Military & Aerospace

The IAF and its Need for Close Air Support
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Issue Vol. 30.4 Oct-Dec 2015 | Date : 12 Nov , 2016

Rethinking Our Defence Needs

Reducing dependence on imported weapon systems is a long term goal. ‘Make in India’ is a vision not a solution. To fulfill the vision, a practical first step would be to rethink our defence needs, make them more realistic and bring our weapon systems requirements into harmony with our modest defence industrial base, secure in the knowledge that our technological prowess is growing rapidly and eventually imports will reduce. It is possible to tone down our weapon systems requirements without jeopardising our security. It just requires, realistic threat assessment, clarity of vision, good planning and training.

Knee-jerk obsolescence driven procurement seems to be leading the services, particularly the IAF…

Knee-jerk obsolescence driven procurement seems to be leading the services, particularly the IAF, to overstate their defence needs. IAF planners appear so enamoured by the success of US-led air campaigns in Iraq and Libya that they have forgotten that the US lost a war against a diminutive, modestly equipped albeit gritty enemy despite a no holds barred unleashing of its aerial might. Yes, I am talking about the Vietnam War.

Muddled Defence Planning

Quiz any reputed defence analyst in India as to what should the IAF be buying – Rafale, Su-30MKI or LCA and you will receive a prompt answer, even if it is sometimes as bizarre as suggesting that the IAF should be buying the F-35! Ask what the IAF’s war aims would be in case China annexes Tawang district and you will hear either a long silence or a disjointed discourse indicative of someone who has been truly stumped!

The IAF was completely unprepared and largely unequipped for the Kargil War. No one has cared to explain why. India’s contested border with China runs entirely, and with Pakistan almost entirely, along the Himalayas; yet the IAF had equipped itself with attack helicopters and Close Air Support (CAS) fighters that were totally ineffective at high altitude in mountainous terrain! The IAF equipped and trained in total disregard of its responsibility to support Army operations along the LOC and LAC, which is why probably Kargil happened in the first place!

The Mirage-2000 was the only IAF aircraft that gave a good account of itself during Kargil, and that too, after the aircraft was hurriedly kitted for delivering Laser Guided Bomb acquired after the war started! The IAF tacitly acknowledges its utter failure during the initial stages of the Kargil War but publically never admits to its poor planning, preferring to sweep it under the carpet of its better showing during the later stages of the war. As a result, there has been no serious introspection, and consequently no change in the pattern of IAF procurements. They continue to be obsolescence driven, not threat assessment based. And they have an unrealistic air-combat orientation that compromises the IAF’s strike ability.

What the IAF needs for providing the Army good CAS in the Himalayas is a low speed fighter aircraft that is highly manoeuverable…

Next Battlefield Contours

There is near unanimity among analysts in government funded strategic affairs think-tanks that the next war would be confined to the Himalayas, even if it is between India and Pakistan.; the reason being – China, India, and Pakistan are all nuclear armed and any threat to their territorial integrity would lead to nuclear deterrence erosion. In other words, India now does not have the option to negate any gains made by the Pakistani Army in Kashmir with a deep incursion into Pakistan. We will have to restrict the battle to Kashmir with the aim of driving the Pakistani army out of POK.

Gurmeet Kanwal, former Director, Centre for Land Warfare Studies, New Delhi says in the April 2015 issue of Geopolitics, “It is not in India’s interest to enlarge a conflict with Pakistan in the plains sector South of River Ravi due to the possibility of escalation to nuclear exchange.” As a result, “there is a fairly high probability that the next conflict with Pakistan, having broken out in the mountains, will also be limited to the mountainous terrain.”

The next battlefield is known and its contours are tightly placed reflecting relief of mountainous terrain, but an analysis of the IAF’s planned procurement does not suggest that the service is equipping itself well to provide close air support in the high mountains of the Himalayas. The IAF has acquired transport aircraft like the C-130J to support troops in mountainous region but not Close Air Support (CAS) aircraft capable of operating in the terrain. It is almost as if the IAF did not draw any lessons from the Kargil War!

Sukhoi Su-30MKI

Close Air Support in the Mountains

The IAF’s current dedicated CAS fleet consists of Jaguars, MiG-27s and MiG-21 Bisons. None of these aircraft would be in a position to support our troops in the mountains because of their inability to manoeuvre in valleys at high altitudes, and their lack of precision attack capability. As in the Kargil War, Mirage 2000s could provide close air support from stand-off ranges, with the Su-30 MKIs acquired later also capable of chipping in.

The outcome of India’s next war along the LAC or LoC would be decided by how events unfold along the mountainous battlefield…

CAS from stand-off ranges requires substantial inventory of very costly PGMs. Stockpiling PGMs raises capital and revenue costs, since they need periodic maintenance and have limited shelf life. Also, use of PGMs from stand-off ranges works best when a massive intervention is required and there is clear-cut separation between enemy and friendly troops. When smaller intervention is required, or when the lines of separation are fluid, visual identification of target is necessary. The IAF does not have a fighter capable of carrying out attacks after visual identification. As things stand, the morale of our troops battling the enemy in valleys and on mountain slopes is not likely to be buoyed by the sight of an IAF fighter during the entire course of a hypothetical war.

What the IAF needs for providing the Army good CAS in the Himalayas is a low speed fighter aircraft that is highly manoeuverable even at altitudes (to enable it to enter into and fly in valleys) and has good firepower including guns for smaller interventions. The fighter should feature armour protection for its crew, defensive suite with IR and radar decoys, and the ability to suppress enemy defences (Surveillance and AD radars). In other words, the IAF needs a USAF A-10 Warthog-like aircraft that can operate at high altitudes. The Russian analog of the Warthog is the Su-25 (Frogfoot).

Nothing available in the public domain suggests that the IAF has ever projected a requirement for such an aircraft to the government. It is difficult to understand why this is so. Reconnecting with the initial flow of this article, it is interesting to note that developing an A-10 – like aircraft optimised for Indian conditions is well within the proven capabilities of HAL. To compress timelines, HAL could seek US assistance.

The Arjun Mk-2 will be a complete non-performer if the war is taken to the mountains…

Light Tank for High Altitudes

Ironically, the Army has a similar requirement that it has never projected to the government – that of a light tank that could be deployed on the Tibetan plateau using our road and rail infrastructure. China has developed such a light tank. Pictures of the tank, which feature a 105-mm gun with sloped glacis plates armour protection, have appeared on the internet since December 2011. The tank has been sighted on railway flat wagons headed towards Tibet. The DRDO and the Indian army are focused on developing the 66-tonne behemoth – Arjun Mk-2 – which can only operate in the plains or on desert terrain. The Arjun Mk-2 will be a complete non-performer if the war is taken to the mountains.

Conclusion

If India’s next war is likely to be fought along the LAC or LoC, the outcome of the war would also be decided by how events unfold along the mountainous battlefield. With good training and motivation, a well-equipped Indian Army backed by a well laid road and rail infrastructure can hold, and even win, ground against either adversary – China or Pakistan – provided troops are well supported from the air.

The current state of the equipment and training of the Indian Army and IAF surprisingly do not reflect a sharp focus on mountain warfare…

The outcome of the next war is going to be determined less by the IAF’s deep strike or air combat capability, more by its ability to support our troops in mountainous terrain. No matter what targets the PLAAF manages to bomb deep in India, troop positions on the ground will decide whether the war ends in victory or defeat. If our troops are poised to enter Tibet, the war will end on our terms. What the IAF would need to do is dominate the air space over the mountains and unleash its CAS power. It is to be noted that the PLAAF does not have an A-10 – type fighter. Even if it did acquire one, the IAF’s CAS fighter would be able to carry more weapons load because of the proximity of IAF bases located at lower altitudes. Also, PLAAF belligerence could be dealt with war time imports of non-lethal electronic equipment from the US, France and Israel.

The current state of the equipment and training of the Indian Army and IAF surprisingly do not reflect a sharp focus on mountain warfare. The IAF’s planned future fighter aircraft procurements – Rafale, LCA Mk-2, FGFA, AMCA – are all at odds with the threat assessment. It appears that the government’s ‘Make in India’ policy is being thwarted to some extent by lack of accurate threat assessment and planning. To reduce our dependence on weapon imports, we do not need to force the IAF to buy Indian, impose Make-in-India on foreign vendors, or privatise HAL; as much as we need to task HAL/DRDO with projects that address our vulnerabilities, and are well within their proven and growing capabilities.

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The views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily represent the opinions or policies of the Indian Defence Review.

About the Author

Sqn Ldr Vijainder K Thakur

Former Fighter Pilot with extensive flying experience on IAF Jaguar and HF-24 Marut.

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11 thoughts on “The IAF and its Need for Close Air Support

  1. With due regard to your senior veteran status however i am not lagging behind in this regard ie a veteran — i would say that close air support is a gimmick and has never been effective — i am of opinion that long range rocket systems and battle field conventional missiles would be a better answer to troops requirement and if people are very keen a Tejus or weaponised Hawk or an attack heptr would adequately meet the requirement
    on the other hand we have made vijayanta and t series tanks but cannot produce one on our own steam similarly we have made mig s,maruts and su but cannot make independently –why why india can have many more technology transfers but we might not achieve the desired results — we require CONSTANT GOADING or in other words a KICK OR TWO at short intervals

  2. Excellent analysis. What IAF needs to do is to provide CAS(Close Air Support) as and when needed to the Army and Navy and to ensure the aircrafts at its disposal are both manouverable and agile for the conditions in which they operate. No fancy or expensive stuff. Gnats were good enough to combat the PAF Sabres in 65!

    • Don’t think you have any idea what is close air support it is support of own forces when confronted by enemy forces — when distances between them is few hundred yards — when it is very difficult to discern where own ends and theirs start –generally known as FLOT = forward line of own troops — further aircrafts moving at high speed have a problem identifying targets which becomes even difficult in AA/SAM environment — so lets concentrate on battle field missiles

  3. This specific is a great unusual investigation in fact. Precisely what comes about for you to our head will be the prolonged forgotten about Gnat jet fighter. For you to our know-how it turned out indigenously internal HAL through the technological innovation given to with the United kingdom. Really does IAF feel it could be a respectable exercising for you to resurrect a new ‘modern’ variation involving Gnat pertaining to request inside tremendous mountain terrains? Therefore it will have inside know-how set taking place using HAL pertaining to even more analysis along with growth. In addition, one of several wonderful complications involving functioning radar..

  4. I won’t give much importance to Fighter planes Bombers , helicopters , warships , Frigates and submarine. These are all weapon carrying vehicles or vessels. India should concentrate on developing miniature missiles which will disintegrate from the main missiles after reaching the designated height and attack military targets . These miniature missiles can escape from the radar. Maintenance of plane is a costly affair and no Aircraft will be able to escape from S-400 or Barrack 8 missiles.

  5. I do not know whether you have read a book written by Air Marshal Philip Rajkumar (Retd) The Tejas story – “The Light Combat Aircraft Project” . IAF and UPA Govt is mainly responsible for the delay . What is the problem with Kaveri Engine? it achieved a Military thrust (throttled): 0.78 lb/(lbf•h) (79.52 kg/(kN·h). It was designed for 70 KN-h. Tejas was designed to replace Mig- 21 fighter plane.Tejas empty weight is slightly more than Mig- 21. The fact is that some of the IAF officers and Congress leaders interested to purchase Rafael plane to increase pilot casualty during war. There was no necessity for a plane operated by two pilots when there is AWAEs or GPS. When India purchased SU-30 Mki fighter plane there was no AWAEs or GPS. So it was a good decision to avoid communication failure between front gunner and rear gunner. Communication failure was a big problem during 1971 war. Do you know how is the IAF finally accepted Tejas? IAF officers were refused to accept Tejas during UPA period saying it is unfit to fly. Since Antony is a lawyer he could counter you people. The present MoD asked only asked one question to IAF officers. If that is the case why do you continue to fly Mig- 21 knowing well it a flying coffin . All the officers stunned after hearing the question and could not give a satisfactory answer and accepted Tejas. with 40 modifications. Defence officers should be a technical person. My first request to Parrikar was to stop using Mig- 21 fighter planes anymore. because IAF has got 240 Su-30 Mki.

  6. As always, a very accurate & analytical insight, which cuts to the core of the issue.While there may be no need to reinvent the wheel, surely HAL could do no worse than design a low cost 3rd Gen (hydraulic driven) combat aircraft which can be built in numbers and used for anti-insurgency, hinterland defense, coastal air defense, back-up close-air support. A few of them can mount long range radars, loiter well within our airspace and be used fro airborne surveillance and electronic counter measures. Hell, in an EMP scenario, hydraulic propelled aircraft with vacuum tube technology, such aircraft would rule. This kind of venture will broaden the human resource base available and if you allow competition by way of separate bureaus or teams, it will result in innovation

  7. Sir,
    Must congratulate you for a no frills article.Excellent and very incisive appreciation of the problem plaguing our think tank.I feel the day India produces a fighter aircraft engine,there will be no looking back.Are we making adequate effort to develop metallurgy with the help of companies like Bharat Forge etc?.Are we honestly trying to make a success of Kaveri engine?.In the past we failed to reverse engineer OSA AK in the Trishul project.Surprisingly,Cyient eng a Bangalore based co makes software for Boeing and certain fighters of USA.What we need is a patriotic and selfless scientific workforce besides a honest bureaucracy to ‘Make in India’ a reality.

  8. This is an excellent insightful analysis indeed. What occurs to my mind is the long forgotten Gnat fighter. To my knowledge it was indigenously built in HAL from the technology passed on by the British. Does IAF think it would be a worthwhile exercise to resurrect a ‘modern’ version of Gnat for application in the mountainous terrains? In that case there will be in house expertise ready at hand with HAL for further research and development. Also, one of the great difficulties of operating radar technology in the mountains is the multi-path effect due to reflection of radar beams by the surrounding peaks. This causes a huge problem in receivers for extracting correct information. I wonder how far the scientific personnel backing up IAF has researched this area and informed the fighter pilots.

    • Tejas is a modern version of Gnat. Is is a wastage of money to spend money on fighter planes. None of the fighter planes will be able to escape from multiple missile attacks. Kindly read my comments. It will not be difficult for DRDO to develop miniature missile. since ISRO can launch 18 satellites on a single rocket.

      • Well, modern fighter planes carry “countermeasures” to missile attacks. There are many versions, e.g. flares against IR missiles, chaff against RF guided missiles, jammers and so on. These are also equipped with “maws” receiver systems which give advance warning to pilots in battle field air wars when any missile gets locked on to the fighter. If the technology in the fighter is advanced enough and the fighter pilot has command of his counter measure technique and pods, any missile, ground launched or air launched, can be successfully evaded however sophisticated technologically the attacking missile may be. So there will always fighters or interceptors (the naming is used mutually) in the inventory of air forces. I do not know why Tejas are not in favour of IAF. Further, missile firing is an intricate operation, the firing system needs to be equipped with target tracking technology, the IR missiles are exception but then their range of effectivity is very limited.

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