Military & Aerospace

The March to Dacca - III
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Issue Book Excerpt: India\'s War since Independence | Date : 01 Dec , 2011

Exploiting Niazi’s pessimistic conclusions about the outcome of the war, the Indians stepped up their psychological warfare. A personal message from Manekshaw was repeatedly beamed by All India Radio to the beleaguered Pakistanis. Leaflets bearing the message were also dropped over the Pakistani defences. The message was addressed to the officers and jawans of the Pakistani Army and invited them to “lay down your arms before it is too late.” It warned: “The Indian forces have reached all round you. Your air force is. destroyed. You have no hope of help from them. Chittagong, Chalna and Mangla ports are blocked. Nobody can reach you from the sea. Your fate is sealed. The Mukti Bahini and the people are all prepared to take revenge for the atrocities and cruelties you have committed. Why waste lives? Do you want to go home and be with your children? Do not waste time. There is no disgrace in laying down your arms to a soldier. We will give you the treatment befitting a soldier.” To demonstrate the futility of resistance, the air attacks on the Pakistani defences were intensified, especially on the approaches to Dacca within 20 miles of the city.

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On 9 December, Dr Malik made concrete proposals to end hostilities in East Pakistan. According to Fazal Muqeem, “…the gist of the Governor’s proposals was that as the conflict in East Pakistan had arisen as a result of political causes it must end with a political solution.” He pleaded for the UN to effect an immediate ceasefire and arrange for a peaceful transfer of power to the elected representatives of East Pakistan. He asked for the repatriation with honour of the Pakistani armed forces as well as the peaceful evacuation of West Pakistan civilians opting for transfer to the western wing. The safety of those settled in East Pakistan since 1947 should be ensured and a guarantee should be given against reprisals.

The proposal was at once brought to the notice of the President of the Security Council. It propounded a five-point plan that sought a ceasefire and the evacuation of West Pakistani civilians, transfer of power to the elected representatives of the people of East Pakistan, and the phased withdrawal of Pakistani forces.

These proposals were however not approved by Yahya Khan as he felt that the Governor’s suggestions were tantamount to accepting an independent East Pakistan. Yahya Khan believed that Malik’s efforts should be confirned to securing the end of hostilities and a guarantee from the UN for “peace, tranquillity, and against reprisals.” Meanwhile, Maj Gen Rao Farman Ali, Niazi’s adviser on civil affairs, had with the tacit consent of the Governor passed on the proposal to Paul M. Henry, representative of the UN Secretariat in New York.

The proposal was at once brought to the notice of the President of the Security Council. It propounded a five-point plan that sought a ceasefire and the evacuation of West Pakistani civilians, transfer of power to the elected representatives of the people of East Pakistan, and the phased withdrawal of Pakistani forces. The proposal visualised that the Soviet, British, French and US representatives in Dacca and the Chinese delegation in New York should jointly take control of East Pakistan and implement its provisions.

Yahya however promptly countermanded Farman Ali’s offer, but by that time it had become abundantly clear that the Pakistani ability to sustain military operations in the eastern wing were limited and that the end of their resistance was imminent. Making use of this indication, delegations friendly to India and sympathisers of Bangladesh kept the Security Council debate alive to enable it to bring the campaign to a successful conclusion. Collin Smith, representative of the London Observer in Rawalpindi, reflecting the mood of the time, wrote that Yahya Khan was completely resigned to the loss of East Pakistan. The question was no longer if and when the Pakistani forces would leave the liberated territory but only how.

“¦wrote that Yahya Khan was completely resigned to the loss of East Pakistan. The question was no longer if and when the Pakistani forces would leave the liberated territory but only how.

Nevertheless, Yahya kept exhorting Niazi to continue fighting and promised that “something big” was in the offing. Flash messages hinted that friends both from the north and south were coming to Niazi’s aid soon. Perhaps Yahya Khan firmly believed that Chinese armed” intervention would materialise when his position in East Pakistan seemed hopeless, and he might have been aware that the US Seventh Fleet was steaming towards the Bay of Bengal. Niazi however refused to believe him and gave up all hope of outside help. A successful offensive in the west might have revived the fight in him for a while, but that was not forthcoming. Instead of appreciating the need to keep the war going to backup the efforts of Pakistan’s friends in the Security Council and in the Bay of Bengal Niazi was intent on seeking a ceasefire quickly. The politico-military implications of his decisions were beyond his comprehension. Nothing was yet lost militarily. His fortresses were still giving a spirited fight. A well-coordinated withdrawal to the Dacca fortress would have prolonged the war for some weeks. In the event, the Indians were able to commit no more than four weak brigades with artillery and armour support and inadequate logistic backing to the battle. It would have taken days to achieve the desired buildup to tackle the Dacca defences, and if Niazi could have managed to muster a division or more to man this natural defence line the war would have lengthened by weeks. But Niazi had lost heart and had no control over operations in the filed. Left to themselves, the field formations were putting up a fight, each according to its own lights. Futlie efforts to keep Niazi in the fight continued almost every day, with promises of help from “the yellow and white nations,” but Niazi no longer believed them.

Events were moving fast. Bypassing islands of Pakistani resistance, the Indians were making good speed in their advance on Dacca from the north, the northeast, the east and the southeast. The continuous pounding of Dacca and its surroundings by air had completely paralysed Pakistan’s Eastern Command, and there were no orders for the troops in the field. Far removed from the events in the east, Yahya and his coterie were not aware of the conditions prevailing there. Ironically, on 12 December, the Pakistani delegation at the UN still sought a simple ceasefire without a political settlement for transfer of power when the Indians were poised for a decisive victory on the battlefield. But India’s friends could not possibly allow any settlement which would deprive it of the fruits of the impending victory. In Pakistani policymaking circles, there was obviously no coordination between military means and political bargaining.

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Niazi put on a brave front by saying: “It does not matter if I don’t have men to defend the city. It is now a question of living or dying and we shall fight to the last man.” But by 13 December he was a defeated man. The same day, he sent the final distress signal to Rawalpindi, persumably seeking permission to negotiate a ceasefire in the field. In reply, he was told that the Security Council was in session and likely to bring about a UN-sponsored ceasefire within a matter of hours. He was urged to keep the fight going and hold on to as much territory as possible. Niazi was however urging for exhortation. Meanwhile, the Indian was exerting capture Dacca before the oncoming ceasefire itself to race for time was on.

“¦the sole representative of the Martial Law Administration, to carry on the fight. But Niazi had given up much earlier, as he told his captors two days ater.

On 14 December, the flow of panic signals between Dacca and Rawalpindi suddenly increased, clearly indicating the moral collapse of the authorities in Dacca. About 1000 hours a message read: “We have been living on hope… Please confirm something. Whatever has to happen should happen fast.” Obviously, this referred to the help from outside. Another message followed: “We have no missiles. What are we to fire? And no air force. Air raids are worrying us a lot.” A little later, another said: “Only Chittagong is left. All else is gone. It looks as though they will destroy Dacca. Everything is being destroyed. We are lost.” The most frutful information was: “At 1200 hours we are going to Government House.”

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Inferring that a high-level meeting was in the offing, the Indian command ordered an air raid to disrupt the deliberations. The pilot who was chosen to undertake it had to be briefed in a hurry with a tourist guide map of Dacca obtained from a foreign airline. A rocket fell in the hall where the meeting was in progress, and this decided the issue. The Governor took cover in an air raid shelter nearby and borrowing a reporter’s ballpoint pen hurriedly wrote out his resignation. He thereafter dissociated himsef from Yahya Khan’s Government and sought refuge in the Hotel Intercontinental along with his cabinet under the Red Cross flag. Now it fell on Niazi, the sole representative of the Martial Law Administration, to carry on the fight. But Niazi had given up much earlier, as he told his captors two days ater. He had not slept for 12 nights and he just could not carry on any longer.

Tools:

  1. For the full text of Gen Manekshaw’s third message beamed to the Pakistani occupation forces in Bangladesh over All India Radio, see Asiaa Recorder, Vol XVIII, No 2 p 10563.
  2. The Soviet veto three times and the abstention of Britain and France prevented the passage of the US resolution till 14 December.
  3. The New York Times quoted official sources to report that the movement of US Navy ships (the nuclear-powered 7th Fleet) towards the Bay of Bengal was intended to provide “political support for Pakistan, whose army in Bangladesh was disorganised.”
  4. For a full account of the Government of East Pakistan’s resignation en masse, see Asian Recorder, Vol XVIII, No 2, p. 10563.

Eventually recognising realities, Yahya Khan addressed Niazi and the Governor the same afternoon with these words: “You have fought a heroic battle against overwhelming odds. The nation is proud of you and the world full of admiration. I have done all that is humanly possible to find an acceptable solution to the problem. You have now reached the stage where further resistance is no longer humanly passible, nor will it serve any useful purpose. It will only lead to further loss of life and destruction. You would now take necessary measures to stop the fighting and preserve the lives of armed forces personnel, all those from West Pakistan and all loyal elements. Meanwhile, I have moved the UN to urge India to stop hostilities in East Pakistan forthwith and to guarantee the safety of the forces and all other people who may be the likely target of miscreants.” This put the final seal on further resistance.

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Niazi immediately approached the American Consul General in Dacca to arrange a ceasefire. The conditions he suggested were broadly four: regrouping the Pakistani armed forces by mutual agreement in designated areas; the safety of all those settled in East Pakistan since 1947; and a guarantee against reprisals for those who had helped the administration from March 1971. In the end, he gave an assurance that he would abide by whatever resolutions the UN passed. This message was transmitted by the Consul General to Delhi, and it was soon flashed all over the world. The Indians had however made known by then that they would accept nothing less than an unconditional surrender.

Quoting Niazis signal, the message read: “Since you have indicated your desire to stop fighting, I expect you to issue orders to all forces under your command in Bangladesh to ceasefire immediately and surrender to my advancing forces, wherever they are located.”

On 15 December, Malik and Farman Ali informed the UN Secretariat that the authorities in East Pakistan were prepared to end hostilities but desired a ceasefire of a few hours to discuss its terms. This message was also intercepted, and before Niazi or anybody else could change his mind the air attacks on Niazi’s headquarters were intensified. Late that same evening, AIR repeatedly broadcast a message from Manekshaw to Niazi at short intervals. Quoting Niazi’s signal, the message read: “Since you have indicated your desire to stop fighting, I expect you to issue orders to all forces under your command in Bangladesh to ceasefire immediately and surrender to my advancing forces, wherever they are located.” Manekshaw gave his solemn assurance that armed Pakistani personnel who surrendered would be treated with the dignity and respect soldiers were entitled to under the Geneva Convention. The wounded and the sick would be cared for, the dead given a respectable burial.

He added: “No one need fear for their safety, no matter where they come from. Nor shall there be any reprisal by forces operating under my command… ” As soon as he received a positive response, he said he would direct Gen Aurora to refrain from all air and ground action against the Pakistani forces. To demonstrate his good faith, he ordered stoppage of all air action over Dacca and its neighbourhood from 1700 hours on 15 December to 0900 hours the next day and emphasised that India had no desire to inflict casualties on Niazi’s troops. And then he warned: “However, should you not comply with that I have stated, you will leave me with no alternative but to resume my offensive with the utmost vigour at 0900 hours 16 December.”

The extension was at once granted, and this time the moratorium was extended to the ground forces as well. A couple of hours later Nagra, accompanied by his brigade commanders, walked into Niazis headquarters.

Radio links were activated on listening watch to pick up Niazi’s response to Manekshaw’s message. But the whole night passed in silence. Manekshaw was getting exasperated at what seemed an endless wait. Next morning arrived without any response. At 0800 hours on 16 December, when Manekshaw was in the process of giving directions for the day’s operations, the radio link became suddenly active, conveying Niazi’s request for an extension of the moratorium by six hours and for an Indian Army representative to come down to Dacca to negotiate the terms of surrender. The extension was at once granted, and this time the moratorium was extended to the ground forces as well. A couple of hours later Nagra, accompanied by his brigade commanders, walked into Niazi’s headquarters.

In Pakistan’s higher direction of war there did not seem to be any coordination between political diplomacy and military means. When this surrender drama was being staged in Dacca, Bhutto was addressing the Security Council thus: “Perhaps this will be my last speech in the Security Council. If the Security Council wants me to be a party to the legalising of abject surrender, then I say that under no circumstances shall I be. I will not take back a document of surrender from the Security Council. I will not be a party to the legalisation of aggression. For four days the Security Council had procrastinated. Why? Because the object was for Dacca to fall… Why should I waste my time here in the Security Council? I will not be a party to the ignominious surrender of a part of my country. You can take your Security Council. Here you are, I am going.” With that, he walked out of the chamber. This defiant political stance was not matched by Niazi’s armed resistance.

“¦the amount of stockpiled material available and the defence potential endowed by mighty rivers and marshy ground proved that if Niazi had the heart to fight he could have prolonged the war long enough to enable Pakistans foreign friends to push through a resolution in the Security Council to safeguard its territorial integrity and compel Indian acceptance of it.

In the early hours of 16 December, Niazi passed orders for a ceasefire to his formations. He lauded their stout and heroic stand against heavy odds and explained that a stage had been reached when further resistance was futile and would end only in unnecessary loss of life. He ordered their withdrawal to specified areas of assembly and gave directions for preparations for surrender. It appeared that either his message did not reach all concerned or some commanders deliberately ignored it for at the time of surrender the defenders at Khulna, Rajshahi, Nator, Dinajpur, Rangpur, Jaydebpur, Sylhet, Maynamati and Chittagong were still putting up a stiff resistance. After the formal surrender, most of the commanders blamed Niazi for the collapse and felt they had been unnecessarily disgraced.

In all 1,606 officers, 2,345 JCOs, 64,109 other ranks, 1,022 non-combatants enrolled in the regular army, 79 officers, 448 JCOs and 11,665 other ranks of the paramilitary forces (not including those paramilitary forces of Bangladesh origin who were handed over to the Bangladesh Government), 91 officers, 30 petty officers and 1,292 ratings of the Pakistani Navy, 61 officers, 31 warrant officers and 1,049 airmen of the Pakistani Air Force, 166 all ranks of the West Pakistan Police and 7,555 civilians surrendered in various garrisons all over East Pakistan. The Indian losses were 1,421 killed, comprising 68 officers, 60 JCOs and 1,293 other ranks, and 4,061 wounded, comprising 211 officers, 160 JCOs and 3,690 other ranks, and 56 missing.

In the excitement and confusion of the surrender drama, the Pakistani Army Aviation Squadron, consisting of some eight heli-copters (four MI-8s and four Alouettes) under the command of Lieut Col Liaqat Bokhari and carrying important wounded personnel, including Gen Rahim Khan, and their families, flew on 15 December night to Akyab, in Burma, and thence to West Pakistan.

Niazi had no control over his command. On surrender, his headquarters were unable to indicate the exact strength of his forces and where they were located. Large quantities of arms and ammunition stowed in various dumps fell into the victor’s hands. The number of troops at Niazi’s disposal, the amount of stockpiled material available and the defence potential endowed by mighty rivers and marshy ground proved that if Niazi had the heart to fight he could have prolonged the war long enough to enable Pakistan’s foreign friends to push through a resolution in the Security Council to safeguard its territorial integrity and compel Indian acceptance of it.

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The US even went to the brink of direct intervention by ordering a naval task force into Bangladesh waters. The force had a flagship of more than 90,000 tons, the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier Enterprise, capable of launching Phantom fighter-bombers carrying nuclear warheads. The Tripoli, another aircraft carrier, was a commando helicopter launcher. There were six other warships, including destroyers and escorts, some marine troops and administrative elements.

The abject surrender brought Pakistan humiliation which it would find it difficult to live with.

Although the proclaimed role of this task force was only to evacuate a handful of US citizens, New Delhi understood this to be an act of international arm twisting by a superpower. But the Indian Government and the military high commend refused to be intimidated. Instead, they were spurred to accelerate the progress Dacca’s surrender. A Washington newspaper columnist, Jack Anderson, later revealed that the tasks assigned to the US force were “to compel India to divert both ships and planes to shadow the task force, to weaken India’s blockade of the East Pakistan’s waters, and force India to keep planes on defence alert, thus reducing their operations against Pakistan ground troops.”

Book_India_wars_sinceThe task force moved too late to carry out any of these assignments. If it had established a beachhead on East Pakistan territory a week earlier and started evacuating Pakistani armed personnel and equipment under its combat arms protection, India and its armed forces in the theatre would have been placed in a very embarrassing position. Action against the task force would have meant open war against a superpower, and this would have prompted other powers to intervene, with the possibility of an escalation into an international conflagration, an eventuality India did not want. But Niazi’s rapid collapse saved India this embarassment. The abject surrender brought Pakistan humiliation which it would find it difficult to live with.

Notes:

  1. Asian Recorder, Vol XVIII, No 2 p 10563.
  2. For an hour-by-hour account of the events leading to the surrender of the Pakistani forces in Bangladesh, see Asian Recorder, Vol XVIII, No. 3 p. 10566.
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