Indian Defence Review

In our context, flight times of missiles to targets could vary from 10 min to 30 min, depending on the location of the launch site and that of the intended target system. Quick detection and interception becomes mandatory to neutralise these missiles in time. 99 percent of atmosphere hovers within 20 miles of Earth. Rockets are required to go above 28 miles of altitude. The SSMs have three important phases of flight; boost phase, cruise phase and terminal attack phase. The major portion of boost and terminal phase is endo-atmospheric and cruise phase is exo-atmospheric. Therefore, the Anti Ballistic Missile (ABM) systems designed would need to tackle the ballistic missiles in all the three phases of flight and hence would require an integrated AD network that includes air and space fusion.

The function of Aerospace Defence requires a synergistic integration between the endo-atmospheric and exo-atmospheric capabilities for all incoming threats utilising air and space environment.

The defence against ballistic missiles would include capability to detect the launch of these missiles, tracking them in all the phases of their flight using ground based radars/space based systems and engage and destroy the missiles either in the boost phase (endo-atmospheric), as close to the launch site as possible or in cruise phase (exo-atmospheric) or destroy the missile in the terminal phase (endo or exo-atmospheric). During the missile launch and boost phase, the SSMs have large infra red signatures. Therefore, Early Warning satellites are required to detect and track their launches. During cruise phase, the target’s temperature closely resembles that of its surroundings, hence detection cannot be effected through detection of IR signature. Different forms of surveillance systems are required to track the missile’s path such as ground based X Band radars and Phased Array Upgraded Early Warning Radars (UEWRs).

The technologies presently operationalised are able to provide defence against SSMs only in their terminal stages of attack and that too they are mostly endo-atmospheric. In Mar 2005, the US Govt offered India advanced version of PAC-2 with radar and engagement system used by PAC-3 missiles and Israel Aircraft Industries offered Arrow-2 Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) technology. The function of Aerospace Defence requires a synergistic integration between the endo-atmospheric and exo-atmospheric capabilities for all incoming threats utilising air and space environment. The atmospheric capabilities are already in place with the IAF, but there is a need to integrate the existing and potential space based capabilities for comprehensive air and space defence of the nation.

Aerospace Assets and India

President APJ Kalam has stated that accomplishments in space have traditionally been a barometer of international status, technological prowess and enhanced military capability. Rapid advancements in Information Technology, Internet and Communications are increasingly utilising space based assets. These assets play a decisive role in shaping the outcome of conflicts and are engines that drive economic growths. India and China are likely to be the economic powerhouses of the 21st Century.  India is also emerging as a key balancer of Asian stability. By its combined military and space technology, India would be required to contain regional conflicts and prevent unscrupulous exploitation of the Indian Ocean region.

There are 800 active satellites orbiting the earth. The number is expected to grow to 2000 by 2010. India itself is planning to launch Cartosat-2/2A/2B, RISAT-2, INSAT 4A/4B/4C/4D/4E, INSAT-3D, SRE-1, GSAT-4, GSAT (MK-III) and Chandrayan ASTROSAT by 2008. The worldwide revenue from the space sector alone is likely to increase from $800 bn to $3 trillion by 2015. As military and economic power becomes more dependent on space based capabilities, the potential for attack on these capabilities would increase. This would be a low cost covert option for an adversary to inflict damage to our economic and military strengths.

An ASAT weapon called “Parasitic Satellite” has completed ground testing and plans are afoot to conduct its testing in space. These nano satellites could be covertly attached to friendly orbiting satellites.

Analysis of the use of space by US and allied forces during Gulf war 1991, Kosovo operations 1999, Op Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan and Iraqi Freedom in 2003 clearly indicates that decisive victories were achieved due to synergistic integration of space based applications especially those related to the employment of airpower. These applications included surveillance; reconnaissance, navigation, secure communications and GPS assisted precision targeting. An opponent possessing even rudimentary anti-satellite capabilities can exert a vast influence on the conduct of warfare. Such capabilities in the hands of Iraq and Serbia would have significantly reduced the asymmetry that the allied forces enjoyed during these conflicts.

Taking lessons from these operations, secret development of anti-satellite weapons is taking place in our neighbourhood. An ASAT weapon called “Parasitic Satellite” has completed ground testing and plans are afoot to conduct its testing in space. These nano satellites could be covertly attached to friendly orbiting satellites. During conflict situations, commands could be sent to these parasitic satellites that would cause interference with the host satellites’ functioning or even lead to its destruction. Small satellites could also be used as space mines that maintain orbital position in the vicinity of their target satellite. Developments are also taking place in High Energy Lasers (HEL) that could be used against satellites in LEO. The laser illumination could cause loss of power due to solar cell degradation or even affect the highly sensitive infra red and CCD detectors in the same band.

In order to ensure that in future our increased dependence on space does not become a vulnerability, defending space based assets should be an important component of our national security. There is also a need to evolve doctrines and procedures for improving space situational awareness and in co-ordinating manoeuvring of satellites in the event that evasive action needs to be taken.

Indian Space Capability and Present Limitations

In 1963, a small sounding rocket facility was set up at Thumba. In 1972, the GOI set up a Space Commission and Department of Space (DOS) to promote development of space technology. The DOS is responsible for the execution of space activities through Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO).  DOS and ISRO provide overall direction to a number of ISRO centres including Vikram Sarabhai Space Centre, ISAC, SHAR, Space Applications Centre, ISTRAC, DECU, NRSA, PRL etc.

The Indian space capability provides high-resolution imagery, telecommunications, TV broadcasting, Meteorological Forecasting, Disaster Warning, Satellite aided Search and Rescue and ability to place satellites in Polar or Geo-stationary orbits.

Indian space programme is directed towards achieving self reliance in the use of space technology for socio-economic development. Its main thrust includes satellite communications for civil and military applications and remote sensing. The Indian space capability provides high-resolution imagery, telecommunications, TV broadcasting, Meteorological Forecasting, Disaster Warning, Satellite aided Search and Rescue and ability to place satellites in Polar or Geo-stationary orbits. These functions are essentially used for promoting mass literacy, communication, education and survey and management of natural resources. However, their present military usage within the armed forces is limited to Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) missions.

The only military organisation that has major operational links with space based assets is Defence Image Processing and Analysis Centre (DIPAC). It was set up to provide essential peacetime inputs to create a terrain and intelligence database. Its essential functions include collection, collation, analysis and dissemination of imagery obtained through remote sensing satellites. DIPAC is focussed essentially towards operationalising the ISR function. It does not co-ordinate and control other space applications like BMD, Space control, Force Application, Psychological Operations, Communications, Navigation, SIGINT, Early Warning and Search and Rescue. It also does not integrate space applications with air power employment and does not address our other future needs besides ISR.  There is, therefore, a need for an organisation that co-ordinates such activities.

In the present context, airpower has taken a leading role in the conduct of multi-dimensional operations. Offensive capability of an airpower could be significantly enhanced by providing space based real-time intelligence, accurate weather forecasting, navigation aids, GPS assisted all weather precision targeting and secure communications. These are currently not available with the IAF. The best examples of airpower employment include Kosovo and Iraq conflicts. In Kosovo, airpower was the only military instrument that was used coercively to further coalition interests. Precision and all weather air attacks assisted by space-based assets were major force multipliers. Compare this capability with Kargil operations. The former was a high technology war, wherein all the facilities of navigation, guidance, surveillance and secure communications were available to friendly airpower and the latter was a war fought with World War II tactics that lacked basic integration with key space based applications that make air power radically combat effective.