Indian Defence Review

Finally, in December 1949 UNCIP reported failure to implement the framework of the resolution of August 13, 1948 and suggested arbitration to the Security Council for examining how to bring about demilitarisation on the two sides. General McNaughton of Canada was appointed the mediator for the purpose on December 17, 1949 but he also reported failure on February 3, 1950. McNaughton had proposed demilitarisation in stages on both sides, consistent with requirements for maintenance of security and local law and order. His proposals dealt with Azad Kashmir forces as well as the J&K State Militia.

McNaughtons scheme again took little notice of the basic factor of Indias complaint, sought to balance India and Pakistan in Kashmir and ignored the legal weight of Indias sovereignty over Kashmir

The programme of demilitarisation was to be applicable to Northern Areas also but its administration was to continue with local authorities. McNaughton’s scheme again took little notice of the basic factor of India’s complaint, sought to balance India and Pakistan in Kashmir and ignored the legal weight of India’s sovereignty over Kashmir. His propositions on demilitarisation were, therefore, non-starters. Sir Owen Dixon, an Australian jurist, was then appointed the UN representative by the Security Council on April 12, 1950 with a mandate to make appropriate suggestions in all contingencies.

UN Representative Finds Plebiscite No Longer Feasible

Dixon was not prepared to label Pakistan an aggressor since the Security Council had not given any such finding but he “was prepared to adopt the view that when the frontier of Kashmir was crossed on October 20, 1947, it was contrary to international law and when the units of the Pakistan forces moved into the territory of the state, that too was inconsistent with international law.”But the Security Council was not prepared to support international law in J&K perhaps because some of its powerful members had an agenda of their own, as mentioned earlier.

In his final report to the Security Council, Dixon expressed the opinion that plebiscite no longer appeared to be a feasible solution for Kashmir and partition of the state and allocation of the Valley through some acceptable method would seem to be the only way out. He recommended no further course of action by the Security Council leaving it to India and Pakistan to negotiate among themselves a final solution. Both India and Pakistan were not unfavourable to the idea of partitioning with the fate of the Valley being decided by a plebiscite but there was wide divergence over the manner of holding plebiscite.

The Security Council managed to arrange a ceasefire between the two countries on September 22, 1965 without Pakistan achieving any of its political objectives behind its invasion of Kashmir.

The Security Council appointed another UN representative, Dr Frank Graham, a US diplomat, on April 30, 1951 to look into the question of demilitarisation but he also could not get an agreement by the two sides on the quantum of troops or civilian armed forces to be retained on either side of the ceasefire line. He reported final failure on March 27, 1953.

Ad Hoc Agreement Not Perpetually Binding

In 1957 the Security Council resumed its consideration of the matter following a new reference from Pakistan over the expected adoption of a constitution for the J&K state by the state assembly. The president of the Council, G Jarring of Sweden was named on February 21, 1957 to look into the matter. Jarring suggested an arbitrator be appointed to examine whether Part I of the’ resolution of August 13, 1948 had been implemented by Pakistan. Part I had asked the two parties to refrain from taking any measures to augment their military potential in Kashmir and it was India’s case that Pakistan had failed to carry out the obligations flowing from the ban imposed on augmenting military potential in the state. India, however, could not accept the concept of arbitration, being inconsistent with its legal sovereignty over the state.

In his report Jarring drew attention to “the fact that the implementation of the international agreement of an ad hoc character which has not been achieved fairly speedily, may become progressively more difficult because the situation with which they were to cope had tended to change”. During debates in the Council which followed his report, Jarring suggested referring to the International Court of Justice certain legal aspects of the problem of Kashmir. While India was positive to this approach, Pakistan wanted a political rather than a judicial consideration and is understood to have used diplomatic channels to convey to others that the proposal was not a good one.4

So far as India was concerned, Kashmir now became a closed issue with the Security Council and hereafter for the resolution of the J&K issue a bilateral approach with Pakistan would be considered to be the only acceptable way.

The Security Council now asked Dr Frank Graham to resume his efforts but nothing worthwhile came out of them since Graham was not ready to examine who was at fault for non-implementation of the two main resolutions of August 1948 and January 1949. As Jarring had underlined, the situation in J&K and elsewhere had not remained static. The J&K Assembly had adopted a new constitution for Kashmir on November 17, 1956, reaffirming that the “State is and. shall be an integral part of the Indian Union.” Pakistan had joined in military alliances with the West, making itself a part of the cold war intrigues.

Pakistan had also started flirting with China. In any case, India had earlier given indications to the Security Council that plebiscite, originally promised, could not forever remain the only means of ascertaining the wishes of the people of the state. So far as India was concerned, Kashmir now became a closed issue with the Security Council and hereafter for the resolution of the J&K issue a bilateral approach with Pakistan would be considered to be the only acceptable way. It also became evident that India would not be averse to a solution on the basis of status quo.

Apart from Pakistan, a great deal of responsibility lies with the Security Council for failure to give due consideration to India’s original complaint of January 1948. It could have taken the opinion of the International Court of Justice right in the beginning or later whether the state’s accession to India in October 1947 had legal validity. It should have given a finding after due evaluation of the core question of Pakistan’s aggression against the state in 1947. It should have investigated whether governance of the state after accession was by legitimate authority. It should have also given a finding whether the forces on the other side of the ceasefire line were phantoms of Pakistan or composed of genuine rebels against the state. By not examining these major questions, the Security Council, in the final analysis, proved itself to be partisan, tilting towards Pakistan without due legal or factual basis.

Under Western pressure in the post 1962 Indo-China war period, there was a general effort to make some progress on Kashmir.

At the end of 1949, India had proposed a no-war declaration to Pakistan. It was rejected on the grounds that no method of settling outstanding issues had accompanied it. The offer was remade in 1954 and was again turned down for the same reasons. Ayub Khan, after his military takeover, offered to India in May 1959, joint defence of the subcontinent provided solutions were found for the Kashmir and Indus water disputes and mutual disarmament was agreed to.

In September 1960, the Indus Water Treaty was signed after intricate diplomacy by the World Bank. Absence of any two-­nation theory implications in this exercise was certainly a positive element towards its success. Under Western pressure in the post 1962 Indo-China war period, there was a general effort to make some progress on Kashmir. The Indian proposals centred on partition of the state along the ceasefire line and a no-war declaration. Pakistan’s partition plan envisaged the Pakistan occupied portion of the Valley and a substantial part of Jammu going to her share. There was thus no meeting point for any progress to be recorded.

Pakistan Forces the Issue

Failing in its objective of integrating Kashmir into Pakistan through UN or bilateral contacts, Pakistan now again thought of using force, like Jinnah in 1947, jettisoning political alternatives. There had been throughout this period a continuous strident anti India campaign during which threats of a Jehad were a recurring feature. The Dawn of October 6, 1960 had reported a declaration by Ayub Khan that the Pakistani Army would not allow Kashmir to remain unsolved indefinitely. The crisis in the Rann of Kutch in early 1965 was a prelude to the war that Pakistan forced later that year.

The problem in the Rann of Kutch really involved the demarcation of the border in Gujarat with Pakistan but on April 4, 1965 Pakistani military had attacked Gujarat Police posts. The intention appeared to be to probe Indian will and military preparedness to face a Pakistan military onslaught. Foreign Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto’s comment at that time was that Kutch was not a dispute in itself: it was a part of a much bigger issue the heart of which was in the Srinagar Valley. The Kutch issue was settled through a tribunal which awarded to India on February 19, 1968 all of the areas wrongly claimed by Pakistan except 300 sq. miles out of 3,500 sq.miles.

American supplied Patton tanks received under US military aid programme, about which the Americans had assured India of their being not used against India, were put into use in the war.

Actually, the Rann of Kutch episode was part of a larger Pakistani design, codenamed Operation Gibraltar. In August 1965, as in 1947, a large number of infiltrators who had been trained as guerrillas were sent across the ceasefire line by Pakistan in the hope that they would be able to work up a revolt against the state in favour of Pakistan. As the Pakistani invaders were being beaten up in Kashmir, Pakistan on September 1, mounted an open armoured attack across the international border in the Chhamb district in order to sever Kashmir from India.

American supplied Patton tanks received under US military aid programme, about which the Americans had assured India of their being not used against India, were put into use in the war. The Indian policy had been declared to be to treat any attack on J&K as an attack on India. India was thus forced to retaliate across Lahore and Sialkot sectors compelling Pakistan to abandon its offensive in J&K. The Security Council managed to arrange a ceasefire between the two countries on September 22, 1965 without Pakistan achieving any of its political objectives behind its invasion of Kashmir. The US stopped its military aid to Pakistan, a consequence highly negative to the latter’s interests. The political terms of mutual disengagement were discussed under Soviet auspices at Tashkent in the first half of January 1966. The Tashkent Declaration issued at the end of the meeting was barren for Pakistan so far as its original objectives were concerned. The declaration confirmed an affirmation by both India and Pakistan to settle their disputes through peaceful means.

This affirmation notwithstanding, Pakistan launched a surprise attack on Indian airfields, in 1971. This war proved very costly for Pakistan. It lost its eastern wing, which became a new nation, Bangladesh. The Simla Agreement of June/July 1972, which followed after peace had returned between the two countries, specifically provided that all differences between the two countries should be settled by peaceful means through bilateral discussions.

The agreement specifically mentioned “a final settlement of the problem of Jammu and Kashmir”, through such discussions. It was tacitly understood that this framework would govern the ultimate settlement on Kashmir along the ceasefire line but Bhutto, Pakistani Prime Minister who signed the Simla Agreement, could not subsequently receive approval of this idea by vested interests within his country.