The unexpected speed of the operations towards Dacca in this sector emboldened the Army Commander to allot 340 Mountain Brigade Group, then engaged at Bogra under Thapan, to harden the punch towards Dacca, little knowing that the allotted brigad was inextricably involved in the Bogra battle and there were no other formations handy to relieve it. And even if the bridge had been available the ferry sites across the Jamuna were either in Pakistani hands or rendered inoperable. This promise of support elated Nagra for a while, but the reality soon dawned on him and he set about dealing with the situation with his own resources, although he was looking forward to some armour to deal with the tanks holding up his advance beyond the Turag.
By the last light of 14 December, Nagra managed to establish a firm base on the Turag with 95 Mountain Brigade Group. 13 Guards and 13 Rajputana Rifles were on their way from the rear areas but had not yet fetched up. 167 Mountain Brigade Group under Irani was in the process of concentrating in the area of Tangail. 2 Para Battalion was also collecting itself. Although the essential fighting transport with the unit had come over its entire administrative transport fleet, as well as that of the sector, was still north of the Brahmaputra. Kler’s force had got stuck along the Turag, and the development of further operations along this axis would have to wait for the buildup of the remainder of the forces. But time was running out fast.
En route, Sant Singh was required to establish a roadblock in the area of Nayarhat to intercept Pakistani troops crossing from the west.
Nagra brought Sant Singh forward and, allotting him 13 Guards, just concentrated in the Chandpur area, asked him to advance along the Chandpur-Sabhar-Mirpur axis to secure Sabhar by the first light on 15 December and capture Mirpur Bridge by the next day. En route, Sant Singh was required to establish a roadblock in the area of Nayarhat to intercept Pakistani troops crossing from the west. On completing this forward movement, 167 Mountain Brigade Group was either to resume the advance towards Dacca if Kler had been able to establish a bridgehead across the Turag or cross the river south of Kler’s brigade and establish a roadblock astride the Tungi road, about three miles north of Tungi.
Sant Singh started his advance with 13 Guards along the Chandra-Sabhar-Mirpur axis about 2200 hours on 14 December. No information regarding the expected opposition along this route was available, but it was expected that some would be met near Sabhar, and that the bridge would certainly be held in strength and was likely to be supported by some tanks. Any advance beyond Sabhar in daylight would therefore have met with disaster. Nagra’s weakness in antitank potential was becoming apparent. After having established a block at Nayarhat, 3 Guards contacted Sabhar in the early hours of 15 December, and while the position was being outflanked the Pakistanis withdrew in haste without a serious fight. A military farm and transmitting station areas were cleared by 0900 hours while intermittent fire continued from the builtup area of the town.
A prisoner of war later revealed that a composite force of some 400 Razakars and Rangers under a major had been hastily dispatched and had reached Sabhar only on the afternoon of 14 December. According to him, about 800 men had followed them through the place from Magura to Dacca. By the end of the day, Sant Singh secured the town, causing casualties to the Pakistani holding troops to the tune of 18 killed and 20 wounded at the cost of his own two killed and 14 wounded, and capturing some 60 small arms. Fearful of the Pakistani tanks operating on the axis, Nagra brought in 2 Para Battalion, the only unit equipped with four 106-mm recoilless guns and RPG7s, to take over the advance from Sabhar in darkness.
The Para Battalion resumed the advance at 2200 hours on 15 December, leading with the modified jeeps on which medium machine guns were mounted. After overcoming a few minor delaying positions it contacted the Mirpur bridge defences about 0200 hours on 16 December. The battalion had firmed in on the western side of the bridge and made a bold effort to rush it with a modified jeep party and a commando platoon, but suffered heavy casualties. The casualties, both in jeeps and personnel, lay on the bridge, and the raiding party rejoined the battalion’s firm base to the west of the bridge.
The very fact that the Pakistanis were not able to destroy the bridge speeded the entry of Indian troops into Dacca the next morning.
Although the bridge was not physically secured, the Para Battalion dominated it with fire to the extent that although the bridge was prepared for demolition the Pakistanis were not able to execute this task. The Indian casualties comprised one officer wounded, four other ranks killed and one taken prisoner. Two jeeps were destroyed. This was a foolish, but nonetheless bold, action which failed.
Mirpur Bridge, across the Budhi Ganga, is the gateway to Dacca. It was surrounded by a sprawling colony on both sides of the river. The very fact that the Pakistanis were not able to destroy the bridge speeded the entry of Indian troops into Dacca the next morning. Otherwise, the construction of a bridge, with no equipment within easy reach, would have taken days.
With this came the end of the hostilities in East Pakistan. Although officially the northern sector had been placed under the operational command of Headquarters IV Corps, they had no contact with each other till the surrender ceremony.
Meanwhile, 167 Mountain Brigade was taking time to concentrate forward. To speed up the operation, Nagra pushed up 10 J and K Rifles, the only battalion concentrated so far, and two companies of 7 Bihar. These battalions crossed the Turag on the night of 15/16 December, at sites already reconnoitred and prepared for them by Kler’s brigade, and established themselves between Autpara crossroads and Tungi, on the main axis facing north and south, about midnight. A convoy of nine vehicles carrying troops and ammunition from Jaydebpur to Dacca was ambushed by this force about 0400 hours on 15 December. All the vehicles were set ablaze, 16 Pakistanis were killed, three captured, and the remainder got away.
Prisoners confirmed that about 400 to 500 men under the redoubtable Col Mahmood of 31 Baluch were holding the crossroads with two or three tanks. About midday on 16 December, when preparations were afoot for Niazi’s formal surrender of the Pakistani forces in East Pakistan, Mahmood attempted to break through the road-block and join the defences of Tungi. But this bid failed at the cost of heavy casualties to both sides. Fighting went on till late in the afternoon, when a ceasefire was effected by whiteflagged emissaries. It appeared that Mahmood had not received orders to halt hostilities. This valiant officer, who had earlier refused to withdraw Prom Jamalpur, had now spurned surrender orders and tried to break through with no more than 100 men of his own battalion and a few stragglers from other units. With this came the end of the hostilities in East Pakistan. Although officially the northern sector had been placed under the operational command of Headquarters IV Corps, they had no contact with each other till the surrender ceremony.
The British Broadcasting Corporation had announced in its evening newscast on 15 December that India had agreed to a ceasefire in East Pakistan at Gen Niazi’s request from 1700 hours to 0900 hours the next day. Later, at 0400 hours on 16 December, Kler picked up a wireless intercept from Niazi’s headquarters at Dacca advising his troops to observe a ceasefire from 0500 hours. Nagra was to pick up Kler at 0600 hours on 16 December and was apprised of this message. No such information had been received from Headquarters Eastern Command.
…there they got in touch with Niazis headquarters, and at 1100 hours on 16 December they were received outside Niazis office by Brig Bakar, Chief of Staff, Pakistan Eastern Army.
Nagra, accompanied by Kler and Sant Singh, moved to 2 Para Battalion position east of Mirpur Bridge to examine the possibility of a quick entry into Dacca city. On reaching there, he was briefed that there had been no exchange of fire at the bridge from 0500 hours on 16 December. The wireless intercept, as also the ominous silence over the battlefield, prompted Nagra to send through his ADC and two officers of 2 Para Battalion this message to Niazi: “My dear Abdullah, I am here. The game is up. I suggest you give yourself up to me, and I will look after you.” Nagra had been some years earlier Indian Military Attache in Pakistan and knew Niazi personally.
His ADC and the Adjutant 2 Para Battalion drove across the bridge in a whiteflagged jeep to deliver the message about 0900 hours. They returned after an hour and a half, followed by a staff car bringing Maj Gen Mohammed Jamshed, General Officer Commanding Pakistan 36 Infantry Division, operationally responsible for the defence of the Dacca fortress. A major incident was providentially avoided. A whiteflagged jeep carrying a Pakistani captain was on its way to inform Nagra that Jamshed was waiting on the other side of the bridge. Some trigger-happy jawans of Para Battalion opened fire on the jeep, hitting one of their own majors and inflicting a bullet graze wound on the Pakistani officer who had come as the representative of Gen Niazi with an offer of surrender.
Nagra, Kler, Sant Singh and Siddiqi got into Jamshed’s car (Nagra flew his 2 Mountain Division flag on its bonnet) and drove to Jamshed’s headquarters. From there they got in touch with Niazi’s headquarters, and at 1100 hours on 16 December they were received outside Niazi’s office by Brig Bakar, Chief of Staff, Pakistan Eastern Army. Niazi arrived later from his underground bunker, which was some distance away. After informing Headquarters Eastern Command at Calcutta, and also Headquarters IV Corps, Nagra drove straight to Niazi’s headquarters.
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On seeing Nagra enter his office Niazi broke down, and sobbingly commented: “Pindi main bethe hue haramzadon ne marwa diya” (Those bastards at higher headquarters at Pindi have let me down). After crying on Nagra’s shoulder, Niazi turned to Kler, who was wearing a maroon turban and wings, and asked him if he was in command of the Para Brigade dropped at Tangail. He was told that they had dropped only one battalion and he did not quite believe this. He then asked Kler to name his regiment. When told that he belonged to the Corps of Signals, he quipped that in their army they did not give brigades to signal officers. Kler retorted: “No wonder you lost the war.”
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