air Defence development has been the acquisition and fielding of advanced, Russian made SA-10 SAM systems and their placement along the Taiwan Strait. The PLA is also working to reverse-engineer a domestic variant of the SA-10 (the HQ 9) of equal capability. This year, the PLA is expected to field the extended range S-300PMU2, which will allow China to engage targets over Taiwan airspace.

Radio Frequency and Laser Weapon Development

Long range beam weapons would use narrow radio frequency beams to engage targets such as aircraft or Precision Guided Munitions (PGMs). Short-range systems would be packed into missiles or artillery shells and launched into the vicinity of targets such as radars or command posts before releasing an RF pulse. In recent years, the application of RF weapons has expanded to include deployment on small vehicles or in suitcases for targeting critical military or civilian infrastructures where close access is possible.

Computer Network Operations

China’s Computer Network Operations (CNO) include computer network attack, computer network defence and computer network exploitation. The PLA sees CNO as critical to seize the initiative and achieve ‘electromagnetic dominance’ early in a conflict and as a force multiplier. Although there is no evidence of a formal Chinese CNO doctrine, PLA theorists have coined the term “Integrated Network Electronic Warfare” to outline the integrated use of electronic warfare, CNO and limited kinetic strikes against key C4 nodes to disrupt the enemy’s battlefield network information systems. The PLA has established information warfare units to develop viruses to attack enemy computer systems and networks, tactics and measures to protect friendly computer systems and networks.

Command, Control, Communications and Computers (C4)

China is continuing to develop a joint Battle Management System which the entire PLA will use for strategic, campaign, tactical planning and operations.

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Socialisation of Logistics

China’s logistics reform features the integration of the civil sector with the military procurement system as a modern adaptation of “People’s War”. Under this concept, the PLA will acquire common and dual-use items on the market. Increasing number of logistics functions will be outsourced, especially when civilian industry can perform similar functions at low costs.