Indian Defence Review

The Logic of Numbers

When the IAF was established as an auxiliary arm of the Royal Air Force on October 8, 1932, life was relatively simple. The service consisted of a lone No 1 Squadron with four Westland Wapiti bi-planes, five Indian pilots and 25 airmen.

Primarily a defensive force with limited offensive capability, even at the height of World War II, its strength did not exceed ten squadrons. Since Independence, however, the IAF has been involved in four major operations and is now the world’s fourth largest Air Force with around 1,400 aircraft of all types and 130,000 personnel. It operates 59 full-fledged flying stations across the country. But its combat strength has been steadily diminishing and the decline is yet to be arrested. Military planning generally begins with numbers. Although the IAF’s current strength on paper is around 34 squadrons, the number of squadrons it can effectively field in combat may be closer to 30. The anticipated acquisitions of the MMRCA, FGFA, LCA and Su-30MKI aircraft are unlikely to take place as planned. Since all MiG-21 squadrons are due to be phased out by 2017, this could further deplete the IAF’s combat potential. The IAF hopes to reach its government-sanctioned strength of 39.5 combat squadrons only by around 2022. The stated objective is to go up to 42 squadrons.

It has long been held that if the IAF is required to go on the offensive against one adversary and resort to a holding action against the other, it would need at least 50 combat squadrons. However, in the light of the dramatic modernisation of the PLAAF and the significant enhancement of the PAF’s capability, that number may need to be revised sharply upward. During the 1980s, the IAF enjoyed perhaps 2.9:1 superiority over the PAF. The ratio is down to 1.6:1 today and is likely to reduce further. The PAF is acquiring new F-16C/D aircraft with advanced radars, Electronic Warfare (EW) systems and Air-to-Air Missiles (AAMs), some of them with Beyond Visual Range (BVR) capability. It is also scheduled to acquire around 250 Chinese FC-1/JF-17 aircraft that will form the bulk of its combat fleet. Airborne Early Warning (AEW) platforms, including four SAAB-2000 aircraft equipped with the ERIEYE phased-array radar and four Y-8 AEW aircraft from China, will enhance the PAF’s air surveillance capabilities and boost the defensive and offensive potential of its combat aircraft. The IAF still enjoys significant qualitative advantages over the PAF. However, the dwindling numbers of IAF combat aircraft are likely to limit its operational flexibility.

If the IAF has to confront two nuclear-armed adversaries who already deploy close to 700 combat aircraft, more the IAF’s entire combat strength, close to the Indian border, can it hold its own? The situation will only get worse. By 2020, there may be around 1,500 to 2,000 fourth-generation Pakistani and Chinese fighters deployed across India’s borders. The PLAAF alone may have more fourth-generation combat aircraft, armed with advanced AAMs and sophisticated air-to-ground weapons, than the total number of aircraft in the IAF inventory. The IAF needs to carefully consider whether it will be possible to match these numbers.

The Challenge of Training

Training is perhaps the biggest challenge confronting the IAF, this despite concerted efforts to create the best possible training environment. The regular loss of precious lives and expensive aircraft in accidents attributable to human error reflects adversely on the quality of training. It is something the country can ill-afford. A force with the most modern aircraft and weapon systems and operating in a network-centric environment needs to be founded on an equally advanced and sophisticated training system. However, stark deficiencies exist, the gravest one being the absence of a basic trainer aircraft.

The HPT-32 basic trainer, designed and built by Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL), has been practically plagued with problems since its induction in 1984. It suffered from a persistent design defect that reportedly caused 108 engine failures claiming the lives of 23 pilots. In July 2009, a long-overdue decision was taken to ground it. And yet, its likely replacement, the Swiss-made turboprop trainer Pilatus PC-7 Mk II, is not expected to be inducted into the IAF before 2013. By then the IAF will have been four years without a basic trainer, adversely affecting its training schedule. As a result, operational preparedness may also suffer simply because there may not be enough suitably trained pilots to fly the sophisticated aircraft that are due in. Each MiG-21 crash today is understandably a cause for concern, but what of the loss of a prohibitively expensive MMRCA tomorrow?

Over the years, due to shortage of suitable trainer aircraft, there have been numerous changes in the training pattern, sometimes even mid-course. The results of a less-than-optimal pilot training sequence may surface later, sometimes with tragic consequences. At present, the IAF is making do with an all-jet training programme using HAL’s HJT-16 Kiran Mk-I and Mk-II jets. The HJT-16 itself is over three decades old and is due for withdrawal from service soon. Its planned replacement, HAL’s HJT-36 Sitara jet trainer, was scheduled for Initial Operational Clearance (IOC) by the end of 2011, but is delayed. The IAF’s subsequent fighter training, however, remains on track, with a decision in July to purchase 57 more Hawk 132 Advanced Jet Trainers (AJT) to add to the fleet of 66. Hopefully, in a year or so, fighter stream training will be conducted fully on the Hawk, giving the much-maligned MiG-21, till now woefully misused in this role, a well-deserved respite.

The Challenge of Indigenisation

The scheduled induction of sophisticated aircraft and other cutting-edge technologies over the next decade or so are indeed exciting. But they hide a bleak truth. Apart from the LCA Tejas (of as yet unproven and uncertain operational performance) not one aircraft will be indigenously designed and manufactured. Assuming that the life of a modern weapon system is 25 to 30 years extendable by another 10 to 15 years through mid-life upgrade, the aircraft being inducted by the IAF over the decade should remain operational up to 2050, perhaps even 2060. Hence the IAF’s dependence on foreign sources seems set to continue for some more time. This near-total reliance on other countries for modern technology and frontline equipment is a worrisome aspect.

India is the only one of the BRIC countries without a credible aerospace industry. This contrasts sharply with China’s impressive progress towards becoming a major producer of modern aircraft in just a decade or so. China will soon have the capacity to produce 48 fighter aircraft of the J-10 and J-11 class each year and is already looking forward to building its own fifth-generation stealth fighter, the Chengdu J-20. Naturally, therefore, the IAF appears to have abandoned all hope of matching the PLAAF’s combat strength. It may seem unfair to compare India with China or Russia in aircraft design and production, but surely Brazil’s achievements are not beyond reach. However, the IAF may not be entirely responsible for the sorry state of indigenisation. After all, the dangerously depleted state of its combat fleet today can be ascribed in large measure to the failure of the LCA Tejas to become operational as promised. The IAF cannot afford to take too many risks while waiting for a home-grown combat aircraft to turn up.

One dimension that the IAF can profitably exploit is space. And the route to space capability is entirely indigenous, since India has already made impressive strides in space technology. The IAF needs to work closely with the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) to obtain new defensive and perhaps offensive space-based capabilities. The emerging field of cyber warfare is another inviting possibility. With India’s impressive information technology base, it does not lack the capability to equal or even trump anything China might come out with.

As the IAF strives to confront many challenges, it rightly means to transform itself into a capability-based force, rather than an adversary-centric one. In future, the service may have a critical role to play especially in situations demanding rapid response. The IAF’s focus is also shifting from the tactical to the strategic – a process that needs to be accelerated. Apart from combat aircraft, force multipliers such as AWACS, FRA, electronic warfare systems, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) and space-based systems will greatly help. While aiming to “effectively respond to any attempt at undermining India’s national security,” as the CAS put it, will the IAF be able to not only mount a sturdy defence but also take the fight to the enemy’s heartland?