Indian Defence Review

With Pakistan, India’s conventional deterrence has been a success wherein the former has reconciled to the fact that her dream of having breakfast in Srinagar and flying her flag over the Red Fort would never come to fruition. It was thus that the case of asymmetric proxy war found favour in her strategy to satisfy her anti-India obsession. Here we may take note of two facts. One, India’s conventional military power was enough to prevent Pakistan from capturing Kashmir but it was inadequate to impose a deterrence of punishment, thus allowing Pakistan the freedom to persist and two, through nuclear posturing, Pakistan communicates her belief that by her nuclearisation she has blocked India’s conventional retaliation while continuing to prosecute proxy war with impunity. Thus, while Pakistan’s deterrence over India has worked beautifully, the same may not be said about the reverse, annual investment of over two lakh crore rupees notwithstanding. The matter is not helped when we examine the possibilities of Pakistan turning into China’s surrogate nuclear arsenal in the same spirit as ‘outsourcing’ her Northern Areas and the Gwadar Port. Helpless Emperor Shah Alam II’s lease of the dewani of Bihar, Bengal and Odhisa to the East India Company in 1765 comes to mind.

Finally, we also need to appreciate as to how the colluding duo, in their anti-India machinations, manage to have the world’s power-group down-playing their pronouncements of blatant lies and nonchalant violations of international treaties and conventions, while humouring India’s hanker for just a ‘good boy pat’ is considered to be enough of a reward for the latter to stay in line. The obvious inference is that in international relations ‘naughty boy’ is better attended to than a sober one. It therefore makes sense for us to be ‘sober with a sabre at hand’.

There are many chinks in our armour that need strengthening for military deterrence to pay dividends.

Deterrence in Sino-Indian Context

Despite the occasional affront posed by hardliners in Beijing, the Sino-Indian equation is currently on a rational keel. That relationship with a great neighbour should be nurtured. The key factor in India being able to do so is the imposition of a healthy military deterrence to convince China to desist from attempting to satisfy her quest by military aggression. However, considering the high and ever increasing capability gap, India’s deterrence over a much stronger neighbour, a none-too-pleased super-power in the making, would have to be rather extraordinary.

It would be banal to expect China to be deterred from her goal of ‘liberating’ her self-sanctified territories by the opposition posed by a dozen or more, of army divisions, naval men-o-war and air squadrons, the first being decidedly obsolescent in composition while the other two are partially so. Similarly, a dozen or two missiles of self-certified test-bed capabilities are unlikely to make China lose her ‘will’ to fight. As demonstrated during the war in Korea, the Cultural Revolution and building of the great dam over the Huang He, in securing her controversial goals, China could not care less about triggering innumerable casualties and widespread devastation. Even if faint voices of dissent are heard these days, the situation has not changed substantially.

Meanwhile, the Chinese autarchy has wisely stoked a sense of nationalistic fervour to its territorial aspirations that makes it a patriotic duty to support. Further, by coupling her economy to that of the developed nations, the Chinese leadership while repudiating international concerns, may not find any threat of economic sanctions too fearsome to deal with. Therefore, after a Deng-inspired ‘lie-low’ period of modernisation, as she gears up to flex her muscles in her traditionally methodical style, something more substantial has to be devised to deter China from ‘teaching us another lesson’.

Conversely, the aura built up by China is a perfect example of existential deterrence over India. This is so that contesting her, diplomatically or militarily, is practically unthinkable amongst the Indian policy makers. The deterrence is so effective that the latter feels it necessary to take up the cudgels of rationalising with its citizens, the former’s diplomatic provocations and regular intrusions across the border Line of Actual Control. In contrast, all that China does to keep her border inviolable is to make occasional visits, while India can neither for a moment leave that line unattended, nor set foot across, let alone stoke trouble in Tibet.

For India to pose a workable deterrence against a severely unfavourable power differential, asymmetric methods may have to be adopted to exploit China’s sensitivities. We are aware that China’s goal is to retain power in the Party’s domain, which is considered imperative to its second priority that is securing her superpower aspirations. Both objectives are contingent upon her internal stability. Therefore, an Indian military capability that does not permit China to proclaim a clear-cut victory in a short period, ties down the People’s Liberation Army in a long drawn stalemate and provokes instability in Tibet, would dissuade China from seeking a military solution to her problems with India. China’s entrapment in such a quagmire might encourage Taiwan and other external and internal victims of her high-handedness to incrementally undermine her quest for greatness. That kind of gathering alliance of the tormented weak, as history tells us, is a sure formula for greatness to dissolve. China knows that.

Our cause is nurtured by the fact that in conventional military conflicts, smaller powers have in the past, and may in future, genuinely hope to defeat larger powers. However, a determinant to note here is that a weaker contestant is certain to lose if it adopts a strategy that is symmetrical to that of the stronger opponent; Belgium-Germany 1914, Falkland 1982, Iraq-Coalition Forces in both the Gulf Wars are a few examples. Conversely, smaller powers do better by adopting asymmetrical strategy to contest their more powerful opponent – French Indo-China, Algeria, Vietnam and Afghanistan, for example. To contest aggression from the North therefore, India could adopt a strategy that would hinge upon strong defence, offensive riposte and Special Operations deep into the Tibetan hinterland to present a prospect of, as discussed earlier, the aggressor falling into a deep and sticky cesspool – deterrence by denial.

The recent posture adopted by China indicates that she articulates her nuclear power in the form of an existential deterrence. Being a nuclear state more in form rather than in substance, that is good for us since it is difficult to visualise India ever inviting a nuclear exchange with China. Danger, however, still lurks in the form of covert support to insurgents and to trouble-maker lackey – Pakistan. Thus, the conventional deterrence by denial will have to be complimented with reverse deterrence in two aspects. One, it has to be demonstrated that puppets stand no chance of success and that the assistance rendered to them would be but a sheer waste if not downright embarrassing. Two, such covert support would free India to pay back in Tibet.

Deterrence in Indo-Pakistan Context

India’s conventional deterrence has worked with Pakistan and that has led to the latter’s imposition of reverse deterrence over India through a combination of proxy war, terrorism and nuclearisation. The message is simple, “We have to keep gnawing at you. But you must not retaliate else we shall have to nuke you!” It, therefore, may be inferred that except in case of conventional war, India’s military deterrence over Pakistan fails both at the sub-conventional as well as nuclear level. The failure in the first instance is attributable to our inability to make Pakistan pay for terrorism while that in the latter case, India’s professed nuclear doctrine seems to permit Pakistan to attack in whatever manner she likes as long as the nuclear button is untouched.

Indeed it is a strange case. India, a superior power, remains deterred to the extent of watching helplessly as terrorists train within striking range, to unleash mayhem in her hinterland. Then she goes further, promulgating a military strategy that, flouting all campaigning norms, enjoins her troops to attack all over the frontline and having broken through, obviously at fearful cost, not to proceed beyond which Pakistan’s sensitivities may be troubled. Whosoever after all, has heard a superior, nuclearised military power, while being militarily tormented by a lesser adversary, taking comfort in preaching that “war is not a solution” and that “nuclear weapons are but political tools, not meant to be used”! One may wonder as to why then have these capabilities at such high cost? This kind of suggestive statements encourage the India-baiters to perceive that the Indian leadership may either be cowed down by global powers or fail to steel itself in unleashing a decimating conventional war or even actuating its professed ‘massive nuclear retaliation’. It is a strange case of a state diluting its own deterrence! One can only sympathise with our unique predicaments.

Conversely, one may admire the effectiveness of Pakistan’s deterrence over India. Here, a smaller military power, inconsequential economically and devastated socially, has waged multi-pronged war against a stronger neighbour over many decades, while the latter remains chary of administering even a token rap on its knuckles. Further, that a recalcitrant state goes on to threaten the mighty world leaders with turning itself into a ‘failed state’ unless they keep her false pretentions afloat. Obviously, Pakistan takes advantage of the theory that for a conventionally weaker nuclear power, the nuclear threshold is lower and in that equation, the combination of tactical nuclear weapons with conventional capability goes to bolster the credibility of blackmail.

To turn the equation around, India may not need to spend more on defence. All she has to do is to accept that beyond a point, it is not necessary to be impressed by nuclear tantrums. After all, India’s nuclearisation did not stop Pakistan from intruding into Kargil nor could Pakistan’s nuclear voodoo dance stop India from evicting that intrusion. Our national leadership needs to accept that military response to aggression and proxy war is an aggression that may be recessed only at own peril. Whether ‘cold start’, ‘hot pursuit’ or retribution at the ‘time and place of own choosing’ or whether limited, conventional or hybrid, India must devise strategies to punish military aggression without being self-deterred. When credibly demonstrated, that strategy would foster credible deterrence for the good of all. Our current strategic demeanour does exactly the opposite. It rewards intransigence.

Investment for Peace Dividend

Alongside the troubles concurrent and brewing, there are hopeful signs of matured realisation and some improvements in the situation. History proves that such improvements in inter-state tolerance are best nurtured under an incentive of deterrence. For the near future however, it is certain that India will continue to be tormented by proxy war and terror acts emanating from Pakistan, while being needled by China’s over territorial claims and land-sea encirclement. There is no doubt that when these inimical forces orchestrate to stalk conjointly, it cannot portend well for the Indian nationhood. As a corollary, it would be an abject failure of her state policies, diplomatic as well as military, if India is unable to deter these inimical powers to desist from their compulsive mission of undermining her.

As stated earlier, given the right impetus, it will take a decade or so to turn around India’s stagnant investment on defence. Meanwhile, to reap the benefits of investment, the national leadership may ordain India’s military transformation, allow professional merit to replace flab with muscle without hindrances contrived by nay sayers and save bureaucrats and scientists the burden of fiddling with military preparedness. India would do better by directly involving the military leadership in policy confabulations rather than through the medium of officials unqualified for that role. There is no need to be wary of that kind of charter; the same Defence Ministry had accomplished that task in the aftermath of 1962.

Then let the investments deliver dividends, let military deterrence keep the peace.