The second incident (Wangdung Incident) was in area of Sumdorong Chu, a rivulet flowing north-south in the Thag La triangle, bound by Bhutan in the west and the Thag La ridge to the north, where Chinese started intruding south of McMahon Line in June 1986, while claiming they were north of it. The initial intrusion of 40 PLA, one to two kilometres deep inside Indian territory, swelled up to 200 by August and Chinese even constructed a helipad. India even suggested a way out of the crisis by suggesting that if the Chinese withdrew in the coming winter, India would not re-occupy the area in the following summer but China rejected the offer. India then airlifted troops to occupy ridges overlooking the intrusion area. In October 1986, Deng Xiaoping warned India against taking any action, threatening to teach India a lesson like China did to Vietnam. Subsequently, China brought massive reinforcements into Tibet. Consequently, the Indian Army moved three Divisions to positions around Wangdung. Eventually, pursuant to political level parleys, the two sides agreed to a simultaneous withdrawal of their troops from the four border posts (two Indian and two Chinese – in the Sumdorong Chu valley).
Having got Tibet on its plate, China has suddenly staked its claim to entire Arunachal Pradesh since 2006…
The third and most recent intrusion (deepest since the 1962 Sino-Indian War) intrusion that the Chinese made in April this year was in the area of Daulat Beg Oldi (DBO) in Ladakh Region. India officially acknowledged this intrusion was 19 kilometres deep inside Indian territory though the distance from KK Pass (North-eastern extremity of J&K State) was actually 30 kilometres. The Government of India also maintained that this was an intrusion at the local PLA commander’s level considering that the Chinese Foreign Minister was to visit India in close succession of the intrusion. These premises were unfounded since such a deep intrusion at local level is impossible given the control of CCP battalion level upwards.
Besides, Chinese strategy has always been based on shock and surprise. This was a psychological challenge posed to the Indian hierarchy and India’s response was lukewarm, simply establishing a post in front of the Chinese intrusion. Eventually, the Chinese did withdraw but not before some 25 days displaying a massive red banner stating this was Chinese territory and compelling India to dismantle its structures in areas near Chumar.
The India-China joint working group meetings over the years have not made much headway. The April 2013 Chinese intrusion apparently did not come up for discussion during the Indian Foreign Minister’s visit to Beijing. This may have been construed by China as the soft image of India. Just before Chinese Premier Li Keqiang’s visit to India, there was another intrusion by the PLA in Ladakh which was again downplayed by India. On June 12, 2013, three Chinese nationals (Sunni Muslims named Adil, Salamo and Abdul Khaliq aged 18-23 years) were apprehended by the army inside Indian territory near Sultanchushku in Ladakh carrying political maps in Arabic in the same area. It was not clear from where they had entered though possibly they could have entered through the Raki Nala, the Jeevan Nala or North of DBO.
Chinese strategy has always been based on shock and surprise…
It is significant to note that the April 2013 PLA intrusion too, was in the area of Raki Nala. Chinese nationals with fake Indian documents had been apprehended during 2012 also in the Eastern theatre on a mission to contact North-east insurgents. China has also been supporting ULFA and has supplied arms, communications equipment and arms manufacturing capability to Indian Maoists and the PLA of Manipur. On June 16, 2013, Chinese troops intruded more than a kilometre into Sikkim’s northernmost point (called Finger Point). Only a month ago, Chinese soldiers had threatened to demolish stone structures in the area. That warning was subsequently echoed and endorsed by Chinese officials.
The 16th round of talks between the Special Representatives of India and China on the boundary question took place in Beijing on June 28-29, 2013. Maintenance of peace and tranquility border areas including possible additional Confidence Building Measures, ways and means of strengthening existing mechanisms for consultation and coordination on border affairs and methodology to enhance the efficiency of communications between the two sides were reportedly discussed, which is no different from previous such meetings without much headway though the usual fanfare of ‘fruitful talks’ was credited to the event.
There is proposal of a new Border Defence Cooperation Agreement (BDCA) but that is of little consequence considering China’s past record of not respecting agreements. The latest example is the open defiance of the Agreement on the Maintenance of Peace along the Line of Actual Control which India and China signed in 1993. In April 2013, China intruded 19 kilometres into India territory and brazenly maintained that the intruded area was on Chinese side of the LAC.
Acceptance of any intrusion in terms of Chinese perceptions is that bit of territory having been ceded…
Just prior to the Indian Defence Minister’s visit to China in July 2013, Luo Yuan, the Deputy Director at a PLA academy told Chinese reporters, “The Indian side should not provoke new problems and increase military deployment at the border areas and stir up new trouble.” Though these are routine Chinese tactics, they also smack of considerable arrogance. The issue was ignored by India. The next India-China joint exercise is scheduled in October 2013, which does not mean much because there has been no apparent change in Chinese attitude towards India including in stoking internal instability by supporting and arming insurgencies.
Analysis of Chinese Behaviour
China’s perceives herself as the second pole after the US in the multi-polar world she strives for. However, within this ambit, she aims for an unequivocal China-centric Asia and as part of this strategy, views India an inconvenient hindrance. Hence the erratic ‘carrot and stick’ policy against India and the penchant to play the Pakistan card both politically and asymmetrically. Chinese strategy focuses on the mind of adversary’s political leadership as the centre of gravity, which it keeps attacking through multiple means. Therefore, acceptance of any intrusion in terms of Chinese perceptions is that bit of territory having been ceded. Analyses of the aforementioned three major cross border incidents shows that whenever India has taken a firm stand, China has backed off. This will remain a reality in future as well no matter the levels to which Chinese comprehensive power rises. To that end, the key uncertainty whether Chinese economic growth will continue or plateau or witness a bubble burst effect is already plaguing China.
Then there is the moot point whether China will be able to contain internal sub-national movements (Xinjiang, Tibet, Inner Mongolia) or will they lead to increased violence thus limiting China’s external hegemonic designs. At the same time, whether Chinese nationalism becomes hyper with propensity to miscalculate or over-react to perceived sensitive situations will remain intrinsic to Chinese behavior. Unfortunately, our Foreign Minister’s trivialising the serious Chinese intrusion in April this year sent across a wrong signal and was reminiscent of Nehru calling loss of Aksai Chin a “small matter” to be settled without much difficulty. Such responses can only encourage China to nibble more of our territory. Capitalising on India’s neglect to border areas, China has built roads right up to the LAC that facilitate intrusions. There have also been reports of a road built by China five kilometres inside Indian territory. These reports have been denied by our government. The fact is that there is plenty of ambiguity under the ambit of ‘differing perceptions of the LAC’ by both sides. Both Aksai Chin and Ladakh are known to have large uranium and mineral reserves though no mining has been undertaken.
India has ceded over 400 square kilometres of territory to China in Ladakh alone…
According to former ambassador P Stopden (himself native of Ladakh), over the years India has ceded over 400 square kilometres of territory to China in Ladakh alone. This is not counting the illegal occupation of Aksai Chin (38,000 square kilometres) and Shaksgam Valley (5,800 square kilometres) by China. He would not make such statement without basis. The implications are, therefore, clear – there have been many intrusions in the past that have been hushed up and similar may be the case in the Eastern theatre. The comprehensive communication network developed by China in forward areas is also being used by China for covertly providing rations and money to villagers in selected areas including in East Sikkim to mould local perceptions and facilitate infiltration of Special Operations forces, when required.
In the game of toying with the border and nibbling territory, China is also launching attacks on the cognitive domain focused on the minds of the political leadership of India. This needs to be met resolutely. Ignoring intrusions apart, even smaller incidents such as acquiescing to not hosting the Tricolor in open at Demchhok in Eastern Ladakh, and stopping development work in the border village of Koyul in Leh for fear of the Chinese, will send completely wrong signals. The need for developing our border communications speedily was never more urgent, which we should do without the fear of China, even at the cost of minor confrontations. China will also use all possible means to bring all neighbours of India into the gravitational ambit of China, which is becoming clear in Bhutan. India must refashion its foreign policy accordingly.
…it is in US interest to ensure that India and China never join hands…
At the political and diplomatic front, we should play on the overall territorial expanse of Tibet that India so far has not contested as being an independent country. Considering this vast expanse of territory, China should see reason to accept the McMahon Line as the international border with India. Aksai Chin must be returned to India with India guaranteeing access to China along China’s National Highway 219, which could be renamed Friendship Highway. The Minsar Enclave must be reverted to India, as should be the Darchen Labrang Enclave to Bhutan for sacred religious reasons. At best, these could be adjusted against Chinese occupation of Shaksgam Valley.
China perhaps is unaware that 1962 vintage documents de-classified in the US were categorical in stating that while some weapons can be given to the Indians to stave off the Chinese, it is in US interest to ensure that India and China never join hands. The Chinese leadership needs to take a cue from this unless they cannot get over the pleasures of jointly promoting terror with Pakistan. That is the reason Russia had proposed a Russia-China-India strategic partnership, which China has downplayed.