Military & Aerospace

The March to Dacca - III
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Yahya however promptly countermanded Farman Ali’s offer, but by that time it had become abundantly clear that the Pakistani ability to sustain military operations in the eastern wing were limited and that the end of their resistance was imminent. Making use of this indication, delegations friendly to India and sympathisers of Bangladesh kept the Security Council debate alive to enable it to bring the campaign to a successful conclusion. Collin Smith, representative of the London Observer in Rawalpindi, reflecting the mood of the time, wrote that Yahya Khan was completely resigned to the loss of East Pakistan. The question was no longer if and when the Pakistani forces would leave the liberated territory but only how.

“¦wrote that Yahya Khan was completely resigned to the loss of East Pakistan. The question was no longer if and when the Pakistani forces would leave the liberated territory but only how.

Nevertheless, Yahya kept exhorting Niazi to continue fighting and promised that “something big” was in the offing. Flash messages hinted that friends both from the north and south were coming to Niazi’s aid soon. Perhaps Yahya Khan firmly believed that Chinese armed” intervention would materialise when his position in East Pakistan seemed hopeless, and he might have been aware that the US Seventh Fleet was steaming towards the Bay of Bengal. Niazi however refused to believe him and gave up all hope of outside help. A successful offensive in the west might have revived the fight in him for a while, but that was not forthcoming. Instead of appreciating the need to keep the war going to backup the efforts of Pakistan’s friends in the Security Council and in the Bay of Bengal Niazi was intent on seeking a ceasefire quickly. The politico-military implications of his decisions were beyond his comprehension. Nothing was yet lost militarily. His fortresses were still giving a spirited fight. A well-coordinated withdrawal to the Dacca fortress would have prolonged the war for some weeks. In the event, the Indians were able to commit no more than four weak brigades with artillery and armour support and inadequate logistic backing to the battle. It would have taken days to achieve the desired buildup to tackle the Dacca defences, and if Niazi could have managed to muster a division or more to man this natural defence line the war would have lengthened by weeks. But Niazi had lost heart and had no control over operations in the filed. Left to themselves, the field formations were putting up a fight, each according to its own lights. Futlie efforts to keep Niazi in the fight continued almost every day, with promises of help from “the yellow and white nations,” but Niazi no longer believed them.

Events were moving fast. Bypassing islands of Pakistani resistance, the Indians were making good speed in their advance on Dacca from the north, the northeast, the east and the southeast. The continuous pounding of Dacca and its surroundings by air had completely paralysed Pakistan’s Eastern Command, and there were no orders for the troops in the field. Far removed from the events in the east, Yahya and his coterie were not aware of the conditions prevailing there. Ironically, on 12 December, the Pakistani delegation at the UN still sought a simple ceasefire without a political settlement for transfer of power when the Indians were poised for a decisive victory on the battlefield. But India’s friends could not possibly allow any settlement which would deprive it of the fruits of the impending victory. In Pakistani policymaking circles, there was obviously no coordination between military means and political bargaining.

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Niazi put on a brave front by saying: “It does not matter if I don’t have men to defend the city. It is now a question of living or dying and we shall fight to the last man.” But by 13 December he was a defeated man. The same day, he sent the final distress signal to Rawalpindi, persumably seeking permission to negotiate a ceasefire in the field. In reply, he was told that the Security Council was in session and likely to bring about a UN-sponsored ceasefire within a matter of hours. He was urged to keep the fight going and hold on to as much territory as possible. Niazi was however urging for exhortation. Meanwhile, the Indian was exerting capture Dacca before the oncoming ceasefire itself to race for time was on.

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