Indian Defence Review

The Social Change

Be that as it may, the strength of tribes in Waziristan lies in the inaccessibility of their area. The tribesmen have used this to their full advantage. The location – inhospitable mountainous terrain bordering between Afghanistan and Pakistan – has given them the flexibility to maintain some independence from central authorities of both countries. Like all other tribes, Wazirs and Mehsuds cherish their independence and are fully conscious of their reputation of ‘honour’ and ‘bravery’. They use these qualities to convey their ethnic superiority.

Over the last decades, the tribal society is, thus, increasingly attached to the settled area both economically and socially.

Wazirs and especially Mehsuds effort to resist any penetration in their enclave was due to their intense independent spirit which almost borders on anarchy. Every Mehsud considers himself as an equal to the other Mehsud – this sentiment was well expressed by one Mehsud leader, Jaggar, to a British officer Evelyn Howell in these words:  ‘Let it be field. Blow us all up with cannon, or make all eighteen thousand of us Nawabs’, suggesting that all were equal. Similarly, the wife of Viceroy Lord Minto had said after the visit to the frontier tribes in April 1906: ‘They fight for the love of fighting, and though at the moment they are contented and peaceful, they say openly that they must soon relieve the monotony by having a rising’.

Of course, gradual change has occurred in Waziristan due to increased interaction of tribes with the government and settled districts adjoining them. As mentioned earlier, the most significant experiment of the British was raising of militias (later called Scouts) from the area. It gave the tribesman an alternative to a boring life of tending the fields. The system has all the incentives that a tribesman can enjoy. He is clothed, fed and given cash. He is given a good rifle, the prized possession and he lives in his own hills with opportunities to use his rifle.

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Over the last decades, the tribal society is, thus, increasingly attached to the settled area both economically and socially. This has limited some of the independence, which the tribesman’s forefathers enjoyed. If he chooses to challenge the central authority, he has to suffer more than his forefathers. On the other hand, the government’s authority to punish the whole tribe is also restricted to some extent due to increased integration of tribesmen into settled districts. And this is precisely what one is witnessing these days in the Swat valley.

Secondly, endowed with this fierce sense of “individual independence”, overwhelming majority of the inhabitants of Waziristan do not consider themselves to be Pakistanis in the legal sense. They simply do not realise that the Durand line has made them Pakistanis. This line for them is artificial in every sense of the term. The other side of the line – “Afghan territory” – is as much their land as this side is (they all are essentially Pasthuns). They have never seen or accepted any restrictions on their movements and the movements of their guests across the Durand line. Nor are they in a mood to accept any such restrictions.

Osama now seems determined to create his own sovereign state comprising Afghanistan, parts of NWFP, Waziristan, Baluchistan and Kashmir as an ideological launching pad for his global terror war.

In fact, going by history and ethnicity, they have more affinity with the people of present day Afghanistan than those in Pakistan. And what is most important, no government in Afghanistan has formally accepted till today that Waziristan is a part of Pakistan. This point needs little elaboration.

The Durand Line

Sir Mortimer Durand, the then foreign secretary of the colonial government of India signed a document with the King of Afghanistan, Abdul Rahman Khan in November 12,1893 relating to the borders between Afghanistan and British India. The line devised was named the Durand Line. The document was to be ratified by the legislative body in Afghanistan. However, it never happened. The Durand Line, which runs though areas inhabited by the Pashtuns, was never accepted by either the Afghanistan government (which signed it under duress) or the Pashtuns (who sought to create their own homeland called Pashtunistan). In fact, In April 1919, Afghan General Nadir Khan had advanced to Tal of Southern Waziristan to reclaim Afghan rights over the region. The area was recovered after a long fight – that killed many – by the British   Brigadier Rex Dyer (of Jalianwala Bagh notoriety).

Besides, Afghanistan’s loya jirga (parliament) of 1949 had declared the Durand Line invalid as they saw it as ex parte on their side, since British India ceased to exist in 1947 with the independence of India and Pakistan. It proclaimed that the Afghan government did not recognise the Durand Line as a legal boundary between Afghanistan and Pakistan.

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This being the situation, every government in Islamabad, military and non-military, has desperately tried to reach a bilateral agreement with successive regimes in Kabul to convert the Durand Line into the international border, but without any success. Even when the Taliban took over Afghanistan, Pakistan, which aided and abetted the Taliban during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, expected, in vain, a favourable response. The then Pakistani interior minister, Moinuddin Haider, called for the revival of the sanctification of the Durand Line, since it had legally lapsed in 1993. It may be noted here that the document between British India and Afghanistan was to remain in force for 100 years. The Taliban regime ignored the Pakistani pleas.