Indian Defence Review

The two-nation theory has mired Indo-Pak relationship into an intractable problem in Kashmir. More than a half-century has gone by after independence and four wars fought during this period but no real progress has taken place towards a solution.

The Pakistani case is that the alphabet K in the original concept of Pakistan, to be created on the basis of two-nation theory, had stood for Kashmir and, therefore, it must get included in the territory of Pakistan. However the British Government, at the time of division of India, had not made the principle of two-nation theory applicable to the princely states.

With the lapse of the British paramountcy, the choice before the rulers of these states was to accede either to India or to Pakistan, depending upon geographical compulsions and requirement of the welfare of the subjects of these states. The states did not have the option of automatic recognition as independent under international law if the instrument of accession was not signed. The instrument of accession signed by the ruler was the legal cover for the transfer of the sovereignty over the state to India or Pakistan, as the case might be.

 Since accession came under abnormal circumstances, India on its own offered to settle the question of confirming accession by a reference to the people, after Kashmir had been cleared of the raiders.

The Maharaja of J&K signed a standstill agreement with Pakistan on August 15, 1947 to preserve the status quo as it existed till then, pending other arrangements to be finalised. The Maharaja proposed a similar relationship with India but India wanted time to think it over. Pakistan, meanwhile, had other plans. Its leadership was aware that the doctrine of two nations had few followers among the Muslims of J&K state and, therefore, the fact of Kashmir being a Muslim majority area was not compelling enough for the Maharaja to decide in favour of accession to Pakistan. The standstill agreement notwithstanding, in the mode of raiders from across the Khyber Pass in the earlier centuries, Pakistan incited tribals from its Western regions to infiltrate into the state and capture it by force for Pakistan.

By October 20, 1947 two thousand tribals had entered Muzaffarabad and by October 27, they were in Baramulla. The tribal incursion had already made the Maharaja approach India with an offer of accession so that military support could be made available to the state to fight the infiltrants. The Instrument of Accession was accepted on October 27, 1947. Since accession came under abnormal circumstances, India on its own offered to settle the question of confirming accession by a reference to the people, after Kashmir had been cleared of the raiders. It is to be noted that this offer was not a legal requirement of accession, which had acquired independent legal validity once the Instrument of Accession, was accepted by India. With accession the J&K state became an integral inviolable part of India.

The Indian military was now sent to J&K to drive out the raiders. Some Pakistani soldiers, on leave, were already in the state fighting along with the raiders but in April 1948, the Pakistan Government decided formally to introduce their troops into Kashmir, to take on the Indian troops which had been making headway. Senior Pakistan military officials later claimed that the Pakistan troops fought with great tenacity since they believed that the two-nation theory had given them a right- to Kashmir.1

Approach to Security Council

Direct appeals from India to Pakistan to stop the infiltration of the tribesmen and Pakistani nationals into the state and settle bilaterally all questions relating to Kashmir having failed, India approached the Security Council on January 1, 1948 “to call upon Pakistan to put an end immediately to the giving of such assistance (to the invaders to cross into India), which is an act of aggression against India”. Pakistan denied giving assistance and claimed that it was discouraging “the tribal movement by all means short of war”.

…neither the Security Council nor the UNCIP took any steps to have the legality of Kashmirs accession to India examined through the International Court of Justice.

In its counter complaint, Pakistan tried to widen the issue, to include all the problems between the two countries, charging India of reservations on partition, genocide and fraudulently bringing about Kashmir’s accession to itself. The Security Council established the UN Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP) on January 20, 1948 to look into the facts. A commitment was forthcoming from both sides for a plebiscite in Kashmir.

However, neither the Security Council nor the UNCIP took any steps to have the legality of Kashmir’s accession to India examined through the International Court of Justice. This failure had the effect of unfairly discounting India’s legal claims on Kashmir and of giving Pakistan an uncalled for equality of status in the dispute.

It was in the highest traditions of democracy and fair play that India had made the reference to the Security Council over Kashmir. Once the Instrument of Accession was signed, India acquired sovereignty over the state and could have pursued the military option of driving out the invaders. While accepting the accession, the offer to ascertain the will of the people was made suo moto. India’s Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru had been an idealist who placed too much faith in the Western powers taking an objective view in the Security Council. Nehru at that time had little experience in real politik and could not anticipate that the real issue of Pakistan aggression would never be judged in the Security Council.

Unrevealed Strategic Aims

Evidence is now forthcoming suggesting that after the Quit India movement of 1942, the British elements both in London and New Delhi of the Churchillian school had felt concerned over how a revived effort by the Soviet Union to expand southwards in the post World War II period should be countered since the British would eventually be leaving the subcontinent. They did not think that an India ruled by people of the Congress ideology would protect Western strategic interests in the area. The Muslim League had been supportive of the British during this period and was, therefore, considered reliable for safeguarding these interests even after the departure of the British.

Pakistan’s strategy in the UN remained throughout to claim a locus in the administration of the state and to stall demands for the withdrawal of infiltrating tribesmen and Pakistan nationals from it.

A new state of Pakistan in the North Western part of British India was considered an ideal buffer. The British, therefore, egged on Jinnah to insist on a Pakistan. Jinnah is quoted as having said that he was offered Pakistan on a platter in 1945.2 This vision of a would-be strategic ally, after Pakistan was created, perhaps explains why the Security Council, under the influence of Western powers, was reluctant to come down hard on Pakistan. Eventually, as subsequent events proved, the Western powers did succeed in roping in the countries of the region through the Baghdad Pact and CENTO to create a strong bulwark to contain the USSR.

Pakistani Aggression Underplayed

Aware of this sympathy, Pakistan’s strategy in the UN remained throughout to claim a locus in the administration of the state and to stall demands for the withdrawal of infiltrating tribesmen and Pakistan nationals from it. The first major Security Council resolution on the subject was of April 21, 1948, which directly asked Pakistan to arrange withdrawal of tribesmen and Pakistani nationals, after which the bulk of Indian troops was also to be withdrawn. The resolution asked the state government to invite major political groups to participate at the ministerial levels while plebiscite was being prepared.

Pakistan conveyed their non-acceptance of the resolution and proposed amendments for stationing of Pakistani troops in all Muslim majority areas of the state and participation of the Azad Kashmir Government, Muslim Conference and National Conference in equal numbers in the interim government. India found the suggestion for participation by all groups in the government of the state to be incompatible with her sovereignty over the state. This suggestion also amounted to recognising the authority of those who were administering the seized parts of the state. India, therefore, rejected the resolution, relationships.

When the UNCIP visited Pakistan in July 1948 for the first time, the Pakistan Government informed them about the entry of Pakistani troops into the state in May in “self defence”; This admission of what constituted formal aggression under international law was not immediately reported to the Security Councilor India by the UNCIP even though it amounted to fool-proof confirmatory evidence of India’s original complaint of Pakistani aggression. Such partiality for Pakistan became the hallmark of the Western attitudes throughout the course of Security Council debates on Kashmir and ultimately convinced India that it was futile to expect idealism to be the currency of international

The local authorities in POK were allowed to administer areas under their occupation and to retain their forces but their quantum and nature were not mentioned. Withdrawal of troops was to precede steps for holding the plebiscite.

Already Prime Minister Nehru’s mind was thinking of a more practical way of dealing with the problem. In one of the meetings with UNCIP in India Nehru indicated that a division of the state between India and Pakistan could be considered for resolving the problem. Sheikh Abdullah had also come round to a similar view. He did not think independence was a real option for J&K state and felt holding a plebiscite would prove too difficult. He, therefore, favoured partition with the Valley and Jammu going to India.3 UNCIP did not project this option due to Pakistan’s total disagreement.

UN Recipe for Kashmir

The two most important Security Council resolutions concerning India’s complaint were of August 13, 1948 and January 5, 1949. The first called for a truce, asked for withdrawal of Pakistani troops from the state since it constituted a material change in the situation from what was originally represented by Pakistan in the Security Council, and stipulated a plebiscite for determining the future of Kashmir. India was to withdraw a bulk of her troops after UNCIP had notified her of vacation of the state by Pakistani forces and tribesmen.

The local authorities in POK were allowed to administer areas under their occupation and to retain their forces but their quantum and nature were not mentioned. Withdrawal of troops was to precede steps for holding the plebiscite. The second resolution established a ceasefire from January 1, 1949. The UNCIP also accepted Indian conditions that the state would retain sovereignty over territories evacuated by Pakistan, no recognition would be extended to ‘Azad Kashmir Government’ and Pakistan would not be involved in the holding of plebiscite.

The Pakistani desire to accept a ceasefire now appeared to have been guided by an assessment that the Indian military had been able to establish a dominating position for themselves.

India also suggested that methods other than plebiscite could also be considered for ascertaining the wishes of the Kashmiris. It was also agreed that residual Indian and J&K State Forces would take care of the security requirements of the state. The Pakistani desire to accept a ceasefire now appeared to have been guided by an assessment that the Indian military had been able to establish a dominating position for themselves.

An agreement over the ceasefire line was arrived at a meeting in July 1949 at Karachi. Thereafter, the problems of disposing of the Azad Kashmir forces, numbering 50,000 quantifying the bulk of Indian troops to be withdrawn and administration of Northern Areas proved insoluble due to insistence by Pakistan on equality with India following the ceasefire and on simultaneous reduction of forces on the two sides.

Both Pakistani demands militated against India’s sovereignty over the state and the artificial dispute so created by Pakistan had the effect of postponing plebiscite which was what Pakistan apparently wanted since it was quite fearful at this stage that the Kashmiris would opt for India in a referendum.For India, holding of a plebiscite under normalised circumstance would have posed no problem but Pakistan’s objective was to seek it under abnormal circumstances. Thus, the two resolutions, even though accepted by the two parties, could not be implemented except for the truce. The stalemate created by Pakistan by not withdrawing its troops continues till today

Finally, in December 1949 UNCIP reported failure to implement the framework of the resolution of August 13, 1948 and suggested arbitration to the Security Council for examining how to bring about demilitarisation on the two sides. General McNaughton of Canada was appointed the mediator for the purpose on December 17, 1949 but he also reported failure on February 3, 1950. McNaughton had proposed demilitarisation in stages on both sides, consistent with requirements for maintenance of security and local law and order. His proposals dealt with Azad Kashmir forces as well as the J&K State Militia.

McNaughtons scheme again took little notice of the basic factor of Indias complaint, sought to balance India and Pakistan in Kashmir and ignored the legal weight of Indias sovereignty over Kashmir

The programme of demilitarisation was to be applicable to Northern Areas also but its administration was to continue with local authorities. McNaughton’s scheme again took little notice of the basic factor of India’s complaint, sought to balance India and Pakistan in Kashmir and ignored the legal weight of India’s sovereignty over Kashmir. His propositions on demilitarisation were, therefore, non-starters. Sir Owen Dixon, an Australian jurist, was then appointed the UN representative by the Security Council on April 12, 1950 with a mandate to make appropriate suggestions in all contingencies.

UN Representative Finds Plebiscite No Longer Feasible

Dixon was not prepared to label Pakistan an aggressor since the Security Council had not given any such finding but he “was prepared to adopt the view that when the frontier of Kashmir was crossed on October 20, 1947, it was contrary to international law and when the units of the Pakistan forces moved into the territory of the state, that too was inconsistent with international law.”But the Security Council was not prepared to support international law in J&K perhaps because some of its powerful members had an agenda of their own, as mentioned earlier.

In his final report to the Security Council, Dixon expressed the opinion that plebiscite no longer appeared to be a feasible solution for Kashmir and partition of the state and allocation of the Valley through some acceptable method would seem to be the only way out. He recommended no further course of action by the Security Council leaving it to India and Pakistan to negotiate among themselves a final solution. Both India and Pakistan were not unfavourable to the idea of partitioning with the fate of the Valley being decided by a plebiscite but there was wide divergence over the manner of holding plebiscite.

The Security Council managed to arrange a ceasefire between the two countries on September 22, 1965 without Pakistan achieving any of its political objectives behind its invasion of Kashmir.

The Security Council appointed another UN representative, Dr Frank Graham, a US diplomat, on April 30, 1951 to look into the question of demilitarisation but he also could not get an agreement by the two sides on the quantum of troops or civilian armed forces to be retained on either side of the ceasefire line. He reported final failure on March 27, 1953.

Ad Hoc Agreement Not Perpetually Binding

In 1957 the Security Council resumed its consideration of the matter following a new reference from Pakistan over the expected adoption of a constitution for the J&K state by the state assembly. The president of the Council, G Jarring of Sweden was named on February 21, 1957 to look into the matter. Jarring suggested an arbitrator be appointed to examine whether Part I of the’ resolution of August 13, 1948 had been implemented by Pakistan. Part I had asked the two parties to refrain from taking any measures to augment their military potential in Kashmir and it was India’s case that Pakistan had failed to carry out the obligations flowing from the ban imposed on augmenting military potential in the state. India, however, could not accept the concept of arbitration, being inconsistent with its legal sovereignty over the state.

In his report Jarring drew attention to “the fact that the implementation of the international agreement of an ad hoc character which has not been achieved fairly speedily, may become progressively more difficult because the situation with which they were to cope had tended to change”. During debates in the Council which followed his report, Jarring suggested referring to the International Court of Justice certain legal aspects of the problem of Kashmir. While India was positive to this approach, Pakistan wanted a political rather than a judicial consideration and is understood to have used diplomatic channels to convey to others that the proposal was not a good one.4

So far as India was concerned, Kashmir now became a closed issue with the Security Council and hereafter for the resolution of the J&K issue a bilateral approach with Pakistan would be considered to be the only acceptable way.

The Security Council now asked Dr Frank Graham to resume his efforts but nothing worthwhile came out of them since Graham was not ready to examine who was at fault for non-implementation of the two main resolutions of August 1948 and January 1949. As Jarring had underlined, the situation in J&K and elsewhere had not remained static. The J&K Assembly had adopted a new constitution for Kashmir on November 17, 1956, reaffirming that the “State is and. shall be an integral part of the Indian Union.” Pakistan had joined in military alliances with the West, making itself a part of the cold war intrigues.

Pakistan had also started flirting with China. In any case, India had earlier given indications to the Security Council that plebiscite, originally promised, could not forever remain the only means of ascertaining the wishes of the people of the state. So far as India was concerned, Kashmir now became a closed issue with the Security Council and hereafter for the resolution of the J&K issue a bilateral approach with Pakistan would be considered to be the only acceptable way. It also became evident that India would not be averse to a solution on the basis of status quo.

Apart from Pakistan, a great deal of responsibility lies with the Security Council for failure to give due consideration to India’s original complaint of January 1948. It could have taken the opinion of the International Court of Justice right in the beginning or later whether the state’s accession to India in October 1947 had legal validity. It should have given a finding after due evaluation of the core question of Pakistan’s aggression against the state in 1947. It should have investigated whether governance of the state after accession was by legitimate authority. It should have also given a finding whether the forces on the other side of the ceasefire line were phantoms of Pakistan or composed of genuine rebels against the state. By not examining these major questions, the Security Council, in the final analysis, proved itself to be partisan, tilting towards Pakistan without due legal or factual basis.

Under Western pressure in the post 1962 Indo-China war period, there was a general effort to make some progress on Kashmir.

At the end of 1949, India had proposed a no-war declaration to Pakistan. It was rejected on the grounds that no method of settling outstanding issues had accompanied it. The offer was remade in 1954 and was again turned down for the same reasons. Ayub Khan, after his military takeover, offered to India in May 1959, joint defence of the subcontinent provided solutions were found for the Kashmir and Indus water disputes and mutual disarmament was agreed to.

In September 1960, the Indus Water Treaty was signed after intricate diplomacy by the World Bank. Absence of any two-­nation theory implications in this exercise was certainly a positive element towards its success. Under Western pressure in the post 1962 Indo-China war period, there was a general effort to make some progress on Kashmir. The Indian proposals centred on partition of the state along the ceasefire line and a no-war declaration. Pakistan’s partition plan envisaged the Pakistan occupied portion of the Valley and a substantial part of Jammu going to her share. There was thus no meeting point for any progress to be recorded.

Pakistan Forces the Issue

Failing in its objective of integrating Kashmir into Pakistan through UN or bilateral contacts, Pakistan now again thought of using force, like Jinnah in 1947, jettisoning political alternatives. There had been throughout this period a continuous strident anti India campaign during which threats of a Jehad were a recurring feature. The Dawn of October 6, 1960 had reported a declaration by Ayub Khan that the Pakistani Army would not allow Kashmir to remain unsolved indefinitely. The crisis in the Rann of Kutch in early 1965 was a prelude to the war that Pakistan forced later that year.

The problem in the Rann of Kutch really involved the demarcation of the border in Gujarat with Pakistan but on April 4, 1965 Pakistani military had attacked Gujarat Police posts. The intention appeared to be to probe Indian will and military preparedness to face a Pakistan military onslaught. Foreign Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto’s comment at that time was that Kutch was not a dispute in itself: it was a part of a much bigger issue the heart of which was in the Srinagar Valley. The Kutch issue was settled through a tribunal which awarded to India on February 19, 1968 all of the areas wrongly claimed by Pakistan except 300 sq. miles out of 3,500 sq.miles.

American supplied Patton tanks received under US military aid programme, about which the Americans had assured India of their being not used against India, were put into use in the war.

Actually, the Rann of Kutch episode was part of a larger Pakistani design, codenamed Operation Gibraltar. In August 1965, as in 1947, a large number of infiltrators who had been trained as guerrillas were sent across the ceasefire line by Pakistan in the hope that they would be able to work up a revolt against the state in favour of Pakistan. As the Pakistani invaders were being beaten up in Kashmir, Pakistan on September 1, mounted an open armoured attack across the international border in the Chhamb district in order to sever Kashmir from India.

American supplied Patton tanks received under US military aid programme, about which the Americans had assured India of their being not used against India, were put into use in the war. The Indian policy had been declared to be to treat any attack on J&K as an attack on India. India was thus forced to retaliate across Lahore and Sialkot sectors compelling Pakistan to abandon its offensive in J&K. The Security Council managed to arrange a ceasefire between the two countries on September 22, 1965 without Pakistan achieving any of its political objectives behind its invasion of Kashmir. The US stopped its military aid to Pakistan, a consequence highly negative to the latter’s interests. The political terms of mutual disengagement were discussed under Soviet auspices at Tashkent in the first half of January 1966. The Tashkent Declaration issued at the end of the meeting was barren for Pakistan so far as its original objectives were concerned. The declaration confirmed an affirmation by both India and Pakistan to settle their disputes through peaceful means.

This affirmation notwithstanding, Pakistan launched a surprise attack on Indian airfields, in 1971. This war proved very costly for Pakistan. It lost its eastern wing, which became a new nation, Bangladesh. The Simla Agreement of June/July 1972, which followed after peace had returned between the two countries, specifically provided that all differences between the two countries should be settled by peaceful means through bilateral discussions.

The agreement specifically mentioned “a final settlement of the problem of Jammu and Kashmir”, through such discussions. It was tacitly understood that this framework would govern the ultimate settlement on Kashmir along the ceasefire line but Bhutto, Pakistani Prime Minister who signed the Simla Agreement, could not subsequently receive approval of this idea by vested interests within his country.

There is speculation that his (Zia) death in the air crash was actually a planned assassination, arranged by those who were in reality opposed to the policy of reconciliation with India.

There was a major effort during Zia’s years of power to break out of this psyche. Towards the closing part of his rule, it had dawned on Zia that a policy of continuous hostility with India required very heavy expenditure, reducing the budget for social, economic and infrastructural development and the real sufferers in the process were the vast numbers of people of Pakistan. A new confrontation had developed between India and Pakistan in the early 1980s in the glacial wastelands of Siachin, placing new burdens on the economy, which perhaps prompted the new direction of thinking by Zia in whose person the offices of the President of Pakistan and Chief of Army Staff were combined. He was thus in a position to ensure a unanimous policy initiative.

Barbara Crossette, correspondent of New York Times in New Delhi in the early 1990s, following an interview with Rajiv Gandhi on May 21, 1991, quoted him as saying that in Zia’s time India and Pakistan could have solved all their major problems and “were close to finishing agreement on Kashmir. We had the maps and everything ready to sign.” These initiatives ultimately collapsed when Zia was killed in a mysterious air crash in August 1988. There is speculation that his death in the air crash was actually a planned assassination, arranged by those who were in reality opposed to the policy of reconciliation with India. After his death, the generals who had consented to the new approach while he was alive and their leader apparently withdrew their consent. The new Zia line was never consummated.

The military incursion in Kargil in 1999 as a climax of the low intensity proxy war in J&K was the latest manifestation of a rigid and frigid mind set, conditioned by years of belief in the two-nation theory.

There is reason to believe that Nawaz Sharif had also come to the conclusion that unattainable goals should be given up and that in the interests of the people of Pakistan, ways should be found to get rid of Indo-Pak problems. Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee’s Lahore bus Yatra in February 1999 appears to have been part of such diplomacy. But the military brass of Pakistan did not see eye to eye with Sharif. Kargil more than proves it.

CBMs: A Futile Exercise

In this context, the Confidence Building Measures (CBMs), so assiduously being pursued by enlightened groups on both sides of the border, seem to have little future for India and Pakistan at this moment. To be successful, CBMs have to be backed by political will and steadfastness. Since the 1980s a number of CBMs have been put in place in military and other fields but the absence of these two ingredients on the part of Pakistan have kept the core questions stalled.

The Lahore Declaration of 1999, signed during Prime Minister Vajpayee’s visit to Lahore, established a number of CBMs in the nuclear area but the confidence and trust generated thereby were rudely shattered by Pakistan’s clandestine manoeuvres and sneak attack in Kargil. This is proof, if proof is needed, that even the danger of a nuclear inferno in the subcontinent is inadequate to promote the objectives of CBMs.

The real leaders of Pakistan i.e. the military brass have viewed CBMs as of merely cosmetic value. They are the ones who put roadblocks to developing even a mutually beneficial economic relationship between the two countries. The Chinese support to the nuclear and missile programme in Pakistan invests the latter leadership with a sense of self assurance that provides the backdrop to the absence of a desire to improve relations with India despite many adverse domestic circumstances in Pakistan.

ISI Activities a True Indicator

More than anything else, the nature of operations of Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) in India spells out the designs, which have been chalked out against India. After having tried to foment militancy in Punjab and Kashmir, the ISI is now working on a much more ambitious programme. It is seeking to encircle India from North and North East through a web of insurgency by coordinating with ULFA of Assam, NSCN of Nagas and PLA of Manipur. It is building an axis between Kashmir Mujahideen and the Jehadi forces, which operated so successfully against the Soviets in Afghanistan, to divert them towards Kashmir. It has started targeting the rest of India also for stoking the fires of Islamic fundamentalism.

The Chinese support to the nuclear and missile programme in Pakistan invests the latter leadership with a sense of self assurance that provides the backdrop to the absence of a desire to improve relations with India despite many adverse domestic circumstances in Pakistan.

The Jehadi groups, which took root in Pakistan during the Afghan campaign, are its collaborators for training and brainwashing volunteers for operations in Kashmir and India. Recruitment is open to any Muslim from any part of the world as it was when the theatre was Afghanistan. Links with Islamic fundamentalist organisations, found among different countries, give the effort a pan Islamic character. The Jamait-I-Islami (JI) units in neighbouring countries like Nepal and Bangladesh provide support to operations from these countries.

The principal Jehadi organisations, collaborating in Pakistan, are the Markaz-e-Oawah-ul-Irshad (MOI), whose field arm is Lashkar-e-Toiba; Hizbul Mujahideen, a front of the JI; and Harkat-ul-Mujahideen, sponsored by Jamait-ul-Ullema. All of these organisations believe in a puritan form of Islam, as embodied in Sunni orthodoxy, and consider Jehad a legitimate activity to achieve this goal. Their volunteers are taking on suicide assignments. As a result, many recent episodes have displayed a great deal of dare-devilry on their part. The organisations are funded and equipped by the ISI with weapons like AK 47, machine guns, anti aircraft machine guns, rocket launchers, ROX, etc., to which only a government can have access.

Speaking on November 17, 2000 the MDI chief Mohammed Saeed indicated that the Mujahideen had already chalked out a plan to carry out lethal attacks in the interior of India and would penetrate deep into India for its disintegration.6 This is not an empty boast because already some cells have been identified and neutralised in India. There are bound to be many more.

The moot question is whether the army, which is the lord and master of ISI, can ever call off such operations particularly since all the leading countries of the world, including Pakistans friend China, are condemning terrorism.

When General Parvez Musharraf recently said that Jehad was the religious duty of every Muslim, he was echoing the philosophy of these organisations and thereby encouraging them.

The moot question is whether the army, which is the lord and master of ISI, can ever call off such operations particularly since all the leading countries of the world, including Pakistan’s friend China, are condemning terrorism. It seems Pakistan’s situation has become somewhat like that of a man riding a tiger. Dismounting has the potential of some risks. Speaking in the context of current efforts to find a formula to establish a durable peace along the Line of Actual Control in Kashmir, the JI chief Qazi Hossain Ahmed has already expressed dissatisfaction and accused General Musharraf of working against national interests. He has gone to the extent of appealing to the Generals in Pakistan to replace Musharraf.7

Obviously, the initiative’ has passed out of the hands of the Government agencies where, it seems in some crucial areas of policy, the ISI has been reduced to playing a second fiddle to militant organisations. The scene is somewhat reminiscent of the Taliban who rode into power in Afghanistan on the strength of their Islamic fundamentalist credentials. The Taliban also believe in Jehad in Kashmir and elsewhere. The portents in Pakistan are certainly not encouraging for India.

The politics of two-nation theory have now evolved into the politics of terrorism and Jehad, which can spiral out of control. While the two-nation theory was an issue between those who wanted Pakistan and those who wanted India to remain undivided, foreigners are being given a toehold in the equation between the two countries which remains as irresolvable today as it was in 1947, thanks to this two-nation theory.