Indian Defence Review

For a while, jubilant mobs took over and went on the rampage, but order was soon re-established. Niazi had to be extricated from the crowd at the race course and placed under strong escort to prevent him from being lynched. On the other hand, his Indian counterpart Aurora was carried shoulder high with acclaim as the liberator of Bangladesh.

Niazis selection proved unfortunate for Pakistan. He was unimaginative and did not grasp the situation in the province in its true perspective.

Lieut Gen Amir Abdullah Khan Niazi was selected to take over from Gen Tikka Khan in August 1971, when under local and international political pressures Yahya Khan made an effort to establish some measure of civil control in East Pakistan. Dr A. M. Malik was accordingly installed as Governor and Niazi as Martial Law Administrator and Commander Eastern Command. From the Pakistani point of view, it would have been preferable to retain Tikka Khan in command of the troops in view of his knowledge of local problems, but his image as the “butcher of Bangladesh” was becoming an obstacle to the pacification programme to be carried out under the new setup.

Niazi’s selection proved unfortunate for Pakistan. He was unimaginative and did not grasp the situation in the province in its true perspective. He was engrossed in platoon and company actions in the border outposts and failed to see the magnitude of the military, political and economic problems facing him. Although personally brave and known for his daring visits to forward troops under fire, he did not inspire confidence in the perception and conduct of operations at the higher plane.

Fear of defeat started germinating in Niazis mind from 6 December onwards, that is two days after the start of all-out hostilities in East Pakistan.

The eastern theatre, far removed from the Pakistani General Headquarters in Rawalpindi needed a man of crisis who could face up to the sensitive and ticklish problems confronting him both in the short and long terms and conduct operations with the minimum supervision and guidance. On the other hand, Niazi liked worldly pleasures and the pomp and show of the status he enjoyed, and he indulged in them freely. He was certainly not the man for the job in hand. He lost the battle before it started.

Fear of defeat started germinating in Niazi’s mind from 6 December onwards, that is two days after the start of all-out hostilities in East Pakistan. His appraisal of the situation, passed on to Pindi for the benefit of his superiors, was that India had invaded the province with eight infantry divisions, four armoured regiments, 39 BSF battalions, and 60,000 to 70,000 Freedom Fighters. Against superior air strength, the Pakistani Air Force had been shot out of the skies and as a result the Indian Air Force operated in complete freedom. Attacks by Indian troops were supported from the air with rockets and napalm. The Freedom Fighters were extremely active in the interior and had attacked bridges, ferries and lines of communication. Because of the extensive disruption they had caused, replenishment of supplies, reinforcing troops and readjustment of defensive positions had become extremely difficult.

He (Niazi) reiterated that he and his men would fight to the last man and to the last round,” a course that was belied by this earlier note of despondency. This massage was picked up by the Indian intercept services and was exploited in building up psychological pressure against Niazi and his troops.

Niazi’s fortresses at Dinajpur, Rangpur, Maulvi Bazaar, Brahmanbaria, Laksham, Chandpur and Jessore were under heavy pressure although still holding out. Chittagong was likely to be cut off any moment. His troops had been involved in counterinsurgency and other active operations for nine months and were battle-weary. Niazi counted the war in the east as having started on 17 November with the battle of Bayra, and the attrition of both men and material had greatly increased without hope of recoupment.

Paucity of armour, artillery and air support had aggravated the situation. Desertion of Razakars and Mujahids to the Indians had increased manifold. Niazi however assured the Pakistani higher command that his troops were in good spirits, had inflicted heavy casualties on the Indians, and would fight to the bitter end. He also informed them that they would fall back on the rear defensive positions, resorting to the fortress defences. He reiterated that he and his men would fight to the last man and to the last round,” a course that was belied by this earlier note of despondency.

This massage was picked up by the Indian intercept services and was exploited in building up psychological pressure against Niazi and his troops. With the ever-increasing pressure of the developing Indian thrust lines and psychological warfare, the tone of Niazi’s messages to Rawalpindi became more and more despondent. He went on emphasising the critical shortage of men and material, knowing fully well that these deficiencies could not be remedied at that stage. Battle conditions on 6 December were not however as grim as he reported to his superiors.

The Pakistanis had given a good account of themselves in fighting the initial battles closer to the border, and by and large had fallen back intact on the main defensive fortresses. In fact, they were putting up a spirited fight and resisting the Indian efforts to overcome them. The Indian thrusts had managed to bypass the islands of resistance at places, but no serious threat had developed in the rear areas so far. Instead of taking charge of reorganising and readjusting his defence zone, Niazi went on lamenting on the hopeless situation he and his troops supposedly found themselves in.

On 7 December, Yahya Khan, in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief, commended Niazi for the brave resistance put up by his troops against heavy odds and advised him to hold on to his defensive positions regardless of loss of territory. The Chief of Staff of the Pakistan Army assured Niazi that Chinese and American intervention was soon likely and that he should sustain the resistance long enough to make this possible. But there did not however seem to be any tangible basis for such an assurance. Perhaps it was given to encourage Niazi to keep his end up while efforts were made to seek a political solution in the United Nations, which was debating the issue.

Yahya Khan could do little more than reassure the Governor that the world powers were making serious efforts at the UN to pass a ceasefire resolution.

Governor Malik joined Niazi in painting a hopeless picture of the situation, obviously based on Niazi’s briefing. He confirmed the collapse of the civil administration because of increasing rebel activities. The movement of supplies was paralysed, and he warned Rawalpindi that Dacca would be without food in seven days. Law and order had broken down and the writ of the Freedom Fighters ran in the entire countryside. Non-Bengali and other loyal elements faced sure butchery the moment the Indians broke through the Pakistani defences. Malik emphasised that if any friendly foreign power meant business nothing less than physical intervention would help, and that too should materialise within the next 48 hours.

If no help of this nature was possible, Malik asked for permission to open negotiations for a ceasefire on honourable terms. This would save unnecessary destruction of property and loss of lives. To prolong the struggle when the end appeared inevitable was, according to him, utterly futile. Yahya Khan could do little more than reassure the Governor that the world powers were making serious efforts at the UN to pass a ceasefire resolution. On 7 December, Pakistan managed to secure a favourable resolution in the General A ssembly, and it was apparent that within a short period a ceasefire would be forced on the warring nations by overwhelming world pressures.

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This impelled the Indian forces to intensify their operations to make the maximum gains before hostilities ceased. Niazi should have made efforts to frustrate the Indian attempts to make further ingress, but he seemed to have given up altogether. He reportedly informed the Chief of Army Staff on 9 December that regrouping troops and readjusting defences had become impossible because of Indian mastery of the skies and the extreme hostility of the local population. He emphasised that movement even by night was difficult because of the extensive disruption of surface transport facilities. He however assured his superiors that his troops were putting up a good fight and would continue to do so as long as required by the national interest.